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Recent Decisions
The Maryland Court of Appeals
1.

A.

COMMERCIAL LAW

Successor Liability and Contract: Maryland Narrowly Construes the
"Mere Continuation of the Entity" Exception
In Academy of IRM v. LVI Environmental Services, Inc.,' the Court of

Appeals held that a claim based on the "mere continuation of the

entity" exception to the general rule against successor liability in corporate asset acquisitions requires a showing of either a continuation
of ownership and management or insufficient consideration.2 A
unanimous court reached its holding after reviewing both Maryland
and out-of-state case law as well as the specific factual and procedural
circumstances of the case.'

In so holding, the Court of Appeals

reached the logical dictate of its prior decisions and clarified its former interpretation of the exception. The result will produce greater
certainty in judicial decisionmaking.
1. The Case.-In 1987, the petitioner, Academy of IRM (IRM),
brought suit in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County against
Diversified Environmental Group, Inc. (Diversified) for moneys due
and owing from work performed at a number of project sites throughout the mid-Atlantic region.4 IRM provided "bulk sampling and air
monitoring services" to contractors, including Diversified, involved in
asbestos removal, but failed to receive payments on the balance of its
outstanding account with Diversified.5 In May 1988, the circuit court
entered a limited order of default against Diversified's trade name,
Desco. 6 The case came before the circuit court again in August 1988
1. 344 Md. 434, 687 A.2d 669 (1997).
2. Id. at 451, 687 A.2d at 677. For the general rule against successor liability, see infra
text accompanying note 28. The general rule is subject to four principal exceptions, which
are recognized by a majority of jurisdictions, including Maryland. See infra note 30 and
accompanying text.
3. See Academy ofIRM, 344 Md. at 451-57, 687 A.2d at 677-80.
4. Id. at 437-38, 687 A.2d at 671. IRM sought to secure payment for work performed
pursuant to a contract for Fort Belvoir, a United States Army installation. Id. at 441, 687
A.2d at 672.
5. Id. at 437-38, 687 A.2d at 671.
6. Id. at 438 & n.2, 439, 687 A.2d at 671 & n.2. Although IRM had named both Diversified and its trade name, Desco, in the complaint, the circuit court specifically limited the
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for the entry of judgment on the order of default. 7 At this hearing,
after finding that Diversified had in fact been notified of its outstanding liability, the court entered judgment against both Desco and Diversified in the amount of $88,967.05.8
As a means of satisfying its judgment against Diversified, IRM
caused writs of garnishment to be issued against both Diversified Environmental Corporation (DEC) and LVI Environmental Services, Inc.
(LVI), which were the same corporation. 9 LVI, then operating under
the name DEC, had acquired the assets of Diversified through a series
of transactions in November 1987.1' In essence, LVI purchased the
secured interests of Diversified's creditors, called its note, and then
effected an agreement for a transfer of Diversified's assets." The asset
purchase agreement between LVI and Diversified, dated December 1,
1987, conveyed collateral that was identified as "all of the contract
rights, assets, accounts receivable and other tangible and intangible
property of the DEBTOR."12
As early as September 1987, LVI began doing business for former
customers of Diversified, operating out of the same location and using
order of default to Desco. This resulted from a finding that service of process had not
been properly effectuated as to Diversified. Id. at 438-39, 687 A.2d at 671-72. Specifically,
the trial court found that service of process on an agent of Diversified, rather than the
requisite corporate officers, was insufficient. Id.
7. Id. at 440, 687 A.2d at 672.
8. Id, The judgment consisted of a principal balance of $78,204, prejudgment interest of $10,763.05, and court costs. Id. The trial court based its ruling on the fact that, as
early as April 1987, Diversified had sought confirmation of its outstanding obligation to
IRM. Id
9. Id
10. Id. Diversified had financed its business operations through secured loan agreements with three separate creditors. Id at 441, 687 A.2d at 672. One of its creditors,
Crouse Group, Inc. (Crouse), was forced to call its note as the result of reorganization
proceedings under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. Id at 441, 687 A.2d
at 672-73.
Diversified approached NICO, Inc. (NICO), the parent corporation of LVI and a national asbestos removal contractor, in the hope of securing financing for its outstanding
obligation to Crouse. Id at 442, 687 A.2d at 673. NICO eventually reached agreements
with all three of Diversified's secured creditors whereby NICO purchased the creditors'
respective secured interests in Diversified. Id NICO's agreement with Crouse was, in particular, approved by the bankruptcy court. Id. at 443, 687 A.2d at 673. NICO sought to
obtain Diversified's assets and gain entry into its geographic market, while avoiding its
outstanding liabilities. Id at 442, 687 A-2d at 673.
NICO, "standing in the shoes of [the] secured creditors," would be able to obtain
Diversified's assets, particularly its assets and contracts, through a "friendly foreclosure."
Id. Two months after acquiring the positions of Diversified's creditors, NICO entered an
agreement whereby Diversified agreed to convey its assets to NICO's subsidiary and assignee, LVI. Id. at 443, 687 A.2d at 673-74.
11. Id. at 443, 687 A.2d at 673.
12. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Diversified's trade name, employees, and equipment. t3 Additionally,
two of Diversified's officers were installed as president and executive
vice president of LVI upon its incorporation.1 4 None of Diversified's
shareholders, however, continued to15play any role in either LVI's business operations or other concerns.
LVI answered IRM's writ of garnishment, contending that it was
not in possession of any of Diversified's property.1 6 The circuit court
nevertheless entered judgment against LVI on a finding that it "was
directly liable to IRM as the successor of [Diversified]."" T LVI appealed the trial court's judgment to the Court of Special Appeals.18
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court. 9 The intermediate appellate court agreed with the appellant that IRM had no legal basis for bringing a garnishment
proceeding against LVI. 9° The court noted that "[a] garnishment
proceeding is, in essence, an action by the judgment debtor for the
benefit of the judgment creditor which is brought against a third
party, the garnishee, who holds the assets of the judgment debtor."2 1
LVI's foreclosure pursuant to its secured interest in Diversified's assets
13. Id., 687 A.2d at 674.
14. Id at 442 n.4, 687 A.2d at 673 n.4.
15. Id. at 454, 687 A.2d at 679.
16. Id. at 444, 687 A.2d at 674.
17. Id The circuit court said, "I find that there really was a continuation of the business. It's the same business. It's operated in the same place. [LVI] has the same employees. [LVI] has the same trucks, the same [asbestos removal contractor] numbers." Id. at
451, 687 A.2d at 677 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
18. Id. at 444, 687 A.2d at 674. LVI relied on three grounds of error: (1) There was no
"legal basis for [IRM] to garnish funds of LVI"; (2) LVI was not "a successor corporation
liable for the debt of its predecessor"; and (3) The "trial court abuse[d] its discretion in
allowing a witness to testify in rebuttal after the witness had been disqualified from testifying in [IRM's] case-in-chief." LVI Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Academy of IRM, 106 Md. App. 699,
701, 666 A.2d 899, 900 (1995), affd, 344 Md. 434, 687 A.2d 669 (1997).
19. LVIEnvtl., 106 Md. App. at 709-10, 666 A.2d at 904.
20. Id. at 708, 666 A.2d at 903-04. Additionally, the court rejected LVI's motion to
dismiss for insufficiency of service of process. Id- at 706, 666 A.2d at 903. The court ruled
that this procedural defense must be raised prior to an answer on the merits. Id at 707,
666 A.2d at 903. By answering the writ of garnishment, LVI made "a voluntary appearance,
submitting [itself] to the jurisdiction of the court for all subsequent proceedings." Id.
(quoting Guen v. Guen, 38 Md. App. 578, 587, 381 A-2d 721, 727 (1978)). LVI, consequently, had effectively waived this procedural defense. Id. at 708, 666 A.2d at 903.
The court further noted, "At no time did LVI assert that the court lacked personal
jurisdiction over [Diversified] and that the default judgment was invalid. This question is
raised for the first time in the appellate court." Id Thus, LVI had "voluntarily submitted
to the jurisdiction of the [circuit court]." Id
21. Id. at 708, 666 A.2d at 904 (quoting Fico, Inc. v. Ghingher, 287 Md. 150, 159, 411
A.2d 430, 436 (1980)).
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eliminated IRM's standing to sue.22 In short, Diversified "did not have
any right to sue LVI"; thus neither did IRM have such a right.2"
Second, the court addressed IRM's theory that LVI was liable as
Diversified's successor.24 While agreeing with IRM that such a theory
did afford the right to assert a direct cause of action against LVI, the
court stated there was no concomitant right to "transform the garnishment proceeding into a direct cause of action."25 IRM, the court determined, had brought the wrong cause of action against LVI.2 6 Thus,
to obtain such relief, IRM should have named LVI in its original suit.
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine "[w] hether
successor liability may be imposed where the 'successor' has acquired
the assets of the debtor through foreclosure of bona fide security interests purchased for value by the 'successor' from the original
lenders."27

2. Legal Background.a. Successor Liability Generally.-The general rule against successor liability in the creditor context is that a successor corporation
which acquires the assets of a predecessor corporation does not assume the predecessor's current or future liabilities.2 8 The rule, however, is subject to four principal exceptions.2 9 These exceptions apply
22. Id. at 709, 666 A.2d at 904.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 709-10, 666 A.2d at 904 (citing Fischer v. Longest, 99 Md. App. 368, 380, 637
A-2d 517, 523 (1994); MD. R. 2-303(b) (requiring the contents of the pleading to "show the
pleader's entitlement to relief")).
26. Id. at 709, 666 A.2d at 904.
27. Academy of IRM, 344 Md. at 437, 687 A.2d at 671. The Court of Appeals also addressed LVI's renewed motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service of process on the original debtor, Diversified. Id.; see also infta note 75 (discussing the court's treatment of LVI's
renewed motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service of process).
28. 1 AMERc.AN LAw OF PRODUcrs Ltaturrv 3D § 7:1, at 10-12 (rev. 1990); see also infra
note 30 and accompanying text (listing exceptions to the general rule against successor
liability).
29. See infra note 30 and accompanying text. Two additional exceptions, however, have
been employed by a minority ofjurisdictions since the mid-1970s. The "product line" and
.continuity of the enterprise" exceptions have been employed, by a minority of courts, as a
means of holding successor manufacturer corporations liable in the products liability context. See 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PRODucrrs LIamLrrv 3D, supra note 28, § 7:22, at 38-39, § 7:27,
at 44-46 (discussing treatment of the theories in various jurisdictions). The "product line"
exception, first recognized by the California Supreme Court in Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d
3 (Cal. 1977), imposes strict liability where the successor corporation continues manufacturing the same product line as its predecessor. Id. at 8-9. The focus is on the product and
its continued manufacture, rather than a continuation of the actual business entity. SeeJ.
Maxwell Tucker, The Clash of Successor Liability Principles, Reorganization Law, and the Just
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when: (1) there has been an express or implied assumption of liability by the transferee; (2) the transaction "amounts to" a merger or
consolidation; (3) the transferee is a "mere continuation" of the transferor; or (4) the purpose of the transaction is to "fraudulently" avoid
30

liability.

Strong policy considerations underscore adherence to the general rule and its four principal exceptions. The general rule against
successor liability in asset acquisition encourages the principal aim of
incorporation, that is, the free transferability of assets.3 1 In addition,
the rule "promote[s] predictability in corporate transactions, free
Demand That Relief Be Afforded Unknown and Unknowable Claimants,12 BANR. DEvs. J. 1, 1314 (1995) (discussing the "product line" exception created by Ray v. Alad Corp. and the
recognition it has received in other jurisdictions).
The "product line" exception has been justified on three principal grounds:
(1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff's remedies against the original manufacturer caused by the successor's acquisition of the business, (2) the successor's
ability to assume the original manufacturer's risk-spreading role, and (3) the fairness of requiring the successor to assume a responsibility for defective products
that was a burden necessarily attached to the original manufacturer's good will
being enjoyed by the successor in the continued operation of the business.
Id.; see also JAMES J. HANKS, JR., MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW § 9.10 n.187 (Supp. 1992)
(discussing the rationale that has been used to support the "product line" exception).
The "continuity of enterprise" exception, alternatively, finds successor corporation liability where "[t]here was basic continuity of the enterprise of the seller corporation, including .. retention of key personnel, assets, general business operations, and even the...
name." Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 883-84 (Mich. 1976); accord Cyr v.
B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1152 (1st Cir. 1974) (recognizing an exception to the rule
of successor liability where "the transferee corporation was a mere continuation or reincarnation of the old corporation"). This exception is properly characterized as a "less radical
departure from traditional corporate law rules" than the "product line" exception. 15 Wit,LIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§ 7123.06, at 276 n.6 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990) (citing Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752
F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1985); Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 608 F. Supp. 1541 (D.V.I. 1985)
(mem.)).
The "continuity of the enterprise" exception is justified on the grounds that
[t]he manufacturer's successor, carrying over the experience and expertise of the
manufacturer, is likewise in a better position than the consumer to gauge the
risks and the costs of meeting them. The successor knows the product, is as able
to calculate the risk of defects as the predecessor, is in position to insure therefor
and reflect such cost in sale negotiations, and is the only entity capable of improving the quality of the product.
Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1154.
30. Smith v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1446, 1448 (D. Md. 1988)
(mem.); accord Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Holtzman, 80 Md. App. 282, 290, 562 A.2d 1286,
1289-90 (1989) (recognizing the four exceptions to the rule of successor liability); HANKS,
supra note 29, § 9.10 (discussing the general rule of successor liability and its four exceptions as addressed by the Maryland courts).
31. See Robert J. Yamin, The Achilles Heel of the Takeover: Nature and Scope of Successor
CorporationProducts Liability in Asset Acquisitions, 7 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 185, 208 (1984)
(discussing the policy arguments favoring the general rule of successor liability).
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availability and transferability of capital, and mobility in the business
and economic world ....
*"32 The four exceptions, alternatively, serve
as a counterbalance to the rule against successor liability by protecting
the rights of creditors and tort claimants when a successor corporation has explicitly or impliedly assumed its predecessor's liabilities, or
attempted a fraudulent evasion of rightful claimants.
The first exception, relating to an express or implied assumption
of liability, focuses on the intent of the successor corporation with regard to the predecessor's outstanding obligations," and involves "little more than a straightforward interpretation of the contract of
sale." 4 The second, or de facto merger, exception focuses on a continuation of the predecessor's shareholders as shareholders of the successor.3 " The "mere continuation" exception protects creditors when
the successor corporation is "substantially the same as the predecessor." 6 The fourth exception is a straightforward equitable principle
that negates a successor's attempt to secure assets with inadequate
consideration.3
b. Maryland Law.-Maryland currently stands among the
majority of jurisdictions in recognizing the general rule, subject to its
four exceptions, that a successor corporation, absent certain appurtenant considerations, is not liable for the debts of its transferor.3 "
Three primary decisions have shown a consistent line of reasoning
with respect to Maryland law on the issue.
In Isle of Thye Land Co. v. Whisman, 9 the Court of Appeals held a
successor corporation liable on the theory that it had impliedly as-

32. Id,at 207.
33. See 15 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 29, §§ 7124, 7328 (discussing conditions under
which a successor corporation's promise to assume its predecessor's debts and liabilities
may be implied).
34. 3 JAMES D. Cox ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 22.8, at 22.29 (1995).
35. Id.
36. 15 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 29, § 7124.10, at 292 ("The exception is designed to
prevent a situation whereby the specific purpose of acquiring assets is to place those assets
out of reach of the predecessor's creditors."); see also Yamin, supra note 31, at 226 (noting
that in its classic form the "mere continuation" exception requires the "legal and economic
ownership [of the predecessor and successor corporations] be essentially the same both
before and after the transaction").
37. 15 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 29, § 7122, at 232 (noting that "grossly inadequate
consideration" will render an asset transfer "fraudulent.., regardless of whether the parties had the actual intert to defraud").
38. See Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Holtzman, 80 Md. App. 282, 290, 562 A.2d 1286,
1289-90 (1989).
39. 262 Md. 682, 279 A.2d 484 (1971).
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sumed the contractual liabilities of its predecessor.4" Isle of Thye arose
out of a series of transactions involving contractual rights to a tract of
land, whereby the plaintiff, Whisman, had contracted with a promoter
for certain future options for ownership of the land.4 1
The promoter, Triska, and his subsequently formed corporation
later transferred all of their assets, which included the tract of land, to
Prestwick, Inc.4 2 Whisman's contract rights were neither assumed nor
disclaimed upon transfer nor were articles of transfer filed with the
State Department of Assessments and Taxation.4" Additionally,
Prestwick attempted to exercise certain options pursuant to the Whisman-Isle of Thye Land Company contract, and thereby ratified the
contract. 44 The court emphasized Triska's role as the promoter for
both Isle of Thye and Prestwick.4 5 Prestwick, the court reasoned, was
therefore liable on the contract with Whisman as "substantially [the
promoter's] alter ego."4 6 While the Isle of Thye court may not have
explicitly enunciated the current jargon, its holding closely tracks the
basis of the "mere continuation of the entity" exception employed by
the courts in recent years.47
Nearly two decades after Isle of Thye, the Court of Special Appeals,
in Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Holtzman,48 revisited the issue of successor
liability. The Baltimore Luggage court refused to find a successor corporation liable for a former employee's fringe benefits pursuant to its
predecessor's employment contract. 9 The case arose out of a series
of transactions whereby the predecessor corporation sold all of its assets and liabilities to a distinct Rhode Island corporation.50 The transferor, by contractual agreement, expressly indemnified its successor
from any liability pursuant to the plaintiffs employment contract.5 '
While the court recognized the holding of Isle of Thye, it distinguished
40. Id. at 707, 279 A.2d at 498.
41. Id. at 687-89, 279 A.2d at 487-89.
42. Id. at 706, 279 A.2d at 497.
43. Id. Although the court did not explicitly state it as grounds for its decision, there
was no consideration paid for the transfer of assets; it amounted to a paper transaction. Id.
at 693, 279 A.2d at 490-91.
44. 1I at 698, 279 A.2d at 493.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 707, 279 A.2d at 497-98.
47. Cf Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Holtzman, 80 Md. App. 282, 294, 562 A.2d 1286, 1291
(1989) ("Isle of Thye implicitly recognizes ... [that] a successor corporation may impliedly
assume the obligations of its predecessor.").
48. 80 Md. App. 282, 562 A.2d 1286 (1989).
49. Id at 302, 562 A.2d at 1295.
50. Id. at 285, 562 A.2d at 1287.
51. Id.

1998]

MARYLAND

COURT OF APPEALS

649

the case under review,52 thereby limiting the scope in which the "mere
continuation of the entity" exception applies. Specifically, unlike the
situation in Isle of Thye, there was no promoter with whom the plaintiff
had contracted. A finding of common ownership or management,
thus, could not be supported. 4 Also, there was a valid asset purchase
agreement, made at "arm's length," under which the successor did
not assume the contractual liability, as opposed to the situation in Isle
of Thye, where only a "mere paper transaction" had been consummated.5 5 Finally, the plaintiff had notice of the asset transfers,5 6
whereas the plaintiff in Isle of Thye was completely unaware of the
transfer of assets. As such, the court stated that the plaintiff in5 Balti7
more Luggage had not been prejudiced by the transfer of assets.
Additionally, the court pointed to the statutory law of Maryland,
embracing the "mere continuation of the entity" exception, as a
means of supporting its decision." The underlying policy of the legislative enactments, the court opined, is the protection of creditors
when there is a transfer of assets. 9 If a successor corporation were
allowed to extinguish the outstanding liabilities of its predecessor
while "maintain[ing] the same or similar management and ownership
but wear[ing] a 'new hat,"' a fraud would necessarily result.6 ° The
Baltimore Luggage court, however, disclaimed any strict reliance on the
codified law of Maryland in recognizing the "mere continuation of the
entity" exception by pointing to a number of "indicia" that may be
considered in finding a successor corporation liable for its predecessor's debts.6 1 The court noted that the proper "indicia" necessary to

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id at
Id
Id. at
Id. at
Id at
Id. at

294, 562 A.2d at 1291.
298,
294,
295,
296,

562
562
562
562

A.2d
A.2d
A.2d
A.2d

at
at
at
at

1294.
1291-92.
1292.
1292.

58. The court noted, "While Maryland has not articulated the general rule of a successor corporation's liability, it is implicit in the Maryland statutes and case law." Id at 290,
562 A.2d at 1290 (citing MD.CODE ANN., CoRs. & ASS'NS § 3-114(e)(1) (1985 & Supp.
1988) (detailing means by which a successor corporation may be held liable following

mergers and consolidations); Maryland Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, MD. CODE
ANN., CoM. LAW II §§ 15-201 to -214 (1983 & Supp. 1988) (providing rules governing asset
transfers by insolvent debtors)). But see HANKs, supra note 29, § 9.10, at 324 ("[I]t is diffi-

cult to see why [the statutes] should be used as support for an additional judicially-crafted
basis for liability.").
59. Baltimore Luggagr, 80 Md. App. at 302, 562 A.2d at 1293.
60. Id. (quoting Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 1458 (11th Cir.
1985)).
61. Id.
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finding a successor liable pursuant to the "mere continuation of the
entity" exception are:
common officers, directors, and stockholders; and only one
corporation in existence after the completion of the sale of
assets. While the two foregoing factors are traditionally indications of a continuing corporation, neither is essential.
Other factors such as continuation of the seller's business
practices and policies and the sufficiency of consideration
running to the seller corporation in light of the assets being
sold may also be considered. To find that continuity exists
merely because there was common management and ownership without considering other factors is to disregard the separate identities of the corporation without the necessary
considerations that justify such an action.6 2
More recently, the Court of Appeals, in Nissen Corp. v. Miller,6"
refused to extend the "continuity of the entity" exception to embrace
the "continuity of the enterprise" exception6 4 in the products liability
context. 6 5 In so doing, the court resolved a split of authority between
two federal district court decisions. 66
The plaintiff in Nissen was injured while using a treadmill manufactured and sold by the predecessor corporation.6 7 The successor
corporation, by an express provision in the cash purchase agreement
for assets, had disclaimed liability for any personal injuries caused by
62. Id. (citing 15

WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW

§ 7122, at 232 (perm. ed. Supp. 1997)).
63. 323 Md. 613, 594 A.2d 564 (1991).
64. See supra note 29; see also 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3D, supra note 28,
§ 7:20, at 36 ("The mere continuation exception focuses on the continuation of the corporate entity, while the continuity of enterprise exception emphasizes continuation of business operation or enterprise.").
65. For an extended treatment of the Nissen decision, see generally Jonathan P. Kagan
& Christopher C. O'Hara, Note, The Successor Liability Rule in a Products Liability Setting, 51
MD. L. REV. 581 (1992) (analyzing Nissen and arguing that the "continuity of the enterprise" exception to the rule of successor liability is inconsistent with Maryland products
liability law); James W. Maxson, Case Comment, Nissen Corp. v. Miller: Maryland Courts
Re'ect the "Continuity of the Enterprise"Doctrine, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 261 (1993) (contrasting the
need to protect consumers from injurious products with the economic impact on business
that the adoption of the "continuity of the enterprise" exception would likely cause).
66. Prior to Nissen, two cases in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland predicted opposite state law results in the products liability context. In Smith v. Navistar InternationalTransportationCorp., 737 F. Supp. 1446, 1449 (D. Md. 1988) (mem.),Judge
Niemeyer predicted that the Court of Appeals would extend the "mere continuation of the
enterprise" exception to products liability cases. Judge Smalkin, in Giraldi v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 687 F. Supp. 987, 991 (D. Md. 1988) (mem.), forecasted the opposite result.
67. Nissen, 323 Md. at 615-16, 594 A.2d at 565.
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
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the predecessor's products sold prior to the acquisition." A fourmember majority of the Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the adoption of the "mere continuation of the enterprise" exception to the
general rule against successor liability and restricted Maryland law to
the four major exceptions to the rule.69
Echoing the Baltimore Luggage court, the majority recognized that
the general rule and its four exceptions are either explicitly codified
in, or supported by, the policy rationale of the Maryland Corporations
and Associations and Commercial Law Articles.7 ° The court stated
that the "continuation of the enterprise" exception, however, was "inconsistent with Maryland law"7" based on a lack of causation "between
the defendant's acts and the plaintiffs injury."72 Furthermore, the
court determined that holding the defendant liable on the rationale
that it is continuing to operate the business, and is thus a "deep
pocket," is "patently unfair.""3 The plaintiffs claim, then, was barred
as there had been no evidence that there was a continuation of the
ownership and management of the predecessor corporation. 74
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The principal issue in Academy of IRM
was whether a creditor corporation could recover from a "successor"
corporation, which had acquired the debtor's assets through foreclosure of bona fide security interests, on a theory predicated on the
"continuity of the entity" exception to the rule against successor liability.75 Judge Rodowsky, writing for a unanimous bench, rejected the
68. Id at 615, 594 A.2d at 565.
69. Id. at 632, 594 A.2d at 573.
70. Id. at 617-18, 594 A.2d at 566; see supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing
the court's reliance on Maryland statutory law in support of its recognition of the "continuation of the entity" exception in Baltimore Luggage).
71. Nissen, 323 Md. at 633, 594 A.2d at 574.
72. Id. at 627, 594 A.2d at 570 (quoting Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 81-82
(3d Cir. 1986)). Furthermore, the court characterized as "nebulous" the rationale employed by the Michigan Supreme Court in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d
873 (Mich. 1976), and as not sufficiently dissimilar from other creditor actions to warrant a
deviation from stated policy. Nissen, 323 Md. at 629, 594 A.2d at 572.
73. Nissen, 323 Md. at 624, 594 A.2d at 569. The "deep pocket rationale" would subject
large and small corporations alike to potentially debilitating liability. Id. at 625, 594 A.2d at
570.
74. Id at 633, 594 A.2d at 574.
75. Academy of IRM, 344 Md. at 437, 687 A.2d at 671.
The court, however, first addressed LVI's renewed motion to dismiss, which was predicated on the theory of improper service of process on its predecessor, Diversified. Id. Like
the Court of Special Appeals, the court found LVI's contention, albeit on a different rationale, of no moment. Id. at 450, 687 A.2d at 677. The court noted that it was deciding
this issue anew for "broader public importance" without intimating an opinion on the
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circuit court's application of Maryland law to the evidence adduced at
trial.

76

The court began its analysis by distinguishing successor liability
predicated on "continuity of the entity" from that based on "continuity of enterprise." 77 Relying on its previous rejection of the "continuity of the enterprise" exception in Nissen,7 8 the court noted that

this exception focuses on "whether there is substantial continuity of
pretransaction and posttransaction business activitiesresulting from the

use of the acquired assets." 79 Conversely, the "gravamen of the traditional 'mere continuation' [of the entity] exception is the continuation of the corporateentity. .

.. "0

That is, mere continuation of the

entity occurs "where there is a continuation of directors and management, shareholder interest and, in some cases, inadequate
consideration. "81

The circuit court, by relying on the corporation's carrying on the
same type of business and use of Diversified's office location and employees, had focused its inqiiry on the wrong facts when it held LVI

liable for Diversified's prior debts.8 2 The Court of Appeals found that,
in so doing, the trial court neglected to determine whether there had

been a continuation of the entity."8 There was no evidence of common ownership between the predecessor and successor corporations.

In effect,

the circuit court had employed

the "mere

correctness of the Court of Special Appeals's finding that there had been a waiver of a
jurisdictional defense to the action. Id. at 445 n.6, 687 A.2d at 675 n.6.
The Court of Appeals addressed whether IRM had effected service of process on LVI
at its Pennsylvania address by means of registered mail. Id. at 445-50, 687 A.2d at 674-77.
According to the return receipt, service had been accepted by an LVI employee other than
the company's controller at whom the process had been directed. Id. at 445-46, 687 A.2d
at 674-675. Nevertheless, the court found that the rendered service was sufficient as it had
been received by an agent of the target corporation within the meaning of Maryland Rule
2-124(c), which specifies the procedure for service of process on a corporation. Academy of
IRM, 344 Md. at 445-47, 687 A.2d 675. Supporting its finding, the court noted that corporate officers, such as those contemplated by the rule, are unlikely to "interrupt their business activities to sign for registered mail" and, additionally, are "most likely to have
authorized ... some responsible person" to do so for them. Id. at 447, 687 A.2d at 675.
76. Academy of IRM, 344 Md. at 451, 687 A.2d at 677 (stating that the circuit court
'undertook... erroneously, [the mere continuation of the entity exception] to apply to
the facts of the instant matter").
77. Id.
78. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
79. Id. at 452, 687 A.2d at 678 (quoting Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613, 620 n.1,
594 A.2d 564, 567 n.1 (1991)).
80. Id. (quoting Nissen, 323 Md. at 620, 594 A.2d at 567).
81. Nissen, 323 Md. at 620, 594 A.2d at 567 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Academy ofIRA, 344 Md. at 452, 687 A.2d at 678.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 453-54, 687 A.2d at 678-79.
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continuation of the enterprise" exception, although the doctrine had
been rejected in Maryland. 5
The Court of Appeals, however, found that three of LVI's practices merited special attention.8 6 Specifically, the court focused on
LVI's use of Diversified's trade name after taking over Diversified's
business operations, its Maryland license for asbestos removal, and its
business dealings relating to a contract originated by Diversified with
the Army Corps of Engineers for work at Fort Belvoir.s7 Again relying
on Nissen, the court agreed with LVI in finding that use of the trade
name, an intangible asset akin to goodwill, did not give rise to successor liability. 8 The court also discounted the other factual circumstances on which the trial court relied as based on "sketchy evidence
...
legally insufficient to support imposition of the continuation of
entity theory. '"89

The court readily disposed of the case law on which IRM relied as
well. Of principal import in its analysis was H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc. v.
Orgonics, Inc.,9" a case in which the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
employed a five-factor test in imposing successor liability pursuant to a
modified continuing business entity theory.9 1 The Court of Appeals,
however, resisted any endorsement of the framework utilized in H.J.
Baker and simply noted that none of Diversified's officers had been
"instrumental" in the transfer to LVI, nor had there been inadequAte
consideration for the transferred assets. 92 Moreover, the trial court
had not found any evidence of fraud to Diversified's unsecured credi85. Nissen, 323 Md. at 633, 594 A.2d at 574.
86. Academy oflIRM, 344 Md. at 452, 687 A.2d at 678.
87. Id. at 452-53, 687 A-2d at 678.
88. Id. at 452, 687 A-2d at 678.
89. Id. at 453, 687 A.2d at 678. Specifically, a witness for IRM testified at trial that
because there had never been a novation of the Fort Belvoir contract, which would have
substituted DEC for Diversified, the checks issued to DEC remained the property of Diversified. Id.
90. 554 A.2d 196 (R.I. 1989).
91. Academy ofIRM, 344 Md. at 456-57, 687 A.2d at 680. The factors listed by the Rhode
Island court were:
"(1) there is a transfer of corporate assets; (2) there is less than adequate consideration; (3) the new company continues the business of the transferor; (4) both
companies have at least one common officer or director who is instrumental in
the transfer; and (5) the transfer renders the transferor incapable of paying its
creditors because it is dissolved either in fact or by law."
Id. at 457, 687 A.2d at 680 (quoting H.J. Baker, 554 A.2d at 205).
92. Id. at 454, 687 A.2d at 679. The court stated, "[N]o former shareholder in [Diversified] holds any ownership of DEC, LVI ... ,or NICO. No shareholder of [Diversified] is a
director of DEC or its parent companies. The only transfusion from old to new was at the
level of employees." Id. at 454, 687 A.2d at 679.
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tors by LVI's acquisition of the assets.9" Given these factual circumstances, the court noted, "successor entity liability does not lie."9 4
In summary, the court stated that "[t]he decision of the trial,
court was based either on a rule of law that is not part of Maryland law
or on facts that are insufficient to support continuing entity liability."9 5 In other words, the Court of Appeals took the position that the
circuit court had either applied the previously rejected "continuity of
the enterprise" exception, or had misinterpreted the "continuity of
the entity" exception in analyzing the facts of the case.
4. Analysis.-The Court of Appeals employed a narrow construction of the "mere continuation of the entity" exception to the
general rule against successor liability in asset acquisitions whereby
either inadequate consideration or continuity of ownership and management is necessary to impose liability on a successor corporation for
the outstanding contractual obligations of its predecessor.9 6 Despite
the necessarily fact-bound nature of the inquiry, the court's decision,
nevertheless, has girded the incomplete analytical framework previously announced in Baltimore Luggage and Nissen. The certainty thus
achieved brings welcome relief to what has been described as the
"dreadfully tangled"9 7 law of successor liability.
a. Inadequate Precedent.-The circuit court and the Court of
Special Appeals both found that IRM had a viable claim against LVI
based on a "mere continuation of the entity" theory.9" Both of these
decisions are understandable given that the courts relied on the inexact guidelines set forth in Baltimore Luggage and Nissen.
The Baltimore Luggage court's treatment of the "mere continuation" exception left open the question of what factors were essential
for imposition of successor liability.9 9 Rather than establishing a clear
93. Id. In fact, IRM never argued that the consideration paid by NICO to Diversified's
creditors for its secured interests was "not fair." Id
94. Id.
95. Id. at 457, 687 A.2d at 680.
96. See id.
97. EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 944 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Yamin, supra note 31,
at 226 (finding that the "mere continuation" exception has been "problematic ...because
it has never been quite clear just in what sense a corporation must continue in order to
trigger the exception").
98. See supranotes 17, 25 and accompanying text. While the Court of Special Appeals
reversed the circuit court, its holding was based strictly on the rationale that IRM pursued
the wrong procedural course. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62 (setting forth the "factors" on which the
Baltimore Luggage court relied to determine whether the "continuity of the entity" exception should apply).
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and straightforward application to the facts of a given case, the decision is apt to several interpretations. The Baltimore Luggage court was
not-explicit as to whether the continuation of a corporation's management, ownership, or both, were necessary to a finding of liability.
Rather, the court chose to adopt a catalog of factors as the proper test,
with none particularly identified as the tell-tale markings of the exception.1 00 The scope of the inquiry was couched in terms of finding
whether a successor corporation is "substantially the same as the predecessor"10 1 and has the "same or similar management."102
This language could conceivably be read to suggest that one or
two common managers, retained by a successor corporation engaged
in the same industry as the predecessor and holding minimal stock
interests, would be sufficient to impose liability. This test could also
imply that a successor that is a close corporation like its predecessor is
"substantially the same" or "similar" in terms of corporate structure,
thus supporting, without more, a basis for liability. Obviously, these
results seem absurd in the abstract as they are devoid of connection to
the underlying policy goals of the exception.1 03 Nevertheless, the language employed in Baltimore Luggage lends more than a modicum of
support to varying interpretations.
Despite the Baltimore Luggage court's cognizance of the underlying policy of the exception, 0 4 the pronounced framework does not
establish a clear link with the policy's goal of preventing creditor
fraud in asset acquisitions. The retained management in the above
hypothetical would most likely reflect a concern with continued employment, as opposed to a scheme of "transactional sleight-ofhand." 0 5 This sort of ambiguous guide was bound to fail given the
widely varying factual scenarios that may arise from the equally diverse
10 6
mechanisms by which corporate assets may be acquired.

100. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
101. Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Holtzman, 80 Md. App. 282, 297, 562 A.2d 1286, 1293
(1989).
102. Id,
103. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
104. Baltimore Luggage, 80 Md. App. at 297, 562 A.2d at 1293 ("The exception is
designed to prevent a situation whereby the specific purpose of acquiring assets is to place
those assets out of reach of the predecessor's creditors.").
105. Nathan F. Coco, Note, An Examination of Successor Liability in the Post-Bankruptcy Context, 22 J. CoRr. L. 345, 346 (1997).
106. Of course, this is not meant to suggest that Baltimore Luggage was incorrectly decided. Quite the contrary is true. By confining its analysis to the facts in the case at bar,
however, the Baltimore Luggage court necessarily set the stage for insufficient claims based
on the "mere continuation" theory.
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I he Nissen decision reflects a modest progression towards a more

definable rule of law from its forerunner, but nevertheless falls short
of a reliable basis for consistent decisionmaking. The Nissen court endorsed the Baltimore Luggage framework without modification.'1 7 The
court, however, added needed elaboration to the proper scope of the
inquiry. The court established that the "mere continuation" exception focuses on whether there has been a "continuation of ownership
and management" as opposed to the continuing business operations
of the successor.'
The court thus refined the analytical framework
established in Baltimore Luggage, but did not shed light on the issue of
adequate consideration for the acquired assets.
b. The Gaps Filled.--Fortunately, the Academy of IRM court
took the initiative to remedy the deficiencies present in Maryland's
earlier interpretations of the "mere continuation" exception.'0 9 The
court developed the alternative elements of the inquiry necessary to a
finding of successor liability-continuity of ownership and management, and inadequate consideration. 1 0 In order for successor liability to lie, a court must find that at least one of these two alternative
elements has been satisfied.'. This exception is now readily applicable to a variety of situations and reflective of the underlying policy
rationale.
At the outset, the court reasserted the proper focus of the "mere
continuation" exception inquiry as determining whether there has
been a "continuation of the corporate entity rather than a continuation
of the business operation."" 2 A successor corporation's pursuit of the
same line of business-even its use of its predecessor's plant, equipment, and employees-is thus immaterial to the analysis. 1 3 This result supportsi a primary reason for the corporate form-the free
transferability of assets. 1 4 Furthermore, such an approach facilitates
107. Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 323 Md. 613, 618, 594 A.2d 564, 566 (1991) (quoting Baltimore Luggage, 80 Md. App. at 296-97, 562 A.2d at 1293).
108. Id. at 620, 594 A.2d at 567.
109. The Court of Appeals side-stepped the Court of Special Appeals's finding that IRM
could not transform the garnishment proceeding into a direct cause of action against LVI,
and "assum[ed] . . . arguendo, that successor liability ha[d] been properly raised ...."
Academy of IRM, 344 Md. at 451 n.9, 687 A.2d at 677 n.9; see also supra notes 24-26 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court of Special Appeals's holding that IRM could not
transform the garnishment proceeding into a direct cause of action).
110. See Academy ofIRM, 344 Md. at 451-54, 687 A.2d at 677-79 (analyzing alternatively
the continuity of ownership and management, and the adequacy of consideration).
111. Id. at 457, 687 A.2d at 680.
112. Id. at 452, 687 A.2d at 678 (quoting Nissen, 323 Md. at 620, 594 A.2d at 567).
113. See id. (distinguishing business operations from business activities).
114. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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the opportunity for successor corporations to preserve the assets of
the predecessors as viable business units, thereby encouraging the
prospects for positive economic growth." 5
The most notable improvement over Maryland's previous treatment of the exception was the court's approach to the inadequacy of
consideration factor. The Baltimore Luggage court restricted its discussion to an abbreviated comment directed to the specific facts of the
case. 1 16 Inadequate consideration was not addressed in Nissen. In
Academy of IRM, however, the court compared three cases from other
jurisdictions." 1 7 Two of the cases that found consideration adequate
involved assignments for the benefit of creditors in lieu of foreclosure1 1 8 and a straight foreclosure. 11 9 On the other hand, the court
found consideration lacking in a case involving a purchase of the
predecessor's stock for fifty dollars.' 2 °
The profile that emerges suggests that consideration must reflect
the real value of the acquired assets as opposed to some groundless
valuation. This strand of the framework applied in the "mere continuation" exception analysis adds a critical basis for imposing liability. In
terms of protecting creditors, the result is readily evident. A successor
corporation must not only be divorced from its predecessor from the
perspective of ownership and management, but mere paper transactions bent on prying assets from unsecured creditors will not suffice as
an end run around the exception. From the standpoint of judicial
decisionmaking, Maryland now has a precedential basis for employing
a clear and meaningful analysis-a prescription for decreased litigation and increased certainty in the law.
5. Conclusion.-In Academy of IRM, the Court of Appeals held
that a successor corporation cannot be held liable for the outstanding,
unsecured debts of its predecessor pursuant to the "mere continua115. See Sharon L. Cloud, Note, Purchase of Assets and Successor Liability: A Necessarily Arbitrary Limit, 11 DEL. J. CoRe. L. 791, 801 (1986) ("[T]he rationales behind the traditional
corporate rule of non-liability encourage economically efficient commercial transactions
."); cf Tucker, supra note 29, at 4 ("[A] business is worth more as a whole than if sold
piecemeal for scrap.").
116. Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Holtzman, 80 Md. App. 282, 299, 562 A.2d 1286, 1294
(1989) ("[T]here was sufficient consideration running to the seller from the purchasing
corporation.").
117. Academy of IRM, 344 Md. at 454-57, 687 A.2d at 679-80 (discussing Illinois ex rel.
Donahue v. Perkins & Will Architects, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 29 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980), Uni-Com
Northwest, Ltd. v. Argus Publ'g Co., 737 P.2d 304 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987), and H.J. Baker &
Bro., Inc. v. Orgonics, Inc., 554 A.2d 196 (R-I. 1989)).
118. See Donahue, 413 N.E.2d at 32.
119. See Uni-Com, 737 P.2d at 308-09.
120. See H.J.Baker, 554 A.2d at 200.
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ion of the entity" exception without a showing that there is a continuation of ownership and management or, alternatively, that there has
been inadequate consideration paid for the assets.1 2 1 This analytical
framework marks a significant improvement of Maryland's previous
treatment of the law of successor liability. While it cannot be said that
a successor corporation's risk of being beset by an errant claim of liability pursuant to this exception has been eradicated, such a prospect,
at least, should be met by a prompt judicial rebuff.
MICHAEL

121. Academy of IRM, 344 Md. at 457, 687 A.2d at 680.

F. Dow
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II.

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Rejecting the Closing Out of the Central Hudson Commercial
Speech Test

In Jakanna Woodworks, Inc. v. Montgomery County,1 the Court of Appeals unanimously struck down a Montgomery County ordinance 2 requiing merchants to obtain a license before advertising "closing-out
sales."' The court held the ordinance invalid both as an overly broad
regulation of commercial speech and as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. 4 The outcome of Jakanna is in accord with the
United States Supreme Court's commercial speech jurisprudence, but
the Court of Appeals's rationale had a noticeable gap. The court's
straightforward use of the Central Hudson test 5 could weaken Jakanna's
precedential value if the Supreme Court decides to adopt a stricter
standard, as the Court's most recent commercial speech case indicates
it soon may do.6 However, the Court of Appeals ultimately strengthened commercial speech protection through its novel application of
prior restraint analysis to a commercial speech case.
1. The Case.-Jakanna Woodworks (the Store) is a small, familyowned furniture business that has been operating in Rockville, Maryland for the last fifteen years.7 In April 1995, the owners, Morton Jacobs and Anna Wheeler,' started looking for a larger space in which
to display furniture and to store their inventory.9 They found a prime
location across the street from their Rockville store and signed the
lease to the new space in May 1995.10

Before moving, Jacobs wanted to sell the entire inventory and to
order all new furniture, in an effort to save on moving costs and minimize damage to the merchandise. 1 To attract potential customers to
1. 344 Md. 584, 689 A.2d 65 (1997).
2. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 30-10 (1994).

3. Jakanna, 344 Md. at 590, 689 A.2d at 67 (internal quotation marks omitted).
4. Id.
5. See infra notes 68-85 and accompanying text for a full discussion of the test, which
was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
6. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); see also infra notes
117-141 and accompanying text.
7. Jakanna, 344 Md. at 590-91, 689 A.2d at 68.
8. Because this case concerns the impact of particular words, it seems fitting to note
that the name of the store, "Jakanna," was most likely created from the names of its proprietors, "Jacobs" Jak-) and "Anna" (-anna).
9. Jakanna, 344 Md. at 591, 689 A.2d at 68.
10. Id.
11. Id
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th1c sale, Jacobs placed an advertisement in the May 17, 1995 issue of
the Montgomery Gazette,12 which read in part:
PUBLIC NOTICE
FURNITURE LIQUIDATION
One of the metro area's largest wood furniture
specialty stores is selling off their [sic] entire
store and warehouse inventory[.]
Every Floor Sample and Every Item
In Stock Must Be Sold!
SELLING OUT TO THE BARE WALLS
13
NOTHING HELD BACK!

All of the information in the advertisement was true, including the
Store's address, its hours of operation, and the prices of some items
that would be on sale. 14 However, Jacobs did not realize that by including the word "liquidation," he violated section 30-10 of the Montgomery County Code (the ordinance).' 5
In Montgomery County, a merchant may not advertise a "closingout sale" 6 until it has first obtained a license from the Director of the
Office of Consumer Affairs (the Director).' 7 The merchant is required to file an application under oath and pay an application fee at
least fourteen days before the opening date of the sale.1 8 The application must include specific information about the sale, so that the Director may determine whether to grant the license. 19
Upon receiving the applicant's information, the Director "may issue" a license if she is "satisfied... that the proposed sale is consistent
12. Id.
13. Id. (emphasis added) (second alteration in original). A copy of the actual advertisement that appeared in the Montgomery Gazette can be found in Brief of Appellant at app.
4,Jakanna Woodworks, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 344 Md. 584, 689 A.2d 65 (1997) (No.
18).
14. Jakanna, 344 Md. at 591, 689 A.2d at 68.
15. Id. Other words that trigger the ordinance include the following: "going out of
business," "discontinuance of business," "selling out," and "lost our lease." Id (quoting
MONTGOMERY COUNTY,MD., CODE § 30-10(a)(2) (1994)). The Store's advertisement also
included the trigger words "selling out." Id.
16. A "closing-out sale" is defined under section 30-10 as
any sale in connection with which the person conducting the sale represents that
the sale is being conducted, or must be conducted, for reasons of
(A) economic or business distress,
(B) inability to continue business at the same location, or
(C) the age or health of an owner of the business.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 30-10(a) (1).

17. Id. § 30-10(b)(1).
18. Id. § 30-10(b) (2).
19. Id

The merchant must submit the following information with the application:
[A]II relevant facts relating to the sale, including:
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with the proposed advertising."2 ° The Director could, at her discretion, investigate the applicant's premises before deciding whether to
grant a license. 21 According to the Director's testimony, an inspection
"could take a couple of days." 2 2 The ordinance does not explicitly
limit the time within which the Director must announce her decision
regarding the license.23
Because Jacobs did not know about the ordinance, he did not
apply for a license before advertising his sale. 24 Under the Montgomery County Code, a merchant can be fined $500 for each day its advertisement violates section 30-10.21 Jacobs received a citation, which
required that he either stand trial or pay the fine. 26 Refusing to pay
the fine, the Store opted to stand trial in October 1995 in the District
Court of Maryland. 27 The district court judge found the Store in violation of the ordinance and imposed a $100 fine.2 8
The Store appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County,
and a trial de novo was held before Judge Pincus in January 1996.29
The Store argued that the ordinance violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution3 ' and Article 40 of the
(A) the first and last dates of the proposed sale;
(B) the date when the owner of the business intends to stop the operations
of the business at the location or locations listed in the application;
(C) a complete inventory of the merchandise to be sold;
(D) a list of all persons with an ownership interest in the business if the
business does not have publicly-traded shares;
(E) the text of all advertising that will be placed in print or electronic media
in connection with the proposed sale; and
(F) all details necessary to locate exactly and identify the merchandise to be
sold.
Id.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id, § 30-10(b) (3).
Jakanna,344 Md. at 593, 689 A.2d at 69.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.

25. MONTGOMERY COUNTY,MD., CODE §§ 1-19, 30-10(d).

26. Jakanna,344 Md. at 593, 689 A.2d at 69. The citation read that "the word [liquidation] can only be used in connection with a closing out sale, which requires a License.
[Jakanna Woodworks] did not have a License." Id. (alterations in original).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. The First Amendment reads in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The First Amendment applies to
the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). The Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Maryland Declaration of Rights31 because it was (1) an overly broad
regulation of commercial speech, and (2) an invalid prior restraint. 32
The Store urged the circuit court to apply a four-part intermediate
scrutiny test,33 articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Cen-

tral Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,34 to resolve
the overbreadth issue.3 5 The Store also requested that the circuit
court determine whether the statute offered sufficient procedural
36
safeguards to constitute a valid prior restraint.
The County's sole contention was that the ordinance was presumptively valid because it had a "clear, rational purpose to protect
consumers" from deceptive advertising.3 7 However, the Director confirmed that the Store was fined only because the word "liquidation"
was included in the advertisement, not because she suspected that the
38
advertisement was false or misleading.
Judge Pincus held that the ordinance did not violate the First
Amendment and that it was a "legitimate exercise of government
power" which served "a legitimate governmental interest. '39 Concluding that section 30-10 was neither unreasonable nor in violation of
either the United States Constitution or the Maryland Declaration of
RightsJudge Pincus fined the store $100.40 Because the Montgomery
County Circuit Court had already provided appellate review of the
District Court's decision, the Court of Special Appeals could not re31. The full text of Article 40 reads:
That the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.
MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 40. The Court of Appeals has interpreted the freedoms
protected by Article 40 as co-extensive with those protected by the First Amendment.
Freedman v. State, 233 Md. 498, 505, 197 A.2d 232, 235-36 (1964) (noting that "[tihe
guaranty of freedom of speech ... ordained in Art. 40 would appear to be, in legal effect,
substantially similar to that enunciated in the First Amendment, and ...Art. 40 has been
treated by this Court as in pari materia with the First Amendment"), rev'd, 380 U.S. 51
(1965).
32. Jakanna,344 Md. at 593, 689 A.2d at 69.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
Jakanna,344 Md. at 593, 689 A.2d at 69.
Id. at 594, 689 A.2d at 69.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. Id.
39. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Judge Pincus neither explicitly
named the test he applied nor explained its origin, the Court of Appeals labeled it a "ra-

tional basis test." Id. at 606-07, 689 A.2d at 75.
40. Id. at 594, 689 A.2d at 69.
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view the circuit court's judgment." The Court of Appeals granted the
Store's petition for writ of certiorari in April 1996.42
2.

Legal Background. 4

3

a. Virginia Pharmacy: Creation of the Commercial Speech Doctrine.--In 1976, in the landmark case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council," the Supreme Court first announced that commercial speech 4 5-i.e., advertising-was entitled to
constitutional protection.4 6 Prior to Virginia Pharmacy, the Court had
considered purely commercial speech unworthy of First Amendment
protection, and thus subject to governmental regulation just like any
other business activity.4 7 The forced dichotomy between commercial
and noncommercial speech raised doubts from its very inception, as
the Court discovered that political and economic freedoms were often
intertwined.4 8 Immediately before Virginia Pharmacy, the Court had
hinted at the coming revolution in its attitude toward commercial
speech, noting that commercial speech was a valuable way of dissemi41. Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 12-305 (1995) (requiring final
judgments rendered by a circuit court on appeal from a district court to be certified to the
Court of Appeals for review).
42. Jakanna, 344 Md. at 594, 689 A.2d at 69.
43. AsJakannawas a constitutional case of first impression before the Court of Appeals,
the legal background of the case will be restricted to commercial speech cases decided by
the U.S. Supreme Court.
44. 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (striking down a Virginia statute outlawing the advertising by
pharmacists of prescription drugs).
45. For an elucidating history of the roots of the Court's commercial speech doctrine,
see Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71
TEX. L. REv. 747 (1993) [hereinafter Kozinski & Banner, Anti-Histoy] (tracing the history
of the Supreme Court's commercial speech jurisprudence from colonial times to the present). According to Kozinski and Banner, the term "commercial speech" was first coined in
1971 by Judge Skelly Wright, a member of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 756. Commercial speech has been called the "stepchild" of the First Amendment because it has received less constitutional protection than its "sibling,"
noncommercial speech. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?,
76 VA. L. REv. 627, 652 (1990) [hereinafter Kozinski & Banner, Who's Afraid?] (criticizing
the Court's differential treatment of commercial and noncommercial speech).
46. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762-65.
47. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding the conviction of a
businessman who distributed handbills advertising submarine rides on one side and relaying a political message on the other). In Chrestensen, the Court easily disposed of the commercial speech question by deferring to legislative wisdom: "Whether, and to what extent,
one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to what extent such activity
shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of user, are matters for legislative judgment." Id. at 54.
48. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964) (invalidating the application of Alabama's libel law to civil rights organization's advertisement in the New York
Times).
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nating information to the public.4 9 Finally, in Virginia Pharmacy, First
Amendment protection was extended explicitly to commercial
speech.50
In Virginia Pharmacy, a state statute prohibited pharmacists from
advertising prescription drugs because such expression was considered "unprofessional conduct."'" The Court struck down the ban as
violative of the First Amendment, despite the purely commercial nature of the speech.52 The majority reasoned that society has a strong
interest in "the free flow of commercial information," as consumers
constantly make decisions about which products to buy and services to
seek.5 3 The Court questioned both the State's interest in maintaining
"a high degree of professionalism on the part of licensed pharmacists"54 and the State's contention that such advertising could lead to
aggressive price wars, ultimately resulting in poor service.5 5 The
Court interpreted this state interest as a paternalistic attempt to protect the public by holding consumers in ignorance.5 6 In rejecting this
form of governmental suppression of commercial speech, the Court
emphasized the consumer's First Amendment right to receive information, as well as the merchant's right to distribute it.57
The Virginia Pharmacy Court's decision to protect commercial
speech was not without caveats. The Court intimated that the protection of commercial speech would probably be less extensive than that
of political speech.5 8 Because of the economic implications of com49. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821-22 (1975) (stating that even though the
advertisement of abortion services was commercial in nature, the State's interest in prohibiting such speech must be weighed against the value of disseminating information to the
public).
50. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
51. Id. at 749-50.
52. Id. at 762.
53. Id. at 764.
54. Id. at 766.
55. Id. at 767-68.
56. Id. at 769.
57. Id. at 756. The Court presented the commercial speech issue as "whether a State
may completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients" and concluded that "the answer.., is in the negative." Id. at 773.
58. Id. at 771-72 n.24. Speaking for the Court, Justice Blackmun stated:
Even if the differences [between commercial and noncommercial speech] do not
justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus subject to
complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate
commercial information is unimpaired. The truth of commercial speech... may
be more easily verifiable by its disseminator than . . . news reporting or political
commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate information
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mercial speech, the broader regulation of the "time, place and manner" of such speech might be tolerated if properly justified by the
government. 9 Finally, the Court noted that the heavy presumption
against prior restraints applicable to noncommercial speech might
not apply to commercial speech cases. 6"
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Virginia Pharmacy warned against
elevating commercial speech to the same level as that of "'protected
speech."' 6 1 He argued that the First Amendment was designed to protect the discussion of "political, social and other public issues, rather
than the decision of a particular individual as to whether to purchase
one or another kind of shampoo."6 2 Justice Rehnquist further noted
Virginia's interest in combating drug abuse, which might be thwarted
by the unregulated advertising of prescription drugs.63
The Court struck down another ban on commercial speech that it
found to be paternalistic the following year in Linmark Associates, Inc.
v. Township of Willingboro.' Buoyed by Virginia Pharmacy, the Court
unanimously held that a racially integrated town's prohibition of "For
Sale" and "Sold" signs on real estate in efforts to stem "white flight"
violated the First Amendment. 65 As in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court
held that any ordinance seeking to keep the public in ignorance for
purposes of manipulating its conduct violates the First Amendment. 66
about a specific product or service that he himself provides and presumably
knows more about than anyone else.
Id.
59. Id. at 770-71.
60. Id. at 772 n.24. The Court announced its new protection of commercial speech
with the following caveat:
[C]ommercial speech maybe more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is
the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled
by proper regulation and foregone entirely.
Attributes such as these, the greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial
speech, may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of
silencing the speaker.
Id.; cf Kozinski & Banner, Anti-History, supra note 45, at 754-56 (noting that Virginia Pharmacy possibly did as much harm as good to commercial speech by emphasizing the distinctions between commercial and noncommercial speech).
61. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 781, 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that
'
commercial speech is not as valuable as " protected speech,'" or speech concerning political or social issues).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 788-89. Justice Rehnquist provided examples of advertisements that might
'
encourage illicit drug use: " Pain getting you down? Insist that your physician prescribe
Demerol. You pay a little more than for aspirin, but you get a lot more relief.' 'Can't
shake the flu? Get a prescription for Tetracycline from your doctor today.'" Id at 788.
64. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
65. Id. at 95-97.
66. Id. at 97.
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The Court rejected the Township's claim that information about sales
might cause residents to act "irrationally," reasoning that if the ordinance were allowed to stand, then "every locality in the country
67
[could] suppress any facts that reflect poorly on the locality."
b. Central Hudson: Developing the Commercial Speech Doctrine.-Despite the Supreme Court's show of enthusiasm for striking
down what it deemed to be paternalistic bans in VirginiaPharmacy and
Linmark, the Court retreated from championing commercial speech a
few years later when it formulated an intermediate scrutiny test in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.6" Rather
than analyzing commercial speech as the public's right to receive information, as it did in Virginia Pharmacy and Linmark, the Court
backed away from such strong protection, indicating that there were
limits to commercial speech protection.6 9 The Court set out four
parts to its new commercial speech analysis: (1) the speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading; (2) the government must
assert a substantial interest in regulating the speech; (3) the regulation must directly advance that government interest; and (4) the regulation must be no more extensive than necessary to achieve its goal.70
In Central Hudson, the Court struck down a governmental ban on
promotional advertising by electric utilities. 71 The Court rejected the
State's contention that advertising by a monopoly is valueless, arguing
that utilities compete with suppliers of alternative energy sources.72
When the Court applied its new four-part test to CentralHudson's facts,
it found: that the regulation prohibited truthful speech;7" that the
State demonstrated substantial interests in conserving energy and
maintaining a fair and efficient rate structure; 74 and that the State
established a direct link between the ban and energy conservation,
but not with maintaining equitable rates. 75 The Court held, however,
that the ban failed the fourth prong because there was a less restrictive
alternative available.7 6
67. Id. at 96.
68. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
69. Id. at 562-63.
70. Id. at 566.
71. Id. at 571.
72. Id. at 566-68.
73. Id. at 566.
74. Id. at 568-69.
75. Id. at 569.
76. Id. at 570-71. The Court suggested less restrictive means to further the State's interest, such as limiting the format and content of the advertising or requiring that the adver-
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In their concurring opinions, Justices Blackmun and Stevens predicted problems that the Central Hudson test would cause in future
commercial speech cases.7 7 Justice Blackmun accepted the intermediate scrutiny test for evaluating potentially misleading commercial
speech, but believed that the test provided inadequate protection
against the government regulation of "truthful, nonmisleading, noncoercive commercial speech.""8 Therefore, rather than endorsing the
balancing test announced in Central Hudson, Justice Blackmun preferred the broader rationale of forbidding the government from keeping the public uninformed.7 9
Justice Stevens agreed to strike down the ban, but was uncertain
whether Central Hudson should be defined as a "commercial speech"
case at all.80 He chose not to discuss whether the new test gave adequate protection to properly defined commercial speech." Both Justice Blackmun's and Justice Stevens's concurrences provided bases for
future opinions in the Court's evolving commercial speech doctrine. 2
The lone dissenter in Central Hudson, Justice Rehnquist, argued
that the new test did not give the government sufficient power to regulate potentially harmful commercial speech."3 He rejected the notion
that commercial speech was worthy of protection similar to political
to
speech 4 Justice Rehnquist argued that the legislature was entitled
85
regulations.
economic
regarding
especially
greater deference,
tisements include information about the relative efficiency and expense of the offered
service under present and future conditions. Id.
77. Id. at 573-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 579-83 (Stevens, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun considered such regulation a "covert attempt by the State to manipulate the choices of its citizens.., by depriving
the public of the information needed to make a free choice." Id at 574-75.
79. Id. at 576-79.
80. Id. at 579-83 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens warned that "[b]ecause
commercial speech' is afforded less constitutional protection than other forms of speech,
it is important that the commercial speech concept not be defined too broadly lest speech
deserving of greater constitutional protection be inadvertently suppressed." Id. at 579
(footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 583.
82. Justice Stevens later penned the principal opinion in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (plurality opinion), which heralded the reworking, if not the
possible demise, of the CentralHudson test. Justice Blackmun's desire to do away with the
test altogether was echoed by Justice Thomas in his bold 44 Liquormartconcurrence.
83. CGentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 584 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 584-85.
85. Id. Justice Rehnquist lamented that
[t]he Court's decision today fails to give due deference to this subordinate position of commercial speech. The Court ...returns to the bygone era of Lochner v.
New York in which it was common practice for this Court to strike down economic
regulations adopted by a State based on the Court's own notions of the most
appropriate means for the State to implement its considered policies.

668

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 57:642

Since the establishment of the Central Hudson test, the Court's
application of the test has met with mixed success; commentators have
concluded that the test is difficult to apply and that the Court simply
manipulates the test to fit desirable outcomes. 8 6 For example, using
the CentralHudson test, the Court allowed Puerto Rico to outlaw advertisements for legally regulated gambling casinos, 87 and it permitted
the Florida Bar to prevent lawyers from contacting accident victims for
thirty days after the accident.88 Yet, the Court recently struck down a
state law banning the display of alcohol content on beer cans. °
Chief Justice Rehnquist moved from the dissent in Virginia Pharmacy and Central Hudson to write the majority opinion in Posadas de
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.9 In Posadas, the Court used the
Central Hudson test to uphold a ban on advertising of casino gambling
aimed at Puerto Rican residents. 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis
deferred to the Puerto Rico legislature, arguing in dictum that when
the government could completely ban a certain activity, then it could
also ban or tightly regulate the advertising of that activity.9 2 As Justice
Brennan's dissent indicated, the Court was "dramatically shrinking
the scope of First Amendment protection available to commercial
speech, and giving government officials unprecedented authority to
eviscerate constitutionally protected expression."9 3 The Court in
Id. at 589 (citation omitted).
Despite his discomfort with the test, Justice Rehnquist later used the Central Hudson
analysis to uphold a governmental regulation against gambling advertisements. See
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
86. See generally Edward J. Eberle, PracticalReason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm,42
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 411 (1992) (recognizing the inconsistencies of the Central Hudson test
and offering a new approach to evaluating commercial speech regulations); Joel M. Gora,
The First Amendment in the Supreme Court: The Future Lies Ahead, 13 TouRo L. REv. 353
(1997) (discussing the impact of 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island on the Court's view of
the First Amendment); Kozinski & Banner, Who's Afraid?, supra note 45 (criticizing the
Court's continued distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech); Sean P.
Costello, Comment, Strange Brew: The State of Commercial SpeechJurisprudenceBefore and After
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 681 (1997) (providing a
survey of the principal cases that constitute the Court's commercial speech doctrine).
87. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 340-47.
88. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 622-35 (1995).
89. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 480-91 (1995).
90. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
91. Id. at 340-44.
92. Id. at 345-46. Justice Rehnquist indicated that "itis precisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but
reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising." Id. at 346. This "greater-includes-the-lesser" theory was later discredited by the Court in 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996). See infra text accompanying notes 129-130.
93. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 358-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Posadas strayed far from its favorable position on the protection of
commercial speech in VirginiaPharmacy.
Three years later, in Board of Trustees of the State University of New
York v. Fox,94 the Court appeared to transform the CentralHudson test
from an "intermediate scrutiny" test into something approaching a
"rational basis" test.95 Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court weakened
the fourth prong's requirement that the government regulation be as
narrow as possible, thus granting more deference to the government. 96 Justice Scalia supported a "narrowly-tailored"9' 7 fit between
the state's interest and its regulation, but warned against interpreting
too strictly the word "necessary" in Central Hudson's fourth prong. 98
Justice Scalia expressed concern that a strict interpretation would lead
to a "'least-restrictive-means' test."9 9 In Fox, the Court again relaxed
CentralHudson's original level of scrutiny, just as it had in Posadas.1 °°
In a show of judicial restraint, the Court adjusted the Central Hudson
test from an intermediate scrutiny standard to a standard that afforded greater deference to the legislature. Despite the acknowledgement that it was deferring to governmental decisionmakers, the Court
did not consider its standard to be a rational basis inquiry.1 0 1
However, six years later, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.," °2 relying
on CentralHudson, the Court unanimously struck down a federal statute that outlawed the printing of alcohol content on beer cans."0 '
Led by Justice Thomas, the Court in Rubin interpreted the fourth
prong of the CentralHudson test as meaning that the government reg94. 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (upholding a university ban on Tupperware parties in school
dormitories).
95. Costello, supra note 86, at 703-05.
96. Id.
97. Fox, 492 U.S. at 478 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id. at 478-80. Justice Scalia was referring to the requirement of CentralHudson that
the governmental regulation must not be "more extensive than is necessary to serve [the
governmental] interest." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (emphasis added).
99. Fox, 492 U.S. at 476.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 480.
We reject the contention that the test we have described is overly permissive.
It is far different, of course, from the "rational basis" test used for Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection analysis. There it suffices if the law could be
thought to further a legitimate governmental goal, without reference to whether
it does so at inordinate cost. Here we require the government goal to be substantial, and the cost to be carefully calculated.
Id.
102. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
103. Id. at 478.
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ulau'on must be "no more extensive than necessary, '' 04 rather than
10 5
the more deferential approach that Justice Scalia had urged in Fox.

The Court used the fourth prong to strike down a regulation that was
not narrowly tailored to serve the state's explicit interest. In contrast
to Fox, the Court in Rubin returned to the stricter intermediate scru10 6
tiny test that was originally formulated in Central Hudson.
In FloridaBar v. Went For It, Inc.,' °7 the Supreme Court used Central Hudson to uphold rules restricting lawyer advertising. The rules,
which prohibited lawyers from soliciting accident victims within thirty
days of the accident,"' were enacted in response to a two-year study
exposing the detrimental impact of lawyer advertising on public opinion. 10 9 The Florida Bar purportedly sought to prevent the downward
slide of the conduct and reputation of its attorneys. 1 0
The five-Justice majority articulated the reasons that the rules survived Central Hudson scrutiny. First, the Court found that the rules
reflected the Bar's substantial interest in both protecting the privacy
of personal injury victims and improving the image of lawyers."' Second, the Bar's two-year study demonstrating the adverse effects of unsolicited advertising by lawyers proved that the rules directly and
materially advanced the Bar's interest.' 1 2 Finally, because the ban
lasted only briefly and did not preclude other channels of communication, the Court found that the rules passed the final "reasonable fit"
prong.'1 3 Justice O'Connor, in her opinion for the majority, used the
Central Hudson test to reach a "commonsense conclusion" that the reg104. Id. at 486, 490-91. Justice Thomas reiterated the government's alternatives to banning the disclosure of alcohol content: the government could directly limit the alcohol
content itself, or restrict the ban to malt liquors only. Id. He concluded that "the availability of these options, all of which could advance the Government's asserted interest in a
manner less intrusive to respondent's First Amendment rights, indicates that [the regulation] is more extensive than necessary." Id. at 491.
105. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
107. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
108. Id. at 620-21.
109. Id. at 620.
110. Id. at 621.
111. Id. at 624-25.
112. Id. at 626.
113. Id. at 633. The Court reasoned that
[t]he Bar has [a] substantial interest both in protecting injured Floridians from
invasive conduct by lawyers and in preventing the erosion of confidence in the
profession that such repeated invasions have engendered ....
The palliative devised by the Bar to address these harms is narrow both in scope and in duration.
The Constitution . . . requires nothing more.
Id. at 635.
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ulation was valid.1 14 However, Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, criticized the Court's sanction of censorship by the Bar.' 15 Three of the
four Justices who joined the dissent, Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg,
formed the plurality opinion the following year in 44 Liquormart,116
which called for a stricter standard against blanket bans on commercial speech.
c. 44 Liquor-mart: Rethinking the Commercial Speech Doctrine.-In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, although the Supreme
Court unanimously struck down a Rhode Island statute prohibiting
the truthful advertising of the prices of lawfully sold alcoholic beverages," 7 the Court presented four different opinions. The purpose of
the ban was to promote temperance in Rhode Island; 8 the State argued that allowing advertising would lower alcohol prices and increase public consumption." 9 The petitioning liquor store did not
display the prices of any items, but ran a newspaper advertisement
featuring pictures of vodka and rum bottles with the word "WOW' in
large letters next to them.' 2 ° The State Liquor Control Administrator
claimed that this was an implied reference to bargain prices for liquor. 12 1 The entire Court agreed that the Rhode Island ban should
be struck down, 122 even though the opinions of the Justices were
many and varied.
Justice Stevens authored the plurality opinion and was joined by
various members of the Court on different points of his analysis. First,
Justice Stevens espoused a stricter standard of review than the Central
Hudson intermediate scrutiny test for state regulations that completely
ban non-misleading information. 1 23 Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg
114. Id. at 634.
115. Id. at 644-45 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy called the majority opinion
a serious departure . .. from the principles that govern the transmission of commercial
speech.... [U]nder the First Amendment the public, not the State, has the right and the
power to decide what ideas and information are deserving of their adherence." Id at 645.
116. See 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (plurality opinion).
117. 44 Liquormar 517 U.S. at 489.
118. Id. at 504 (plurality opinion).
119. Id. at 505.
120. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 492.
121. Id. at 492-93.
122. Id. at 489; id. at 518 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 528 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at
534 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
123. Id. at 501-04 (Stevens, J.). Justice Stevens stated that such absolute bans "usually
rest solely on the offensive assumption that the public will respond 'irrationally' to the
truth." Id. at 503 (quoting Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85,
96 (1977)).
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joined his call for stricter scrutiny of such absolute bans.on commercial speech. 124 In cases in which the purpose of the regulation is to
guard against deceptive commercial speech, Justice Stevens would ap125
ply the intermediate scrutiny standard.
Under his analysis, Justice Stevens concluded that the Rhode Island ban would fail not only a more rigorous standard, but even the
less stringent, intermediate Central Hudson standard. 126 - The ban did
not pass the third prong of the Central Hudson test because it did not.
directly advance the State's interest in .curbing.alcohol consumption.12 7 The ban also failed
the fourth prong because it was more
128
restrictive than necessary.

Next, Justice Stevens explicitly rejected the "greater-includes-the1 29
lesser" rationale from Posadas
as illogical, declaring that a ban on
speech could be more detrimental than a ban on conduct.1 30 Justices
Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg signed onto this abandonment of
Posadas,while ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Souter,
13
and Breyer generally agreed that Posadaswas no longer controlling. '
Justice O'Connor focused on the ban's failure to pass the final
prong of the traditional CentralHudson test. 13 2 She emphasized that

the fit between Rhode Island's method (banning all price advertising)
and its goal (curbing drinking) was "not reasonable."13 3 HoweverJustice O'Connor did not agree with Justice Stevens that heightened

124. Id. at 489, 501.
125. Id. at 501.
126. Id. at 504-08.
127. Id. at 505-07.
128. Id. at 507-08. Justice Stevens determined that the State could have attacked the
drinking problem by less stringent means, such as increasing taxation on alcoholic beverages, limiting per capita purchases, or launching educational campaigns. Id. at 507.
129. See supra text accompanying note 92.
130. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 510-12. Justice Stevens cautioned that
it [is] quite clear that banning speech may sometimes prove far more intrusive
than banning conduct.... [A] local ordinance banning bicycle lessons may curtail freedom far more than one that prohibits bicycle riding within city limits....
The text of the First Amendment makes clear that the Constitution presumes that
attempts to regulate speech are more dangerous than attempts to regulate
conduct.
Id, at 511-12.
131. Id. at 528, 531-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor
remarked: "Since Posadas ... this Court has examined more searchingly the State's professed goal, and the speech restriction put into place to further it, before accepting a
State's claim that the speech restriction satisfies First Amendment scrutiny." Id. at 531.
132. Id. at 530-32.
133. Id. at 530.
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scrutiny should be
applied to government regulation of truthful com13 4
mercial speech.
Justice Thomas was willing to go the furthest toward giving commercial speech the same protection as political speech."' 5 He viewed
paternalistic state bans that withhold information from the public as
per se unconstitutional." 6 As Justice Blackmun argued in Virginia
Pharmacy,13 7 Justice Thomas declared that "all attempts to dissuade
legal choices by citizens by keeping them ignorant are impermissible";1 3 8 he urged the Court to abandon what he called the "inherently
nondeterminative" Central Hudson test and return to the clearer rule
139
of Virginia Pharmacy.

Despite Justice Thomas's strong drive to end the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech and abandon the Central Hudson test altogether, four members of the Court chose to use
the Central Hudson test to strike down the advertising ban." Justice
Stevens's proposal-to apply strict scrutiny to the regulation of truthful commercial speech, and intermediate scrutiny to the regulation of
misleading commercial speech-struck a compromise between Justice
Thomas's categorical approach and Justice O'Connor's mechanical
14 1

one.

In sum, the Court has continued to apply its four-part intermediate scrutiny test from Central Hudson to the government regulation of
commercial speech. However, while the majority of the Court still
thinks that commercial speech should be afforded less protection
than political speech, the numerous concurring opinions in 44 Liquormart suggest that the Court is considering a restructuring of the
Central Hudson test. In 44 Liquormart, five Supreme Court JusticesJustices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg-questioned
134. Id. at 532.
135. Id. at 518-28 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
136. Id. at 526-28. Justice Thomas noted that in cases
in which the government's asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or
service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace, the balancing test adopted in [CentralHudson] should not be applied.... Rather, such
an "interest" is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of "commercial" speech than it can justify regulation of "noncommercial" speech.
Id. at 518 (citation omitted).
137. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
138. 44 Liquormar4 517 U.S. at 526 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
139. Id. at 527-28.
140. Though preferring the traditional route, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer still applied a rather strict version of the CentralHudson test.
Id. at 528-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
141. See Costello, supra note 86, at 687.
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the effectiveness of applying the traditional Central Hudson test in all
commercial speech contexts.
d. The Supreme Court's "PriorRestraint" Jurisprudence.-The
Supreme Court's formula for determining whether a state licensing
regulation constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint was first articulated in Freedman v. Maryland.'4 2 In Freedman, the Court held that
a film licensing statute was an invalid prior restraint on free speech
because the State's procedural guidelines unconstitutionally impaired
the freedom of expression.1 4 Consequently, the Court established
the following requirements for the government to avoid creating invalid prior restraints on speech: (1) the government must bear the
burden of proof if the license is denied; (2) the administrative agency
must act on a license request within a brief time specified by the statute; (3) the denial of a license may not become effective unless the
administrator goes to court for an injunction; and (4) judicial review
of an appeal must be expeditious."

The Court has also applied the Freedman guidelines in contexts
other than film censorship. In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 45
the Court announced that "a law subjecting the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority,
is unconstitutional."1 46 An ordinance requiring parade permits was
struck down due to the lack of concrete guidelines for the licensing
official to follow.'4 7 The Court reversed the defendant's conviction
for participating in a civil rights protest march without a license on
the ground that the ordinance was arbitrarily administered.' 48
1 49
The Court held, in City of Lakewood v. PlainDealerPublishingCo.,
that speech requiring a license or permit cannot be subject to an "official's boundless discretion." 5 ' In Plain Dealer Publishing, no explicit
limits were placed on the mayor's discretion to grant a permit for placing newsracks on public property.15 ' Such arbitrary guidelines failed
to protect against unreviewable censorship; thus, this prior restraint
142.
before
143.
144.
145.
146.

380 U.S. 51 (1965) (striking down a statute that required the licensing of a film
exhibition as an invalid prior restraint).
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 58-59.
394 U.S. 147 (1969).
Id. at 150-51.

147. Id.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 158-59.
486 U.S. 750 (1988).
Id. at 764.
Id. at 755-59.
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was invalidated. 52 The Court refused to accept the City's contention
would act on good faith, absent specific
that the mayor necessarily
15 3
standards in the statute.

In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,'5 4 the Court enunciated a "heavy
presumption" against the constitutionality of licensing regulations for
"sexually oriented businesses." 155 Such prior restraints are presumed
unconstitutional in their attempt to suppress certain undesirable expression completely. 1 56 FW/PBS emphasized two particular evils of
prior restraint schemes: (1) that they vest an official with unfettered
discretion to grant permits, and (2) that they fail to place time limits
on the official's decisionmaking process.' 5 7
Although Freedman, Shuttlesworth, Lakerwood, and FW/PBS do not
demonstrate conclusively that the Court will apply its prior restraint
analysis to commercial speech cases, they do illustrate the Court's refusal to tolerate arbitrary censorship, which is anathema to any protected speech. 158 To date, the Court has not stated directly that its
prior restraint analysis should be applied in the commercial speech
context.
3. The Court's Reasoning.--The Court of Appeals began its analysis in Jakanna Woodworks, Inc. v. Montgomery County by noting that the
United States Supreme Court's First Amendment commercial speech
doctrine applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 59 The
court also acknowledged that it has interpreted Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to be co-extensive with the First Amendment.' 60 In relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Court of
Appeals noted that "[s]everal well-settled principles have emerged
from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment,
both as to commercial speech and as to prior restraints on speech."16 1
152. Id.
153. Id. at 769-70.
154. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
155. Id. at 225.

156. Id. at 223.
157. Id. at 225-26.
158. Cf Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 645 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,dissenting) ("The guiding principle ...is that full and rational discussion furthers sound regulation and necessary reform .... The Court's opinion reflects a new-found and illegitimate
confidence that it . . .knows what is best for the Bar and its clients. Self-assurance has
always been the hallmark of a censor.").
159. Jakanna,344 Md. at 595, 689 A.2d at 70 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980); Freedman v. State, 233 Md. 498, 501, 197
A.2d 232, 234 (1964), rev'd on other grounds, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)).
160. Id. (citing Freedman, 233 Md. at 505, 197 A.2d at 235-36).
161. Id.
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a. Applying the Supreme Court's Commercial Speech Doctrine.1 62
The court first characterized Jakanna as a commercial speech case.
The court next noted that commercial speech is afforded some protection under the Constitution, because such speech "'not only serves
the economic interest of the speaker, but also furthers the societal
interest in the fullest possible dissemination of information."'" 6 3 The
Court of Appeals outlined the intermediate scrutiny test for commercial speech regulation as set forth by the Supreme Court in Central
Hudson: (1) the commercial speech must not be misleading or concern unlawful activity; (2) the governmental interest must be substantial; (3) the regulation must directly advance that particular
governmental interest; and (4) the regulation must be no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. 164 The court then discussed
the Supreme Court's recent application of the Central Hudson test in
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 6 ' upholding the validity of Florida Bar
rules that restricted lawyers' solicitation of accident victims within a
1 66

month of the accident.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the Store's argument that the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County applied the incorrect test to
the ordinance.' 6 7 It noted that instead of using the Central Hudson
test, Judge Pincus had erroneously applied a more lenient rational
168
basis test, upholding the ordinance in deference to the legislature.
Because the circuit court did not make any findings of fact, and because the Store continued to argue that its commercial speech was
of Appeals undertook an inconstitutionally protected, the Court
69
record.'
the
of
review
dependent
The court rejected the County's argument that the Store's advertisement was misleading because it used the words "Public Notice,"
implying that some official entity was conducting the sale.17 ° The
162. Id. The court defined commercial speech as "'expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.'" Id. (quoting CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at
561 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976))).
163. Id. (quoting CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62).
164. Id. at 596, 689 A.2d at 70 (citing CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566). See supra notes
68-89 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the CentralHudson test.
165. See supra notes 107-114 and accompanying text.
166. Jakanna,344 Md. at 596, 689 A.2d at 70.
167. Id. at 597-99, 689 A-2d at 71-72.
168. Id. at 607, 689 A.2d at 75.
169. Id. at 606-07, 689 A.2d at 75-76 (citing Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 566
(1970) (stating that an appeals court should undertake an independent review of the
whole record when a constitutionally protected right is involved)).
170. Id. at 604, 689 A.2d at 74.
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County also argued that the advertisement was false because the Store
did not sell all of its inventory as its advertisement had stated it
would. 1 7 1 However, the Court of Appeals determined that the Store
satisfied the first prong of the Central Hudson test-that its advertisement was not misleading. 1 72 The court acknowledged the necessity of
"closing-out sales" for businesses in financial straits. 17 ' The court
noted that it would be unreasonable to expect a merchant to know
whether enough buyers would come to purchase the entire inventory
fourteen days before the actual sale, when the application had to be
submitted to the Director. 174 The court also held that the ordinance
passed the second prong of the Central Hudson test. 1 75 It determined
that the government's interest in protecting the public from mislead7 6
ing commercial speech was substantial.'
The County argued that the ordinance passed the third prong as
well, because it directly advanced its interest in protecting consumers
by requiring merchants to submit specific information to the Office of
Consumer Affairs when applying for a license.1 77 Finally, the County
contended that the ordinance satisfied the fourth prong through its
9
78
which narrowly tailored the regulation.1
use of "triggering words,'
The Court of Appeals, however, held that the ordinance failed
both the third and fourth prongs of the test.18 0 The court determined
that the ordinance did not directly advance the County's interest by
using trigger words, such as "liquidation," because those words are no
more misleading than words like "50% off," which do not require a
license. 18 ' Finally, the court reasoned that the ordinance was more
extensive than necessary because it regulated not only deceptive
speech, but it also regulated truthful speech, as injakanna's advertisement, from which consumers need no protection. 182 The court then
cited examples of Maryland statutes that protect consumers from de171. Id.
172. Id. at 607-08, 689 A.2d at 76.
173. Id. at 608, 689 A.2d at 76.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id; see also Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1995) (stating that
"[u] nder Central Hudson, the government may freely regulate commercial speech that... is
misleading"); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (noting that "the State's interest in
protecting the public from the deceptive and misleading use of optometrical trade names
is substantial and well demonstrated").
177. Jakanna,344 Md. at 605, 689 A.2d at 75.
178. See supra note 15.
179. Jakanna,344 Md. at 605, 689 A.2d at 75.
180. Id. at 608-09, 689 A.2d at 76-77.
181. Id., 689 A.2d at 76.
182. Id. at 609, 689 A.2d at 77.
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ceptive advertising by regulating conduct without impermissibly restricting speech.1 8
b. Applying the Supreme Court's PriorRestraintDoctrine.-Judge
Chasanow traced the Supreme Court decisions concerning prior restraint, starting with Freedman v. Maryland.8 4 Although prior restraints "'present [the] danger of unduly suppressing protected
expression,1'1 8 5 they may pass constitutional muster if the State provides adequate procedural safeguards to protect against unwarranted
censorship.1 8 6 The court reiterated Freedman's procedural safeguards:
(1) such restraint may be imposed for "only a specified brief period
[of time] during which the status quo must be maintained"; (2) judicial review of the decision must be expeditious; and (3) the censor
bears the burden of going to court to suppress the speech as well as
87
the burden of proof in court.'
Judge Chasanow reviewed two decisions following Freedman in
which the Supreme Court evaluated prior restraints by focusing on
two separate problems: (1) regulation that provides unfettered discretion to government officials in the licensing process, and (2) regulation that does not place any limits on the time within which the
decisionmaker must issue the license.18 8 The County argued that the
Montgomery County ordinance was a valid prior restraint on speech
because it (1) provided "narrow, objective and definite" standards to
guide the Director in granting or denying a license, 8 9 and (2) provided that a license will be issued within a brief and reasonable time
period.'9 Because the ordinance required merchants to apply for a
183. Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-703 (1990) (prohibiting any person
from "advertis[ing] falsely in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce, or in the
provision of any service"); MD. CODE ANN., CoM. LAW II § 13-303 (1990) (prohibiting any
person from engaging in unfair or deceptive trade practices when conducting several consumer transactions)).
184. Jakanna,344 Md. at 599, 689 A.2d at 72; see also supra notes 142-144 and accompanying text.
185. Jakanna,344 Md. at 599, 689 A.2d at 72 (alteration in original) (quoting Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 54 (1965)).
186. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-60.
187. Jakanna, 344 Md. at 600, 689 A.2d at 72 (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493
U.S. 215, 227 (1990) (citing Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-60)).
188. Id. (citing FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 225-26); see also supra notes 142-157 (discussing the
Supreme Court's prior restraint jurisprudence).
189. Jakanna, 344 Md. at 605, 689 A.2d at 75. Section 30-10 provides in part:
[i]f the Director is satisfied from the application that the proposed sale is consistent with the proposed advertising, the Director may issue a license, upon payment of a fee ....
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 30-10(b) (3) (1994).
190. Jakanna, 344 Md. at 606, 689 A.2d at 75.
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license fourteen days before the sale,"'1 the County contended that
1 92
the Director would make the decision within that time frame.
However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Montgomery
County ordinance was an invalid restraint on speech because it
granted the Director "unfettered discretion" in the licensing process.1 93 Although the ordinance required merchants to submit information to the Director,194 it never explicitly required the Director to
do anything with that information. 19 5 Because the Director's decisionmaking powers were not specifically defined, the Store was not guaranteed adequate safeguards against arbitrary censorship.' 9 6 The court
noted that the ordinance provided no explicit time constraints on the
Director's decision, thus failing to satisfy the "brief and reasonable
97
requirement" under Freedman.1
In sum, the Court of Appeals held that section 30-10 was unconstitutional because it (1) did not directly advance the government's
interest in regulating misleading advertisements, and (2) was more
extensive than necessary to serve that interest. 98 The court also held
that the ordinance was an invalid prior restraint because it both
granted unbridled discretion to a government official to suppress protected speech, and failed to limit the amount of time in which the
official may render her decision.1 99
4. Analysis.-At first glance, the court's holding in Jakanna appears solidly based in the Supreme Court's current commercial
speech jurisprudence. However, upon closer inspection, it seems that
the Court of Appeals arrived at the proper result but may have applied
certain tests too confidently. First, the court applied the CentralHudson test to section 30-10 when the Supreme Court appears to be revising its use of that test. z° ' The Maryland court neglected to address
the reexamination of the Central Hudson test that the Supreme Court
undertook recently in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island. Second, to
evaluate the ordinance as a prior restraint, the court rather boldly ap191. Id.
192. Id. The County claimed that, in practice, the decision is made usually within "a
couple of days" after an on-site inspection is completed. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
193. Id. at 609, 689 A.2d at 77.
194. See supra note 19.
195. Jakanna, 344 Md. at 609-10, 689 A.2d at 77.
196. Id. at 610, 689 A.2d at 77.
197. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 144.
198. Jakanna, 344 Md. at 609, 689 A.2d at 76-77.
199. Id. at 609-10, 689 A.2d at 77.
200. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (plurality opinion).
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plied the Freedman procedural guidelines, which have traditionally
been used for political speech cases, to a commercial speech case.
Jakanna ultimately demonstrates the Maryland court's eagerness
to support commercial speech protection. However, by ignoring 44
Liquormart and simply applying the CentralHudson test, the court may
have left its holding in Jakanna vulnerable to attack. On the other
hand, its original application of Freedman to Jakannamay serve to bolster the constitutional protection of commercial speech in Maryland.
a. Central Hudson:. A Cautious Approach to Commercial
Speech.-The first gap in the court's opinion is its failure to even mention 44 Liquormart. The court probably did not apply 44 Liquormartto
Jakanna because, as a plurality opinion, 44 Liquormart did not provide
a unified rule of law:2" 1 44 Liquormart's numerous opinions may well
have left the Maryland court confused about how to address commercial speech issues. Another possible reason for shunning 44 Liquormart is that the Court of Appeals did not consider it analogous to
Jakanna. While the former was about an absolute ban on advertising
liquor prices,2 °2 the latter concerned a licensing requirement for closing-out sales. 20 3 The court may have wanted to "play it safe" by applying the traditional Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test.
However, the striking similarity between Jakanna and 44 Liquormart is
that the government was suppressing important commercial information through a paternalistic method of protecting the public, reminis20 5
cent of the facts of Virginia Pharmacy2°4 and Linmark.
Notwithstanding Justice Stevens's reevaluation of the CentralHudson test, as well asJustice Thomas's outright rejection of that test, in 44
Liquormart, the Court of Appeals applied the Central Hudson test in
determining the unconstitutionality of the ordinance. The court applied the Central Hudson test in a straightforward manner, much as
Justice O'Connor employed the test in 44 Liquormart.2°6 The court
attempted to demonstrate the validity of the Central Hudson test by
indicating that the Supreme Court had recently used the test in Florida
201. Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinion, and Justices Scalia, Thomas and
O'Connor wrote separate concurring opinions. Id.
202. Id. at 490.
203. Jakanna,344 Md. at 590, 689 A.2d at 67.
204. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
206. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 528-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (urging a mechanical application of the Central Hudson test to strike down the Rhode Island
liquor advertising ban).
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Bar.20 7 However, the five-to-four majority in that case illustrated the
208
problems the Court was encountering with the CentralHudson test.
The Court of Appeals should have instead included a discussion of 44
Liquormart because it is the Supreme Court's most recent attempt to
clarify the Central Hudson test. Although 44 Liquormart's plurality
opinion cannot be considered a strong precedent, that case's multiple
opinions signal that the Court is attempting to refine its commercial
speech doctrine.
Perhaps the Court of Appeals hesitated to discuss 44 Liquormart
because that case exposed the Supreme Court's lack of unification
about applying the Central Hudson test 20 9 to commercial speech cases.
The Maryland court may have applied the Central Hudson test under
the assumption that the test is here to stay. Regardless of its reasons,
the court erred by failing to address 44 Liquormart,which exposed the
Supreme Court's confusion over the application of the CentralHudson
test.2 10 If the Maryland court had even briefly mentioned 44 Liquormart, then its Jakanna opinion would have reflected the Maryland
court's greater awareness of the evolving commercial speech
jurisprudence.
Instead, the court completely ignored 44 Liquormartand relied on
the Supreme Court's decision in FloridaBar,211 which was arguably less
supportive of Jakanna'sresult than a discussion of 44 Liquormartwould
2 12
have been. The former dealt with rules of conduct for lawyers,
while the latter directly addressed the impact of restrictive ordinances
targeted at liquor stores.2 1 3 However, there is one crucial similarity
between the Florida lawyers, Rhode Island liquor store owners, and
Maryland merchants: The government thought that certain aspects of
their conduct should be regulated. Further, when commercial speech
rights were violated, the state courts emphasized the "commercial"
half of the issue, rather than the "speech" half.2" 4 When the Supreme
Court began to examine the "speech" half more closely in 44 Li207. Jahanna,344 Md. at 597-99, 689 A.2d at 71-72 (citing Florida Bar v. Went For It,
Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624-33 (1995)).
208. F/oridaBar, 515 U.S. at 635-45 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (questioning the majority's
outcome in applying the Central Hudson test to the Florida Bar rules).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 116-141.

210. See Costello, supra note 86, at 722-34 (arguing that the Court is heading toward a
new commercial speech analysis that affords greater protection to commercial speech).
211. Jakanna, 344 Md. at 597-99, 689 A.2d at 71-72 (citing F/orida Bar, 515 U.S. at 62433).
212. See supra notes 137-116 and accompanying text.

213. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996).
214. See generally Kozinski & Banner, Who's Afraid, supra note 45 (strongly urging equal
constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech).
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.
quorima't,
ule lviaryland court looked the other way, refusing to follow the Supreme Court's lead. Thus, while the Supreme Court is
moving toward greater protection of commercial speech,21 6 Maryland
courts may be clinging to an antiquated test. Although the Court of
Appeals reached the same conclusion in favor of commercial speech
as the Supreme Court did in 44 Liquormart, its straight application of
the Central Hudson test overlooked the vigorous debate of 44
Liquormart.
Because both the Store's brief 217 and the amicus curiae brief " 8
relied heavily on 44 Liquormart,it is odd that the Court of Appeals did
not mention the case at all. The County tried to remove Jakannafrom
the scope of 44 Liquormart altogether, by arguing that "l[t] he County
has not promulgated and enforced a paternalistic statute that bans
speech for the purpose of 'keep [ing] legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace.' 122
That statement, however, is erroneous. By requiring
licensing before truthfully advertising closing-out sales, Montgomery
County impeded the free flow of commercial information that benefits both consumers and businesses. In both Jakanna and 44 Liquormart, the government attempted to regulate certain commercial
speech in order to protect consumers from making their own choices
in the marketplace. 22' This paternalistic ordinance by Montgomery
County is equally as repugnant to the First Amendment as were the
liquor advertising ban in 44 Liquormart22 1 and the prescription drug
advertising ban in Virginia Pharmacy.2 22
Despite the absence of 44 Liquormartin the reasoning of its opinion, the Court of Appeals intuitively followed 44 Liquormart's lead in
heightening the protection of commercial speech. However, the
court's application of the inconsistent CentralHudson test, without the
215. See supra text accompanying notes 117-141. Note especially justice Stevens's plurality opinion and Justice Thomas's concurring opinion.
216. See Costello, supra note 86, at 748.
217. Brief of Appellant at 9-28, Jakanna (No. 18).
218. The Washington Legal Foundation filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the
Appellant. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Washington Legal Foundation in Support of
Appellant at 2, 9-13, Jakanna Woodworks, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 344 Md. 584, 689
A.2d 65 (1997) (No. 18).
219. Brief of Appellee at 8, Jakanna Woodworks, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 344 Md.
584, 689 A.2d 65 (1997) (No. 18) (second alteration in original) (quoting 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 16-23, 118-121.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 135-139.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 51-57.
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acknowledgment of 44 Liquormart, leaves questions as to the court's
awareness of the Supreme Court's shifting attitude toward commercial
speech. There is a possibility that the Maryland court wanted to distinguish itself as a champion of the traditional Central Hudson test,
aligning itself with those Justices on the Supreme Court who are not
yet willing to abandon or revise Central Hudson.22 3
The Court of Appeals may have had good reasons to steer clear of
44 Liquormart. However, because the Supreme Court's reevaluation of
the Central Hudson test was an integral part of 44 Liquormart, it was
imperative for the state court to include that decision in its Jakanna
analysis.
b. Freedman: Scrutinizing Prior Restraint on Commercial
Speech.-In the second part of his opinion, Judge Chasanow easily
struck down the ordinance under the Supreme Court's procedural
guidelines for licensing statutes announced in Freedman v. Maryland.2 24 Over two decades ago, in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court spoke
of "common-sense" differences between commercial and noncommercial speech, expressing in dicta that prior restraints on commercial
speech do not carry as strong a presumption against validity as do
prior restraints on political speech because of the "hardy" nature of
commercial speech.22 5 However, the result reached by the Court of
Appeals followed the Supreme Court's trend in providing greater protection for commercial speech.
Thus, while erring in not addressing 44 Liquormart, the court
seemed to be on the cutting edge in its extension of the Supreme
Court's prior restraint doctrine to commercial speech. In Freedman
and its progeny, the court found the extra support it needed to buttress its otherwise shaky determination of the ordinance's unconstitutionality under the CentralHudson test. In finding the ordinance to be
an invalid prior restraint, the Court of Appeals lent its holding more
credibility.
The Court of Appeals innovatively applied prior restraint precedents, normally used in political speech contexts, to Jakanna-acommercial speech case involving a licensing requirement. Jakanna is
unique because it raises both commercial speech and prior restraint
issues; the key was to label commercial speech as the dominant issue.
Although the Supreme Court has not decided whether its prior re-

223. See supra note 140.

224. 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965).
225. See supra text accompanying note 60.
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straint doctrine should apply to commercial speech cases, the Court of
Appeals has answered in the affirmative.
The court properly relied on City of Lakewood v. Plain DealerPublishing Co., 22 6 which dealt with the licensing of newsracks on public
property, an arguably commercial speech issue.22 7 Regardless of
whether prior restraint analysis has been used before in commercial
speech cases, the outcome reached by the Jakanna court was consistent with its other finding of overbreadth under the Central Hudson
test. The court correctly decided under Freedman that the Montgomery County Director had unfettered discretion to grant or deny permits and an unlimited amount of time in which to make her
decision.2 2 8 Therefore, the court concluded that the Montgomery
County ordinance constituted an invalid prior restraint on commercial speech in violation of the First Amendment.
By using prior restraint analysis in conjunction with a traditional
application of the CentralHudson test, the Court of Appeals made definite strides toward narrowing the gap between First Amendment protection of commercial and noncommercial speech. Despite its failure
to address the Supreme Court's doubts about the CentralHudson test,
Jakanna provides greater constitutional armor for commercial speech
through its prior restraint analysis. This step toward freeing the flow
of commercial speech is crucial to the healthy functioning of a democratic society, in which people are free to shop the marketplace of
2 29
ideas for themselves.
5. Conclusion.-In Jakanna Woodworks, Inc. v. Montgomery County,
the Court of Appeals followed the Supreme Court's recent trend toward greater protection of commercial speech. However, the court's
failure to acknowledge the implications of the Supreme Court's 44
Liquormartdecision left a serious gap in its rationale. Nonetheless, the
court's novel and convincing use of prior restraint analysis to invalidate the licensing regulation of commercial speech should ensure
Jakanna's precedential value for future commercial speech cases in
Maryland.
MELISSA

K.

FELICIANO

226. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
227. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (striking
down an ordinance banning newsracks distributing primarily advertisements on public
property).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 194-198.
229. See generally Kozinski & Banner, Who's Afraid?, supra note 45 (providing compelling
reasons for giving commercial speech the same protection as political speech).
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III.

A.

CONSTRUCTION LAW

Mutual Express Agreement Required Before a Party Can
Compel Arbitration

In HartfordAccident & Indemnity Co. v. Scarlett HarborAssociates Ltd.
1 the Court of Appeals held that by issuing a performance
Partnership,
bond that incorporated by reference a mandatory arbitration provision from a contract between a developer and a contractor, a surety
could not enforce arbitration against the developer in an action on the
bond.2 The co urt correctly reached this decision by adhering to the
requirement for a mutual express agreement before one party can
compel arbitration.' In so doing, the court refused to rewrite a contract even when faced with the strong public policy favoring arbitra-

tion that has been followed blindly in some other jurisdictions.4
1. The Case.-In January 1993, the Scarlett Place Residential
Condominium owners filed suit against the complex's developer,
Scarlett Harbor Associates Limited Partnership, and its present and
former general partners known collectively as SHALP. 5 In that suit,
the condominium owners alleged construction and design defects in
the Scarlett Place Residential Condominium situated on the edge of
the Inner Harbor in downtown Baltimore City.6 In response, SHALP
filed third-party claims against the subcontractors, including Leonard
A. Kraus, Inc. (Kraus) and its surety, the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (Hartford).'

Kraus and Hartford filed "Petitions to Compel Arbitration and to
Stay Proceedings" against them in circuit court.' Kraus centered its
1. 346 Md. 122, 695 A.2d 153 (1997).
2. Id. at 131-32, 695 A.2d at 157.
3. See id. at 127-32, 695 A.2d at 155-57.
4. See id. Several other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have overlooked
shortfalls in mutual consent and relied on a strong public policy interest to compel arbitration. See, e.g., Boys Club of San Fernando Valley, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 8 Cal. Rptr.
2d 587, 590 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding a surety bound by an arbitration clause when the
performance bond at issue incorporated by reference the terms of the general contract);
see also infra notes 84-112 and accompanying text.
5. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 109 Md.
App. 217, 229, 674 A.2d 106, 112 (1996), affd, 346 Md. 122, 695 A.2d 153 (1997).
6. Id at 232-34, 674 A.2d at 113-14. According to the condominium owners, the design defects included drainage problems in the entrance and deck areas, a malfunctioning
phone system, damaged interior brass work, and poorly installed window flashing. Id. at
232-33, 674 A.2d at 113-14.
7. Id. at 229, 674 A.2d at 112. As required by the SHALP-Kraus contract, Hartford
issued a performance bond for Kraus. Hartford, 346 Md. at 125, 695 A.2d at 154.
8. Hartford, 109 Md. App. at 235, 674 A.2d at 114.
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claim for compulsory arbitration on its contract with SHALP.9 Paragraph 7.9.1 of the contract's General Conditions provided for arbitration of "'[a]ll claims, disputes and other matters in question between
the Contractor [Kraus] and the Owner [SHALP] arising out of or relating to the Contract Documents or the breach thereof."'' l Likewise,
Hartford based its petition for arbitration on that same arbitration
clause in the contract between SHALP and Kraus." Specifically, Hartford predicated its petition on the theory that the bond incorporated
the contract by reference and therefore included the arbitration
clause. 2 The trial court granted Kraus's petition for arbitration, but it
denied Hartford's petition because the plain language of the bond
did not clearly indicate an agreement between SHALP and Hartford
13
to arbitrate.
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals held, inter alia, that the
trial court had correctly denied Hartford's petition to compel SHALP
to arbitrate.' 4 Before this intermediate appellate court, Hartford asserted that by incorporating by reference the SHALP-Kraus contract
into the bond, its intent to arbitrate was made clear.' 5 The court,
however, found this fact to be indeterminate, stressing that the objective theory of contracts is the basis for interpreting contracts in Maryland. 6 Rather, the Court of Special Appeals concluded, the bond
incorporated the Kraus subcontract purely to "establish the primary
obligation on which Hartford's secondary obligation would de-

9. Id. The SHALP-Kraus contract was based on the 1980 edition of the American
Institute of Architects Document A201/CM. Hartford,346 Md. at 124 n.2, 695 A.2d at 154
n.2; see also AMERICAN INST. OF ARCHITECTS DOCUMENT A201/CM: GENERAL CONDITIONS OF
THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION (construction management ed. 1980).
10. Hartford, 346 Md. at 124 n.3, 695 A.2d at 154 n.3. (quoting the SHALP-Kraus
contract).
11. Hartford, 109 Md. App. at 235, 684 A.2d at 114.
12. Hartford, 346 Md. at 126, 695 A.2d at 155. The SHALP-Kraus contract required
Kraus to obtain a performance bond. Id. at 125, 695 A.2d at 154. Hartford provided Kraus
a bond that named SHALP as the obligee and that read in pertinent part: "'Whereas,
Principal [Kraus] has by written agreement... entered into a subcontract with Obligee
[SHALP] for Renovation and addition to Scarlett [Place] . . . which subcontract is by reference
made a part hereof and is hereinafter referred to as the subcontract.'" Id. at 125, 695 A.2d at
154 (quoting the bond issued by Hartford).
13. Id. at 125, 695 A.2d at 154-55. The circuit court ruled on many other issues, none
of which, however, related to the discussion of arbitration. See Hartford, 109 Md. App. at
234-38, 674 A.2d at 114-16.
14. Hartford, 109 Md. App. at 240, 674 A.2d at 117.
15. Id. at 292, 674 A.2d at 143.
16. Id. at 291, 674 A.2d at 142. The court defined the objective theory as what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have understood the language of the
agreement to mean at the time of its formation. Id.
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pend."' 7 The court also rejected Hartford's argument because it overlooked the specificity in the arbitration agreement between SHALP
and Kraus." s In so doing, the court reasoned that the "incorporation
of one contract into another contract does not automatically transform the incorporated contract into an agreement between the parties to the second contract.""9
Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision to deny Hartford's petition to arbitrate.2" Hartford
then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which granted certiorari2 to
review the question whether a surety, which issued a performance
bond that incorporated by reference a mandatory arbitration clause
from the contract between the principal and the obligee, can compel
the obligee to arbitrate in an action on the bond.2 2
2. Legal Background.-Marylandhas consistently adhered to the
requirement for a mutual express agreement before a party can compel arbitration. 23 While Maryland recognizes the benefits of arbitration, 24 it correctly refuses to interpret contracts liberally to favor
arbitration. 25 Numerous Maryland cases have addressed situations
where parties have attempted to compel arbitration, 26 but none have
addressed the situation where a non-party to an arbitration agreement
attempted to compel a party to arbitrate. Due to the limited number
of Maryland decisions focusing on this particular issue, after reviewing
the Maryland cases it will be helpful to examine decisions from other
jurisdictions 27 to understand fully the development of the law in this
area.

17. Id. at 292, 674 A.2d at 143.
18. Id, 674 A.2d at 142. The agreement required arbitration between the owner,
SHALP, and the contractor, Kraus, but not between SHALP and any other party associated

with Kraus. I&
19. Id. at 292, 674 A.2d at 143.
20. Id. at 296, 674 A.2d at 144.

21. Hartford Acc. v. Scarlett Harbor, 343 Md. 334, 681 A.2d 70 (1996).
22. Hartford, 346 Md. at 126-27, 695 A.2d at 155.
23. See, e.g., Curtis G. Testerman Co. v. Buck, 340 Md. 569, 579-80, 667 A.2d 649, 654
(1995) (requiring that an arbitration agreement must first exist between the parties before

arbitration can be compelled).
24. See, e.g., Bel Pre Med. Ctr. v. Frederick Contractors, 21 Md. App. 307, 320, 320 A.2d
558, 565 (1974) (noting Maryland's policy favoring the settlement of disputes through
arbitration), cause remanded, 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975).
25. See infra notes 28-80 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 28-80 and accompanying text.
27. See infta notes 84-112 and accompanying text.
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a. Maiyland Law.-In Maryland, arbitration is a long-accepted method of resolving legal disputes. 2 8 In 1946, the Court of
Appeals stated that "i]t is a fundamental principle that where the
parties'to a dispute decide of their own accord to submit their dispute
to arbitration without restriction or condition, the award

. . .

is bind-

ing and conclusive upon the parties. '2 9 At common law, however, the
30
courts exhibited a generally ambivalent attitude toward arbitration.
While suits to enforce an arbitration award were viewed as "favored"
actions, executory arbitration agreements were assigned "unfavored"
31
status, and suits to compel arbitration could not be brought.
In Maryland, the common law governed the enforcement of arbitration awards until 1965, when the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act
(MUAA) 32 was adopted.3 3 The MUAA was seen as a "radical departure from the common law."' 34 Two of the more significant changes
were that the MUAA compelled courts to uphold executory agreements to arbitrate and to hear suits to compel arbitration or stay suits
pending arbitration. The Court of Special Appeals, in Bel Pre Medical
Center v. Frederick Contractors,36 specifically noted that the enactment of
the statute established Maryland's policy favoring the settlement of
disputes through arbitration and "ended the ambivalence of courts
under the common law."37 -The basis for this public policy in support
of arbitration is to save time and judicial resources and "to foster voluntary resolution of disputes in a forum created, controlled and ad28. See, e.g., Roberts Bros. v. Consumers Can Co., 102 Md. 362, 368, 62 A. 585, 587
(1905) (indicating that arbitration is intended to resolve disputes in a "simple and inexpensive" manner and that fair decisions will be supported by the courts). In 1930, the
Court of Appeals extended the preferred status of arbitration by stating that "[a] rbitration
is a method favored by law for the settlement of disputes." O'Ferrall v. De Luxe Sign Co.,
158 Md. 544, 552, 149 A. 290, 294 (1930).
29. Continental Milling & Feed Co. v. Doughnut Corp. of Am., 186 Md. 669, 674, 48
A.2d 447, 449 (1946).
30. See, e.g.,
id. at 675, 48 A.2d at 450 (warning that if arbitrators exceed their authority,
their award is void to that extent).
31. See Bel Pre Med. Ctr. v. Frederick Contractors, 21 Md. App. 307, 316-17, 320 A.2d
558, 563-64 (1974) (describing common law courts' ambivalence toward the arbitration
process), cause remanded, 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975).
32. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. §§ 3-201 to -234 (1995 & Supp. 1997).
33. See Bel Pre, 21 Md. App. at 317, 320 A.2d at 564.
34. Id. at 319-20, 320 A.2d at 565.
35. Id. at 320, 320 A.2d at 565.
36. 21 Md. App. 307, 320 A.2d 558 (1974), cause remanded, 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526
(1975).
37. Id. at 320, 320 A.2d at 565. Maryland's policy favoring arbitration is consistent with
federal policy. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582-83 (1960) (noting the "congressional policy in favor of settlement of disputes ...
through the machinery of arbitration").
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ministered according to the parties' agreement to arbitrate."3 8 In
accordance with this legislative policy, the role of the courts in Maryland, when dealing with arbitration controversies, is limited to the determination of whether "there39 [is] an agreement to arbitrate the
subject matter of the dispute."

Even with the strong public policy favoring arbitration, Maryland
courts still require express consent of the parties to compel arbitration.40 The foundations of the consent requirement in Maryland appeared in ContinentalMilling & Feed Co. v. Doughnut Corp. of America,4 1
in which the Court of Appeals held that only the specific express consent of the parties to an agreement can create the basis for the arbitrator's jurisdiction.4 2 In Continental, the operator of a flour mill brought
suit in equity against its buyer for underpayment. 4 The parties to the
suit contested specific matters submitted for arbitration and sought a
ruling to determine whether the arbitrators had exceeded their authority.44 Upon consideration, the Court of Appeals found that, "[i] n
order that an award shall be binding, the arbitrators must follow exactly the authority given them by the agreement of the parties."4 5 The
38. Bel Pre, 21 Md. App. at 320, 320 A.2d at 565 (citing, among other cases, Maietta v.
Greenfield, 267 Md. 287, 291, 297 A.2d 244, 246 (1972) (superseded by the recodification
of the MUAA, Mn. CODE ANN., C-s. &JUD. PROC. §§ 3-201 to -234 (1974)).
39. Id., 320 A.2d at 566; accordUnited Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,
567-68 (1960) (holding that the role of the court, in a motion to compel arbitration,
should be restricted to determining whether the dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement).
40. See Curtis G. Testerman Co. v. Buck, 340 Md. 569, 579-80, 667 A.2d 649, 654 (1995)
(holding that a non-party corporate officer was not bound by an arbitration award); Continental Milling & Feed Co. v. Doughnut Corp. of Am., 186 Md. 669, 675-76, 48 A.2d 447,
450 (1946) (holding that the express consent of the parties is required to establish an
arbitrator's jurisdiction); see also A.B. Eng'g Co. v. RSH Int'l, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 1259, 1263
(D. Md. 1986) (mem.) (ruling that there was no legal basis to impose arbitration upon a
non-party to an arbitration agreement).
41. 186 Md. 669, 48 A.2d 447 (1946).
42. Id. at 675-76, 48 A.2d at 450; accord Stephen L. Messersmith, Inc. v. Barclay
Townhouse Assocs., 313 Md. 652, 658, 547 A.2d 1048, 1051 (1988) (holding that, absent an
arbitration agreement between the parties, an arbitration panel cannot validly assert
jurisdiction).
43. Continenta 186 Md. at 672, 48 A.2d at 448.
44. Id. at 675, 48 A.2d at 450.
45. Id. For authority on the issue of arbitration jurisdiction, the court looked to New
York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Cardozo's examination of the issue:
"The question is one of intention, to be ascertained by the same tests that are
applied to contracts generally. * * * No one is under a duty to resort to these
conventional tribunals, however helpful their processes, except to the extent that
he has signified his willingness. Our own favor or disfavor of the cause of arbitration is not to count as a factor in the appraisal of the thought of others."
Id. (star ellipsis in original) (quoting Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 169 N.E. 386,
391 (N.Y. 1929) (Cardozo, C.J.)).
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court reasoned that "the terms of an arbitration agreement must not
be strained to discover power to pass upon matters in dispute."4 6 Further, the court noted that such provisions must be "clear and unmistakable to oust the jurisdiction of the Court, for trial by jury cannot be
taken away in any case merely by implication."4 7 The Continentalcourt
found that although the arbitrators had the authority to establish the
amount of the underpayment, they had exceeded their authority by
making their award for a shorter period of time than that designated
in the arbitration agreement.4" The reduction in the award based on
the decreased time period was therefore not binding on the parties.49
Forty years later, in A.B. Engineering Co. v. RSH International,
Inc.,5 ° the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
noted that in Maryland, arbitration cannot be imposed unless the parties to the arbitration at issue expressly agreed to arbitrate.5 1 Specifically, the court considered a dispute that arose from a joint venture
created to design transportation infrastructure in Jubail, Saudi Arabia,5 2 and held that a non-party parent company could not be compelled to arbitrate based on an agreement signed by its subsidiary.5 3
The party attempting to compel arbitration, A.B. Engineering Co.
(ABENGCO), urged the court to construe the arbitration agreement
liberally in accordance with public policy.5 4 ABENGCO argued, because the parent company and its subsidiary were essentially the same
entity, an agreement by the subsidiary necessarily bound the parent to
that agreement. 55 The court refused, however, to find that the parent
company was a de facto party to the agreement5 6 and reasoned that
"no matter how broadly an agreement is construed, it cannot impose
obligations on a person who is not a party to that agreement."5 7
More recently, in Curtis G. Testerman Co. v. Buck,58 the Maryland
Court of Appeals held that a corporate officer who was not a party to
an arbitration agreement could not be bound by an arbitration award
resulting from arbitration held in accordance with the terms of the
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 676, 48 A.2d at 450.
Id.
Id. at 676-77, 48 A.2d at 450.
Id. at 677, 48 A.2d at 450.
626 F. Supp. 1259 (D. Md. 1986) (mem.).
Id. at 1263.
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1263.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1262-63.
Id. at 1263.
340 Md. 569, 667 A.2d 649 (1995).
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agreement.5 9 In so ruling, the court took the opportunity to summarize the status of Maryland arbitration law.6 ° The court emphasized
that "the Arbitration Act leaves but one issue for the court to resolve:
'is there an agreement to arbitrate?"' 6 1 The court also reiterated that
it cannot force a party to submit to arbitration if the party has not
voluntarily and expressly agreed to arbitration.6 2 Additionally, the
court reflected that, based on the objective theory of contracts, the
intent of the parties as expressed in the contractual language controls
the analysis.63 Moreover, the court explained, only once a valid arbitration agreement exists can a court then consider the application of
the strong public policy favoring arbitration.'
Over the years, a number of cases have arisen in which the intent
of the parties to arbitrate was unclear because of ambiguous contractual language, and Maryland courts have interpreted such agreements
in favor of arbitration.6 5 For instance, in Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v.
LarmarCorp.,66 the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a
court or an arbitrator should initially determine if a dispute falls
within the scope of an arbitration clause.6 7 In Gold Coast Mall, a landlord brought an action in equity against its tenant for a percentage of
the rentals received by the tenant from its subtenants.6" The court
found that conflicting clauses, including an arbitration provision, rendered the lease ambiguous as to whether the particular dispute fell
within the scope of the arbitration agreement.6 9 The court held that
when the intent of the parties to arbitrate is unclear, the strong public
59. Id. at 580, 667 A.2d at 654. In Testerman, a group of homeowners brought suit over
a construction dispute against a contracting company and its president. Id. at 572-73, 667
A.2d at 651.
60. See id. at 579, 667 A.2d at 654.
61. Id. at 578, 667 A.2d at 653 (citing the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, Mn. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-207(b) (1995), and quoting Bel Pre Med. Ctr. v. Frederick
Contractors, 21 Md. App. 307, 320, 320 A.2d 558, 566 (1974), cause remanded, 274 Md. 307,
334 A.2d 526 (1975)).
62. See id. at 579-80, 667 A.2d at 654 (citing Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Larmar Corp., 298
Md. 96, 103, 468 A.2d 91, 95 (1983)).
63. Id. at 580, 667 A.2d at 654 (citing Kasten Constr. Co. v. Rod Enters., 268 Md. 318,
328-29, 301 A.2d 12, 18 (1973)).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Gold Coast Mall, 298 Md. at 107, 468 A.2d at 97 (holding that the arbitrator,
rather than the court, should initially determine whether a dispute is arbitrable).
66. 298 Md. 96, 468 A.2d 91 (1983).
67. Id. at 99, 468 A.2d at 93.
68. Id. at 100, 468 A.2d at 93.
69. Id. at 107, 468 A.2d at 97. The broad arbitration clause provided that " ' in the event
of disagreement between the parties ... such disagreement shall be submitted ... to ...
arbitration.'" Id. (second and third ellipses in original) (quoting the arbitration clause in
the lease). There were, however, several other clauses in the lease agreement that ap-
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policy in favor of arbitration dictates that the arbitrator, rather than
7°
the court, address the question of substantive arbitrability initially.
In so ruling, the court first defined arbitration as a matter of contract where "parties voluntarily agree to substitute a private tribunal
for the public tribunal otherwise available to them." 7 1 The court then
recognized that section 3-207(b) of the MUAA restricted the court's
role to determining only whether there existed an agreement to arbitrate the subject matter of the particular dispute.7 2 The court also
examined three other possible situations, all of which were distinct
from the factual scenario in Gold Coast Mall, and all of which- involved
the scope of arbitration clauses. 73 First, the court concluded that,
where the language of the arbitration clause is unambiguous and the
dispute plainly falls within the scope of the clause, arbitration should
be compelled.74 Second, when the dispute clearly falls beyond the
scope of the agreement, the court explained, the opposing party
should not be compelled to arbitrate. 75 Third, where the language of
an arbitration agreement imposes arbitration for all disputes arising
under a specific contract, all issues should be arbitrated unless specifically excluded.7 6
When attempting to determine the intent of the parties to a dispute, a court must consider collateral agreements that have incorporated the general contract by reference. 77 Because bond agreements
are regarded as any other written contract, 78 when interpreting bonds,
a court must ascertain the intent of the parties and enforce that intent

peared to provide the parties with remedies other than arbitration; hence, the ambiguity
arose. See id. at 108, 468 A.2d at 97.
70. Id. at 107, 468 A.2d at 97. Other cases have applied the public policy favoring
arbitration when the language of the arbitration clause is ambiguous. See, e.g., United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960) (establishing
the federal policy favoring arbitration); Bel Pre Med. Ctr. v. Frederick Contractors, 21 Md.
App. 307, 320-22, 320 A.2d 558, 565-66 (1974) (applying the public policy based on the
MUAA), cause remanded, 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975).
71. Gold Coast Mal, 298 Md. at 103, 468 A.2d at 95.
72. Id. at 103-04, 468 A.2d at 95; accord MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 3-207(b)
(1995) ("If the opposing party denies existence of an arbitration agreement, the court
shall proceed expeditiously to determine if the agreement exists.").
73. Gold Coast Mal, 298 Md. at 104-07, 468 A.2d at 95-97.
74. Id. at 104, 468 A.2d at 95.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Kirby & McGuire, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 210 Md. 383, 385, 123 A.2d 606,
608 (1956) (explaining the incorporation of a construction contract into a performance
bond).
78. See Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. W. &J. Knox Net & Twine Co., 150 Md. 40, 45,
132 A. 261, 262 (1926) (indicating that the liability of a surety is dependent upon its
agreements).
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where possible.79 Where a contract is incorporated by reference into
a bond, the bond and the contract "[will] be read and construed together, as if [the contract is] set forth in the bond." 0
In summary, while Maryland recognizes the strong public policy
supporting arbitration, 81 a court cannot compel a party to submit a
dispute to arbitration where that party has not agreed contractually to
do so. 82 Maryland, however, has never directly addressed the issue of

whether a performance bond that incorporates by reference a subcontract containing a provision mandating arbitration of disputes between parties to the subcontract entitles the surety to compel the
obligee to arbitrate in an action on the bond. A review of other jurisdictions, therefore, is necessary to gain a full understanding of the
development of the law in this area.8 3
b. Law from Other Jurisdictions.-In jurisdictions other than
Maryland, there has been a clear trend toward a more liberal interpretation of arbitration clauses. 84 The primary impetus for this trend has
been the strong public policy favoring arbitration.8 5 For example, in
Boys Club of San Fernando Valley, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,8 6 the California Court of Appeals held that by incorporating the general contract by reference in its bond, the surety intended and agreed to be
bound by the arbitration provision of the contract even though it was
not a party to the contract.8 7 In Boys Club, the general contractor,
McLaughlin, had entered into a contract to construct a recreation facility for the Boys Club.88 The contractor obtained a performance
bond, which incorporated the construction contract by reference,
through Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland in favor of the Boys
79. See Walsh v. Jefferson Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 216 Md. 131, 137, 139 A.2d 847, 850
(1958) (summarizing the rules for interpreting bonds).
80. Kirby & McGuire, 210 Md. at 385, 123 A.2d at 608.
81. See, e.g., Bel Pre Med. Ctr. v. Frederick Contractors, 21 Md. App. 307, 320, 320 A.2d
558, 565 (1974) (noting Maryland's policy favoring the settlement of disputes through
arbitration), cause remanded, 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975).
82. See, e.g., Curtis G. Testerman Co. v. Buck, 340 Md. 569, 579, 667 A.2d 649, 654
(1995) (finding that although Maryland recognizes the public policy favoring arbitration,
an arbitration agreement must first exist between the parties).
83. The Court of Appeals has noted thit federal decisions interpreting the Federal
Arbitration Act are persuasive when construing the MUAA based on the similar policies
behind the two acts. See Testerman, 340 Md. at 580 n.5, 667 A.2d at 655 n.5.
84. John G. McGill, Bonds and Arbitration, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Apr. 1994, at 18, 22-23.
85. See id at 23 (referring to both a strong federal and prevailing state policy favoring
arbitration).
86. 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587 (Ct. App. 1992).
87. Id. at 590.
88. Id. at 588.
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Club.8 9 A dispute over defects in construction arose, and the Boys
Club moved to compel the surety to arbitrate. 0
The surety argued that it could not be held to the arbitration
agreement because it was not a party to the contract containing that
agreement.9 1 The court, however, rejected this argument, reasoning
that the act of incorporating the construction contract containing the
arbitration agreement was an expression by the surety of its intent "to
be bound by the arbitration provision in the contract even though it
was not a party to the contract. '9 2 The Boys Club court additionally
relied on the strong public policy in favor of arbitration to support its
decision to compel the surety to arbitrate.9"
The United States District Court for the District of Maine also
addressed the issue of incorporation by reference in a case in which
the performance bond referred specifically to litigation.9 4 In Cianbro
Corp. v. Empresa Nacional de Ingenieria y Technologia, S.A. 9 5 the court
held that a surety was bound to arbitrate a dispute under its bond,
which incorporated by reference a subcontract containing a
mandatory arbitration clause. 6 In Cianbro, the owner of the Fairfield
Energy Venture contracted with Cianbro to construct a wood-fired
power plant.9 7 In a subcontract containing a mandatory arbitration
clause, Empresa Nacional de Ingenieria y Technologia, S.A. (ENSA)

89. Id. at 588-89.
90. Id. at 589.
91. Id. The original arbitration agreement required the parties to arbitrate "'[a]ll
claims, disputes and other matters in question between the Contractor and the Owner
arising out of, or relating to, the Contract Documents or the breach thereof."' Id at 588
(alteration in original) (quoting the contract between the owner and the general
contractor).
92. Id. at 590.
93. See id. (indicating that California favors arbitration as a method of dispute resolution). Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a surety
was bound by an arbitration clause when the performance bond at issue incorporated by

reference the terms of the subcontract, which, in turn, incorporated obligations of the
general contract. Exchange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haskell Co., 742 F.2d 274, 276 (6th Cir. 1984)
(per curiam).
94. See Cianbro Corp. v. Empresa Nacional de Ingenieria y Technologia, S.A., 697 F.
Supp. 15, 18 (D. Me. 1988) (order) (ordering the surety to arbitrate because its bond
unambiguously incorporated the subcontract by reference and because the subcontract
contained a mandatory arbitration clause). Similarly, in 1990, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia held that the surety was bound to arbitrate
based on the incorporation of a subcontract containing an unequivocal arbitration clause
into the performance bond. See Transamerica Premier Ins. Co. v. Collins & Co., Gen.
Contractors, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1050, 1051 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (order).
95. 697 F. Supp. 15 (D. Me. 1988) (order).
96. Id.
97. Id at 16.
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agreed to provide Cianbro with materials and services.9 8 ENSA obtained a performance bond, which incorporated the subcontract by
reference, with the Insurance Company of North America in favor of
Cianbro. 99 A dispute over the performance of ENSA arose, and when
the American Arbitration Association released the surety from arbitration, Cianbro brought suit to compel the surety to arbitrate.1 °°
The court, applying section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act,10 1
relied heavily on the strong public policy supporting arbitration in
rejecting the surety's argument that language in the bond agreement
10 2
referring to litigation manifested the parties' intent not to arbitrate.
Basing its ruling on the incorporation of the subcontract into the
bond, the Cianbro court reasoned that "[t]he mere fact that [the
surety] is not a signatory to the Subcontract... does not preclude it
from being subject to the arbitration clause.""0 3 Thus, rejecting the
allegedly expressed intent of the surety, the court ordered the surety
to arbitrate the dispute with the contractor."0 4
The Florida District Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
whether a non-party to an agreement could compel arbitration in
Henderson Investment Corp. v. InternationalFidelity Insurance Co.1°5 The
Henderson court held that a surety could compel arbitration when its
performance bond incorporated by reference a construction contract
containing an arbitration clause. 10 6 In Henderson, an owner had
agreed to bind himself to arbitration for all contract disputes between
himself and the contractor. 10 7 Significantly, the incorporated arbitra98. Id. The arbitration agreement read in pertinent part: "'All other claims, disputes,
and other matters in question arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach
thereof.., shall be decided by arbitration ....'" Id& at 16 n.1 (quoting Article 14.2 of the
subcontract between the general contractor and the subcontractor).
99. Id. at 16.
100. Id. at 17.
101. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1954) (currently codified as 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994)). The crux of the
Act's pro-arbitration policy is outlined in 9 U.S.C. § 2, which states that agreements to
arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." Id. The Supreme Court has stated
unequivocally that the Act established that "any doubts concerning the scope of the arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). The Court further labeled the Act, specifically section 2, a "congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements." Id. at 24.
102. See Cianbro, 697 F. Supp. at 19 (finding that the language of the bond was not
intended to preempt the arbitration clause incorporated by reference from the
subcontract).
103. Id. at 17.
104. Id. at 18.
105. 575 So. 2d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
106. Id at 772.
107. Id. at 771.
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tion clause specifically identified the owner and the contractor."'
Later, the owner filed an action against the contractor's bond alleging
breach of contract; as a result, the surety moved to compel arbitration
under the arbitration clause of the construction contract.' 0 9
The Florida District Court of Appeals relied on the general rule
of contract law "that where a writing expressly describes another document, the other document is to be interpreted as part of the writing.""'
Additionally, the court emphasized that the surety's
obligations under the bond agreement are commensurate with those
of the contractor under the subcontract."' Finally, the Henderson
court held that when a surety incorporates by reference a construction
contract containing an arbitration clause, it is bound to arbitrate;
therefore, the surety "should also be allowed to invoke arbitration as
well."" 2
Even when faced with the strong public policy favoring arbitration, Maryland courts have refused to rewrite contracts." By so doing, Maryland has resisted a trend followed in many other
jurisdictions" 4 and has preserved the requirement for an express
agreement to arbitrate." 5 .
3. The Court'sReasoning.-In HartfordAccident & Indemnity Co. v.
Scarlett Harbor Associates Ltd. Partnership, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a surety, which issued a performance
bond that incorporated by reference a mandatory arbitration clause
from the contract between the principal and the obligee, can compel
the obligee to arbitrate in an action on the bond." 6 The Court of
Appeals held that the surety could not force a developer to arbitrate
an action on a bond, when that developer had not agreed to arbitrate
its claim against the surety."1 7 The court's analysis focused primarily
on three areas: the fundamentals of Maryland arbitration law, the ef108. I. The arbitration clause stated in pertinent part: "'All claims, disputes and other
matters in question between the contractor and the owner arising out of, or relating to, the
contract documents or the breach thereof... shall be decided by arbitration....'" Id.
(quoting the contract between the owner and the contractor).
109. Id.
110. Id. (citation omitted).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 772.
113. See, e.g., Curtis G. Testerman Co. v. Buck, 340 Md. 569, 580-81, 667 A.2d 649, 654-55
(1995) (finding that although Maryland recognizes the public policy favoring arbitration,
an arbitration agreement must first exist between the parties).
114. See supra notes 84-112 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Testerman, 340 Md. at 579-80, 667 A.2d at 654.
116. Hartford, 346 Md. at 126-27, 695 A.2d at 155.
117. Id. at 131-32. 695 A.2d at 157.
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fect of incorporating contract clauses, and the balancing of the strong
public policy in favor of arbitration against basic common law principles of contract law."1
In addressing the issue of whether a surety can enforce an arbitration agreement in a contract to which it was a non-party, the court
began by summarizing the fundamentals of arbitration law in Maryland.119 Specifically, the court looked to its decision in Curtis G. Testerman Co. v. Buck for guidance. 2 ° The court emphasized that
arbitration is a voluntary process that requires an unambiguous agreement between two or more parties to arbitrate, and that no one can
be forced to accept arbitration against her will.121 The court reasoned
that "[a] rbitration is 'consensual; a creature of contract. As such, only
those parties who consent can be bound."'12 2 Applying these concepts to the facts of Hartford,the court found that the only parties who
had agreed to arbitrate in this case were SHALP and Kraus.' 2 3
The court next reviewed the attempt by Hartford to use the
bond's incorporation-by-reference clause to compel SHALP to arbitrate. 124 The Court of Appeals, agreeing with the Court of Special
Appeals, found that the SHALP-Kraus contract contained a specific
agreement "whereby those two parties agree [d] to arbitrate with each
other."'125 The court indicated that the incorporation clause simply
served to indicate the primary contract on which the bond depends. 26 The court thus concluded that the net effect of incorporat118. See id. at 127-32, 695 A.2d at 155-57.
119. Id. at 127, 695 A.2d at 155.
120. Id.(citing Testerman, 340 Md. at 578-80, 667 A.2d at 653-55).
121. Id. (citing Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Larmar Corp., 298 Md. 96, 103, 468 A-2d 91, 95
(1983)).
122. Id. (quoting ThomasJ. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search
for Workable Solutions, 72 IowA L. REv. 473, 476-77 (1987) (citing Martin K. Eby Constr. Co.
v. City of Arvada, 522 F. Supp. 449, 451 (D. Colo. 1981) (mem.); accord MARTIN DOMKE,
DoMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01, at I (rev. ed. 1984))).
123. Id. at 128, 695 A.2d at 155-56. Hartford's claim to arbitration was based on the
incorporation of the SHALP-Kraus contract in a bond agreement that Hartford itself had
prepared. Id.
124. See id. at 129, 695 A.2d at 156.
125. Id. at 128, 695 A.2d at 155. The court also pointed out that because the SHALPKraus contract lacked a requirement for inclusion of an arbitration provision in any bond
furnished by Kraus, Hartford's claim for arbitration relied exclusively on the incorporation-by-reference clause contained in the performance bond issued by Hartford. Id., 695
A.2d at 155-56.
126. See id. at 128, 695 A.2d at 156 ("'[O]rdinarily the surety bond will be interpreted in
the light of the contract, the performance of which is secured by the bond. The use of an
express incorporation by reference clause is therefore more a matter of caution to make
certain that the bond will be so construed.'" (quoting 13 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw § 47:24, at 244 (2d ed. rev. vol. 1982))).
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ing the arbitration clause of the primary contract into the bond was
nothing more than incorporating the explicit agreement between
1 27
SHALP and Kraus.
Moreover, the court refused to approve the surety's attempt to
expand the obligation of the obligee, SHALP. 12 ' The obligee, the
court found, was not a direct party to the agreement between the principal and the surety, and the obligee never expressly agreed to arbitrate with the surety. 129 The court reasoned that the bond served "'to
protect the [owner] from loss.. . and [could not] be construed to add
to, or change any of the terms of the contract. "'130
The court also directly addressed the strong public policy favoring arbitration, a policy that has been the primary reason that other
jurisdictions have ruled differently on this issue. 131 In so doing, the
court criticized the reliance of courts in other jurisdictions on this
132
policy at the expense of a true analysis of the underlying contract.
The Court of Appeals stressed that a proper analysis must include a
thorough review of the express language contained within the arbitration clause and must respect the contract rights of the parties.' 3 3 The
court noted that, in this case, the arbitration clause explicitly identified the developer and the contractor as the parties to the arbitration
clause. 134 In Hartford, the court applied the requirement of a mutual
express agreement and refused to follow a blanket public policy favoring arbitration at the expense of the contract rights of one of the parties to the agreement.'

127. Id. at 129, 695 A.2d at 156.
128. Id. at 129-30, 695 A.2d at 156-57.
129. Id.

The court emphasized that SHALP did not exhibit an element of consensual

modification regarding the scope of the agreement to arbitrate. Id. at 130, 695 A.2d at
157. Thus, the court surmised, SHALP's acceptance of the surety agreement could not be
viewed as an acceptance of an offer by Hartford to arbitrate. Id.

130. Id. at 130, 695 A.2d at 156-57 (quoting Milske v. Steiner Mantel Co., 103 Md. 235,
247, 63 A. 471, 473 (1906)).
131. See id. at 131, 695 A.2d at 157. The court acknowledged that support for Hartford's
position can be found in other jurisdictions, but it dismissed the reasoning in these cases as
inconsistent with Maryland's contract analysis. See id. at 130-31, 695 A.2d at 157; see also

supra notes 84-112 and accompanying text (discussing the trend in other jurisdictions to
rule in favor of arbitration).
132. See Hatford, 346 Md. at 129 n.7, 695 A.2d at 156 n.7 ("The analysis ... [in other
jurisdictions] does not go beyond the fact that the contract containing an arbitration provision has been incorporated into the bond.").

133. See id. at 127-32, 695 A.2d at 155-57.
134. Id. at 128, 695 A.2d at 155; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
135. Hatford, 346 Md. at 131, 695 A.2d at 157.
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4. Analysis.-In Hartford, the Court of Appeals held that a court
cannot compel a party to submit a dispute to arbitration in the absence of a contractual agreement to do so. 136 The court's decision,
which comports with Maryland precedent,1 3 v reflects the Marylandjudiciary's refusal to disregard basic contracting principles.1 3 The
Court of Appeals appropriately refused to rewrite the clear language
of the contract, even to comply with the strong public policy support13 9
ing arbitration.
a. Hartford Distinguished from Seemingly Similar Cases.Although Hartford is consistent with Maryland law, a large number of
other jurisdictions have held the opposite in factually similar cases14°
In those cases, however, there were subtle but significant factual differences. In particular, there are two facts that distinguish Hartford
from most of these non-Maryland cases in which courts have compelled arbitration in similar circumstances: the party that is being
compelled to arbitrate and the specificity of the arbitration
1
agreement. 41
First, in Hartford, the party seeking to compel arbitration was the
surety, 1 42 whereas in the majority of non-Maryland cases on point the
surety was being compelled to arbitrate. 14 The specific party seeking

136. Id. at 131-32, 695 A.2d at 157.
137. See supra notes 28-80 and accompanying text. Hartford may even be viewed as an
extension of Maryland law, because it is the first Maryland case in which a non-party to an
arbitration provision attempted to compel a party to the provision to arbitrate.
138. See, e.g., Curtis G. Testerman Co. v. Buck, 340 Md. 569, 579-80, 667 A.2d 649, 654
(1995) (providing a summary of the status of Maryland law regarding arbitration).
139. See Hartford, 346 Md. at 131, 695 A.2d at 157 (recognizing that "there is a strong
policy favoring arbitration and a strong policy to avoid repetitious hearings"); see also A.B.
Eng'g Co. v. RSH Int'l, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 1259, 1263 (D. Md. 1986) (mem.) (refusing to
construe an arbitration agreement liberally to impose obligations on a non-party to the
agreement).
140. See supra notes 84-112 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Boys Club of San Fernando Valley, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 8 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 587, 590-91 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding a non-party bound to a broadly worded
arbitration clause); see also supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
142. Hartford,346 Md. at 126, 695 A.2d at 154.
143. See, e.g., Exchange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haskell Co., 742 F.2d 274, 276 (6th Cir. 1984)
(per curiam) (holding that a surety was bound by an arbitration clause in a performance
bond that incorporated by reference the terms of a subcontract, which, in turn, incorporated the obligations of the general contract); Cianbro Corp. v. Empresa Nacional de Ingenieria y Technologia, S.A., 697 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D. Me. 1988) (order) (holding that an
arbitration clause in a subcontract was incorporated by reference into performance and
payment bonds, and ordering a surety to arbitrate on the grounds of these incorporations); Boys Club, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590-91 (holding that by incorporating a construction
contract by language in its bond, a surety intended and agreed to be bound by an arbitration provision in the contract, despite being a non-party to that contract).
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to compel arbitration is an important factor to be considered in ruling
on cases such as those at issue. When a surety bonds the work of a
contractor and, in so doing, incorporates the construction contract
into the bond agreement, it has taken an affirmative step to include
the arbitration clause. It is thus reasonable to require the surety to
arbitrate under the incorporated provision, because the surety drafted
the bond to include the arbitration clause. Conversely, an owner may
have required a performance bond without having necessarily expressly agreed to arbitrate disputes under the bond, as was the case in
Hartford.1 44 To force the owner to arbitrate would violate that party's
clearly expressed intent under the original contract. While the surety
may make an informed decision to contract with the principal and
bind itself to the obligee, the obligee does not necessarily make such a
choice. Therefore, the obligee should not be bound to arbitrate with
the surety.
Second, broad, inclusive language in the arbitration clause (as
opposed to narrow, exclusive language in the same) may have a major
impact on whether a nonsignatory will fall under the scope of the arbitration agreement.' 4 5 For example, if the parties to the original contract agree to a broad arbitration clause consenting to arbitrate all
disputes related to the contract, then the arguments for inclusion
within the scope of the arbitration agreement are strong. 1 46 Conversely, if, as in Hartford, the parties to the original contract clearly
indicate their intent to limit the parties included in the agreement,
that intent must be respected in compliance with the objective theory
of contracts.' 4 7 The Court of Appeals in Hartford was correct in not
allowing the surety to compel arbitration. By complying with the specificity of the incorporated arbitration agreement, 14 the court properly adhered to the objective theory of contracts.
b. ContractInterpretation.-The objective theory of contracts
remains the fundamental and guiding rule in Maryland.' 4 9 Under
144. See Hartford, 346 Md. at 130, 695 A.2d at 157.
145. See, e.g., Hartford, 109 Md. App. at 292, 674 A.2d at 14243 (finding that a narrow
arbitration clause only requires arbitration between the parties to the agreement and that
the act of incorporating one contract into another does not automatically expand the
scope of the original arbitration agreement).
146. See, e.g., Boys Club, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 590-91 (holding that a surety was bound by a
broad arbitration clause where a performance bond incorporated by reference the terms
of a general contract containing the broad arbitration clause).
147. See Hartford, 109 Md. App. at 290-91, 674 A.2d at 142 ("A fundamental principle of
contract interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the parties ..
148. See Hartford 346 Md. at 131-32, 695 A.2d at 157.
149. See Hartford, 109 Md. App. at 290-91, 674 A.2d at 142.
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that theory, a court determines from the language of the contract
what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have
understood at the time of the agreement. 5 ° Applying these fundamentals, the Court of Appeals in Hartfordproperly reviewed the intent
of the surety and the owner as expressed in the clear language of the
party had clearly expressed
agreements and determined that neither
5
1
arbitration.1
to
bound
be
to
consent
In Hartford,the bond agreement made no mention of the surety's
intent to arbitrate and actually indicated an intention to litigate disputes.152 Specifically, the bond had a clause pertaining to the institution of suits: "'Any suit under the bond must be instituted before the
expiration of two years from the date on which final payment under
the subcontract falls due."' 1 53 In order to be consistent with Hartford's argument for arbitration, this clause would have to be read out
of the bond agreement. 5 4 Eliminating this clause would conflict with
the principle that a contract should not be interpreted1 55in a manner
that disregards a significant portion of the agreement.
Because the surety failed to indicate an intent to arbitrate in the
contract documents, it should not be allowed to choose unilaterally its
method of dispute resolution. It would have been easy for the surety,
as the drafter of the bond agreement, to include a clause that clearly
indicated its desire to arbitrate all or any disputes. Not only did Hartford fail to do this, it created an inconsistency by referring to "any
suit" in the bonding agreement and by attempting to incorporate a
contract that included an arbitration clause. 156 Consistent with the
rules of contract interpretation, the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the bond agreement against the party who drafted the document, i.e., Hartford.

1 57

The owners' intent, as expressed in the language of the primary
contract, was to arbitrate disputes under the contract, not under the
150. See id. at 290-91, 674 A.2d at 142 (holding that the intent of the parties as expressed
in the language of the contract controls the analysis); accord Kasten Constr. Co. v. Rod
Enters., 268 Md. 318, 328, 301 A.2d 12, 18 (1973) (same).
151. See Hartford,346 Md. at 129-32, 695 A.2d at 156-57.
152. Hartford, 109 Md. App. at 293, 674 A.2d at 143.
153. Id. (quoting the bond issued by Hartford).
154. See id. (noting that to allow Hartford to compel arbitration would require the court
to disregard a provision of the bond agreement).
155. See Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 330 Md. 758, 782, 625 A.2d 1021,
1033 (1993) (explaining that contracts must be construed in their entirety).
156. See Hartford, 109 Md. App. at 293-94, 674 A.2d at 143.
157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF COTRACrs § 206 (1981) (indicating a preference
for the meaning that operates against the drafter of the contract when choosing the reasonable meaning).
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bond.15 By refusing to allow the surety to compel the owner to arbitrate, the Court of Appeals correctly refused to expand the obligation
of the owner.1 59 In so doing, the court complied with the objective
theory of contracts by not forcing the owner to meet an obligation to
which he never consented.160 Notably, the Court of Appeals had previously recognized this issue in Milske v. Steiner Mantel Co.,"' in which
it found that a bond could not enlarge an obligee's commitments
under a contract. 162 The Hartford court remained properly committed to the objective theory of contracts even when faced with strong
public policy favoring arbitration.
c. Non-application of the Public Policy Favoring Arbitration.Many jurisdictions have demonstrated a willingness to apply the public policy favoring arbitration at the possible expense of the contract
rights of the parties involved.' 6 3 The public policy in favor of arbitration, however, should never trump the parties' actual and clearly expressed intent and freedom to contract. Considering a history of
consistent application of the common law, and now the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, the Court of Appeals's decision in Hartford is
64
well supported.1

A court should not rewrite the plain language of a contract and
force a party to forfeit its right to litigate a dispute, even to accommodate the strong and sensible public policy in favor of arbitration.' 6 5 As
158. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
159. See Milske v. Steiner Mantel Co., 103 Md. 235, 247, 63 A. 471, 473 (1906) (finding
that because the bond was an independent and collateral contract, it could not change the
terms of the general contract).
160. See Hartford,109 Md. App. at 290-91, 674 A.2d at 142 (explaining that the objective
theory of contracts directs that the intent of the parties as expressed in the language of the
contract controls the analysis).
161. 103 Md. 235, 63 A. 471 (1906).
162. Id. at 247, 63 A. at 473.
163. See supra notes 84-112 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 28-80 and accompanying text.
165. See Curtis G. Testerman Co. v. Buck, 340 Md. 569, 580-81, 667 A.2d 649, 654-55
(1995) (finding that although Maryland recognizes the strong public policy supporting
arbitration, an arbitration agreement must first exist between the parties). The basis for
the public policy favoring arbitration is to save time and judicial resources, and to encourage resolution of disputes in a forum chosen by and controlled by the voluntary agreement between the parties. See Bel Pre Med. Ctr. v. Frederick Contractors, 21 Md. App. 307,
320, 320 A.2d 558, 565 (1974) (explaining the support for the MUAA), cause remanded, 274
Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975). One Maryland court emphasized that public policy should
not be invoked to alter a contract: "One may not be required to do what he did not
promise merely because what he did promise was not sufficient to meet the requirements
of some real or supposed public policy." Mayor of Baltimore ex rel. Lehigh Structural Steel
Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 171 Md. 667, 672-73, 190 A. 250, 253 (1937).
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established in Testerman, a valid agreement to arbitrate must exist
66
before the court will apply the public policy favoring arbitration.1
The SHALP-Kraus contract indicated SHALP's intent to arbitrate with
Kraus. 16 7 The incorporation by reference of the arbitration agreement into the performance bond, as argued by Hartford, would require the expansion of the owner's agreement to arbitrate without its
express consent. 16 The performance bond, however, is designed to
protect the owner and cannot be interpreted to enlarge the owner's
obligation under the contract by expanding its agreement to arbitrate
to the surety. 1 6 9 Therefore, the instant case does not make it over that
initial hurdle, erected by the Court of Appeals in Testerman, because
1 70
no agreement existed between SHALP and Hartford to arbitrate.
In refusing to allow the surety to compel the owner to arbitrate,
the Hartford court properly refused to interpret the incorporated arbitration clause liberally. In so doing, the court avoided the dangers
inherent in liberal interpretation of such clauses. The court had previously recognized these dangers in ContinentalMilling & Feed Co. v.
Doughnut Corp. of America, when it noted that the fundamental rights
of parties involved in an arbitration agreement-such as the right to
trial by jury t 71 or public tribunal 17 2-should not be taken away merely
by implication. 17 Instead, the express agreement of both parties is
required before arbitration proceedings can take precedence over any
1 74
fundamental right.
With this decision, the court gives notice that parties who seek to
incorporate clauses from other contracts into their agreement must
166. Testerman, 340 Md. at 579-84, 667 A.2d at 654-56; accord Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1983) (requiring, under federal law, a
clear agreement between the parties before forcing arbitration).
167. See supra notes 10, 158-162 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.
169. See Milske v. Steiner Mantel Co., 103 Md. 235, 247, 63 A. 471, 473 (1906) (finding
that because the bond was an independent and collateral contract, it could not change the
terms of the general contract); supra note 162 and accompanying text.
170. See Hartford, 346 Md. at 128, 695 A.2d at 155-56.
171. See Continental Milling & Feed Co. v. Doughnut Corp. of Am., 186 Md. 669, 676, 48
A.2d 447, 450 (1946) (holding that the express consent of the parties is required to establish an arbitrator's authority); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VII (preserving the right to trial
by jury in suits at common law); MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. arts. 5, 23 (preserving the right
to trial by jury in criminal and civil proceedings).
172. See Continental, 186 Md. at 675, 48 A.2d at 450 (finding that no one should be
compelled to resort to arbitration against her will).

173. Id. at 676, 48 A.2d at 450 (finding that express consent of both parties is required
to create the basis for jurisdiction of arbitration proceedings, because such rights "cannot

be taken away in any case merely by implication").
174. See id. (providing protection from unintended contractual arrangements); supra
notes 136, 149-162 and accompanying text.
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ensure that the language of the contract clearly and unambiguously
allows them to benefit from the rights expressed in the incorporated
clause. This is especially important in complex contractual arrangements involving multiple parties. 175 Although modem courts have developed rules, such as joinder and intervention, to accommodate
multiple parties in consolidated proceedings, 1 76 arbitration agreements rarely include such rules. 177 Traditionally, arbitration involves
disputes between two parties to a written agreement. 1 78 The fact that
parties are allowed to construct their own agreements and procedures
for resolving disputes often results in the failure to address multiparty
scenarios. 79 Therefore, the advantages of arbitration, including
speed and judicial efficiency, may ironically be sacrificed in multiparty
situations due to the non-availability of "procedural advantages critical
to expeditious resolution of a multiparty controversy."'8 , It follows
then, that continued adherence to the objective law of contracts in
Maryland will ensure a persistent protection against unintended contractual arrangements.
5. Conclusion.-Although the Court of Appeals, in Hartford, acknowledged the strong public policy arguments favoring arbitration, it
refused to subjugate the traditional rules of contract and arbitration
law to achieve this goal.1 8 ' Instead, the Court of Appeals properly distinguished Hartford from factually similar cases from other jurisdictions, in which the courts have compelled arbitration, based on the
party being compelled to arbitrate and the specificity of the arbitration agreement. 8 2 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals stood firmly by
the fundamental rules of contract interpretation, including, most importantly, the requirement for an express agreement before a party
can be forced into arbitration.' 83 In so doing, the court appropriately
refused to rewrite the contract at issue, even to adhere to a strong
public policy favoring arbitration. 184 With this decision, the court
gives notice to parties seeking to incorporate clauses from other con175.
tiparty
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See Stipanowich, supra note 122, at 475-76 (discussing the difficulties regarding muldisputes involving arbitration agreements).
See id. at 475.
See id. at 476.
See id.
See id. at 528.
Id. at 476.
See supra notes 131-135, 166 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 140-148 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 136, 149-162, 174 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 163-170 and accompanying text.
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tracts that the language of both agreements must clearly support the
inclusion of the rights the party hopes to incorporate.
THOMAS

P.
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CONTRACrS

Exculpatory Clause Requires Statement of Specific Intent

In Adloo v. H. T. Brown Real Estate, Inc.,' the Court of Appeals held
that a real estate listing agreement and a lock-box authorization, each
containing an exculpatory clause, did not sufficiently express an intent to shield a real estate company from liability for its negligence.2
In an opinion written by Chief Judge Bell,' the court struck down the
exculpatory clause because it did not "clearly, unequivocally, specifically, and unmistakably" express an intention to absolve a party from
liability for its own negligence. 4 The court held that although it does
not need to contain the word "negligence," a valid exculpatory clause
must evidence a clear intent to absolve the party from liability.5 The
court's holding was consistent with Maryland precedent, which has
upheld the "clear and unequivocal" standard for exculpatory clauses.6
The court, however, in its strict application of the standard, selectively
analyzed case law and inadequately and inconsistently applied the
standard's rationale to the facts of the case. In so doing, the court
may have deviated from precedent by applying a more stringent and
exacting standard-that of express negligence. 7 By failing to explicitly require an express negligence standard, the court nonetheless retained flexibility to respond to sympathetic parties by refusing to
enforce clauses it declares ambiguous.
1. The Case.-Abdolrahman and Monireh Adloo decided to sell
their house, located in Silver Spring, Maryland, through an exclusive
listing contract with Century 21 H.T. Brown Real Estate, Inc. (H.T.
Brown).' The listing contract contained the following clause:
REALTOR'S sole duty is to effect a sale of the property ....

The entire property will be available to REALTOR

for showing at all reasonable hours.... Neither REALTOR
nor his agents or subagents are responsible for vandalism,
1. 344 Md. 254, 686 A.2d 298 (1996).
2. Id. at 267-68, 686 A.2d at 305.
3. Id. at 256, 686 A.2d at 299.
4. Id. at 267, 686 A.2d at 305.
5. Id. at 266-68, 686 A.2d at 304-05.
6. See infra notes 61, 68 and accompanying text.
7. The Adloo court found that, absent express language absolving a party from liability
for its own negligence, the agreement's exculpatory clause applied only to situations enumerated in the clause that occurred without the party's negligence. Id. at 267-68, 686 A.2d
at 305.
8. Id. at 256-57, 686 A.2d at 299-300; see also Record Extract at 538-39, H.T. Brown
Real Estate Inc. v. Adloo (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Sept. 14, 1995) (No. 1851).
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theft, or damage of any nature whatsoever to the property,
nor is REALTOR responsible for the custody of the property,
its management, maintenance, upkeep or repair. 9
To facilitate the sale of the house, the Adloos allowed a lock-box
to be placed on their door, which enabled their home to be shown
when they were not there.' ° They signed a lock-box agreement which
advised them "[t] hat SELLER and BROKER have discussed the safeguarding of personal property and valuables located within [the
house]."

t

'

The lock-box contract also contained the following clause:

"SELLER further acknowledges that neither Listing or Selling BROKER nor their agents are an insurer against the loss of personal property; SELLER agrees to waive and releases BROKER and his agents
and/or cooperating agents and brokers from any responsibility therefore [sic]." 2
H.T. Brown real estate agents explained few procedures-to the
Adloos." The Adloos were instructed, however, to disengage their security system to allow real estate agents to use the lock-box and enter
their home. 4 Moreover, the Adloos were told that if the agency
planned to show the house to a prospective buyer, it would call ahead
of time. 5 On March 25, 1992, a man identifying himself as "Alvin
Harris" called H.T. Brown to obtain the lock-box combination to the
Adloo house.' 6 He claimed to be an agent of Shannon and Luchs,
another real estate agency, and stated that he intended to show the
Adloos' house that afternoon. 7 "Mr. Harris" also provided a telephone number at which he could be reached.' 8 Following company
procedure, an H.T. Brown employee contacted the Adloos to request
9. Record Extract at 538, Adloo (No. 1851).
10. Adloo, 344 Md. at 257-58, 686 A.2d at 300; see also Record Extract at 540, Adloo (No.
1851) ("[T]he purpose and function of a lock-box is to permit access to the interior of [the
house] by the listing Broker and his agents and/or cooperating agents and brokers.").
The Adloos used a combination lock-box, which contained a key to the home for sale. Id.
at 328 (testimony of Donna McBrain, H.T. Brown realtor). If someone dials the correct
combination, the box detaches from the doorknob and a door on the box opens, permitting access to the house key. Id. at 329.
11. Record Extract at 540, Adloo (No. 1851).
12. Adloo, 344 Md. at 258, 686 A.2d at 300.
13. Record Extract at 56-57, 216, Adloo (No. 1851) (testimony of Monireh and
Abdolrahman Adloo regarding lock-box procedure instructions provided by the realtor).
14. Adloo, 344 Md. at 258, 686 A.2d at 300.
15. Record Extract at 57, Adloo (No. 1851) (testimony of Monireh Adloo). Mrs. Adloo
later testified that she received no other advice from the real estate company, apart from
the lock-box authorization, on safeguarding valuables. Id. at 153.
16. Adloo, 344 Md. at 258, 686 A.2d at 300.
17. Id.
18. Id,
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permission to show their home.19 She left a message on the telephone answering machine when nobody answered at the Adloo
home. 20 Even though her attempt to contact the Adloos was unsuccessful, the H.T. Brown employee called "Alvin Harris" back to give
him the lock-box combination a few minutes later. 2 1 H.T. Brown
22
made no other attempt to verify "Mr. Harris's" bona fides.
The Adloos called their answering machine and received the
message that a real estate agent planned to show their house that afternoon.23 Upon arriving home that evening, Mrs. Adloo gradually
became aware that something was wrong when she found the house
24
unlocked and discovered that some of her possessions were missing.
The Adloos eventually discovered that $39,000 in cash, jewelry, rare
rugs, artwork, and other property had been taken from their home.25
After Mrs. Adloo noticed that "Alvin Harris" was the last name signed
in a log she kept for real estate agents to sign, she called the adjacent
number and found it disconnected. 26 She also learned that a real es27
tate license had never been issued in the name of "Alvin Harris.
Moreover, the phone number he had provided was not a Shannon
and Luchs number.2 8
As a result of their loss, the Adloos settled with their insurance
carrier 29 and sued H.T. Brown in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County for negligently disclosing the lock-box combination to "Mr.
Harris" without exercising reasonable care to verify that he was indeed
a real estate agent.3 " A jury awarded the Adloos $20,000.31 H.T.
Brown then moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict based
on an affirmative defense that the lock-box authorization agreement
expressly released them from liability and barred the Adloos' claims as
19. Record Extract at 339, Adloo (No. 1851) (testimony of Donna McBrain regarding
company procedure).
20. Id. at 73.
21. Id. at 193-94.
22. Company procedure was simply to call the agent back at the number the agent
provided. Id. at 339.
23. Id. at 73.
24. Id. at 74-78.
25. Id. at 23.
26. Id. at 77.
27. Adloo, 344 Md. at 258, 686 A.2d at 300.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 259, 686 A.2d at 300.
30. See Record Extract at 23, Adloo (No. 1851) (alleging in the complaint that the real
estate company "knew or should have known that it was not maintaining proper security
precautions").
31. Adloo, 344 Md. at 259, 686 A.2d at 300.
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a matter of law.32 The trial judge denied the motion, finding that the
exculpatory clause, as it appeared in this particular case, was not "an
absolute bar to recovery in all situations." 3 In so ruling, the circuit
court provided an economic rationale, finding that the real estate
box" and, therefore, "could have
agent "was in control of the lock
34
kept the loss from happening."
The Court of Special Appeals reversed in an unreported per
curiam opinion, holding that the exculpatory clause was enforceable.3 5 In emphasizing Maryland's policy of freedom of contract, the
court examined the nature of the parties' relative risks and their expectations when entering into the contract, concluding that the seller
accepted the risk of theft due to the use of a lock-box. 36 The Court of
Appeals subsequently granted the Adloos' petition for a writ of certiorari to consider whether the exculpatory clauses in the real estate listing contract and the lock-box authorization absolved H.T. Brown
from liability for its own negligence. 7
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Exculpatory Clauses Are Generally Valid in Maryland.-Maryland public policy, adhering to the doctrine of freedom of contract,
grants parties the right and power to construct their own bargains.3"
Consistent with this policy, parties can generally agree to an exculpatory clause in a contract. 39 Although the term "exculpatory clause" is
32. Record Extract at 410, Adloo (No. 1851).
33. Id. at 498.
34. Id. at 499.
35. Adloo v. H.T. Brown Real Estate, Inc., No. 1851, slip op. at 1, 10 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. Sept. 14, 1995) (per curiam), rev'd, 344 Md. 254, 686 A.2d 298 (1996).
36. Id. at 10. The court concluded:
Individuals who choose to have lock-boxes on their homes know that there is a
risk that the box may be broken into or the key otherwise obtained and wrongfully used to gain entrance into the home when unoccupied.... [T]he type of
harm that occurred is exactly the type of harm contemplated by the parties-if
the key is wrongfully obtained, a burglary will most likely occur.
Id. at 9.
The court further observed that, "[a] lthough our ruling may appear harsh, we must be
mindful of Maryland's policy in favor of freedom of contract." Id.
37. Adloo, 344 Md. at 256-57, 686 A.2d at 299-300.
38. See Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525, 531, 644 A.2d 522, 525 (1994) ("In the absense of
legislation to the contrary, exculpatory clauses are generally valid, and the public policy of
freedom of contract is best served by enforcing the provisions of the clause."). See generally
Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 570-74
(1982) (explaining that freedom of contract promotes efficiency by facilitating individual
action and minimizing governmental interference in agreements).
39. See Wolf, 335 Md. at 531, 644 A.2d at 525. The court noted:

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 57:642

sometimes referred to by other names, including "indemnity clause"
and "release," all of these clauses act similarly to transfer risk from one
party to another. 40 Inclusion of an exculpatory clause releases one or
both parties from liability for their wrongful acts.4 1
b. Exceptions to the General Rule: Exculpatory Clauses That Are
Invalid by Law.-

(1) Judicially Created Exceptions.-While exculpatory clauses
are generally enforced, Maryland courts have recognized several exceptions that invalidate such clauses: (1) intentional, reckless, wanton, or grossly negligent conduct; (2) exculpatory clauses produced by
grossly unequal bargaining power; and (3) transactions impacting the
public interest.4 2
Traditionally, the public interest exception has applied only to
common carriers, public utilities, and others with a public service obligation.
Because of a disinclination to "invoke the nebulous public
interest to disturb private contracts," the standard for invalidating an
"It is quite possible for the parties expressly to agree in advance that the
defendant is under no obligation of care for the benefit of the plaintiff, and shall
not be liable for the consequences of conduct which would otherwise be negligent. There is in the ordinary case no public policy which prevents the parties
from contracting as they see fit .... "
Id. (omission in original) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 482 (5th ed. 1984)).
In a 1962 case of first impression, Eastern Avenue Corp. v. Hughes, 228 Md. 477, 180
A.2d 486 (1962), the Court of Appeals held that an exculpatory clause in a lease was valid
and not against public policy. Id. at 480, 180 A.2d at 488.
40. See Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993)
("[Tihese agreements, whether labeled as indemnity agreements, releases, exculpatory
agreements, or waivers, all operate to transfer risk.").
Despite the interchangeability of the terms, a distinction must be made between exculpatory clauses and indemnity clauses. The exculpatory clause refers to a clause that acts to
release one party to the contract from liability for certain future acts of its own negligence
that harm the other party. John D. Perovich, Annotation, Validity of Exculpatory Clause in
Lease Exempting Lessor from Liability, 49 A.L.R.3D 321, 323 n.2 (1973). An indemnity clause,
also known as a "hold harmless" clause, covers harm sustained by third parties that might
be caused by one of the contracting parties, and shifts the financial burden for the payment of damages from the injured party to the contracting party assuming responsibility
for such harm. Id.
41. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 566 (6th ed. 1991) (defining exculpatory clause as "[a]
contract clause which releases one of the parties from liability for his or her wrongful acts.
A provision in a document which protects a party from liability arising, in the main, from
negligence").
42. Wolf 335 Md. at 531-32, 644 A.2d at 525-26 (citing Winterstein v. Wilcom, 16 Md.
App. 130, 135-36, 293 A.2d 821, 824-25 (1972)).
43. Id. at 532, 644 A.2d at 526; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195
cmt. a (1981) (stating the common law rule that prohibits public service workers from
exempting themselves from liability).
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exculpatory clause under the public interest exception is "strict."4 4 In
determining what constitutes the public interest, the court disfavors
formulaic multi-factor tests and instead prefers a totality of the circumstances approach.45
(2) Statutorily Created Exceptions.-The Maryland legislature
has also enacted statutes forbidding exculpatory clauses in certain
types of contracts about which it had public policy concerns. 4 6 For

instance, responding to Hughes, the General Assembly enacted a statute that voided exculpatory clauses in agreements between tenants
and landlords as against public policy.4 7 The only other statute enacted in Maryland limiting exculpatory provisions prohibits certain
construction industry indemnity agreements. 4"
c. Standards for Determining the Enforceability of Exculpatory
Clauses.-If an exception to the validity of exculpatory clauses does
not apply, the court will look to the language of the clause. 49 A clause
will be enforced by the court if it determines that reasonable parties
would have intended that it apply to that particular situation.5 0 To
make this determination, the trial judge considers the nature of the
clause, "'its purpose, and the facts and circumstances of the parties at
44. Wolf, 335 Md. at 532, 644 A.2d at 526.
45. Id. at 535, 644 A.2d at 527 (rejecting the six-factor test of Tunkl v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (1963), which was adopted in Winterstein, 16 Md. App. at 137,
293 A.2d at 825).
46. See Winterstein, 16 Md. App. at 142, 293 A.2d at 827 ("If the legislature deems it
advisable to extend the prohibition against exculpatory clauses to agreements other than
landlords and tenants, it is, of course, free to do so.").
47. Mn. CODE ArN., REAL PROP. § 8-105 (1996).
48. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-305 (1995) (invalidating any agreement
in a construction contract that purports to indemnify the promisee against liability for
damages caused by the promisee's sole negligence).
49. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 261, 492 A.2d 1306,
1310 (1985).
50. See id. ("It is well settled that Maryland follows the objective law of contracts....
[Tihe true test of what is meant is not what the parties to the contract intended it to mean,
but what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it meant.");
Pacific Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 302 Md. 383, 388, 488 A.2d 486, 488 (1985)
("The test [for interpreting the intention of the parties to a contract] is what meaning a
reasonably prudent layperson would attach to the term.").
As it is generally applied to exculpatory clauses, the term "enforceability" can be distinguished from the term "validity." The latter refers to whether some public policy demands that the clause be invalidated. See BLACK'S LAw DICrIoNARY, supra note 41, at 107576 (defining "valid" as "[h]aving legal strength or force ... incapable of being rightfully
overthrown or set aside.... [o]f binding force"). In contrast, a court deciding whether a
clause is "enforceable" analyzes a specific fact situation and determines whether the clause
applies to that situation. See id. at 365 (defining "enforce" as "[t]o put into execution; to
cause to take effect; to make effective").
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Next,,the judge examines the clause to de-

termine if an ambiguity exists. 52 She assigns words "their ordinary and

accepted meanings." 53 The clause is ambiguous when, "to a reasonably prudent person, the language used .. .is susceptible of more
54
than one meaning"

(1) "Clear and Unequivocal" Standard.-The general rule in
Maryland is that exculpatory clauses must express the parties' intention in "clear and unequivocal" terms.55 This "clear and unequivocal"
standard was first established in Maryland in 1972 by the Court of Appeals in Crockett v. Crothers,5 6 when it considered whether to enforce an
indemnity clause between two contractors constructing a sewage system. 57 In Crockett, an engineering contractor negligently failed to reveal a water main while drafting plans and specifications. 58 Relying on
those drawings, the building contractor ruptured a water main, causing a home to be flooded, which resulted in a lawsuit.5 ° However, the
engineer claimed that a contract clause entitled him to indemnity
from the other contractor.6 ° Reasoning that the contractor did not
agree "in so many words or otherwise unequivocally" to indemnify the
engineer against his own negligence, the court declined to enforce
the clause.6 1

51. Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chem., Inc., 320 Md. 584, 596, 578 A.2d 1202,
1208 (1990) (quoting Pacific Indem. Co., 302 Md. at 388, 488 A.2d at 488).
52. Id.; see also 41 AM.JUR. 2D Indemni § 19 (1996) ("Where the language of the agreement regarding indemnification is not clear and unequivocal, then the indemnity provision is ambiguous and will not be enforced.").
53. Pacific Indem. Co., 302 Md. at 388, 488 A.2d at 488.
54. Heat & Power Corp., 320 Md. at 596, 578 A.2d at 1208; see also BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARv, supra note 41, at 1057 (defining "unambiguous" as "[s]usceptible of but one meaning.
A contract provision is 'unambiguous' if its meaning is so clear as to preclude doubt by a
reasonable person").
55. Heat & Power Corp., 320 Md. at 593, 578 A.2d, at 1206-07.
56. 264 Md. 222, 285 A.2d 612 (1972).
57. Id. at 227-28, 285 A.2d at 615. The case took place before the enactment of a
statute invalidating construction contract exculpatory clauses. See supra note 42.
58. 264 Md. at 223-24, 285 A.2d at 613.
59. Id. at 223, 285 A.2d at 613.
60. Id. at 228, 285 A.2d at 615. Although the clause specifically provided that the engineer would not be liable for damages resulting from his own performance, it did not specifically indemnify the engineer against his own negligence. Id. The court affirmed the
trial court's finding that the engineer was negligent and, therefore, liable for the damage.
Id.
61. Id.
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In Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.,62 the Court
of Appeals reaffirmed the standard it had set forth in Crockett.6 3 In
Heat & Power Corp., a property owner entered into a contract with a
contractor to construct a building according to the owner's design
and specification.6 4 During construction, the building exploded, injuring an employee of the contractor. 6' The parties did not dispute
that the owner was solely negligent in designing a building incapable
of being used for its intended industrial purpose.6 6 At issue for the
court was the interpretation of a contract clause that purported to
give rise to a duty of the contractor to indemnify the owner. 6 7 Applying the standard from Crockett, the court stated the contract was not
sufficiently "clear and unequivocal" to indemnify the owner against its
own negligence.6 8
Maryland courts, however, have been inconstant in applying that
standard. While the courts generally recognize the existence of two
approaches toward the enforcement of general exculpatory clausesclauses that typically promise to indemnify another against "any and
all claims"-they have not conclusively settled the preferred Maryland
approach.69 The possible approaches are characterized in the following sections.
(a) LiteralEnforcement.--The most liberal approach to determine whether an exculpatory clause is enforceable is the "literal en62. 320 Md. 584, 578 A.2d 1202 (1990).
63. Id. at 593, 578 A.2d at 1206-07. This part of the opinion, however, is dicta because
the clause was invalidated by the statute. Id. at 592-93, 578 A-2d at 1206.
64. Id. at 587, 578 A.2d at 1204.
65. Id. at 587-88, 578 A.2d at 1204.
66. Id,at 588, 578 A.2d at 1204.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 593, 578 A.2d at 1206-07.
69. The dichotomy of interpretive views regarding the "clear and unequivocal" standard is recognized in Maryland and elsewhere. See State Highway Admin. v. Greiner Eng'g
Sciences, Inc., 83 Md. App. 621, 631, 577 A.2d 363, 367 (1990) (recognizing the dichotomy of approaches in the case law); Annotation, Tenant's Agreement to Indemnify Landlord
Against All Claims as Including Losses Resulting from Landlord's Negligence, 4 A.L.R.4TH 798
§ 2a (1996).
There are two divergent views on the question of what constitutes a sufficient
expression of the intent of the parties concerning the indemnification of the
landlord for his own negligence. One view is that the clear and unequivocal requirement is met only by specific reference in the indemnity clause to the landlord's negligence ....

The other major view ... is that specific reference . . . is

not necessary. ...
Id. (footnote omitted). The more liberal interpretation is appropriately known as the "literal enforcement" approach. See infra text accompanying notes 77-89. For a proposed
clarification of the distinction between the two interpretive approaches, see infta note 131.
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forcement" approach to interpreting "clear and unequivocal" clauses.
A few Maryland cases have applied this approach to enforce broadly
worded exculpatory clauses 70 as long as the clauses clearly and unambiguously encompassed damages from unforeseen events. 7 1 In one

early Maryland case, EasternAvenue Corp. v. Hughes,72 the Court of Appeals enforced a broadly worded contract. 7 In Hughes, a clause between a tenant and landlord provided:
The Tenant covenants and agrees that the Landlord
shall not be liable for any injury to his person or damages to
his property occasioned by failure to keep the demised
premises in repair or howsoever caused . . . and Tenant

agrees he will not hold Landlord responsible in any way,
whether such accident occurred in
any of the Landlord's
74
buildings or on any of its property.
The court held that it had "no doubt that the language used, however
strictly construed, [was] broad enough to cover the claim for damages
in the instant case."75 Although the Hughes court made a comprehen76
sive statement, it applied no specific standard in its opinion.
More recently, in 1990, the Court of Special Appeals addressed
whether a contract clause could exculpate a party from damages
caused by unforeseen events, which could presumably include damages caused by a party's negligence, in State Highway Administration v.
GreinerEngineeringSciences, Inc." In Greiner, the State Highway Administration (SIA) contracted with a design consultant to perform engineering services for the construction of a road in western Maryland.78
The consultant signed an exculpatory clause providing that the SHA
70. Such phrases typically use general exculpatory language such as a promise to indemnify against "any and all claims" without reference to a particular cause of loss or damage. Cf 41 AM. JUR. 21 Indemnity § 20 (1995) ("General phrases indicating that the
indemnitor agrees to indemnify the indemnitee from and against loss, damage or injury
'from any act or omission' of the indemnitee, or 'occasioned by' the indemnitee, may be
sufficient to impose liability on the indemnitor.").
71. See Greiner, 83 Md. App. at 638-39 577 A.2d at 371-72.
72. 228 Md. 477, 180 A.2d 486 (1962).
73. Id. at 480, 180 A.2d at 488.
74. Id. at 479, 180 A.2d at 488.
75. Id.
76. Id. Similarly, in Rigger v. Baltimore County, 269 Md. 306, 305 A.2d 128 (1973), the
Court of Appeals enforced a broad indemnity clause without citing the standard established in Crockett a year earlier. Id. at 312, 305 A.2d at 132.
77. 83 Md. App. 621, 577 A.2d 363 (1990). In Greiner, neither of the parties claimed
the other was negligent. However, the court found that enforcement of an exculpatory
clause was not unconscionable even if the event triggering the clause was not within the
parties' contemplation when they entered the agreement. Id at 641, 577 A.2d at 373.
78. Id. at 624, 577 A.2d at 364.
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would not be liable for damages caused by any delay.79 After the SHA
caused numerous delays and stoppages, the consultant submitted a
claim for damages from overruns.8 0 Although the parties had contemplated the impact of ordinary delays, the consultant argued that
the character and extent of the delays were such that they were unforeseen." The court held that Maryland law followed the "literal enforcement approach," 2 under which a broadly worded exculpatory
clause is enforceable if it clearly and unambiguously encompasses
damages from unforeseen events. 8 3 In so ruling, the court provided
guidance for drafting exculpatory clauses by quoting a Wisconsin
court's conclusion that parties can mutually assent to a clause without
specifically anticipating all of the potential causes whereby damage
may occur.8 4 The court noted that "it is the unforeseen events which
occasion the broad language of the clause since foreseeable ones
could be readily provided for by specific language."8 5 Because the
court held that the clause was clear and unambiguous-and therefore
enforceable-it did not need to inquire into the parties' initial
contemplation. 6
A minority of other states have adopted the literal enforcement
approach.8 7 These states explain that this approach is based upon the
principle that a literal interpretation of the language of a general exculpatory clause, containing the words "any and all claims," is plainly

79. Id. at 629, 577 A.2d at 366-67. The clause stated that "[t]he Consultant agrees to
prosecute the work continuously and diligently and no charges or claims for damages shall
be made by him for any delays or hindrances, from any cause whatsoever...." Id at 629,
577 A.2d at 367.
80. Id, at 626-28, 577 A.2d at 365-66.
81. Id. at 630, 577 A.2d at 367.
82. See id. at 634-37, 577 A.2d at 369-71 (comparing the "literal enforcement approach"
to the "New York approach," which does not enforce a contract clause where the damage
was not contemplated by the parties).
83. Id. at 638-39, 577 A.2d at 371-72.
84. Id at 635, 577 A.2d at 370 (quoting John E. Gregory & Son, Inc. v. A. Guenther &
Sons Co., 432 N.W.2d 584, 587 (Wis. 1988)).
85. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Id. at 638-39, 577 A.2d at 371.
87. See, e.g., Hardage Enters., Inc. v. Fidesys Corp., 570 So. 2d 436, 437-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that "specific wording is not a precondition to finding that a release
precludes negligence claims" and that "broad and all-encompassing language" in an exculpatory release clearly and unequivocally reflected the intent of the parties to release a party
from any and all liabilities, including those arising out of its own negligence); Topp Copy
Prods., Inc. v. Singletary, 626 A-2d 98, 99-100 & n.1 (Pa. 1993) (holding that an exculpatory clause that released a party "from any and all liability for damage" clearly and unambiguously reflected the intention of the parties to cover negligence claims).

716

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 57:642

understood to mean every claim, including claims for negligence.8 8
These courts further note that the literal enforcement approach best
represents the actual intent of laypersons upon signing a valid exculpatory contract-that they have distributed their risks and intend to
waive their rights to bring suit. 9
(b) Strict Application of "Clear and Unequivocal. "-The majority of other states strictly apply the "clear and unequivocal" standard to
interpret a party's intention to exculpate itself from liability for its
own negligence.9 ° This interpretation requires either a specific reference in the exculpatory clause that directly requires indemnification
for a party's negligence or a clause specifically excluding indemnification for a party's negligence under certain limited circumstances.9 1
This strict interpretation of the "clear and unequivocal" standard requires specific language to express the intent of a party to indemnify
the other for its own negligence.9 2 General clauses containing
broadly worded exculpatory language are insufficient to satisfy the
clear and unequivocal requirement;9" however, this approach also rec88. See University Plaza Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Stewart, 272 So. 2d 507, 510 (Fla. 1973)
("This point of view is based upon the theory that the words 'any and all claims' are crystal
clear; ergo, all means all without exception."); Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc., 923 S.W.2d
330, 345 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) (Robertson,J., dissenting) (arguing for plain interpretation
of the word "all"); 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indemnity § 20 (1995) ("General phrases indicating that
the indemnitor agrees to indemnify the indemnitee from and against the loss, damage or
injury 'from any act or omission' of the indemnitee, or 'occasioned by' the indemnitee,
may be sufficient to impose liability on the indemnitor.").
89. See Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 345 (Robertson,J., dissenting) ("[H]ow does anyone know
when 'all' means 'every' and when it means something less?"); Colgan v. Agway, Inc., 553
A.2d 143, 147 (Vt. 1988) (Peck, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is ill-advised to declare that a
contract provision that has been "carefully written, unambiguous, and clear to anyone,
including a layman . . ." is ambiguous by simply stating it is).
90. See, e.g., Stewart, 272 So. 2d at 511 (refusing to enforce a generally worded indemnification agreement because it did not contain "a specific provision protecting the indemnitee from liability caused by his own negligence"); Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 337 (refusing to
enforce an exculpatory clause unless the intention of the parties to release a party for his
or her own negligence is expressed in "clear, unambiguous, unmistakable, and conspicuous language"); Barnes v. New Hampshire Karting Ass'n, Inc., 509 A.2d 151, 154 (N.H.
1986) (enforcing a clause "[a] s long as the language of the release clearly and specifically
indicates the intent to release the defendant from liability for personal injury caused by the
defendant's negligence").
91. See Perovich, supra note 40, at 801-02 (describing one view of what constitutes a
sufficient expression of the parties' intent as requiring a specific reference to the party's
negligence).
92. Id.
93. Stewart, 272 So. 2d at 509-10 (stating that "general language such as 'any and all
claims' in an agreement" has been held to be insufficient to impose indemnity for an
indemnitee's negligence).
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ognizes that the exculpatory clause need not expressly contain the
word negligence or require any mandatory words. 4
For instance, in Alack v. Vic Tanny International, Inc.,95 the
Supreme Court of Missouri held that a general exculpatory clause was
ambiguous and did not insulate a health club from liability for injuries
sustained by a member as a result of the club's negligence. 6
Although the clause was quite extensive and appeared to release the
club, it did not specifically state that the member released the club
from claims arising from the club's negligence.9 7 The court noted
that, superficially, the word "all" in a release includes every possible
contingency. 98 However, this would include claims that could not be
waived.9 9 The court observed that the reasonable person constructs
relationships upon a fault-based foundation, and must have clear notice before such a relationship is altered. ° ° It stated that the exculpatory language must effectively notify a reasonable person such that she
actually understands what future claims are being waived. 1 Thus,
the court found that clear and unambiguous language is required to
10 2
release a party from her own future negligence.
(2) The "ExpressNegligence" Standard.--Only one state has rejected the clear and unequivocal standard in favor of the strictest of all
94. See Alack, 923 S.W.2d at 335-36 (noting cases that do not require the use of the
word "negligence" to release a defendant from his own negligence liability).
95. 923 S.W.2d 330 (Mo. 1996) (en banc).
96. Id. at 332.
97. Id. at 337. The health club contract contained the following clause:
By the use of the facilities.., the Member expressly agrees that Seller shall not be
liable for any damages arising from personal injuries... as a result of their using
the facilities and the equipment therein .... Member assumes full responsibility
for any such injuries ...and does hereby fully and forever release and discharge
Seller... from any and all claims, demands, damages, rights of action, or causes
of action, present or future ....
Id. at 333 n.2.
98. Id. at 337 ("In a theoretical vacuum, the words 'any' and 'all' might appear unambiguous: 'all' means '[elvery' and 'any' means '[a]ll.").
99. Id.
[T]he words used here would purport to include [intentional torts, gross negligence, or public interest] claims, which cannot be waived. Although these claims
were not asserted here, they demonstrate the ambiguity of the contractual language. A contract that purports to relieve a party from any and all claims but
does not actually do so is duplicitous, indistinct and uncertain.
Id. (footnote omitted).
100. Id. ("Our traditional notions of justice are so fault-based that most people might
not expect such a relationship to be altered .. .unless done so explicitly.").
101. Id. at 337-38.
102. Id.
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standards, that of express negligence.'
The express negligence standard requires that the intent to indemnify a party for its own negligence must be expressed in specific terms and be derived solely from
within the four corners of the contract.1 0 4 Whereas the other approaches are, in essence, balancing tests that give weight to the language, its context, and the surrounding facts, express negligence
requires courts to limit their analysis to situations in which the con10 5
tract language includes words of negligence.
The Supreme Court of Texas adopted the express negligence
standard in a workers' compensation suit in Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Construction Co. °6 In Ethyl, a worker was seriously burned because of the
negligence of two contractors; in the resulting lawsuit, the court assessed whether to enforce a contract provision exculpating one of
them. 0 v The contract between them required one contractor to indemnify the other against "any loss or damage" to persons resulting
from their performance under the contract.1 0 8 Arguing for indemnification, the contractor asserted that the words "any loss" revealed an
intent to cover the contractor's own negligence. 0 9 Without determining the result of the case under the "clear and unequivocal" standard,
the court changed the law to adopt the "express negligence" standard. 1 0 The court described its rationale as follows:
As we have moved closer to the express negligence doctrine, the scriveners of indemnity agreements have devised
novel ways of writing provisions which fail to expressly state
103. See Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508-09 (Tex. 1993)
(extending the express negligence doctrine to all exculpatory provisions, including releases and indemnity agreements); Singleton v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 729 S.W.2d
690, 691 (Tex. 1987) (per curiam) (declaring that the "clear and unequivocal rule" had
been abandoned and the "express negligence rule" adopted).
104. Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. 1987) ("The express
negligence doctrine provides that parties seeking to indemnify the indemnitee from the
consequences of its own negligence must express that intent in specific terms. Under the
doctrine of express negligence, the intent of the parties must be specifically stated within
the four corners of the contract.").
105. The parties must now expressly state their intent to indemnify a party for its own
negligence. Id. (" [W] e overrule those portions [of Texas precedent] stating it is unnecessary for the parties to say, 'in so many words,' they intend to indemnify the indemnitee
from liability for its own negligence.").
106. 725 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1987).
107. Id. at 706-07.
108. Id. at 707 ("Contractor shall indemnify and hold Owner harmless against any loss
or damage to persons or property as a result of operations growing out of the performance
of this contract and caused by the negligence or carelessness of Contractor, Contractor's
employees, Subcontractors, and agents or licensees.").
109. Id. at 708.
110. Id.
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the true intent of those provisions. The intent of the scriveners is to indemnify the indemnitee for its negligence, yet be
just ambiguous enough to conceal that intent from the indemnitor. The result has been a plethora of lawsuits to construe those ambiguous contracts. We hold the better policy
is to cut through the ambiguity of those provisions and adopt
the express negligence doctrine.1 1 '
Thus, the Texas Supreme Court held that the indemnity provision did
not meet the express negligence test and was, therefore,
unenforceable.1 1 2
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Adloo, the Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Special Appeals, refusing to enforce an exculpatory clause in a real estate contract. 1
The court found that the real
estate listing agreement and lock-box authorization, each containing
an exculpatory clause, did not sufficiently express the parties' intent
to shield the real estate company from liability for its negligence. 14
In so ruling, the court began its analysis with a review of the Maryland
legal history of exculpatory contractual clauses.1 15 Recognizing the
general validity of such clauses, the court noted that they comply with
Maryland's public policy of freedom of contract.' 16 It then defined
the three public interest exceptions that will invalidate an exculpatory
clause.11 7 It disposed of this line of analysis by stating that the court
must address the threshold issue of whether the clause applies to the
situation presented and if, in fact, the clause is exculpatory in
18
nature. 1
Specifically, the court emphasized that whether the clause should
be applied in a particular situation depends on the parties' intention

111. Id. at 707-08. Also, the risk-shifting purpose of these clauses has amplified the scrutiny that Texas courts apply to them. See Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853
S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993) ("Because indemnification of a party for its own negligence is
an extraordinary shifting of risk, [Texas] has developed fair notice requirements."). In
Texas, fair notice requires the use of the express negligence doctrine and a "conspicuous
requirement" that "something must appear on the face of the [contract] to attract the
attention of a reasonable person when he looks at it." Id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted) (alteration in original).
112. Ethyl, 725 S.W.2d at 708.
113. Adloo, 344 Md. at 268, 686 A.2d at 305.
114. Id. at 267-68, 686 A.2d at 305.
115. Id. at 259-61, 686 A.2d at 301.
116. Id. at 259, 686 A.2d at 301.
117. Id. at 260, 686 A.2d at 301.
118. Id. at 261, 686 A.2d at 301.
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as expressed by the language of the clause. 1 9 The court looked to
Maryland precedent, noting the general rule expressed in Crockett that
"contracts will not be construed to indemnify a person against his own
negligence unless an intention to do so is expressed in those very
2
words or in other unequivocal terms.'
Selectively reviewing case law from other states, the court sought
to define the "clear and unambiguous" requirement.12 ' The court
noted that the standard is stringent and exacting and that various
courts require that the clause unambiguously, understandably, clearly,
unequivocally, specifically, unmistakably, explicitly, and conspicuously
indicate an intent to release a defendant from liability for injury
caused by its own negligence.' 22 It held that these standards were
consistent with Maryland's "objective law of contract interpretation
and construction."'12 The court narrowed the list to require that the
clause "clearly, unequivocally, specifically, and unmistakably" express
the intention to absolve a party for its negligence.' 24 However, the
court did not require that the clause "contain or use the word 'negli25
gence' or any other 'magic words.""
Finally, the court applied this standard to the facts in Adloo. 1 26 It
determined the parties' intent by examining each sentence of the
lock-box and listing agreements. 27 Construing the first sentence of
the lock-box agreement, the. court noted that it provided notice that
the listing or selling broker "is not an insurer against the loss of...
personal property," and the second sentence released the broker from
responsibility for any such lOSS.1 28 Because the listing contract was
concerned with "vandalism, theft or damage of any nature to the
property," the court simply found it did not clearly and unequivocally
express the parties' intention to include damage or injury resulting
from the real estate agency's negligence.' 29 Nothing in the clause or

119. See id. ("Stated differently, the question is the adequacy of the clause to shield one
of the parties from liability. That issue turns on the intention of the parties.").
120. Id. at 261-62, 686 A.2d at 301 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Id. at 263-66, 686 A.2d at 303-04.
122. Id. at 263-64, 686 A.2d at 303 (citing, among other cases, Baker v. Stewarts', Inc.,
433 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1988); Alack v. Vic Tanny Int'l, Inc., 923 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo.
1996) (en banc); Audley v. Melton, 640 A.2d 777, 779 (N.H. 1994)).
123. Id. at 266, 686 A.2d at 304.
124. Id. at 267, 686 A.2d at 305.
125. Id. at 266, 686 A.2d at 304 (citations omitted).
126. Id. at 267-68, 686 A.2d at 305.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 267, 686 A.2d at 305.
129. Id at 268, 686 A.2d at 305.
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the facts suggested the listing clause was broad enough to include
t3
thefts resulting from the real estate agency's negligence. 0
4. Analysis.-The Court of Appeals's ruling in Adloo, based upon
a strict interpretation of the "clear and unequivocal" standard for determining whether a party intended to exculpate another for its negligence, complies with Maryland precedent.13 1 When it applied this
standard to the Adloos, however, the court inconsistently interpreted
a troublesome standard that seemingly requires the word "negligence"
to appear in the contract, yet permits instances where that particular
language is not included.13 2 Without providing sufficient rationale,
the court simply determined that the parties did not meet that standard.1 33 In so doing, the court overstepped the "clear and unequivocal" standard such that it now encroaches on the domain of another
stricter standard, that of express negligence. The effect of the inherent uncertainty in the state of the law in Maryland will likely have a
negative impact on the drafting and enforcing of contractual exculpatory provisions.
a. Interpreting the Correct Standard.-In holding that the parties in Adloo must clearly and unequivocally express their intention
within the contract clause to exculpate for negligence, the Court of
Appeals selected a standard consistent with precedent. In both Crockett and Heat & Power, the Court of Appeals refused to enforce clauses
that it determined to be ambiguous."' Similarly, the court in Adloo
determined that the clause was ambiguous and refused to enforce
it.t3 5
Although the court did not explicitly select one of the two interpretive approaches,' 36 its application of the "clear and unequivocal"
standard to the facts in Adloo permits the safe presumption that it re-

130. Id.
131. See supranotes 68-69 and accompanying text; infra notes 134, 137-138 and accompanying text. The strict interpretation of the "clear and unequivocal" standard, while adequately characterized in numerous cases, has no name. It is suggested here that a court's
strict application of the "clear and unequivocal" standard should be named the "specific
intent" approach. This name conveys the court's focus on the intent of the contracting
parties and its requirement that the exculpatory clause specifically state that intent.
132. See Adloo, 344 Md. at 266, 686 A.2d at 304 (stating that the weight of authority does
not require the word "negligence").
133. Id. at 268, 686 A.2d at 305.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 61, 68.
135. Adloo, 344 Md. at 267, 686 A.2d at 305.
136. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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jected the literal enforcement approach. 13 7 This can be inferred from
the court's refusal to enforce the clause in the listing contract even
though it released the real estate agency from the direct cause of damage that eventually occurred-theft."3 8 Also, the court refused to enforce the lock-box clause, which released the agency from the loss of
all personal property. 3 9 Because the listing contract anticipated a
specific cause of the damage and the lock-box authorization provided
a general release, a court following the literal enforcement approach
would likely not have inquired whether the parties contemplated a
peripheral source of damage such as negligence. 14 ° If the court had
adopted this approach, the court would likely have found that the
clauses were enforceable because they clearly and unambiguously encompassed damages from unforeseen events. 1 4 ' By eliminating the
literal approach, the court apparently adopted the strict approach to
the "clear and unambiguous" requirement. Thus, the Court of Appeals required greater specificity in the drafting of exculpatory language than did past Maryland courts.
b. Lack of Clarity and Rationale.-Although the court's ruling
is consistent with precedent, its rationale was inadequate and inconsistent. First, the court failed to explicitly adopt the strict interpretation
of the "clear and unequivocal" standard or the "express negligence"
standard.' 4 2 After a selective review of the approaches followed in
other states, the court came to its conclusion without giving a rationale for its decision. Although the court's favored approach may be
reached by its presumed rejection of the literal enforcement approach' 4 3 and by the language it chose,' 4 4 it remains unclear whether
the court also adopted the background rationale of either approach
to the clear and unequivocal standard or the express negligence
standard.'

45

137. Furthermore, the court's adoption of language requiring the parties to express
their intention "clearly, unequivocally, specifically, and unmistakably" implies a strict interpretation of the "clear and unambiguous" language. Adloo, 344 Md. at 267, 686 A.2d at
305.
138. See id. at 268, 686 A.2d at 305. Instead, the Adloo court emphasized the role of
negligence, unmentioned in the contract, in causing the damage rather than the direct
cause mentioned in the contract. See id. at 267, 686 A.2d at 305.
139. Id. at 267-68, 686 A.2d at 305.
140. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 137-141 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
144. See supra text accompanying note 124.
145. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing the Alack rationale); supra
note 111 and accompanying text (discussing the Ethyl rationale).
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Second, the court seemingly ignored a recent Court of Special
Appeals case that, after detailed analysis, supported a less strict approach to analyzing the effect of unforeseen events on the enforceability of an exculpatory clause.14 6 In Greiner, that court recognized
the existence of two possible approaches to interpret the clear and
unequivocal standard, investigated each approach, and finally declared what the law was in Maryland.14 Although the Adloo court was
not required to follow the lower court, it could have clarified Maryland law and public policy by explicitly rejecting one approach and
adopting the other. Had the Court of Appeals followed a similar analysis, it would have settled Maryland law and created less confusion in
the lower courts.
Third, the court's inconsistent analysis in Adloo may indicate that
it actually adopted the express negligence standard. The court primarily requires that the clause "clearly, unequivocally, specifically, and
unmistakably" express the parties' intention to exculpate a party for
their negligence, but then claims that the weight of authority does not
require the use of the word "negligence."'4 a However, it is unclear
what language would suffice to meet this strict standard without mentioning the word "negligence."' 4 9 Apparently, the court left the door
open to construe the intent of the parties in those situations in which
the clause or the context suggests something different.1 5 ' When the
court subsequently applies this analysis to the Adloo clauses, however,
one finds this opening to be but a crack. Because the clauses in Adloo
146. Adloo failed to reject, or even mention, State Highway Administration v. GreinerEngineering Sciences, Inc., 83 Md. App. 621, 577 A.2d 363 (1990). This is remarkable because the
Greiner court found that its adoption of the literal enforcement approach was consistent
with the objective law of contract interpretation and construction. See Greiner,83 Md. App.
at 638, 577 A.2d at 370. The Adloo court also claimed to be following Maryland's objective
law of contract interpretation in rejecting that approach and adopting the stricter approach. See Adloo, 344 Md. at 266, 686 A.2d at 304.
147. See Greiner, 83 Md. App. at 631-39, 577 A.2d at 368-72 (comparing the strict approach to the literal enforcement approach and declaring that Maryland law followed the
literal enforcement approach).
148. Adloo, 344 Md. at 266, 686 A.2d at 304 (adopting the view expressed in Audley and
Alack, that "[t]o be sure, as the weight of authority makes clear... the exculpatory clause
need not contain or use the word 'negligence' or any other 'magic words"' (citations
omitted)).
149. For an example of a court applying Adloo's comment that words expressly mentioning negligence are not required, see Cornell v. Council of Unit Owners HawaiianVillage Condominiums, Inc., No. CIV. Y-96-4037, 1997 WL 697443, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 1997). In Cornell,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, applying Maryland substantive law,
held that a broadly worded exculpatory clause that did not explicitly mention the word
negligence nevertheless unambiguously limited a party's liability for negligence. Id. at *10.
150. See Adloo, 344 Md. at 268, 686 A.2d at 305 ("There is nothing in the clause or,
indeed, in the context, that would suggest a different or broader intent.").
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were fairly specific-with one clause mentioning theft1 5 ' and the
other clause releasing a party from the loss of personal property152 -it
is difficult to imagine a clause that could be enforceable without mentioning the word "negligence." Accordingly, one could infer that a
clause that fails to mention negligence will be interpreted by the court
as applying only to those situations when there is no negligence by the
party claiming indemnification. 15 The court's inconsistent rationale,
therefore, may have caused it to overstep the "clear and unequivocal"
standard to something even more strict-the express negligence
standard.
c. Underground Policy.-The undeclared public policy the
court expressed in Adloo may be that the law will not be allowed to
intrude upon justice. In Adloo, the court was presented with a dilemma: justice demanded that the real estate agency bear the damages,1 54 and the plaintiffs plight was sympathetic; yet, this was a poor
case in which to develop the law. Apparently, the court resolved this
dilemma by predetermining a just outcome and then filling in the
gaps with its reasoning. The court ostensibly began by assessing what
155
it called its threshold issue, determining the meaning of the clause.
However, to a reasonable person, the ordinary and accepted meaning
of clauses mentioning theft and providing a general release for property damage was that they are enforceable. Next, the court likely foresaw problems in extending the well-settled common law validity
exceptions 156 to the Adloos' situation. First, there was no intentional
or grossly negligent conduct. Second, if the young, unsophisticated
plaintiff in Wolf v. Ford15 7 did not present a party with a disparate bargaining disadvantage, 5 8 then surely the mature and well-educated Adloos also could not.' 59 Likewise, if the fiduciary relationship in Wolf
151. Id. at 257, 686 A.2d at 300.
152. Id. at 258, 686 A.2d at 300.
153. Id. at 268, 686 A.2d at 305.
154. The real estate agency's agent (Alvin Harris) had exclusive control of the property
at the time of the burglary because the Adloos were not home. Brief of Petitioners at 2425, Adloo v. H.T. Brown Real Estate, Inc., 344 Md. 254, 686 A.2d 298 (1996) (No. 143).
The cost to maintain security is best borne by the real estate industry. For example, lowcost procedures could easily be implemented to verify that agents are legitimate and, when
using the lock-box to enter a home, to maintain minimal awareness of the agent's
behavior.
155. Adloo, 344 Md. at 261, 686 A.2d at 301-02.
156. See supra text accompanying note 42.
157. 335 Md. 525, 644 A.2d 522 (1994).
158. Id. at 536, 644 A.2d at 528.
159. Mrs. Adloo obtained a computer science degree from the University of Maryland
and had partly completed a Master's degree in Management Information Systems there.
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was not sufficiently intertwined with the process of government and
justice to affect the public interest, 6 ' then neither was the real estate
broker-client relationship in Adloo. The exceptions could not extend
to invalidate the Adloos' exculpatory clause.
With Maryland law seemingly settled, the court was left with few
options, but with one reliable court device: the court's time-honored
practice of finding a contractual term ambiguous and resolving its interpretation in a manner justice compels."' The court therefore returned to the threshold issue of determining whether the meaning of
the clause was ambiguous. However, without disciplined application
of a standard approach to resolving contract ambiguities, "the understandable promptings of sympathy" motivate judicial decisions, leading inevitably to uncertain and inconsistent enforcement by the
court. 6 2 It has been said that contract interpretation is largely an individualized process,' 63 which permits a court to interpret a contract
with the full contextual background in mind.1 64 However, a legal
Record Extract at 43-44, Adloo (No. 1851). Mr Adloo had received a pharmacy degree and
was partially finished with his Doctor of Pharmacy degree at the University of Maryland,
Baltimore. Id. at 207.
160. See Wolf 335 Md. at 532, 644 A.2d at 526.
161. See generally Michael J. Kresslein, Note, Medical Insurance: "Full-time Student" Status
and Recovery of Attorneys' Fees, 52 Mt. L. Rav. 592, 592 (1993) (reviewing the finding in
Collier v. MD-IndividualPracticeAss'n, 327 Md. 1, 607 A.2d 537 (1992), that the term "fulltime student" in an insurance policy was ambiguous despite meeting the criteria of the
relevant school's definition). In Collier, a student at a local college was paralyzed while
playing touch football. Kresslein, supra, at 592. His treatment at two hospitals cost approximately $286,000. His insurance policy provided coverage only to a "full-time student." He
was permitted to register for only six credits per semester after the college placed him on
academic probation. Id. Because the college defined full-time student status as twelve
credits per semester, the insurer sought to deny coverage to him as a part-time student in
the college. Id. at 593. Even though the only evidence presented to construe the intent of
the parties was the college's definition, the Court of Appeals found the term susceptible to
two or more meanings and therefore ambiguous. Id at 598.
162. Colgan v. Agway, Inc., 553 A.2d 143, 147 (Vt. 1988) (Peck, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's interpretation that a carefully written, broadly worded exculpatory
clause was not enforceable because it was "based primarily on 'the understandable promptings of sympathy,' which, however appealing from a purely subjective and emotional point
of view is, nevertheless, bad motivation for judicial decisions, leading inevitably to bad law"
(citation omitted)).
163. United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 213-14 n.17 (1970) ("Contract interpretation is largely an individualized process, with the conclusion in a particular case turning on
the particular language used against the background of other indicia of the parties'
intention.").
164. For example, the Adloo court may have believed the assertion made by counsel for
the Adloos that:
The obvious problem for real estate brokers is that they fear that, if the immunity
from liability for its own negligence sought were to be explicitly stated in clear,
direct and unmistakable language, prospective listing sellers would find such onerous terms patently offensive and not only would be unlikely to agree to them,
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standard that fails to rein in the purely subjective and unpredictable
sympathetic notions of a court also fails to guide laypersons in the
165
preparation of binding agreements.
d. Implication.-By strictly interpreting the "clear and unequivocal" standard, the Court of Appeals may find that it has-intentionally or otherwise-made the express negligence standard the law
of Maryland. Just before it abandoned the "clear and unequivocal"
standard, the Supreme Court of Texas warned of forthcoming change
because it had "come as close as possible to adopting the express negligence doctrine without doing SO. '"166 If adopted in Maryland, this
standard would offer the advantages of certainty, uniformity, and predictability to contracts, as well as the promise that less effort would be
required to construe them. On the other hand, express negligence is
a formulaic and legalistic approach that could negate the true intent
of the parties, even an intent that was otherwise clearly expressed without use of the correct legal words.
The Court of Appeals is unlikely ever to explicitly adopt the express negligence standard. Because it is similar to the rigidly formulaic test the court rejected in Wolf, 6 7 one might assume that
express negligence does not meet the court's need for flexibility. The
court would not want to be handcuffed by a doctrine that may prevent
the court from making a decision required for justice. In practicable
terms, the parties may have allocated the risk of negligence, but if the
allocation was not specifically stated in writing, an "express negligence" court would be prevented from enforcing the clause.16 8

but, more importantly, probably would be unwilling to sign contracts listing their
properties with the broker for sale.
Brief of Petitioners at 17, Adloo (No. 143).

165. See Colgan, 553 A.2d at 147-48 (Peck, J., dissenting). Judge Peck argued that the
majority failed to follow a standard in refusing to enforce a general exculpatory clause:
Gone are the days, apparently, when prospective parties to a contract, and
the attorneys who advise them, can look to the courts and precedential decisions,
with the slightest degree of confidence and trust, for guidance in the preparation

of binding agreements....
. . [T]he
[
test now, which is controlled entirely by individual whim, is a
sufficient hardship to evoke the purely subjective and unpredictable sympathy of
the malleable majority of this Court.

Id.
166. See Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex. 1987).
167. See supra note 45. Maryland courts have never explicitly addressed the express neg-

ligence test.
168. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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Rather, the court seems to have implicitly applied the express negligence test without suffering the consequences.
By clearly adopting a standard and consistently applying it, the
court would clarify the law in Maryland. If the court favors plain, unsophisticated language or seeks to prevent long, complex contracts
drafted by attorneys, it should favor the literal enforcement approach.
If it believes that a fault-based tort standard permeates contractual relations, then the court should apply the strict approach to the clear
and unequivocal standard. If the court sympathizes with those who
unwittingly agree to indemnify another party for their negligence, and
seeks to achieve simplicity and consistency in contract drafting, then it
should adopt the express negligence standard. With its decision in
Adloo, the court clearly favors a strict standard requiring exculpatory
clauses to specifically state an intent to release a party from liability for
her own negligence. If the court can be convinced to abandon its
untenable flexible response tendencies, it can achieve consistency by
explicitly adopting the express negligence standard. It is not too burdensome a public policy to ask contracting parties to write "negligence" if they mean negligence.
5. Conclusion.-In finding that a broadly worded exculpatory
clause that allocated damages caused by theft, but did not address the
effect of negligence, did not "clearly and unambiguously" reveal the
intention to absolve a party from liability for its future negligence, the
Court of Appeals rendered a fair decision consistent with precedent.
However, the facts in Adloo may produce a greater effect than the
court intended. The court decided that broadly worded exculpatory
clauses are insufficiently specific to waive negligence claims-even
when a cause of the damage was contemplated by the parties.1 69 Instead, the court implicitly required that the parties anticipate the effect of negligence and mention it in the contract. Although the court
in this case breached the boundaries of the strict approach to the
"clear and unequivocal" standard, a different set of facts may yet allow
it to retreat. Certainly, this court intends to retain the flexibility to
provide justice to sympathetic parties. However, this revisionist approach-analyzing contracts after the state's citizens and businesses
have already formed their relationships and assigned their risks-is a
poor surrogate for a public policy. If the Court of Appeals instead

169. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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provided a consistent rationale, it would firmly establish when exculpatory language will be enforced.
Sco-rr A.

CONWELL

B. Enforcing Express Promises in Umbrella PersonalLiability Insurance
Policies by InterpretingAmbiguity Against Carriers
In Bailer v. Erie InsuranceExchange,' the Court of Appeals held that
when an umbrella personal liability insurance policy expressly covers
invasion of privacy as "personal injury" while excluding "personal injury expected or intended by the insured," the policy is ambiguous
and must be construed in favor of coverage for invasion of privacy by
unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion of another.2 To reach this
holding, the court has necessarily extended precedent by concluding
that this form of invasion of privacy can only be committed intentionally.3 Furthermore, the court has followed precedent by interpreting
ambiguity in an insurance policy against the insurer.4 The court's approaches are practical in light of two conflicting public policies: discouraging insurance coverage for intentional torts and upholding the
freedom to contract by enforcing the insurer's express obligations. 5
The court's ruling has properly promoted the latter policy when it
conflicts with the former, thereby fulfilling the contracting parties'
reasonable expectations.6
1. The Case.-Byron C. Bailer and Victoria Bailer, a husband
and wife residing in Rockville, Maryland, hired a Danish au pair, Majbrit Meier.' Meier assisted the Bailers with household work and child
care in exchange for salary, room, and board.' Meier had her own
room and bath during her stay with the Bailers.9 One day in the fall
1. 344 Md. 515, 687 A.2d 1375 (1997).
2. Id. at 517, 687 A.2d at 1376. At common law, invasion of privacy by unreasonable
intrusion upon seclusion of another is one of four recognized forms of the tort of invasion
of privacy. See infra notes 99, 118-119 and accompanying text (discussing the four types of
invasion of privacy).
3. Id. at 534, 687 A.2d at 1384.
4. Id. at 521-22, 687 A.2d at 1378; see also infra text accompanying notes 44, 57, 67.
5. 344 Md. at 534-35, 687 A.2d at 1385 (discussing the rationale for holding that the
insurer should honor its express promises and that public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for invasion of privacy by unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion of another); see also infra text accompanying notes 137-140, 173-180.
6. 344 Md. at 534-35, 687 A.2d at 1385; see also infra text accompanying notes 137-140,
149-159, 173-180.
7. 344 Md. at 517, 687 A.2d at 1376.
8. Id. at 517-18, 687 A.2d at 1376.
9. Id. at 518, 687 A.2d at 1376.
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of 1993, while her bathroom was being used for laundry drying, Meier
asked for permission to shower in the bathroom adjoining the Bailers'
bedroom.' ° Unbeknownst to Meier, before giving her access to the
bath, Mr. Bailer had hidden a video camera in the bathroom, which
he turned on and focused on the shower area." Meier used the
shower and eventually discovered she had been videotaped.12 She left
her job and the Bailers' home after this incident.' 3 Meier then sued
the Bailers in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for invasion
of privacy. 4
The Bailers requested that their insurer, Erie Insurance Exchange (Erie), defend against Meier's suit and indemnify them for
any losses, because they believed that Erie's catastrophe liability insurance covered the suit.15 Erie, however, "declined to do either," assert-

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The record did not indicate how Meier had discovered the "surreptitious video
taping." Id at 518 n.1, 687 A.2d at 1376 n.1. The depositions of the Bailers indicated that
after Meier had showered, "Mr. Bailer retrieved the tape and placed it in the pocket of a
jacket hanging in his closet, without having viewed the tape." Id Meier obtained the tape
later and played it for Mrs. Bailer. Id.
13. Id at 518, 687 A.2d at 1376.
14. Id.
15. Id at 518, 520-21, 687 A.2d at 1376-78. The Bailers had purchased three insurance
policies from Erie: a basic homeowner's policy, an automobile liability policy, and a personal catastrophe liability policy. Id. at 517, 687 A.2d at 1376. The catastrophe policy
required the Bailers "to maintain in full effect during the policy period, without alteration,
the policies shown on the Declarations... as underlying insurance. . . ." Id. at 522, 687
A.2d at 1378 (ellipses in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The "underlying
insurance" included the Bailers' basic homeowner's and automobile policies. Id. If the
claims were covered under the underlying insurance, the catastrophe policy would
"appl [y] only to damages in excess of the underlying limit." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The Bailers did not assert that their homeowner's policy covered Meier's suit. Id.
According to the Bailers' homeowner's policy, under the section "Home and Family Liability Protection," Erie agreed to
pay all sums up to the amount shown on the Declarations, which anyone we protect becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage resulting from an occurrence during the policy period. We will pay
for only bodily injury or property damage covered by this policy.
Id at 522, 687 A.2d at 1378-79 (internal quotation marks omitted). That policy defined
"bodily injury" as "physical harm, sickness or disease, including mental anguish, and includes care, loss of services, or resulting death." Id., 687 A.2d at 1379 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Moreover, that policy defined an "occurrence" as "an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to the same general harmful conditions." Id. at 522-23,
687 A.2d at 1379 (internal quotation marks omitted). The basic homeowner's policy's
liability protection provisions contained essentially the same exclusion as found in the catastrophe policy for "[b]odily injury or property damage expected or intended by anyone we
protect." Id at 523, 687 A.2d at 1379 (emphasis added).
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ing that the policy excluded coverage for intentional conduct.16
Consequently, the Bailers hired a separate attorney to defend them in
Meier's suit and sued Erie in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County for breach of contract. 7 Meier settled her action against the
Bailers."s In the Bailers' suit against Erie, the trial court granted
Erie's motion for summary judgment.19 The Bailers appealed, but
before the Court of Special Appeals could review the matter, the
Court of Appeals issued, on its own motion, a writ of certiorari to hear
the case.2 °
2.

Legal Background.a.

Fundamental Contract Principles and Interpretation of Insur-

ance Policies.--Marylandcourts apply contract principles in construing
insurance policies.2 1 First, the courts use an objective theory of con-

tract for determining the parties' intent and contractual obligations
by examining the written insurance policy as a whole, focusing on the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the policy. 2 2 In reviewing the insurance policy, the courts accord the words their ordinary
meanings and determine the parties' intent based on what meaning a
reasonable person would attach to the words. 23 Second, the courts
apply the principle that if the policy language is clear, the policy
should be enforced without straining to create ambiguities in that language, presumably because the clear language of the policy best evidences the parties' intent as to their agreement. 24 Third, if ambiguity
16. Id. at 518, 521, 687 A.2d at 1376, 1378.
17. Id. at 518-20, 687 A.2d at 1376-77. The Bailers presented two claims in their action.
Id. at 519, 687 A.2d at 1377. The first claim asserted that the Bailers were "entitled to
insurance coverage including defense." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The second claim sought damages for breach of contract, including attorney's fees and costs incurred in defense of Meier's claim as well as attorney's fees and costs accrued in the
Bailers' suit against Erie. Id.
18. Id. at 518, 687 A.2d at 1376.
19. Id. at 519, 687 A.2d at 1377.
20. Id. at 518, 687 A.2d at 1376.
21. See Bond v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 289 Md. 379, 384, 424 A.2d 765,
768 (1981) ("Insurance policies, being contractual, are construed as other contracts.").
22. See Pacific Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 302 Md. 383, 388, 488 A.2d 486,
488 (1985) (reciting a few "well-established principles" for interpreting insurance contracts
in Maryland and emphasizing that in "determin[ing] the intention of the parties to the
insurance contract ... [the court should] construe the instrument as a whole" (citations
omitted)).
23. Id.
24. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 261, 492 A.2d 1306,
1310 (1985) ("[W]hen the language of the contract is plain and unambiguous there is no
room for construction, and a court must presume that the parties meant what they
expressed.").
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remains after considering the parties' intentions from the policy as a
whole, and after admitting any relevant parol evidence, the courts
should construe ambiguity in the policy against the insurer as the
drafter of the contract.2 5 Fourth, the courts apply the rule that when
the policy's provisions appear inconsistent, the judge should first attempt to resolve the inconsistency without nullifying any provisions of
the policy.2 6 Finally, the courts adopt the principle that when a contract has two possible constructions, one of which would produce an
absurd result and the other of which would effectuate the purpose of
the agreement, the latter construction should prevail.27 Consequently, application of this principle fulfills the parties' reasonable
expectations.

28

b. Interpreting Ambiguity in Insurance Policies.-The judicial
policy of enforcing express promises in insurance contracts by interpreting ambiguity against the insurer is evident in cases that resolve
ambiguity stemming from the legal nuances of the contract terms. In
these cases, the court construes ambiguity in favor of the insured by
rejecting the insurer's narrow interpretation of the contract. In United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. NationalPaving & ContractingCo.,2 the
Court of Appeals considered whether an insurance policy that expressly covered liability resulting from an independent contractor's
negligence obligated an insurer to indemnify an insured for liability
arising out of an automobile collision caused by the insured's contractor's employee. 3" The court answered in the affirmative, holding that
the insurer's express promise to cover damage caused by an independent contractor's negligence does not limit coverage to situations where the independent contractor solely causes the injury or
where the contractor is sued for negligent performance of a nondelegable duty. 1

25. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. National Paving & Contracting Co., 228
Md. 40, 50, 178 A.2d 872, 876-77 (1962); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrS
§ 206 (1979) ("In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or
a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who
supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.").
26. See, e.g., Chew v. DeVries, 240 Md. 216, 221, 213 A.2d 742, 744-45 (1965) ("[I]f a
reconciliation can be effected by a reasonable interpretation, such interpretation should
be given to ... apparently repugnant provisions, rather than nullify any.").
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Born v. Hammond, 218 Md. 184, 188, 146 A.2d 44, 47 (1958).
Id. at 189, 146 A.2d at 47.
228 Md. 40, 178 A.2d 872 (1962).
Id at 44, 178 A.2d at 873.
Id. at 53, 178 A.2d at 878.
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NationalPaving involved an automobile collision between a contractor of the insured, National Paving and Contracting Company
(National) and a bus driver.3 2 National was insured by a United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Company (USF&G) policy that agreed to pay "all
sums which [National] shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of bodily injury... sustained by any person, caused by accident and
arising out of the hazards hereinafter defined."" The policy defined
"hazards" as, inter alia, "[o] perations performed by independent contractors." 4 When the bus driver sued National for its contractor's
negligence, USF&G refused National's request to defend the suit.35
At trial, a verdict was directed in favor of National, but on appeal
the Court of Appeals reversed the directed verdict and remanded for
a new trial. 6 Before the new trial, National settled the case with the
bus driver.3 7 Because USF&G chose not to participate in the settlement, National paid $37,500 to the bus driver and then sued USF&G
under its insurance policies.3 8
In National's suit against USF&G, the trial court ruled in favor of
National, holding that the policy covered National's liability. 9 On appeal, USF&G argued that because National's settlement with the bus
driver precluded a judicial determination of National's obligation to
pay, National was not "legally obligated" to pay within the meaning of
the policy, and thus USF&G was not bound to reimburse National.40
The court rejected USF&G's "narrow" interpretation, agreeing
with the trial court that the words in the coverage provision "caused by
accident and arising out of the hazards hereinafter defined" referred
to the injury, not to National's legal liability.4 1 The court held that,
for the coverage to apply, the injury, not the "legal obligation," must
have been caused by accident and must have arisen out of the independent contractor's operation.4 2 The court found that the policy's provision did not contain language which either expressly or by
implication restricted coverage to situations when the independent
contractor alone caused the injury, or when a contractor was sued for
32. Id. at 44, 178 A.2d at 873.
33. Id. at 49, 178 A.2d at 876.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

44-45, 178 A.2d at 873.
45, 178 A.2d at 873-74.
46, 178 A.2d at 874.

47-48, 50, 178 A.2d at 875-76.
50-51, 178 A.2d at 876-77 (emphasis added).
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the negligent performance of a nondelegable duty performed by the
independent contractor.4" Reasoning that if the bus driver's injuries
arose out of the operations of the independent contractor, then
USF&G was liable to National under the policy's coverage, the court
resolved the ambiguity in favor of National and enforced USF&G's
obligations in providing coverage.4 4
In 1962, the same year it issued National Paving, the Court of Appeals resolved an ambiguity in another insurance policy in Haynes v.
American Casualty Co. 45 The Haynes court held that damage to another's land caused by the insured contractor's employees who, contrary to his instructions, encroached upon another's land and cut
down the trees, was within the contractor's liability policy covering
property damage caused by accident, even though the employees intentionally cut the trees.4 6 In so ruling, the court noted "'the fact that
an injury is caused by an intentional act does not preclude it from
being caused by accident if in that act, "something unforeseen, unusual and unexpected occurs which produces the result.""' 4 7
In Haynes, the insurer, American Casualty Company, argued that
the insured's employees had acted voluntarily and intentionally in cutting the trees, and the damage naturally resulted from the act.4 8
Therefore, even though the result may have been unforeseen and unintended, the policy would not cover damage caused by the insured's
43. Id. at 53, 178 A.2d at 878.
44. Id. at 50-51, 55, 178 A.2d at 876-77, 879.
45. 228 Md. 394, 179 A.2d 900 (1962).
46. Id. at 399-401, 179 A.2d at 903-04. The appellant in that case, Mack C. Haynes, had
purchased a manufacturer's and contractor's liability policy from the appellee, American
Casualty Company, to cover against accidents in his excavating operations. Id. at 395, 179
A-2d at 901. The insurance policy at issue in Haynes provided:
"Coverage B-Property Damage Liability: To pay on behalf of the insured all
sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by
accident and arising out of hazards hereinafter defined."
"Definition of Hazards
"Division 1-Premises-Operations. The ownership, maintenance or use of
premises, and all operations."
Id.
While doing excavation work in Baltimore County, Haynes pointed out to his employees the property line within which the work was to be done and then left them for several
hours. Id. When he returned, he found that the employees had encroached on an adjacent property and cut down 48 trees. Id. When the landowners sued Haynes for the resulting damage, the insurer began defending the action, but later denied liability under the
policy. Id. Haynes then sued his insurer for breach of contract. Id. at 396, 179 A.2d at 90102.
47. Id. at 397, 179 A.2d at 902 (quoting M.R. Thomason, Contractor v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 248 F.2d 417, 420-21 (5th Cir. 1957) (Rives, J., dissenting)).
48. Id. at 396, 179 A.2d at 902.
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employees' misjudgment. 49 Conversely, Haynes asserted that the contract, when read as a whole, provided coverage. 50 Moreover, Haynes
pointed out that a majority of the jurisdictions reject any distinction
between the terms "accidental means" and "accidental results," so that
any intentional or voluntary act of the insured that causes damage
unforeseen by him at the time comes within the meaning of the term
"caused by accident."5 1
The court found Haynes's arguments persuasive, and held that
the policy covered the damage to the adjacent property. 5 2 The court
noted that the case involved "a technical trespass ... through the unwitting and heedless act of the insured's employees in going upon the
land of another, contrary to the insured's instructions, and cutting the
trees."5 " The court concluded, however, that American Casualty
could not contend that the injury to another's property was intentional.5 4 The court explained: "To argue that, because the means employed were not accidental, the resulting damage cannot be construed
as being 'caused by accident,' though the damage was in no way reasonably anticipated, is to rely upon a fine distinction which would
never occur to, or be understood by, the average policy holder."55
The court reasoned that it would construe the phrase "caused by accident" too narrowly if it held that recovery under such a provision was
limited not only to those cases where the result was unintended, but
also where the means used were accidental. 6 The court then concluded that, where an insurance company attempts to limit coverage
by employing ambiguous language, the ambiguity will be resolved
against the insurer.5 7
Twelve years after Haynes, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Sparks,5" the

Court of Special Appeals held that a provision of a homeowner's policy excluding coverage for property damage "which is either expected
49. Id.
50. Id. Although not explicitly stated, Haynes's assertion seems to rest on the fact that
when the policy's provisions are considered together, the policy covered "destruction of
property... caused by accident and arisingout of... hazards," which was defined in another
provision as "all [excavating] operations" on the property in question. Id. at 395-97, 179
A.2d at 901-02.
51. Id. at 396, 179 A.2d at 902.
52. Id. at 399-401, 179 A.2d at 904.
53. Id. at 399, 179 A.2d at 903.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 400, 179 A.2d at 904.
57. Id. (citing United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. National Paving & Contracting Co.,
228 Md. 40, 178 A.2d 872 (1962); Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.
v. Shirer, 224 Md. 530, 168 A.2d 525 (1961)).
58. 63 Md. App. 738, 493 A.2d 1110 (1985).
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or intended from the standpoint of the Insured" did not relieve the
insurer of liability for a fire caused at a mill when the insured's son
ignited gas fumes while attempting to steal gas.59 In that case, the
insured, Frances Sparks (Sparks), allowed her son James to use her
car one night.6" James drove to the premises of the Farmers Supply
Company (Farmers Supply) with his friends to steal gas from the company's feed truck.6 ' While siphoning the gas, James unwittingly illuminated the dark area with a cigarette lighter, thereby igniting the gas
fumes in the area of the truck.6 2 The fire "destroyed the Farmers Supply mill and substantially all of its contents. "63
The insurer, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), sought a
judgment declaring that Sparks's insurance policies did not cover the
losses resulting from the fire.' Allstate viewed the fire as an "intentional act" excluded by the terms of the insurance policies. 65 The
court rejected this argument, reasoning that although the son intended to steal gas, he did not intend to cause the resulting fire.6 6
Thus, the conduct was not "intended" as defined by the coverage, and
Allstate had a duty to cover the damage caused by this accident.6 7
Three years later, in Harpy v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance

Co.,68 the Court of Special Appeals held that a homeowner's insurance
policy, which excluded coverage for personal liability as to bodily injury or property damage expected or intended by the insured, did not
cover the insured's sexual assault of his daughter, even though the
insured contended that he did not intend or expect that his daughter
would suffer the injuries she alleged in her complaint as a result of the

59. Id. at 740-41, 744, 493 A.2d at 1111, 1113.
60. Id. at 740, 493 A.2d at 1111.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id
64. Id Sparks had purchased a homeowner's policy and an automobile policy from
Allstate. Id. The homeowner's policy, under a "Family Liability" clause, provided coverage
for "all sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages... caused
by an occurrence." Id. at 741, 493 A.2d at 1111 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
policy defined an "Insured" to include members of the "Named Insured's household." Id.
Further, the policy defined an "occurrence" as an "accident... which results, during the
policy period, in bodily injury or property damage." Id However, the policy excluded
coverage of "property damage which is either expected or intended from the standpoint of
the Insured." Id. The court found that the homeowner's policy applied. Id. at 744, 493
A.2d at 1113.
65. Id. at 741, 494 A.2d at 1111.
66. Id. at 744, 494 A.2d at 1113.
67. Id.
68. 76 Md. App. 474, 545 A.2d 718 (1988).
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sexual abuse.6 9 Cheryl J. Harpy (Cheryl), a minor, sued her father,
Joseph T. Harpy (Harpy), for sexually abusing her in various ways,
including sexual intercourse.7v The suit specifically alleged assault
and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
71

negligence.

Harpy had purchased two homeowner's insurance policies from
Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Nationwide) .72 Believing that these policies covered Cheryl's suit against him, Harpy demanded that Nationwide defend him in the suit. 73 In response,
Nationwide sought a judgment declaring that neither of the policies
provided defense or coverage. 4 While conceding that the policies
did not cover either assault and battery or intentional infliction of
emotional distress, Harpy asserted that his 'intent to harm his daughter was a disputed material fact relevant to the daughter's negligence
claim. 75 The court rejected this assertion, agreeing with the trial court
that "for the [1]aw to define sex with one's nine to thirteen year old

69. Id. at 475, 545 A.2d at 719.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 475-76, 545 A.2d at 719. The abuse was alleged to have occurred from 1979
to 1984. Id. at 475, 545 A.2d at 719. On November 14, 1980, Harpy purchased an insurance policy from Nationwide that insured him against loss from damages for "negligent
personal acts." Id. at 476, 545 A.2d at 719 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nationwide
promised to "[d]efend with counsel of its choice any suit against an Insured alleging...
bodily injury, illness.., and seeking damages therefor. Such suit shall be defended even if
groundless, false or fraudulent." Id. (alteration and ellipses in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nationwide also promised to "pay on behalf of the Insured all sums
which he shall become legally obligated to pay (1) as damages because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease ...." Id. (ellipsis in original). The policy, however, excluded damages
that resulted from "bodily injury, illness, or death or property damage caused intentionally
by or at the direction of the Insured ...." Id. at 476-77, 545 A.2d at 719-20 (ellipsis in
original). On November 14, 1984, a new policy replaced the 1980 policy. Id. at 477, 545
A.2d at 720. The new policy promised to pay "'damages the insured is legally obligated to
pay due to an occurrence'" and to "'provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our
choice.'" Id. The new policy, like the previous one, excluded coverage for personal liability as to bodily injury or property damage "which is expected or intended by the insured."
Id.
73. Id. at 476, 545 A.2d at 719.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 482, 545 A.2d at 722. Harpy relied on Sparks in asserting that his actual subjective intent to cause the "'specific injuries which occurred'" was the factual issue to be
decided and that his statement in an affidavit that he did not intend or expect the alleged
injuries created a dispute as to that fact. Id. at 483, 545 A.2d at 723. The court rejected
this assertion, distinguishing Sparks by pointing out that in that case no "substantial certainty" existed that the stealing of gasoline would start a fire, whereas in the case at hand, it
was substantially certain that Harpy's repeated sexual molestation of his daughter would
cause her "to suffer serious harm." Id.
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daughter to be anything but intentional injury is ridiculous."7 6 The
court remarked further that for a father in such a situation to claim
that he did not expect or intend to cause injury to his daughter "flies
in the face of all reason, common sense and experience."77 Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's granting of a declaratory
judgment and summary judgment in Nationwide's favor.78
In 1995, a Tennessee federal court reviewed an ambiguous insurance policy in Linebeny v. State FarmFire & Casualty Co.79 and held that
when a policy expressly covers injuries resulting from invasion of privacy, an inherently intentional tort, but excludes injuries intended or
expected, "the coverage is illusory, and the policy is ambiguous and
must be interpreted against the insurer and in favor of the insured."8 °
In Lineberry, two men had built a "secret viewing room" which had twoway mirrors.8 1 One man engaged in sexual activities with a woman
and another videotaped the activity from the viewing room. 2 Four
women who had been secretly videotaped sued the men who, in turn,
sued their insurer for defense and indemnification under their personal liability umbrella policy.8 3 The policy defined "loss" to mean
"'an accident that results in personal injury. '"'84 In turn, "personal
injury" meant "'false arrest, false imprisonment, wrongful eviction,
wrongful detention, malicious prosecution or humiliation; . . . libel,
slander, defamation of character or invasion of rights of privacy; and
...
assault and battery."'8 5 The policy, however, provided that State
Farm would not cover personal injury or property damage "'which is
either expected or intended by [the insured.]"' 8 6
The Linebeny insurer, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (State
Farm), argued that it was not obligated to defend or indemnify the
insured because the injuries they caused did not result from an "accident" and the policy excluded intentional conduct.8 7 The court recoguized that invasion of privacy is "an inherently intentional tort" and
76. Id at 482-83, 545 A.2d at 722 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
77. Id. at 485, 545 A.2d at 724 (quoting CNA Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 666 S.W.2d 689, 691
(Ark. 1984)).
78. Id. at 487, 545 A.2d at 725.
79. 885 F. Supp. 1095 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (mem.).
80. Id. at 1099.
81. Id. at 1096 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Id
83. Id.
84. Id at 1097 (emphasis omitted).
85. Id.
86. Id (emphasis added).
87. Id
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thus cannot be committed by accident."8 Because the policy expressly
covered invasion of privacy and expressly excluded coverage for intentional torts, the court found the policy to be ambiguous and construed it in favor of the insured. 9 Accordingly, the court ordered
State Farm to defend and indemnify the insured."
c. The Tort of Invasion of Privacy.-Maryland first recognized
the tort of invasion of privacy in Carr v. Watkins.9" In that case, Carr
sued Watkins and others for divulging to Carr's employer information
about criminal charges brought against Carr years before, which allegedly prompted Carr's employer to discharge him.9 2 Carr's suit alleged, inter alia, invasion of privacy.9 3 The trial court held that Carr
could not maintain the invasion of privacy claim because Maryland
had not yet recognized that tort. 4 After reviewing the case law of
other jurisdictions, the court followed the lead of thirty-one states and
the District of Columbia in recognizing the tort of invasion of
95
privacy.
After Watkins, courts focused on the reasonableness of a defendant's conduct in determining whether an invasion of privacy has occurred. 6 This approach parallels that of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which sets forth that a defendant's intrusion upon a plaintiffs
private affairs will not subject the defendant to liability for invasion of
privacy unless "the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person." 7 For instance, in Beane v. McMullen, 8 the court held that
reasonableness of a defendant's conduct under the facts presented is
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1099.
Id.
Id.
227 Md. 578, 588, 177 A.2d 841, 846 (1962).
Id. at 581, 177 A.2d at 842.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 586-88, 177 A.2d at 845-46.
See infra text accompanying notes 98-108.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976) (emphasis added). The Second

Restatement further explains that the defendant's intrusion does not amount to an invasion
of privacy "unless the interference with the plaintiff's seclusion is a substantial one, of a

kind that would be highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable [person], as the result of
conduct to which the reasonable [person] would strongly object." Id. § 652B cmt. d (em-

phasis added). For example, under the Second Restatement's view, no liability would exist
when a defendant knocks at the plaintiffs door or calls the plaintiff on occasion to collect
a debt. Id. However, liability would exist "when the telephone calls are repeated with such

persistence and frequency as to amount to a course of hounding the plaintiff." Id. In some
cases, a plaintiffs right to privacy has not been violated even if she has been "seriously
annoyed" by a defendant's conduct. Id For example, a landlord's conduct does not
amount to an invasion of her tenant's privacy when she calls the tenant at nine o'clock on
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a determining factor in all types of invasions of privacy, 99 except perhaps appropriation of name or likeness.1 °0 Specifically, Beane involved landowners who brought an action against the owners of an
adjacent property for an alleged invasion of privacy.' 1 Applying the
reasonableness test, the Beane court held that the defendant owners'
making a relatively small number of complaints to government officials about their neighbors' possible violations of local laws was reasonable and did not justify the plaintiff landowners' recovery under
10 2
the theory of invasion of privacy.
Similarly, in Household Finance Corp. v. Bridge,l ' the court held
that the issue of what action a creditor may take to collect a debt and
yet remain immune from liability for invasion of privacy must be decided on a case-by-case inquiry of reasonableness."0 4 Bridge involved a
debtor's suit against her creditor for invasion of privacy. 1° 5 In that
the
case, a creditor attempted to recover a debt by repeatedly 10calling
debtor and her parents over a period of eleven months. 6 During

Sunday morning to demand rent payment, even though she knows that the tenant is not
ready to pay it and that the tenant objects to such a call on Sunday. Id.
98. 265 Md. 585, 291 A.2d 37 (1972).
99. See infra note 118 and accompanying text (listing the four types of invasion of privacy). The tort of invasion of privacy consists of "a complex of four distinct wrongs." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 652A cmt. b (1976).

These "distinct wrongs" have a

common denominator: "each involves interference with the interest of the individual in
leading, to some reasonable extent, a secluded and private life, free from the prying eyes,
ears and publications of others." Id
These forms of invasion of privacy may overlap. Id, § 652A cmt. d. The same conduct
or a series of conduct may constitute two or more types of invasion of privacy. Id A hypothetical illustrates this point: "A breaks and enters B's home, steals a photograph of B, and
publishes it to advertise his whiskey, together with false statements about B that would be
highly objectionable to a reasonable man." Id. A may be liable for invasion of privacy by
intrusion upon B's seclusion, by the appropriation of B's likeness, by giving publicity to B's
private photograph, and by giving publicity to B that places him in a false light before the
public. I& Although B may rest his cause of action "upon any or all of these grounds ...
he may have only one recovery of damages for invasion of privacy." Id.
In addition to these four recognized forms of invasion of privacy, other forms may be
held to be actionable, because several courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
have "spoken in very broad general terms of a somewhat undefined 'right of privacy' as a
ground for various constitutional decisions involving indeterminate civil and personal
rights." Id § 652A cmt. c.
100. 265 Md. at 600-01, 291 A.2d at 45.
101. Id. at 588-93, 291 A.2d at 37-42.
102. Id. at 599-600, 291 A.2d at 44-45.
103. 252 Md. 531, 250 A.2d 878 (1969).
104. Id. at 540, 250 A.2d at 884 ("[T]he question of how far a creditor may go to collect
his debt must be decided on the individual facts of each case [and] ... on the ground of
reasonableness.").
105. Id. at 532-35, 250 A.2d at 879-81.
106. Id. at 533-34, 250 A.2d at 880-81.
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these calls, the creditor used allegedly objectionable language, threatening the debtor that she could go to jail, that her reputation could
be ruined, and that she could lose herjob.'1 7 Balancing "the interest
of the creditor in collecting his debt against that of a debtor of ordinary sensibilities," the Bridge court held that the creditor's conduct did
not constitute unreasonable intrusion of the debtor's right to be left
alone as to support a cause of action for invasion of privacy.108
3. The Court'sReasoning.-In Bailer v. Erie InsuranceExchange, the
Court of Appeals held that when an umbrella personal liability insurance policy ambiguously covers invasion of privacy as "personal injury"
while excluding "personal injury expected or intended by the insured," the ambiguity must result in favor of coverage for invasion of
privacy by unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion of another.10 9 The
court addressed the merits of the Bailers' breach of contract claim,
which rested entirely on the personal catastrophe policy and consisted
of accrued damages, including counsel fees. 1 0 At the outset, the
court noted that the coverage of the Bailers' catastrophe policy was
integrated with the underlying automobile and homeowner's liability
coverages, so as to support the Bailers' assertion "that the parties in-

107. Id., 250 A.2d at 880.
108. Id. at 543-44, 250 A_2d at 886.
109. 344 Md. at.517, 534, 687 A.2d at 1376, 1385. The court began by noticing that the
trial court had erred in deciding this declaratory judgment action. Id. at 519, 687 A.2d at
1377. The trial court's "final order ... simply recite[d] that Erie's motion for summary
judgment was granted as to all counts" without "declar[ing] the rights of the parties." Id.
(citing Broadwater v. State, 303 Md. 461, 469, 494 A.2d 934, 938 (1985) (holding, after
reviewing various prior decisions, "that the trial judge erred .. .in failing to declare the
rights of the parties")). The court observed, however, that because Meier had settled her
lawsuit against the Bailers before the appeal, "the need for a declaration of the rights of
the parties, in order for it to operate prospectively, has become moot." Id. Thus, the
Bailers' claim that they were "entifled to insurance coverage including defense" against
Meier's lawsuit was no longer at issue. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Id. at 520, 687 A.2d at 1377. The personal catastrophe policy that the Bailers
purchased from Erie provided: "'[Erie] will pay the ultimate net loss which anyone we
protect becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of personal injury or property
damage covered by this policy. This applies only to damages in excess of the underlying
limit or Self-Insured Retention.'" Id.
The Bailers relied on this policy, which defined "'[p]ersonal injury'" as "'false arrest,
wrongful detention or imprisonment, malicious prosecution, wrongful entry or eviction,
invasion of privay, or humiliation caused by any of these.'" Id., 687 A.2d at 1377-78. Erie,
on the other hand, relied on the exclusion provision of the policy. Id. at 521, 687 A.2d at
1378. In the "What we do not cover-Exclusions" section, the policy stated: "We do not
cover.., personal injury or property damage expected or intended by anyone we protect. We
do cover reasonable acts committed to protect persons or property." Id. (emphasis added).
The circuit court rested its decision on this exclusion provision. Id
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tended for the policy to cover liability for invasion of privacy."11 1 The
court noted that the Bailers' "catastrophe policy enlarges the coverage
from 'bodily injury' to 'personal injury' and then defines the latter
term specifically to include certain enumerated torts among which is
invasion of privacy. ' 112 The court further observed that the catastrophe policy explicitly indicated its intention to operate both as excess
insurance over the limit of the required underlying insurance and as
primary coverage for certain risks not covered at all by the underlying
policy. 3 The court then concluded that the policy covered liability
for invasion of privacy claims.' 14
Next, the court addressed Erie's contention that no ambiguity existed in the policy because it should be construed to cover negligent
invasions of privacy, while excluding intentional invasions."1 5 The
court rejected Erie's proposed distinction between intentional and
negligent invasions of privacy. 1 6 In doing so, the court pointed out
that it had recognized the tort of invasion of privacy in Carr v. Watkins1 17 and that subsequent cases have approved the definition of "invasion of privacy" as set out in section 652A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.'" 8 The court noted that "Meier alleged [the] form of invasion
of privacy consisting of 'unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of
another, as stated in § 652B." ' 1 9 The court also cited with approval
Snakenberg v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co.,12 ° which held that

111. Id. at 522, 687 A.2d at 1378.
112.- Id. at 523, 687 A.2d at 1379.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 524, 687 A.2d at 1379.
115. Id. at 525, 687 A.2d at 1380.
116. Id.
117. 227 Md. 578, 586-88, 177 A.2d 841, 845-46 (1962).
118. Bailer, 344 Md. at 525, 687 A.2d at 1380. The Second Restatement provides:
§ 652A General Principle
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for
the resulting harm to the interests of the other.
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by
or
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another...
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness ... ; or
or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life ...
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before
the public ....

§ 652A (1976).
119. Bailer,344 Md. at 526, 687 A.2d at 1380 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652A(2) (a)). Section 652B states: "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
120. 383 S.E.2d 2 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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"wrongful intrusion into private affairs always involves an intentional act. It is mistaken to conclude ...

that if malice is

not an element of invasion of privacy, neither is intent. The
tort cannot be committed by unintended conduct amounting merely to lack of due care. Intentional
conduct is a nec1 21
essary element of the cause of action."

Therefore, the court concluded that invasion of privacy by unreasonable intrusion upon
seclusion of another could only be committed
2
intentionally.

2

The court then addressed Erie's assertion that intentional conduct and intentional results must be distinguished. 123 According to
Erie, even if invasion of privacy is exclusively an intentional tort, and
even if the policy covered intended conduct that produced unintended results, the policy's exclusion still applied because Mr. Bailer
intended the injury. 124 Erie further contended that one could reconcile the insuring provision and the exclusion by distinguishing between intended means and an unintended result.12 5 Under Erie's
contention, the insurance policy would cover an invasion of privacy
that produced an unintended result, even if the means were intended,
but would exclude coverage for Mr. Bailer's conduct, because he had
26
intended it and expected the resulting harm.
In addressing Erie's argument, the court distinguished policies
that contain an exclusion and an express covenant insuring against
liability for one or more intentional torts from those policies that do
not have such apparently conflicting provisions.' 27 The court then
identified three approaches in dealing with the conflicting provisions:
(1) avoid the conflict, (2) apply the distinction between intentional
121. Bailer, 344 Md. at 527, 687 A.2d at 1381 (quoting Snakenberg, 383 S.E.2d at 7). The
Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he homeowner's policy in Snakenberg did not expressly
insure against damages for liability for invasion of privacy." Id. The court also observed
that "Erie has not briefed whether forms of invasion of privacy, other than 'Intrusion Upon
Seclusion' under Restatement § 652B, can be committed unintentionally, and Erie does
not argue that its policy, properly construed, insures against liability for some other form
of that tort." Id. The court then declined to "express (an] opinion on such a possible
construction," stating that "i]t is sufficient for present purposes to hold that the tort in the
form alleged here does not accommodate Erie's proffered distinction between negligent
and intentional conduct. That proposed distinction does not resolve the intrinsic contradiction in the policy." Id.
122. Id. at 534, 687 A.2d at 1384.
123. Id. at 528, 687 A.2d at 1381.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Haynes v. American Cas. Co., 228 Md. 394, 396-98, 179 A.2d 900, 901-03
(1962)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 528-29, 687 A.2d at 1381-82.
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and unintentional conduct, or (3) deem the policy ambiguous and
hold in favor of the insured.1 2 After discussing the cases representing
each approach,1 2 9 the court followed the third approach, as exemplified in Linebery.130 Applying this reasoning, the court concluded that
Erie's proposed reconciliation of the conflict in the policy terms did
3
not apply to Meier's claim against the Bailers.1 1
Moreover, the court observed that the Bailers' catastrophe policy
is a personal-not commercial-liability policy. 13 2 As such, a reasonable person in the Bailers' position at contracting time could infer
that Erie's promise to pay damages for liability for invasion of privacy
referred to an intrusion upon seclusion.' 3 3 Namely, people owning at
least one house and one car normally purchase an excess insurance
policy to cover liability resulting from invasion of privacy by unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion of another.1 34 They would not, however, contemplate the term "invasion of privacy" as relating primarily
to "exotic and usually commercial-context torts as appropriation of
another's name or likeness, unreasonable publicity, or false light publicity."135 The court then held that "[i]ntrusion upon seclusion must
always be intentional in order to be tortious, and it is the intrusion

128. Id. at 529, 687 A.2d at 1382.
129. Id. at 529-31, 687 A.2d at 1382-83 (citing Fuisz v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 61 F.3d
238, 240-43 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that a personal liability insurance policy's exclusion of
intentional acts excluded coverage of all claims for injury arising out of defamation where
the insured was alleged to have specifically intended to cause injury); Lineberry v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 885 F. Supp. 1095, 1099 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (mem.) (resolving ambiguity in an insurance policy in favor of the insured); Shapiro v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 347
N.E.2d 624, 625-26 (N.Y. 1976) (mem.) (holding, without explanation, that willful and
malicious defamation was not covered under a personal excess policy that provided coverage for liability for personal injury, including libel, slander, defamation of character, and
invasion of privacy because such personal injury could be "neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the Insured")).
130. Id. at 531, 687 A.2d at 1383. The court adopted the reasoning in Lineberry, which
held that an insurance policy is ambiguous when it expressly covers injuries resulting from
invasion of privacy, an inherently intentional tort, but excludes injuries intended or expected, and the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the insured. Id. (citing Lineberry,
885 F. Supp. at 1099); see also Knowles v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 832 P.2d 394, 396 (N.M.
1992) ("Exclusionary clauses in insurance policies are to be narrowly construed .. .with
the reasonable expectations of the insured providing the basis for . . . analysis.");
Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 7 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
"wrongful intrusion into private affairs always involves an intentional act"). For the facts of
Lineberry, see supra text accompanying notes 79-90.
131. Bailer, 344 Md. at 533-34, 687 A.2d at 1384.
132. Id, at 534, 687 A.2d at 1384.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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that constitutes the harm against which that form of invasion of privacy is intended to protect." ' 36

Finally, the court rejected Erie's claim that a construction that
permitted insurance of an intentional injury would counter public
policy, pointing out that Erie had failed to cite any appropriate authority to support its claim.' 3 7 The court also noted that Erie failed to
submit any evidence to clarify the parties' intent once the policy was
determined to be ambiguous.1 3 8 The court reasoned that the Bailers'
personal catastrophe policy was "designed for persons who own their
own homes, own one or more automobiles, and are sufficiently concerned about protecting their assets that they insure for excess and
enhanced coverage in addition to their underlying liability coverage."13 9 Furthermore, the court observed that Erie failed to present
any evidence that people with coverage become motivated by the insuring agreement intentionally to invade the seclusion of others. 4 '
Therefore, the court read the insurance policy as providing coverage
for invasion of privacy by unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion
of another.1 4 ' Upon these findings, the court reversed the trial
court's judgment and remanded the case for the entry of a summary
judgment on liability in favor of the Bailers.' 4 2
Judge Chasanow filed a dissenting opinion, in which he criticized
the majority for "nulliffying] a specific limitation of coverage in an
insurance policy" by "straining to provide insurance coverage for a
'peeping Tom' with a video camera."' 4 3 Judge Chasanow asserted that
136. Id. The court pointed out that Meier alleged an intentional intrusion. Id. Thus,
no basis existed for contending that the policy would insure for intentional intrusions
upon seclusion that did not result in intended or expected harm, but that the policy would
not insure for intentional intrusions upon seclusion that did result in expected or intended harm. Id., 687 A.2d at 1384-85. In the instant case, "the insured's conduct, the
invasion, and the claimant's harm, the invasion, are one and the same." Id., 687 A.2d at
1385. The court concluded: "Erie's proposed distinction in the context of this specific
claim against the Bailers postulates that the policy insures and does not insure for the same
conduct, at the same time, and in the same respect. The policy is at least ambiguous, and
Erie was obliged to defend and indemnify." Id.
137. Id., 687 A.2d at 1385.
138. Id. at 535, 687 A.2d at 1385.
139. Id.
140. Id. (citing First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 241-43,
389 A.2d 359, 366-67 (1978) (holding that public policy does not prohibit insurers from
issuing policies that cover liability for punitive damages awarded in a civil action for malicious prosecution, even though malice provided the basis for the damages). The court
concluded that "[t]he instant case is an even weaker one for voiding the insuring agreement on public policy grounds than was .. .First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's." Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 536, 687 A.2d at 1385 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
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the court could reconcile the seemingly inconsistent provisions of the
policy by holding the policy to cover only negligent, as opposed to
"expected or intended," conduct.14 ' He also claimed that the court
departed from precedent, which set forth that unreasonableness of
the invasion
of privacy was the test, not the intentionality of the
45
conduct. 1

4. Analysis. -In Bailer v. Erie InsuranceExchange, the Court of Appeals held that an umbrella personal liability insurance policy is ambiguous when it both expressly covers invasion of privacy as "personal
injury" and excludes "personal injury expected or intended by the insured," and the ambiguity must be construed in favor of coverage for
invasion of privacy by unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion of another.'4 6 The ruling is consistent with prior cases construing ambiguity in an insurance policy against the insurer.' 4 7 However, the Bailer
ruling extends precedent by concluding that invasion of privacy by
unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion of another can only be committed intentionally. 4 '
a. Following Precedent with Respect to Contract Interpretation.The Bailer court followed precedent by interpreting ambiguity in in49
surance policies against the drafters. As in National Paving,
Haynes,'50 and Sparks,' the Bailer court resolved any potential ambiguity in the insurance policies in favor of the insured.' 5 2 Under the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the insurance policies,
the results in National Paving, Haynes, and Sparks appear reasonable
given the parties' expectations. In National Paving,for example, National purchased the insurance with the expectation that the policy
would cover the negligent conduct of National's independent contractor, as explicitly stated in the policy.' 3 In that case, the court cor144. Id. at 537, 543-44, 687 A.2d at 1386, 1387-90.
145. Id. at 536-37, 687 A.2d at 1386; see also supra text accompanying notes 96-108.
146. 344 Md. at 517, 534, 687 A.2d at 1376, 1384-85.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 29-67.
148. Bailer,344 Md. at 527, 687 A.2d at 1381 ("'The tort [of invasion of privacy by unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion of another] cannot be committed by unintended conduct amounting merely to lack of due care. Intentional conduct is a necessary element of
the cause of action.'" (quoting Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 7 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1989))).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 29-44.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 45-57.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 58-67.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 123-131.
153. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. National Paving & Contracting Co., 228 Md.
40, 44, 50, 178 A.2d 872, 873, 876-77 (1962).
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rectly rejected the insurer's clever, but narrow, interpretation of the
policy.15 4 Likewise, in Haynes, the court declined to accept a narrow
interpretation of "caused by accident" to mean unintentional conduct. 155 The court chose not to distinguish between "accidental
means" and "accidental results" for purposes of interpreting the insurance policy because such distinction would defeat the purpose for
which the insured had purchased the insurance policy in the first
place. 156 Similarly, in Sparks, the court rejected the insurer's narrow
interpretation of the insurance policy, distinguishing intentional conduct from unintended result to rule in favor of coverage for the
insured.

15 7

As National Paving, Haynes, and Sparks aptly illustrate, where an
insurer presents a narrow interpretation of an insurance policy, Maryland courts have refused to accept the narrow construction when a
broader reading would provide insurance coverage as consistent with
the insured's expectation. 5 ' This approach is proper because when
an insurance policy could have two meanings, one of which makes it
fair by fulfilling the insured's reasonable expectations and the other
of which makes it unreasonable by denying coverage contrary to the
policy's purpose, the former meaning should prevail.1 59 Courts have
been especially willing to apply this rule in cases where two seemingly
conflicting provisions exist.160 These cases, however, should be distinguished from those in which the policies expressly exclude conduct
"intended or expected" without specifying the intentional torts covered. In the latter type of cases, such as Harpy, the courts have been
inclined to uphold exclusion of coverage. In Harpy, for example, the
policy excluded "intended or expected" conduct, but did not expressly cover intentional conduct such as sexual abuse.1 61
Moreover, the courts' approaches in National Paving, Haynes,
Sparks, and Harpy are sound because the insured may reasonably be
expected to rely on the plain language of the policy in bargaining for
a certain type of coverage. Thus, when an insurance policy expressly
154. Id. at 50, 178 A.2d at 876 (rejecting the insurer's interpretation because it was "a
narrow one for which [the court found] little support either in the language of the contract itself or in the decisions").
155. Haynes v. American Cas. Co., 228 Md. 394, 399-401, 179 A.2d 900, 903-04 (1962).
156. Id.
157. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sparks, 63 Md. App. 738, 738-44, 493 A.2d 1110, 1110-13 (1985).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44, 48-57, 64-67.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44, 45-57, 59-67.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 45-57, 79-90.
161. Harpyv. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 Md. App. 474, 482-87, 545 A.2d 718, 72225 (1988); see also supra text accompanying notes 69-78.
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provides coverage for a particular intentional tort, the insured has a
legitimate expectation of coverage. If the insurers want to exclude
coverage for a certain type of liability, such as intentional torts, they
must-and undoubtedly can-draft policies with unequivocal exclusion provisions. When the insurers fail to do so, and the contract remains arguably ambiguous, it is a good policy to interpret the insurance
contract in favor of the insured, thereby imposing a responsibility on
the insurers to draft clear language. Insurers presumably know the
type of coverage they offer and have control over the selection of the
insurance policy's terms. 162 When the insurers draft clear language
indicating what liability the policy covers or excludes, future disputes
between the insurer and insured may be obviated. Thus, it is wise to
hold the insurer accountable for clearly excluding a certain type of
163
liability if there is any doubt whether the policy covers the liability.
It seems that if the insurers were permitted to take advantage of the
ambiguity in the policy, they would be inclined to draft ambiguous
policies if doing so tends to exonerate them from their obligations.
It is significant to note, however, that the clarity of the language
of an insurance policy should be judged from a reasonably prudent
person's standpoint, not from a jurist's viewpoint.'6 4 This is the key
difference between the majority and the dissent in Bailer. Dissenting
in Bailer,Judge Chasanow focused primarily on the technical distinctions of the term invasion of privacy, as viewed from a jurist's vantage.165 Specifically, Judge Chasanow indicated that the distinction
between negligent and intentional invasion of privacy has been recognized by several jurisdictions.' 6 6 Assuming, arguendo, that negligent
invasion of privacy has been recognized as a cause of action, Judge
Chasanow's position might be correct if one assumed also that an ordinary insured can fully understand the legal nuances of the contract
162. See Shapiro v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 347 N.E.2d 624, 626 (N.Y. 1976) (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting) ("[W]here an ambiguity exists the language of the entire contract should be
construed against the insurer whose experts on insurance draftsmanship and attorneys
selected the language and should have clearly excluded the risk if there was any doubt.").
163. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
164. See Pacific Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 302 Md. 383, 388, 488 A.2d 486,
488 (1985) ("[Wle accord words their ordinary and accepted meanings. The test is what
meaning a reasonably prudent layperson would attach to the term [of an insurance
policy].").
165. Bailer, 344 Md. at 536-47, 687 A.2d at 1385-91 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 543, 687 A.2d at 1389 (citing Boyles v. Kerr, 806 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1991) (stating that "the basis for liability in a privacy action may rest upon a negligent, as well as an intentional, invasion"), rev'd, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993); Prince v. St.
Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 484 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (noting that "a
negligent invasion of the right of privacy ... can just as effectively invade one's right of
privacy as an intention to do so")).
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terms as can ajudge. If these assumptions were made, then the seemingly inconsistent provisions in the Bailer insurance policy could be
reconciled because "invasion of privacy" could be committed both intentionally and negligently.
However, Judge Chasanow's approach is problematic because an
ordinary person would likely not appreciate such fine legal distinctions before purchasing an insurance policy presumably drafted by sophisticated attorneys. The insured, conversely, would likely rely on
the insurer's promises as expressly stated in the policy. If the insurers
wanted to exclude certain coverage, they should have phrased the policy such that, to an ordinary person, the exclusion was unambiguous.
Thus, to protect the ordinary insured from potentially deceptive trade
practices, the court should err on the side of interpreting insurance
policies to provide for the coverage expressly stated in the policy.1 6 v
This task can be accomplished by determining the ambiguity from the
insured's standpoint, taking into account the surrounding circumstances from which the parties' intent can be inferred, rather than
from a jurist's hindsight.
Judge Chasanow's approach would also be impractical because it
would produce an absurd result. Under the dissent's view, the exclusion in the insurance policy would swallow the coverage. 168 . The dissent attempted to distinguish between intended conduct that
produced an intended result (to which the exclusion applied) and
intended conduct that produced an unintended result (to which the
exclusion did not apply).169 However, with respect to invasion of privacy, Erie failed to present any situations in which the policy would
cover intended means that produced an unintended result. 7 Hence,
under the dissent's view, perhaps no situations would exist where the
tort of invasion of privacy would be covered by the policy. If so, Erie
would be exonerated of its contractual obligations, while the Bailers'
expectation of coverage, based on Erie's express promises, would remain unfulfilled. 7 1 Thus, Judge Chasanow's interpretation would destroy the purpose of the Bailer contract because it does not provide for
167. See Creech v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 516 So. 2d 1168, 1174 (La. Ct. App. 1987)
("Public policy is better served by giving effect to the insurance contract rather than by
creating an exclusion based on ajudicial perception of public policy not expressed by the
legislature.").
168. Bailer, 344 Md. at 525, 687 A.2d at 1380 ("The complexity in the case before us lies
in the exclusion. If the exclusion totally swallows the insuring provision, the provisions are
completely contradictory. That is the grossest form of ambiguity . . ").
169. Id. at 543-44, 687 A.2d at 1389-90 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
170. Bailer, 344 Md. at 535, 687 A.2d at 1385.
171. Id.
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situations in which the insured would benefit from the bargained-for
exchange. This result would prove unreasonable, no matter what
172
legal doctrines one may employ to support the result.
b. Conflicting Public Policies.-Some states have passed laws
that prohibit insurance for intentional conduct. For example, section
533 of the California Insurance Code provides that "[a]n insurer is
not liable for a loss caused by the willful act of the insured; but he is
not exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of the insured's
agents or others.' 1 73 Similarly, many courts have held that insurance
172. Doctrinally, Judge Chasanow asserted:
[The Court of Appeals] has never before held that invasion of privacy must be
intentional; to the contrary, [the court has] indicated [in Beane] that for most
forms of the tort, including unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion, the requirement is that the defendant must have acted unreasonably, not that the defendant
must have acted intentionally.
Id at 541, 687 A.2d at 1388 (Chasanow,J., dissenting) (citing Beane v. McMullen, 265 Md.
585, 291 A.2d 37 (1972)). Judge Chasanow then postulated a hypothetical of a potentially
negligent invasion of privacy in the Baiter context: the camera had been placed in the
bathroom in response to the theft ofjewelry or other items from that room, and the Bailers
negligently failed to tell Ms. Meier about the camera when they permitted her to use the
shower. Id. at 544, 687 A.2d at 1389-90 (citation omitted). However, the conduct
presented in this hypothetical situation is arguably not "unreasonable." The only time that
a defendant's conduct could be "unreasonable" appears to be when he acts intentionally.
Thus, because the installation of the camera in the hypothetical served a legitimate purpose, the court may deem such conduct reasonable under the circumstances. Therefore,
such conduct would perhaps not be considered an invasion of privacy by "unreasonable"
intrusion upon the seclusion of another. If the court did not hold the conduct to be
unreasonable, then the invasion would, by definition, not be intentional under the Restatenent (Second) of Torts. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text. To hold otherwise
would lead to an undesirable expansion of the tort of invasion of privacy. Namely, had the
court adopted the dissent's view, the tort would be unduly broadened because people
would be held liable for such "negligent" invasions of privacy as the hypothetical situation
cited by the dissent. Bailer,344 Md. at 527 n.4, 687 A.2d at 1381 n.4. As the majority aptly
stated:
The dissenting opinion would hold that the "Intrusion Upon Seclusion"
form of invasion of privacy can be committed unintentionally. That enlarges the
tort beyond the confines of Restatement (Second) of Torts-confines beyond
which this Court thus far has not gone. Although the dissent's position is one way
of resolving the ambiguity in this case, that position imposes personal injury liability for negligent conduct that does not result in bodily injury. Thus, those persons who have only an underlying homeowner's policy in the language of the
Bailers' underlying policy would have no insurance against this new liability.
Under the majority position, persons who unintentionally intrude have not committed a tort, have no liability, and have no need for indemnification.
Id.
173. CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1993). Other states have enacted similar laws. See, e.g.,
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 175, § 47 (West 1987) ("[N]o company may insure any person
against legal liability for causing injury, other than bodily injury, by his deliberate or intentional crime or wrongdoing. . . ."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-32-04 (1995) ("An insurer is
not liable for a loss caused by the willful act of the insured . . ").
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coverage for personal liability resulting from intentional conduct violates public policy. 174 The public policy against insurance for intentional conduct derives from the notion "that no one shall be
permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. 17 5 The second reason
for this policy is to deter policy holders from engaging in willful misconduct.1 7 6 However, the public policy of deterring intentional misconduct conflicts with another policy, which requires insurers to
honor their express obligations. One court keenly observed, "There is
more than one public policy. One such policy is that an insurance
company which accepts a premium for covering all liability for damages should honor its obligation. 1 7v7 In light of these competing policies, it is important to evaluate carefully the circumstances of each
case and determine the outcome accordingly. The Bailer court properly reconciled these competing policies by holding, under the
unique facts of that case, that the insurer should fulfill its promise by
covering conduct that it expressly insured. 17 Thus, the court put the
responsibility of determining whether that conduct is, in fact, insurable squarely on the insurer.1 7 Because the policy in favor of enforcing express promises is important, if the insurers have decided to issue
174. See, e.g., St. Paul Ins. Cos. v. Talladega Nursing Home, Inc., 606 F.2d 631, 633 (5th
Cir. 1979) (holding that "it is against Alabama public policy to insure against the consequences of intentional wrongs"); Phoenix Control Sys., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 796
P.2d 463, 467 (Ariz. 1990) (in banc) (stating that "[p]ublic policy forbids indemnifying a
person for his own wilful wrongdoing"); Rubenstein Lumber Co. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co.,
462 N.E.2d 660, 662 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (stating that "[a]n agreement to indemnity or
insure against one's voluntary, not accidental, misconduct is against public policy and unenforceable"); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 230 (W. Va. 1981) (stating that
"[m]ost courts conclude that it is against public policy to permit insurance coverage for a
purposeful or intentional tort").
175. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead, 397 N.E.2d 737, 742
(N.Y. 1979) (quoting Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 133 N.E. 432, 433 (N.Y. 1921)).
176. B & E Convalescent Ctr. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894, 904 (Ct.
App. 1992). The California Court of Appeal stated: "The purpose of section 533 [of the
California Insurance Code] is to discourage willful torts." Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 173 (quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 533).
177. Creech v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 516 So. 2d 1168, 1174 (La. Ct. App. 1987); accord
Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 342 Md. 634, 654, 679 A.2d 540, 549 (1996) ("The function of an insurance company is more than that of premium receiver." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Continental Cas. Co. v. Kinsey, 499 N.W.2d 574, 581 (N.D. 1993) (ruling
that, in enacting a statute prohibiting insurance for intentional conduct, the legislature did
not intend to "benefit insurance companies by allowing them to collect premiums for coverage they do not intend to provide").
178. Bailer, 344 Md. at 517, 522-27, 531-34, 687 A.2d at 1378-81, 1383-85.
179. See id. at 534-35, 687 A.2d at 1385 (stating that Erie failed to "cite to us any cases
involving insurance" contracts against public policy and to present any "evidence that persons to whom personal catastrophe policies are marketed become motivated by the insuring agreement intentionally to invade the seclusion of others").

1998]

MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS

policies that expressly cover intentional torts, the insurers should be
estopped from arguing later that "public policy" vindicates them from
their obligations.'
c. Extending Precedent with Respect to the Tort of Invasion of Privacy.-Prior to Bailer, Maryland cases involving invasion of privacy focused on the reasonableness of a defendant's conduct in determining
whether a cause of action based on the invasion is justified.'
In
8
2
Beane v. McMullen," the court held that reasonableness under the
facts presented is a determining factor in all types of invasions of privacy, except perhaps appropriation of name or likeness."8 ' Similarly,
in Household FinanceCorp. v. Bridge,'8 4 the court held that the question
of how far a creditor may go to collect the debt and yet not be liable
for invasion of privacy must also be decided by reasonableness."' 5 By
definition, invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion of another
must be "unreasonable." ' 6 Therefore, the reasonableness test properly could be applied to Beane, Bridge, and Bailer. The Bailer court,
however, went further to clarify that, for the invasion to be "unreasonable," it must also be intentional. 8 7 This clarification comports with
the definition of invasion of privacy under the Restatement (Second) of
Torts."ss Moreover, this clarification is proper because Beane and
Bridge did not involve the interpretation of conflicting insurance policy provisions as did Bailer.l 9 Because Beane and Bridge dealt with
one's invasion of another's privacy, the question was one of the degree of the invasion, and the court needed only to focus on the question of reasonableness to resolve the cases before it. 9 ' Stated
differently, the court in Beane and Bridge did not need to focus on the
intent behind the defendant's conduct to decide those cases.' 9 1
Bailer, however, involved an insurance policy that expressly provided coverage for invasion of privacy, but excluded coverage for con180. See supra text accompanying notes 137-142, 177.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 98-108.
182. 265 Md. 585, 291 A.2d 37 (1972).
183. Id. at 600-01, 291 A.2d at 45.
184. 252 Md. 531, 250 A.2d 878 (1969).
185. Id. at 540, 250 A.2d at 884.
186. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
187. Bailer, 344 Md. at 527, 687 A.2d at 1381.
188. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 98-108.
190. See Beane, 265 Md. at 600-01, 291 A.2d at 45-46; Bridge, 252 Md. at 540-41, 250 A.2d
at 884-85.
191. See Beane, 265 Md. at 600-01, 291 A.2d at 45-46; Bridge, 252 Md. at 540-41, 250 A.2d
at 884-85.
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duct expected or intended. 9 2 Faced with such facts, the Bailer court
had to resolve the issue of intent of the insured's conduct in order to
reach its ruling.1 9 3 While clarifying the elements of invasion of privacy, the court did not overrule Beane or Bridge, because reasonableness remains a crucial factor in determining whether invasion of
privacy by unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion of another has been
committed. 19 4 Nevertheless, the Bailer court, by holding that invasion
of privacy by unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion requires intent, 195 has properly extended the rulings in Beane and Bridge.
5. Conclusion.-A savvy insurer may attempt to nullify explicit
coverage of intentional torts in one section of an insurance policy by
inserting an ambiguous provision excluding coverage in another section. However, as the Bailer ruling illustrates, the insurer's attempt in
taking away with the left hand what the right hand gave may not escape the confines of fundamentally reasonable contract interpretation. By construing ambiguity in an umbrella personal liability
insurance policy against the insurer, the Bailer court has aptly resolved
two conflicting public policies: enforcing express promises when they
become due and excluding coverage for intentional torts."' 6 When
these two policies conflict, it becomes proper and necessary to promote the former policy over the latter, even if it means having to interpret a policy broadly "to provide insurance coverage for 'a peeping
'' 97
Tom' with a video camera.
SON B. NGUYEN

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Bailer, 344 Md. at 520-21, 687 A.2d at 1377-78.
Id.
Id. at 525-27, 687 A.2d at 1380-81.
Id. at 527, 687 A.2d at 1381.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
Bailer, 344 Md. at 536, 687 A.2d at 1385 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
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V.

A.

CRIMINAL LAW

Recognizing and Limiting the Routine Booking Question Exception

In Hughes v..State,1 the Court of Appeals recognized and limited
the application of the routine booking question exception to the procedural safeguards of Miranda v. Arizona.' The court held that a question on an arrest intake form asking whether the arrestee was a
narcotic or drug user fell outside of the exception, and therefore the
arrestee's answer, absent Mirandawarnings, could not be introduced
at trial.3 In analyzing and applying the seemingly contradictory jurisprudence offered by the Supreme Court regarding the application of
Miranda warnings to routine questions asked during booking, the
Court of Appeals, in Hughes, correctly interpreted the standard to be
used-questions that the police know or should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response are excluded from the exception. By adopting the approach urged by Justice Marshall's dissent in
Pennsylvania v. Muniz,4 the Court of Appeals limited the scope of the
exception to those questions that the police officer objectively has no
reason to anticipate will incriminate the arrestee. This limitation is
consistent with the purpose of Miranda: to protect the rights of criminal suspects from undue influence and coercion.5
1. The Case.--On October 14, 1993, Michael Patron Hughes was
arrested by Corporal David Morrissette of the Prince George's County
Police Department for his suspected involvement in the distribution
of illegal drugs.6 The arrest resulted from a narcotics surveillance operation in Landover Hills during which two plain-clothed police officers watched a small group of individuals suspected of drug
trafficking, while approximately fifteen uniformed officers waited
nearby to execute any necessary arrests. 7 The plain-clothed officers
observed the area for twenty to twenty-five minutes, during which time
they observed three or four individuals enter the area, approach one
member of the group, and then leave the area.8 The officers also saw
1. 346 Md. 80, 695 A.2d 132, cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 452 (1997).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Hughes, 346 Md. at 84, 695 A.2d at 134.
4. 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
5. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455 ("[Tlhe very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a
heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weaknesses of individuals.").
6. Hughes, 346 Md. at 84, 695 A.2d at 134.
7. Id.
8. Hughes v. State, No. 808, slip op. at 2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 27, 1996) (per
curiam), rev'd, 346 Md. 80, 695 A.2d 132, cert. denied, 118 5. Ct. 452 (1997).
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an individual who appeared to be serving as a lookout.9 The plainclothed officers informed the other uniformed officers, including
Corporal Morrissette, that they had witnessed a series of apparent
drug transactions.1" As the uniformed officers approached the group,
the individuals, including Hughes, fled.1 1 Corporal Morrissette
chased Hughes, who discarded a bag as he ran.12 This bag was later
determined to be a glassine bag containing eight rocks of crack cocaine." Morrissette apprehended Hughes, arrested and searched
him, and confiscated a pager and $62.00 in mostly small bills.1 4
During the booking process, Morrissette filled out a standard
Prince George's County Police Department arrest form.'" Morrissette
asked Hughes for his name, address, and telephone number, and also
whether he was a "narcotic or drug user."1 6 Hughes denied that he
was a narcotics or drug user.1 7 Hughes "was subsequently charged
with possession with intent to distribute cocaine, possession of cocaine, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute cocaine." 8
During Hughes's trial in the Circuit Court for Prince George's
County, the State's Attorney asked Morrissette how Hughes had responded to the "drug or narcotics user" question.19 Hughes objected,
arguing that his response to the question was inadmissible because at
the time the question was asked, he had not been advised of his Miranda rights.2 ° The State responded that the question fell within the
routine booking exception to the Mirandarequirements. 2 ' The court
sustained the objection and directed the prosecutor to ask Morrissette
9. Id.
10. Hughes, 346 Md. at 84, 695 A.2d at 134.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 84-85, 695 A.2d at 134. The amount of crack cocaine contained in the bag
appears to be in dispute. The opinion of the Court of Special Appeals stated that the bag
contained only seven rocks of crack cocaine. Hughes, No. 808, slip op. at 2.
14. Hughes, 346 Md. at 84-85, 695 A.2d at 134.
15. Id. at 85, 695 A.2d at 134.
16. Id.
17. Id. If Hughes had answered "yes," Morrissette would then have asked the "type" of
narcotic or drug Hughes used. Id.
18. Id. at 84, 695 A.2d at 134; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286(a) (1) (1996) ("Except as authorized by this subheading, it is unlawful for any person: (1) To manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, or to possess a controlled dangerous substance in sufficient quantity to reasonably indicate under all circumstances an intent to ... distribute . . . a controlled dangerous substance.").
19. Hughes, 346 Md. at 85, 695 A.2d at 134-35.
20. Id., 695 A.2d at 135.
21. Id.
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why he had asked that question.2 2 When Morrissette stated he did not
know why, the court examined the arrest form to ascertain the origin
of the question, and overruled the objection. 23 Morrissette was permitted to testify regarding Hughes's answer to the question.2 4
During closing argument, the State's Attorney asked the jury to
consider Hughes's response that he was not a drug or narcotic user as
evidence that Hughes intended to distribute the cocaine, rather than
consume the drugs for his own personal use. 25 The jury found
Hughes guilty on all four counts: possession with intent to distribute
22. Hughes, No. 808, slip op. at 3.
23. Id. After examining the form, the trial court stated:
"This appears to be Prince George's County Form No. 3245, which has been in
use since December of 1984. It looks like a standard booking form arrest report
from the police department for an adult. And it seems to contain just basic information which is needed in order to process a criminal case and a person accused,
and I'm going to overrule the objection and allow the answer."
Id. (quoting the trial judge).
24. Hughes, 346 Md. at 85, 695 A.2d at 135. The testimony that the judge permitted was
as follows:
[State's Attorney]: Corporal Morrissette, I'm showing you what has been marked
as State's Exhibit No. 4, and what is that document, just for the record?
[Morrissette]: Prince George's County Police Department arrest report.
[State's Attorney]: And who filled that document out?
[Morrissette]: I did.
[State's Attorney]: And on Question No. 18, which is part of the preprinted
booking information, did you ask the defendant whether or not he was a narcotics or drug user?
[Morrissette]: Yes.
[State's Attorney]: And what was his response?
[Morrissette]: No, he was not.
Id. The second time Corporal Morrissette was asked about Hughes's response to the "narcotics or drug use" question, Hughes failed to object. Hughes, No. 808, slip op. at 3M. On
appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the State argued that Hughes had waived his right
to object to the statement's admission because of his failure to object at trial. Id. at 3. The
Court of Special Appeals held, however, that Hughes's failure to object to the second question did not constitute a waiver of his right to challenge the admission. Id. at 4 (citing
Watson v. State, 311 Md. 370, 535 A.2d 455 (1988)). The court reasoned that because the
trial court had already ruled unequivocally that Corporal Morrissette would be permitted
to answer, a second objection would serve only to highlight the defendant's response. Id.
25. Hughes, 346 Md. at 86, 695 A.2d at 135. In her closing argument, the prosecutor
stated:
"You also have a statement that was made during the booking process by the
defendant that he doesn't use drugs. Well, you may consider that however you
wish. You can ignore it totally if you want to, whatever you want to do, but I think
that that is-you can take that into consideration. If he says he doesn't use drugs,
then he presumptively didn't have this for his own personal use, he intended to
do something with it, or if you decide that because he was being booked at that
time that maybe he wasn't telling the whole story, that's fine, but even without
that statement, you certainly have a quantity of drugs with the surrounding circumstances that indicate that he in fact intended to sell it or give it away."
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cocaine, possession of cocaine, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine.2 6
Hughes appealed his conviction to the Court of Special Appeals.2 7 He argued that the trial court committed reversible error in
admitting Morrissette's testimony regarding Hughes's answer to the
"narcotics or drug use" question because Hughes had not received
Mirandawarnings prior to answering the question. 28 In considering
the argument that the "narcotics and drug use" question was inadmissible because Hughes had not yet received the Mirandawarnings, the
Court of Special Appeals noted that its own interpretation of the routine booking question exception has extended it to instances in which
the response to the question was incriminating. 29 The court then
chronicled the somewhat contradictory measures adopted by other
courts to evaluate the exception.3" The court ultimately adhered to
the interpretation of the United States Supreme Court, established in
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 1 exempting routine booking questions (i.e.,
"biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services") 3 2 from the requirements of Miranda unless the questions are
asked to obtain incriminating information.3 3
The Court of Special Appeals held that the question asked of
Hughes fell within the routine booking question exception for several
reasons.3" First, the court found persuasive the fact that the question
is asked of all arrestees, regardless of the reason for their arrest. 5 Second, the court reasoned that the question is necessary to determine
whether the arrestee may need medical attention.3 6 Finally, because
26. Id. at 84, 695 A.2d at 134. Hughes was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment, with
10 years suspended. Hughes, No. 808, slip op. at 1.
27. Hughes, 346 Md. at 86, 695 A.2d at 135.
28. Hughes, No. 808, slip op. at 3. Hughes also argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine, but the court denied that argument. Id. at 10-12.
29. Id. at 5 (citing Clarke v. State, 3 Md. App. 447, 240 A.2d 291 (1968)).
30. Id. at 6-9. Some courts have held that Miranda warnings must be given prior to
routine booking questions if the questions are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response, while others have held that Mirandawarnings are necessary only if the questions
are asked for the purpose of eliciting incriminating information. See infra notes 53-117 and
accompanying text.
31. 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
32. Id. at 601 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Hughes, No. 808, slip op. at 6-8.
34. Id. at 10.
35. Id. at 8.
36. Id. The court made an analogy to the facts in State v. Geasley, 619 N.E.2d 1086, 1093
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993), in which the Ohio Court of Appeals held that a question regarding
an arrestee's medical condition constituted a legitimate police concern, and therefore, was
exempt from the requirements of Miranda. Hughes, No. 808, slip op. at 8.
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no evidence was presented alleging that the police officer asked the
question for the purpose of eliciting an incriminating answer, the
court refused to read such an intent into the question. 7 The court
found no error in the trial court's admission of the defendant's response into testimony, and affirmed the conviction. 8 The Court of
Appeals granted certiorari3 9 to consider the validity and the scope of
the "routine booking question" exception to Mirandaas applied to the
facts of Hughes."
2. Legal Background.--Since the Supreme Court first enunciated
the procedural requirements necessary to ensure the voluntariness of
statements made to police officers, 4 ' the question of when Miranda
warnings are required has troubled both state and federal courts.
While the Supreme Court has established clear definitions of terms
such as "custodial interrogation,"4 2 the Court has not conclusively
43
ruled on the subject of the routine booking question exception.
The landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona established procedural
safeguards that must be followed anytime a person is subjected to
"custodial interrogation."4 4 In Miranda, the Court reversed the conviction of the defendant because the prosecution entered into evidence a confession signed by the accused that was obtained after he
had been interrogated by police officers for two hours.4 5 The police
officers failed to inform the defendant of his legal right to counsel
and his right to remain silent.4 6
37. Hughes, No. 808, slip op. at 9 ("We agree with appellant that if the Corporal's question had been asked to elicit an incriminating response, it would not have fallen within the
exception, but appellant has presented no such evidence.").
38. Id. at 10.
39. Hughes v. State, 343 Md. 334, 681 A.2d 70 (1996).
40. Hughes, 346 Md. at 83-84, 695 A.2d at 134.
41. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) (outlining the guidelines to be
used to inform suspects of their right against self-incrimination).
42. Id. at 444 (noting that by "custodial interrogation," the Court means "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way"); see also Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) ("[T]he term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only
to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police ... that
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect." (footnote omitted)).
43. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990) (plurality opinion) ("Muniz's
answers to these first seven questions... fall within a 'routine booking question' exception
44. Miranda,384 U.S. at 444.
45. Id. at 491-92.
46. Id. at 492.
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The Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."4 7 The Court required that an individual subject to a custodial interrogation must be warned prior to questioning:
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.4"
The Court's rationale for requiring warnings prior to any custodial interrogation stemmed from its deep concern with preserving the
sanctity of the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination in
light of the inherently coercive nature of police interrogation.4 9 The
Court devoted a significant portion of the opinion to tracing the
evolution of the Fifth Amendment, alternatively using phrases such as
"fundamental to our system of constitutional rule"5 and "the essential
mainstay of our adversary system" 5' to describe an individual's right
against self-incrimination. This commitment to safeguarding the prohibition against self-incrimination from abuses via psychological manipulation can be traced throughout the cases that followed
5 2

Miranda.

Following Miranda, state and federal courts, including courts in
Maryland, recognized an exception to the Miranda warning requirements. In Clarke v. State," the Court of Special Appeals held that Miranda was not violated when a police officer asked an arrestee his
name, address, and place of employment even after the arrestee ex-

47. Id. at 444.
48. Id. at 479.
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.... ."); Miranda,384 U.S. at 457 ("It is obvious that such
an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner."). The Court examined a variety of studies about the
physical intimidation and torture that can occur during a criminal interrogation. It also
included a detailed discussion regarding the psychological warfare engaged in by interviewing officers, some of which was gathered from police training manuals instructing new
officers on coercive techniques. Id. at 445-55. The Court strongly objected to this type of
baiting and tricking of suspects. Id. at 455 ("[T]he very fact of custodial interrogation
exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.").
50.
51.
52.
53.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468.
Id. at 460.
See infta notes 76-103 and accompanying text.
3 Md. App. 447, 240 A.2d 291 (1968).
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pressly requested that he wanted an attorney.5 4 Stating that these
questions did not "constitute an interrogation of the type contemplated by the Court in Miranda,' 55 the Court of Special Appeals distinguished questions asked during booking of arrestees from those
intended to elicit an incriminating response.5 6 Because the booking
process did not constitute custodial interrogation, the warning requirements were not necessary.57
A number of Maryland cases followed the distinction established
in Clarke. In Propst v. State,5 8 the Court of Special Appeals held that
questions asked during the booking process about an arrestee's address did not require Mirandawarnings even though evidence regarding control of the residence was an element of the crime.5 9 In Grimes
v. State,6" a case in which a suspect was asked his name prior to being
given Miranda warnings, the Court of Special Appeals held that the
question was "not proscribed by Miranda, and ... his answers [were]

not rendered inadmissible by the exclusionary rule announced in Miranda," even though the question was asked during the defendant's
arrest, and not during a formal booking procedure at the police
station."
Maryland courts placed a limit on the routine booking question
exception in cases in which the circumstances were extenuated. In
Nasiriddin v. State,6 2 the Court of Special Appeals held that a trial
court's admission of a statement that the defendant made "voluntarily" during the alleged booking process constituted reversible error.6"
In Nasiriddin, the defendant was arrested for leaving the scene of an
accident, and brought into the police station for booking. 64 Prior to
54. Id. at 451, 240 A.2d at 294.
55. Id.
56. Id. That the defendant's response did, in fact, incriminate him was not dispositive
to the court's consideration. Id. at 449-50, 240 A.2d at 293. When asked during booking,
the defendant stated that he was employed by the Topaz House. Id. at 449, 240 A.2d at
293. The police checked that location and found a truck loaded with stolen property,
which the defendant was suspected of stealing. Id. at 449-50, 240 A.2d at 293.
57. Id. at 451, 240 A.2d at 294.
58. 5 Md. App. 36, 245 A.2d 88 (1968).
59. Id. at 43, 245 A.2d at 92.
60. 44 Md. App. 580, 409 A.2d 767 (1980), rev'd on othergrounds, 290 Md. 236, 429 A.2d
228 (1981).
61. Id. at 586, 409 A.2d at 771. The Court of Special Appeals explicitly noted in Grimes
that this interpretation had not been recognized by the Court of Appeals, which had declined to decide the issue in Mills v. State, 278 Md. 262, 363 A.2d 491 (1976). Grimes, 44
Md. App. at 586 & n.2, 409 A.2d at 771 & n.2.
62. 16 Md. App. 479, 298 A.2d 490 (1973).
63. Id. at 501, 298 A.2d at 503.
64. Id. at 482-83, 298 A.2d at 492-93.
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questioning the defendant, the police searched his car, wherein they
found marijuana and other drug paraphernalia.6 5 Although the defendant requested an attorney, the police officer asked the defendant
questions for three hours, under the pretext of obtaining information
necessary to complete the arrest forms.6 6 One of the questions concerned the physical condition of the defendant.6 7 The officer appeared concerned about the defendant's health because the
defendant had alternated between extreme agitation and near despondency throughout the arrest process.6" After the defendant
stated he was fine, the officer followed up by asking whether the defendant "had any problem related to drugs at that time."6 9 The defendant answered, "No, not at this time. ' 70 The police officer claimed
that the defendant then spontaneously stated that he "had a problem
in the past with heroin and that he had taken a methadone maintenance program treatment,
71
methadone.

.

.

and he had been treated with

Distinguishing Nasiriddin from prior cases recognizing a routine
booking question exception, the Court of Special Appeals rejected the
State's argument that the question regarding the defendant's prior
drug history was a routine booking question that was not intended to
elicit an incriminating response. 72 The court held that the police of65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 483, 298 A.2d at 493.
Id. at 490-91, 298 A.2d at 497.
Id. at 495-96, 298 A.2d at 500.
Id.
Id. at 496, 298-A.2d at 500.
Id. at 497, 298 A.2d at 500.
Id.
Id. at 499-500, 298 A.2d at 501-02. The court stated:
We do not agree, as the police would have it, that the statements were obtained under routine booking procedures. We have held [in Propst and Clarke]
that, absent unusual circumstances, routine booking procedures are not included
within the types of interrogation proscribed by Miranda. There were clearly no
unusual circumstances in either Propst or Clarke. In the former, the address given
by the accused when they were booked was used to show a fact required to be
proved by the State, control of the premises by the accused. In the latter, investigation of the accused's place of employment, given during the booking, turned
up stolen merchandise from which criminal agency was established. But here the
inculpatory statements did not result from a question routinely asked as part of
usual booking procedures. They resulted from a question asked by the police
some time in the course of a three hour procedure to "process" Nasiriddin for
booking and-followed a general question whether he wanted medical care. The
specific question was whether Nasiriddin had "any problem related to drugs at
that time." Nasiriddin answered: "No, not at this time" and continued that he
had a problem in the past with heroin and had taken methadone maintenance
program treatment. The direct answer to the question had inculpatory implications and what followed was patently inculpatory. We are not able to say that the

1998]

MARYLAND

COURT OF APPEALS

ficer's concerns about the defendant's health should have been satisfied by the first question,7 3 and, therefore, the officer's subsequent
question about the defendant's drug use, "asked within the frame of
reference of the officers' knowledge of the narcotic paraphernalia being found in Nasiriddin's automobile, was precluded by Miranda in
the light of Nasiriddin's prior requests for an attorney."7 4 The Court
of Special Appeals considered the context in which the question was
asked and did not rely solely on the officers' subjective intent to determine whether the question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.75
Maryland was not alone in its struggle to apply the holding of
Miranda to increasingly complex fact scenarios. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 76 the Supreme Court reconsidered the scope of Miranda and expanded its safeguards by broadening the scope of circumstances
constituting custodial interrogation.7 7 With regard to Mirandajurisprudence, Innis concerns a defendant's statements and actions prior
to booking, but after he has been arrested, advised of his Miranda
rights, and invoked his right to counsel.7 8 In Innis, as three police
officers transported the defendant to the police station, one of the
officers initiated a conversation with the other officers about the missing weapon, which had been used in the robbery and murder of two
taxicab drivers.

79

The officer expressed concern about the possibility

of a handicapped child finding the gun. ° The suspect interrupted
the conversation and asked the officers to turn the car around so that
he could take them to the location of the gun. s ' When the State tried
to use this statement against the defendant, the defendant contended
that the statement was inadmissible because the conversation in the
police car constituted custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda's
question which primed the pump and forced the flow of the inculpatory admissions was without the ambit of Miranda.

Id. at 500-01, 298 A.2d at 502 (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 501, 298 A.2d at 502.
74. Id., 298 A.2d at 503.
75. Id. (noting that the relevant consideration was totality of information that the police possessed). Additionally, the Nasiriddincourt mentioned that the police officers did
not intend to interrogate Nasiriddin. Id. at 491, 298 A.2d at 497. This lack of intent,
however, was not dispositive to the court's consideration of the question.
76. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
77. Id. at 300-01 (expanding custodial interrogation to include "express questioning or
its functional equivalent").
78. Id. at 298.
79. Id. at 293-94.
80. Id. at 294-95.
81. Id. at 295.
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requirement to stop questioning a suspect once he has requested an
attorney.8 2
The Supreme Court, noting that Miranda defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way," s" refused to construe Miranda
narrowly to mean that procedural safeguards are necessary only when
express questioning occurs.8 4 The Court expanded the definition of
"custodial interrogation" to encompass "any words or actions on the
part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect," 5 and held that the police
officers' conversation did not constitute a custodial interrogation. 6
Thus, Innis requires courts, when determining whether police action
constitutes a "custodial interrogation," to consider what knowledge
police actually have, or are presumed to have, when they question
87
criminal defendants.
Innis was not without its critics. Justice Stevens's dissent in Innis
advocated an even broader interpretation of custodial interrogation,
arguing that "any police statement or conduct that has the same purpose or effect as a direct question" should be considered custodial
interrogation under Miranda.s8 Justice Marshall's dissent took issue
with the majority's application of the expanded definition of "custodial interrogation" to the facts of the case.8 9 Although he agreed with
the majority's objective evaluation of whether the police knew or
should have known that a question would produce an incriminating
response, Marshall was "utterly at a loss" regarding the application of
this objective standard to the facts of the case.9" He thought that the
82. Id. at 295-96.
83. Id. at 298 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (emphasis
omitted)).
84. Id. at 299.
85. Id. at 301 (footnote omitted).
86. Id. at 302.
87. Id. Also relevant to this inquiry is the justification given by the Court for its expansive reading of "questioning." The Court pointed to the purpose underlying Miranda warnings-to ensure that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not
undermined-to justify its broad reading of the types of situations in which Mirandawarnings are required. Id. at 299. The Court stated that in determining what constitutes a
custodial interrogation, the perspective of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police,
should be considered. Id. at 301.
88. Id. at 311 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 305-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 305.
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police officers' conversation in the car did constitute an interrogation,
and thus the defendant's statements should not have been admitted.9 1
State and federal courts applying the Innis standard have held
that the routine booking question exception does not apply if a police
officer knows or should know that the routine question is reasonably
likely to produce an incriminating response. In State v. Conover,92 the
Court of Appeals analyzed whether statements made during the booking of a defendant after he exercised his right to counsel were the
type of Fifth Amendment violations that Mirandaand Innis intended
to prevent.9" While holding that administrative questions asked of all
arrestees do not usually require Miranda warnings, the court opined
that any such Mirandaanalysis must be mindful of the "evils addressed
by Miranda and the goals of the safeguards there established."94
Federal courts have interpreted Innis to require a stricter examination of routine booking questions. In United States v. MataAbundiz,9 5 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an INS
investigator's question to a defendant regarding his citizenship was
not excepted from Miranda protection as a routine booking question
because the question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response. 96 The court stated that the relationship between the question asked and the suspected criminal act is "highly relevant" to determining the knowledge that the police should have had.9 7
In United States v. Disla,98 the Ninth Circuit again considered the
routine booking question exception in light of the Innis reasoning.
During the execution of a search warrant for unrelated items at a particular address, police officers found large quantities of illegal drugs

91. Id. at 306-07.
92. 312 Md. 33, 537 A.2d 1167 (1988).
93. Id. at 38, 537 A.2d at 1169.
94. Id. at 40, 537 A-2d at 1170. This type of analysis had not been present in Maryland
cases up to this point. A 1988 Court of Special Appeals decision illustrates that court's
adherence to the 1970s interpretation of the routine booking question exception; no analysis of the impact of Innis is included in the court's consideration. Ferrell v. State, 73 Md.
App. 627, 536 A.2d 99 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 318 Md. 235, 567 A.2d 937 (1990).
Holding that police questions regarding name, address, and age were routine booking
questions, the Court of Special Appeals stated that, "'Until the Court of Appeals directs us
otherwise, we shall adhere to the view that routine [booking] questions.., are not proscribed by Miranda.. . .'" Id. at 640, 536 A.2d at 105 (quoting Grimes v. State, 44 Md. App.
580, 586, 409 A.2d 767, 771 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 290 Md. 236, 429 A.2d 228
(1981)).
95. 717 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1983).
96. Id. at 1280.
97. Id.
98. 805 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1986).
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and drug paraphernalia.99 Shortly thereafter, the police arrested a
person matching the description of the individual who lived in the
apartment.1"' Before advising him of his Miranda rights, the police
asked the man his name, age, address, and employment status.' 0 ' At
trial, the government introduced his statement that he lived at the
address as evidence that the drugs belonged to him.1 1 2 The Ninth
Circuit held that the officer should have known that, because the
drugs were found in the home, the question asking for the arrestee's
address was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, especially because the issue of where the arrestee lived was an element of
the suspected crime.'0 3
In Pennsylvania v. Muniz,' °4 the Supreme Court recognized the
routine booking question exception to Miranda. °5 In Muniz, the
Court considered whether a series of questions asked of a defendant
who had not been advised of his Miranda rights, and who was suspected of driving while intoxicated, were admissible.' 6 In accordance
with police procedure, Muniz was asked about his name, address,
height, weight, eye color, age, and date of birth.'
The arresting officer also asked Muniz if he knew the date of his sixth birthday, to
which Muniz answered that he did not.'0 8 The entire proceeding was
videotaped, and the videotape was admitted into evidence at trial.'0 9
On appeal, Muniz argued that because he had not been advised of his
Miranda rights, the admission of the videotape violated Miranda and
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.' 10
The Supreme Court held that the part of the tape concerning
Muniz's response to the question about the date of his sixth birthday
tl
should have been excluded because of its incriminating content,"
99. Id. at 1342-43.
100. Id. at 1343.
101. Id. These were part of a standard arrest form. Id.
102. Id. at 1344-45.
103. Id. at 1347. Despite this finding, the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court's admission of this statement constituted harmless error because evidence presented at trial
proved "overwhelmingly" that the defendant lived in the apartment where the drugs were
found. Id.
104. 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
105. Id. at 601 (plurality opinion).
106. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 584-85.
107. Id. at 586.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 585-87.
110. Id. at 587. In considering the defendant's Fifth Amendment claim, the Court revisited the concept of the cruel trilemma, whereby in answering a question, a suspect faces
either self-accusation, perjury, or contempt. Id. at 596.
111. Id. at 600.
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but a plurality found that the other seven questions fell within "a routine booking question" exception to Miranda.t12 The plurality explained that the exception applied to questions intended to secure
the ""'biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial
services.""'"" This exception did not extend, however, to questions
"'that are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions."'" 4
Justice Marshall agreed that the sixth birthday question should
have been excluded, but declined to recognize an exception for routine booking questions.' 15 Justice Marshall argued that an Innis-based
approach should be followed. In other words, questions that the police know or should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response should be exempted from the exception." 6 Marshall
contended that even if a routine booking exception were warranted,
"the key components of the analysis are the nature of the questioning,
'
the attendant circumstances, and the perceptions of the suspect." 117
The standard advocated by Justice Marshall in Muniz provided the
framework for the Court of Appeals's decision in Hughes v. State.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Hughes v. State, the Court of Appeals recognized and limited the routine booking question exception
to Miranda by holding that a question on an arrest intake form asking
whether the arrestee was a narcotics or drug user fell outside of the
exception, and was therefore inadmissible without Miranda
warnings."' 8
In determining whether the drug question was within the exception, the court analyzed the scope and validity of the exception by
considering the development of Miranda, Innis, and Muniz, and how
these decisions interact with one another." 9 Because Mirandawarnings are triggered whenever there is a custodial interrogation, the
112. Id. at 601 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Pennsylvania v. Muniz,
496 U.S. 582 (1990) (No. 89-213) (quoting United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n.2
(8th Cir. 1989))). The Court also described the questions as "'requested for record keeping purposes only,'" and "reasonably related to the police's administrative concerns." Id. at
601-02.
114. Id. at 602 n.14 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Muniz (No.
89-213)).
115. Id. at 608-09 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. Id. at 609.
117. Id. at 611.
118. Hughes, 346 Md. at 100-01, 695 A.2d at 142. The Court of Appeals unanimously
held that admission of the defendant's answer to the question constituted reversible error.
Id. at 84, 695 A.2d at 134. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals
and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 101, 695 A.2d at 142.
119. Id. at 87-88, 91, 695 A.2d at 136-38.
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court tracked the concurrent developments of the routine booking
question exception and the expanded definition of custodial
interrogation.

120

The court detailed the tensions between the different interpreta121
tions of the routine booking question exception. Discussing Innis,
the Court of Appeals noted that lower courts interpreted Innis as allowing the exception only to those questions that a police officer
neither intended, nor should have reasonably expected, to elicit an
incriminating response.1 22 With regard to the different standard
enunciated in Muniz, a plurality of the Supreme Court recognized
that the applicability of the exception, which "exempts from Miranda's
coverage questions to secure the "'biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services,""'" 2 3 was contingent on whether the
1 24
question asked was intended to elicit an incriminating response.
The Court of Appeals hypothesized that the distinction between
the Innis and Muniz standards may not have received more attention
because the Muniz plurality did not expressly reject the Innis standard. 12' Alternatively, some courts may perceive the two approaches
1 26
as reconcilable.
The Hughes court acknowledged the appropriateness of applying
the routine booking question exception for questions "aimed at accumulating 'basic identifying data required for booking ...."127 The

court rejected the interpretation and integration of the standard offered by the Court of Special Appeals, which it characterized as a dismissal of the Innis-based approach in favor of the principle
"established" by Muniz.12' Rather, the Court of Appeals adopted an
Innis-based standard: If a question on its face asks for innocuous information, courts should consider whether the officer asking the ques120. Id. at 87-94, 695 A.2d at 136-39.
121. See supra notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
122. Hughes, 346 Md. at 91, 695 A.2d at 138.
123. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990) (plurality opinion) (quoting Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (No.
89-213) (quoting United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n.2 (8th Cir. 1989))).
124. Id. at 602 n.14 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Muniz
(No. 89-213)).
125. Hughes, 346 Md. at 94, 695 A.2d at 139.
126. Id. (noting that some courts view the Innis-based formulation as merely
"'elaborat[ing] upon the booking [question] exception'" as defined by Muniz).
127. Id. at 94-95, 695 A.2d at 139 (quoting United States ex rel. Hines v. LaVallee, 521
F.2d 1109, 1113 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1975)). The court offered examples of questions to which
the exception will ordinarily apply, such as the arrestee's name, address, telephone
number, age, and date of birth. Id. at 95, 695 A.2d at 139.
128. Id. at 94, 695 A.2d at 139.
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tion "knew or should have known that the question was reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response."12 9 If so, then the question
will not be admitted at trial without Miranda warnings.1 3 0 In determining the police officer's knowledge, the totality of the circumstances, including the context in which the question was asked, must
be considered.1 3 1 The court called attention to "routine" questions
which, in fact, provide proof of some aspect of the offense for which
the suspect is arrested, observing that "'[t]he closer the connection
between the crime in question and the information sought, the
stronger the inference that the [police officer] should have known
that [the] inquiry was "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re1 32
sponse from the suspect."'
In applying the above standard to the facts in the case, the Hughes
court held that the "narcotics or drug use" question fell outside of the
scope of the exception for several reasons. 33 First, regarding the
State's argument that the question qualified as a "routine booking
question" because it was preprinted on a standard booking form, the
court reasoned that the simple fact that a question was asked during
booking, or from an arrest form, is not dispositive of whether the
question constitutes a "routine booking question."13 4 Thus, the question did not fall under the exception merely because of the time during which it was asked.
Second, the court reasoned that the exception would not necessarily be satisfied simply because the question was asked of every arrestee. 135 Rather, the trial court must examine the totality of the
circumstances. 13 6 The strong nexus between the contested question
and the charges at hand led the court to a strong presumption that
137
the question exceeded the scope of the exception.

129. Id. at 95-96, 695 A.2d at 140.
130. Id. at 100-01, 695 A.2d at 142.
131. Id. at 95, 695 A.2d at 140. The court emphasized that "'courts should carefully
scrutinize the factual settings of each encounter of this type.'" Id. (quoting United States v.
Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1025 (6th Cir. 1983)).
132. Id. at 96, 695 A.2d at 140 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v.
Minkowitz, 889 F. Supp. 624, 628 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S.
582, 601 (1990) (plurality opinion))).
133. Id. at 97, 695 A.2d at 141.
134. Id. at 98, 695 A.2d at 141. "The police may not use the booking process as a pretext
for gathering incriminating information." Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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Third, the court rejected the State's purported health justification for asking the question. 13 Because there was no evidence offered that the defendant was under the influence of drugs or
narcotics, and because the question was too broad to elicit the desired
information, the court stated that it served no valid purpose. 1 39 Additionally, the court disagreed with the Court of Special Appeals's analogy to State v. Geasley,140 an Ohio case. 14 ' The specific142question in that
case differed dramatically from the issue in Hughes.
4. Analysis.-In Hughes v. State, the Court of Appeals recognized
the routine booking question exception, but prevented its application
to a question preprinted on a standard arrest form asking the arrestee
whether he was a "narcotics or drug user."' 4 3 This limitation requires
that administrative questions asked during the arrest process that the
police officer knows or should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response are inadmissible if the suspect had not been
advised of, or has refused to waive, his Miranda rights. In determining
whether a question should be admitted without Mirandawarnings, the
totality of the circumstances must be considered, including the officer's intent, the context of the questioning, and the nexus between
the question asked and the elements of the offense.1 4 4 In deciding
Hughes, the Court of Appeals accomplished two significant tasks. First,
it identified conflicts in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence that have
arisen in the application of the routine booking question exception,
conflicts not recognized by the Court of Special Appeals, or even by a
majority of the Supreme Court. 14 1 Second, the court clarified the ap138. Id. at 99, 695 A.2d at 14142. The State contended that the question served an
administrative function in that, first, it provided knowledge of potential illness or violence
from a suspect suffering from drug withdrawal, thereby allowing the police to procure
medical attention if necessary, and, second, the question allowed the police to take into
account whether a suspect was under the influence of drugs to ascertain the voluntariness
of any statement. Id., 695 A.2d at 141.
139. Id., 695 A.2d at 142. The court did not rule out a more specific question that asked
an arrestee whether he was currently under the influence of drugs or whether he has any
particular medical concerns. Id. Such questions would be more narrowly tailored to the
purported aims of the State. Id.
140. 619 N.E.2d 1086 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
141. Hughes, 346 Md. at 100, 695 A.2d at 142.
142. Id.; see also supra note 36.
143. 346 Md. at 100, 695 A.2d at 142.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 92-94, 695 A.2d at 138-39. See supra notes 29-37 and 53-75 for a discussion of
the Court of Special Appeals's handling of this analysis. Additionally, the Supreme Court,
in Innis, failed to recognize some of the subtleties involved in the routine booking question exception. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). The Court's unrefined
approach is illustrated by its inexact definition of custodial interrogation, in which the
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proach to be taken in Maryland with regard to the routine booking
question exception. Importantly, the approach the court adoptedthat advocated by Justice Marshall in his Muniz dissent' 4 6 -is consistent with the intentions of Miranda. This approach properly ensures
that the concerns which Mirandawas designed to remedy continue to
be addressed and are not undermined by overly broad and inclusive
exemptions.
As the Court of Appeals noted, the tensions between the different
approaches taken by the Supreme Court with regard to the routine
booking question exception have not been addressed by courts, commentators, or case book writers 4 7 The conflict, as outlined above,
relates to which questions fall under the rubric of the routine booking
question exception. As offered in Innis, and as applied by lower
courts, 1 4 8

questions that police officers know or should know are rea-

sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response qualify as custodial
interrogation.149 Thus, such questions, including those asked during
the booking process, should be inadmissible if the defendant has not
been given, or has refused to waive, his Mirandarights. However, the
Innis Court confused the issue by specifically excluding from the definition of interrogation words and actions on the part of police which
are "normally attendant to arrest and custody."15 As the Court of Appeals noted, "[t]he notion that a question 'normally attendant to
arrest and custody' may also be 'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response' appears not to have been contemplated by the Innis
Court.""5 ' The plurality decision in Muniz furthered the Supreme
Court's imprecise analysis by excluding from the routine booking
question exception those questions which are designed to elicit an
incriminating response.' 5 2
The Court of Appeals is one of the first courts to identify this
tension between the two different standards offered by the Supreme
Court to evaluate the admissibility of statements made by defendants
without the benefit of Miranda warnings. 153 Similarly, commentators
Court categorically exempts "words or actions on the part of the police .. .normally attendant to arrest and custody" from the procedure requirements of Miranda. Id. at 301.
146. See supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
147. Hughes, 345 Md. at 92-94, 695 A.2d at 138-39.
148. See supra notes 92-103 discussing how courts have interpreted Innis on the routine
booking question exception.
149. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
150. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.
151. Hughes, 346 Md. at 91, 695 A.2d at 138.
152. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 602 n.14 (1990) (plurality opinion).
153. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text regarding the Hughes court's hypothesis as to why other courts have not identified this conflict.
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writing about Miranda jurisprudence and custodial interrogation have
failed to identify any conflict between the two decisions.1 5 4 This lack
of commentary has extended to hornbooks as well. 15 5 Hughes is significant for bringing this conflict to light.
The second significant aspect of the Hughes decision is that the
standard adopted by the Court of Appeals-excluding from the routine booking question exception those questions that are either
designed to elicit, or are reasonably likely to elicit, an incriminating
response 1 56 -is consistent with the intent of Miranda. Miranda created procedural safeguards that protect an individual's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.157 Reflecting on the nature of
this fundamental right, Chief Justice Warren stated in Miranda that
"the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege [against selfincrimination] is the respect a government-state or federal-must
accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." 5 ' Miranda's safeguards are designed to protect individuals from the coercive force of
the government in its capacity as the enforcer of laws.1 59
154. See Robert A. Allison, CustodialInterrogations,84 GEO. L.J. 852, 858 & n.572 (1996)
(citing Muniz as authority for the proposition that Mirandadoes not apply to routine booking questions because they are not designed to elicit an incriminating response); Kevin
Corr, A Law Enforcement Primer on Custodial Interrogation, 15 WHIrrIER L. REV. 723, 738
(1994) (citing Muniz for the unequivocal proposition that "routine booking questions do
not need to be preceded by Mirandawarnings"); Scott Lewis, Miranda out on a Limb: How
Much Flexibility Before Rules Are Broken?, CRIM.JUST., Fall 1994, at 20, 22 (identifying Muniz as
the source of the routine booking question exception, and stating that such questions are
excepted from Miranda warnings, "provided that the questions are not 'designed to elicit
incriminating admissions'"); see also DAVID M. NissMAN&& ED HAGEN, LAW OF CONFESSIONS
§ 5:13, at 5-22 (2d ed. 1994) (stating, without qualification, that "[t]he [routine booking
question] exception was formally adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v[.] Muniz" (emphasis omitted)).
155. SeeWAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL,CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.7, at 327 (2d ed.
1992) (stating that Muniz supports lower court decisions, based on the definition of interrogation in Innis, that routine booking questions do not require Miranda warnings, but
offering no discussion of the limits of the exception).
156. Hughes, 346 Md. at 100, 695 A.2d at 142.
157. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 467-79 (1966). The court noted:
We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures .... [T]o exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the
accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise
of those rights must be fully honored.
Id.
158. Id. at 460.
159. See id. at 439-58. The Supreme Court understood and applied this purpose in its
holding involving custodial interrogation in Rhode Island v. Innis. The expansion of custodial interrogation in Innis to include any actions or words that police know or should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,
300-01 (1980), reflects the Court's appreciation of the true purposes of Miranda-to pre-
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Against this background, it is evident why the Court of Appeals
decision in Hughes represents a return to safeguarding the liberties
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. The court's application of the
Innis custodial interrogation standard to all words and actions taken
by police officers means that the majority of police action will be subject to review; no longer will certain procedures be per se exempt
from Miranda scrutiny. Because all questions asked during routine
booking must be analyzed under this standard, this in effect takes
away most of the bite of the exemption. The only way in which responses given to routine questions will be admissible at all during
criminal trials will be if a defendant gives an incriminating response to
a routine question which the police officer had no reason to know
would likely elicit such an answer. Such an application is consistent
with the Supreme Court's motives in Mirandato protect citizens from
the coercive nature of law enforcement.16 ° By allowing the booking
process to be scrutinized, the Court of Appeals incorporated the concerns of Mirandainto Maryland law.
The Maryland decision is also consistent with the Court's concept
of the suspect's "trilemma," in which he confronts a choice between
truth, falsity, or silence, and the response whether based on truth or
falsity contains a testimonial component.16 1 By advising a suspect of
his right to remain silent, and by prohibiting from admission any comments related to the defendant's choice to exercise that right, the
Court ensures that the suspect's right against self-incrimination is
protected.

162

The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the question
regarding "narcotics and drug use," asked in light of the petitioner's
arrest for drug possession, placed the arrestee in the type of
vent the suspect from being coerced into making a statement against his free will. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58. The Court refused to construe interrogation narrowly to include
only express questioning, finding that other "techniques of persuasion, no less than express questioning, were thought, in a custodial setting, to amount to interrogation." Innis,
446 U.S. at 299. However, the Court's specific exemption of police conduct normally attending arrest and custody proceedings from the expansion of custodial interrogation, id.
at 301, violates the intent of Miranda by broadening unnecessarily the range of police activity protected from Miranda scrutiny. The plurality decision in Muniz continued to misinterpret Miranda By narrowly excluding from the routine booking question exception only
those questions designed to elicit incriminating responses, the plurality continued to sanction violations of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Pennsylvania v.
Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 602 n.14 (1990) (plurality opinion).
160. See supra note 159.
161. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 596 ("At its core, the privilege reflects our fierce 'unwillingness
to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or
contempt . . . .'" (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988)).

162. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68.
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"trilemma" that the Supreme Court has held violates the Fifth Amendment. 163 No matter how the petitioner answered the question, he
would be incriminating himself. This point was exemplified by what
happened in Hughes- The State used the defendant's denial of drug
use to argue that he had only one reason for possession of crackdistribution. 6 4
The standard adopted by Maryland in Hughes represents an incorporation of the approach advocated by Justice Marshall in his dissent
in Muniz.165 Not only is the language used to describe the two standards essentially the same-both identify the essential analysis regarding whether an officer should have known a question was reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response as the totality of the circumstances, including the content and context of the question16 6-but
also Justice Marshall implicitly acknowledged the tension between
Muniz and Innis in his opinion. While arguing that no routine booking question exception should be warranted, Justice Marshall acknowledged that even if such an exception were allowed, it should not
extend to any booking question that the police should know is
designed to elicit an incriminating response. 167 He cited Innis for this
proposition, indicating that, in his view, the plurality's limitation on
the routine booking question exception as applying only to those
questions specifically designed to elicit an incriminating response,
represents a misreading of Innis.168 This reasoning offered by Justice
Marshall served as the proper cornerstone of the Court of Appeals's
decision.
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals placed an important limitation on the government's ability to violate an individual's right

163. Such an argument was raised by the defendant in his brief to the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner argued that the prosecutor's closing remarks, in which he suggested that
the petitioner was either a liar or a drug distributor, further illustrated the trilemma, because the petitioner's response was used against him. Brief for Petitioner at 16, Hughes v.
State, 346 Md. 80, 695 A.2d 132 (1997) (No. 60).
164. Hughes, 346 Md. at 86, 695 A.2d at 135.
165. See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 610-11 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
166. Compare id. at 611 (outlining that the "key components of the analysis are the nature of the questioning, the attendant circumstances, and the perceptions of the suspect")
with Hughes, 346 Md. at 100, 695 A.2d at 142 (stating that the court must consider "the
totality of the circumstances, including the context of the questioning and the content of
the question").
167. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 610-11 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[The] exception should not extend to any booking question that the police should know
is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.").
168. Id. at 611.
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against self-incrimination. In Hughes v. State, the court held that a routine booking question, even when innocuous on its face, can be admitted into testimony, absent a waiver of Mirandarights, only if the police
officer did not know or reasonably should not have known that the
question was reasonably likely to prompt an incriminating response. 6 9 This holding represents a return to the protection of the
guarantees established in the Fifth Amendment and enshrined in Miranda v. Arizona. This case marks a departure from recent Supreme
Court holdings that, perhaps unintentionally, have undermined the
procedural safeguards established by Miranda. As such, it is an important triumph for criminal suspects and supporters of civil liberties in
Maryland.
ABIGAIL

B.

N. Ross

Maryland's Unfortunate Attempt to Define a Batson Remedy

In Jones v. State,' the Court of Appeals contemplated the proper
remedy for a Batson violation. 2 A Batson violation occurs when an attorney uses a peremptory strike to remove a prospective juror from
the venire solely on the basis of the juror's race.' The Court of Appeals held that a trial court has discretion to fashion a remedy for a
Batson violation and that, in Jones, the trial judge exercised his discretion properly by reseating the improperly stricken jurors.4 The court
reasoned that this remedy preserved both the equal protection rights
of the improperly stricken jurors and the Sixth Amendment rights of

169. Hughes, 346 Md. at 100, 695 A.2d at 142.
1. 343 Md. 584, 683 A.2d 520 (1996).
2. Id. at 591-605, 683 A.2d at 523-30.
3. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that "the Equal Protection
Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their
race"). Although Batson violations were originally limited to prosecutors, the restriction

applies to defense attorneys as well. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (concluding that a defendant in a criminal trial is prohibited from making race-based peremp-

tory challenges of prospective jurors). Batson has also been extended to civil trials. See
Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (finding that the use of race-based
peremptory challenges in civil trials violates the challenged jurors' equal protection rights
and therefore must be proscribed). In recent years, Batson has been extended to proscribe

peremptory challenges based on gender. SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994)
(holding that "gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and
impartiality").
4. Jones, 343 Md. at 602, 605, 683 A.2d at 529, 530.
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the defendant, which the court found must be weighed equally when
5
fashioning a Batson remedy.
Although the Court of Appeals decision is in accord with the
mandates of the Supreme Court,6 the Jones court improperly affirmed
the trial judge's choice of remedy under the unique facts and circumstances of the case. 7 By conducting the peremptory challenges in
front of the potential jurors and then reseating the stricken jurors, the
trial court created a situation in which the jurors may have developed
a feeling of rejection or resentment toward the defendant,' thereby
endangering the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury.' The trial court, therefore, should have simply excused the jurors who were stricken improperly."0 Instead, the Court of Appeals
overemphasized the rights of the stricken jurors at the expense of the
defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury.1 1 This is troublesome,
for it was Jones, not the jury, who was facing imprisonment.12 Consequently, although Batson was intended to preserve a defendant's right
5. Id. at 601, 683 A.2d at 528-29 ("[T]he juror's right not to be excluded from jury
service in a manner violative of his or her equal protection rights must be balanced against
the potential prejudice to .. . the defendant.").
6. The Supreme Court left open the issue of how to remedy a Batson violation, delegating this decision to the trial courts. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99-100 n.24. The Court stated
that "[i]n light of the variety of jury selection practices followed in our state and federal
trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how to best implement our holding today." Id.
7. The Court of Appeals did recognize that different factual circumstances call for
different Batson remedies. Jones, 343 Md. at 602, 683 A.2d at 529 ("[T]he Supreme Court
in Batson... did suggest that the facts and circumstances of a particular case are important
considerations in making th[e] determination [of the proper remedy].").
8. Although Americans notoriously complain about jury service, it still hurts their
pride to be told that their participation is not desired. See Barbara D. Underwood, Ending
Race Discriminationinjury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725, 746
(1992) ("[N]o one likes to be rejected, even from performing an onerous task ...
[W] hen the task in question is widely understood as a fundamental aspect of citizenship, as
is jury service, then rejection amounts to a judgment of unfitness for citizenship.").
9. In 1968, the United States Supreme Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury into the Fourteenth Amendment, which made the former applicable to every state. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-58 (1968). The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

10. See State v. Walker, 453 N.W.2d 127, 135 n.12 (Wis. 1990) (concluding that a
stricken juror who is aware of the identity of the challenging party "should not be reinstated because there is a substantial likelihood that he or she will have developed a bias
against [that party]").
11. Jones, 343 Md. at 601, 683 A.2d at 528-29 (determining that "the goal [in fashioning
Batson remedies] must be to achieve the proper balance, to vindicate and effectuate each
of the competing rights").
12. Id. at 590, 683 A.2d at 523. Jones was eventually sentenced to fourteen years in
prison. Id.
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to an impartial jury,' 3 the Jones decision may potentially deprive defendants of this traditional and indispensable right.
1. The Case.-Anzelo Jones, an African-American male, was
charged with various drug-related offenses, and was tried by a jury in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.1 4 During jury selection for the
case, the attorneys for both the defendant and the State exercised
their peremptory strikes in the presence of the potential jurors. 1 5 Specifically, the clerk called out each individual juror's number and that
juror was then instructed to come forward. 6 This separated the juror7
1
from the rest of the venire, so that the attorneys could observe her.
Then, in open court and directly in front of the juror, each attorney
was allowed to announce whether that juror was "acceptable."" If
both said yes, the juror was seated. 9 If either said no, the juror was
excused.2 °
During this selection process, the defendant's attorney exercised
five peremptory challenges, all against white venirepersons. 2 1 In response, the State made a Batson objection.22 After considering the
defense attorney's justification for his strikes, the trial judge found
that he failed to provide race-neutral reasons for dismissing the five
white venirepersons. 21 Consequently, the court held that a Batson vio24
lation had occurred.
13. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1986).
14. Jones, 343 Md. at 587, 683 A.2d at 521.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 587-88, 683 A.2d at 521-22.
22. Id. at 588, 683 A.2d at 522.
23. Id. at 588-89, 683 A.2d at 522. Defense counsel argued that he struck the jurors
because he believed that their age bracket, their profession, or the neighborhood where
they lived would prevent them from relating to the defendant and his experiences. Id. at
588-89 n.2, 683 A.2d at 522 n.2. The trial judge rejected this reasoning, and declared that
he did not "find the explanations given to be justified." Id. As such, the court ruled that
"the real reason those persons were struck was solely because of their race." Id.
24. Id. at 588-89, 683 A.2d at 522. Under Batson, the trial court must engage in a threestep process in order to determine if a peremptory strike is discriminatory. First, the trial
court must ascertain whether the complaining party has made a prima facie showing of
purposeful racial discrimination in the selection of the venire. Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 93 (1986). Once the court finds that there has been a prima facie showing, the
burden shifts to the exercising party to rebut the prima facie case by giving race-neutral
explanations for the strikes. Id. at 94, 97. Finally, the court must decide whether the challenging party has established purposeful discrimination. Id. at 98.
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The trial judge remedied the violation by invalidating each of the
defense attorney's peremptory challenges and recalling the five jurors
who had been struck improperly. 25 The judge stated that his intent
was to "roll the clock back to where we were" by "reconstitut[ing] the
jury precisely as it was before either party exercised a [peremptory]
challenge. "1 2' After the stricken jurors had returned to the courtroom, the judge informed the venire that he had "invalidated the [peremptory] challenges which [had] been previously exercised."'2 7 He then
reseated the jurors who had been dismissed improperly by the defense
attorney.28
Jones was eventually tried and convicted by that jury, and he was
subsequently sentenced to fourteen years in prison. 29 Jones appealed
to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in
ruling that his attorney violated Batson.3 ° Jones further contended
that he offered race-neutral reasons for striking the jurors and that
the trial court should have dismissed the entire venire instead of reinstating the stricken jurors.3 1 To start, the court upheld the trial
judge's finding of a Batson violation, which it reviewed under a "clearly
erroneous" standard.3 2 In so ruling, the court recognized its "limited
role" in reviewing these violations, reflecting that
"[i]t is the trial judge who is in close touch with the racial mood, be it harmonious or be it tense, of the local community, either as a general proposition or with respect to a
given trial of high local interest. The trial judge is positioned
to observe the racial composition of the venire panel as a
whole, a vital fact frequently not committed to the' 3 record
and, therefore, unknowable to the reviewing court.
The court also approved the remedy fashioned by the trial judge
to rectify the racial challenges.3 4 The court emphasized its general
25. Jones, 343 Md. at 589, 683 A.2d at 522.
26. Id. at 589-90, 683 A.2d at 522-23 (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original).

27. Id. at 590, 683 A.2d at 523 (first alteration in original).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Jones v. State, 105 Md. App. 257, 267, 659 A.2d 361, 366 (1995), affd, 343 Md. 584,
683 A.2d 520 (1996).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 268, 659 A.2d at 366.
33. Id. (quoting Bailey v. State, 84 Md. App. 323, 328, 579 A.2d 774, 776 (1990)).
34. Id. at 277, 659 A.2d at 370-71. The court offered many reasons to explain why
reseating the improperly stricken jurors was the best means for resolving a Batson violation.
Id. at 274-77, 659 A.2d at 369-71. Primarily, the court argued that reseating the stricken
jurors saved judicial time and resources, and also served to protect the equal protection
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preference for reseating an improperly struck juror, as opposed to
quashing the entire panel and starting the jury selection anew.3 5 Unsuccessful in the intermediate appellate court, Jones appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which granted certiorari in order to decide what
action should be taken by a trial court to remedy a Batson violation.36
2. Legal Background.a. The Batson Violation. -Traditionally,
the peremptory
challenge has been defined as the right to remove a prospective juror
from the jury panel without being required to provide a reason for the
challenge." The peremptory challenge historically has been recog'3
nized as "'one of the most important rights secured to the accused,'
and commonly has been viewed as a means to implement and maintain a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury.3 9 However, in recent years, the Supreme Court has
redefined the scope of the peremptory challenge. In Batson v. Kentucky,4 ° the Court held that a prosecutor may not use peremptory
strikes to discriminate purposefully against members of a venire because of their race." In so ruling, the Court stressed that a criminal
rights of the jurors. Id. at 275-77, 659 A.2d at 370. The court also warned that if it were to
"require the trial court to strike the entire panel in every case of discrimination, then there
might be those parties who would purposefully discriminate . . .for the sole purpose of
getting a new panel." Id. at 275, 659 A.2d at 370. Finally, the court held that by reseating
the stricken jurors, it was protecting the plight of the community as well, because society
will lose confidence in the judicial system if it willingly allows racial bias to control jury
selection. Id. at 276, 659 A.2d at 370 (quoting Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49-50
(1992)).
35. Id. at 274-77, 659 A.2d at 369-71.
36. Jones, 343 Md. at 591, 683 A.2d at 523.
37. BLACK'S LAw DIcrIoNARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990). This definition has been supported

throughout history. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 118 (1986) (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting) (noting that the peremptory challenge has "very old credentials"). The peremptory challenge has been part of the common law for many centuries and a strong
component of the American jury system for nearly two hundred years. Id. at 118-19.
38. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151
U.S. 396, 408 (1894)), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
39. Batson, 476 U.S. at 118-19 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("Long ago it was recognized
that '[t]
he right of challenge is almost essential for the purpose of securing perfect fairness
and impartiality in a trial.'" (alteration in original) (quoting WILIAM FoRSYrH, HISTORY OF
TRIAL BYJURy 175 (1852)).

40. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
41. Id. at 84. Batson, however, was not the first case in which the Supreme Court found
racially motivated peremptory challenges to be unconstitutional. Id.at 83-86. For example, in Swain v. Alabama, the Court recognized that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a
state from purposefully discriminating against black jurors. Swain, 380 U.S. at 203-04.
However, in Swain, the Court held that in order to prove purposeful discrimination by a
state, a defendant was required to prove that a specific prosecutor had discriminated
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defendant's constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury is violated
when a prosecutor purposefully eliminates members of the defendant's race from the jury.4 2 The Court underscored its duty to protect
individual jurors' equal protection rights, which are infringed when
the venirepersons are denied the chance to serve on a jury because of
their race. 43 Although Batson addressed a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges, subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have extended the Batson holding to prohibit criminal defendants from
making race-based peremptories as well.4 4
Despite the Court's opinions defining a Batson violation, it has
refused to articulate a specific remedy that should be applied to rectify discriminatory peremptory strikes.4" The Court explained its reasons for judicial restraint in this area:
In light of the variety ofjury selection practices followed
in our state and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to
instruct these courts how best to implement our holding today. For the same reason, we express no view on whether it
is more appropriate in a particular case, upon a finding of
discrimination against black jurors, for the trial court to discharge the venire and select a new jury from a panel not previously associated with the case, or to disallow the
discriminatory challenges and resume selection with the improperly challenged jurors reinstated on the venire.4 6
against black jurors in numerous trials over a period of time. Id. at 223-24. Conversely, in
Batson, the Court rejected this systematic burden of proof as "crippling," holding that a
defendant could prove purposeful discrimination based solely on the prosecutor's acts in
this case. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93, 95.
42. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-87. The Court explained that the purpose of the right to be
tried by ajury of one's peers is to "prevent oppression by the government." Id. at 86-87 n.8
(quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)).
43. Id. at 87. The Court also reasoned that the entire community is affected by the
harm inflicted upon the defendant and the excluded juror, because "[s] election procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in
the fairness of our system ofjustice." Id.
44. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (holding that "the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the
ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges"). The Court has also expanded
the Batson holding to prohibit discriminatory peremptory challenges in many other circumstances. SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (concluding that gender-based
peremptories are unconstitutional); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,
616 (1991) (holding that race-based peremptory challenges in civil cases are impermissible); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414-16 (1991) (ruling that a criminal defendant may
object to race-based exclusion ofjurors even though the excluded juror and defendant do
not share the same race).
45. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99-100 n.24.
46. Id. (citations omitted).
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As a result of the Supreme Court's silence on this issue, state courts
have been left to determine the remedy of a Batson violation.4 7 In an
effort to resolve the issue, much confusion, division, and inconsistency
has arisen among the states.4 8
b. Emerging Patterns'ofBatson Remedies Throughout the Nation.-Although trial courts have little difficulty in determining
whether or not a Batson violation has occurred, 49 they have had a difficult time determining how to create a remedy for a Batson violation
once they determine that one exists. This wide-spread problem, due
to the Supreme Court's refusal to dictate a remedy for a Batson violation,5" has resulted in great diversity in the remedy selected by the
trial courts.
Most state courts follow one of three remedies.5 1 The majority of
states give the trial judge discretion to select the remedy that best fits
the facts and circumstances of each case.5 2 Recognizing that a judge
must have the authority to adjust a remedy to meet the particular
needs and elements of each case, these jurisdictions have "interpet[ed] Batson as suggesting that either remedy may be appropriate
depending on the particular circumstances of the trial."5 3 Thus, in
most states, the trial judge has a choice between reseating the improp-

47. See, e.g., Koo v. State, 640 N.E.2d 95, 100 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) ("Clearly, the remedy
which a particular trial court employs upon a finding of particular discrimination is a matter left to the court's discretion."); State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 416 (Mo. 1993) ("The
proper remedy for discriminatory use of peremptories is to quash the strikes and permit
those members of the venire stricken for discriminatory reasons to sit on the jury if they
otherwise would.").
48. See, e.g., People v. Moten, 603 N.Y.S.2d 940, 948 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (concluding that
reseating improperly stricken jurors was the "appropriate relief" for the Batson violation at
issue); Ezell v. State, 909 P.2d 68, 72 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (interpreting Batson as suggesting that "either remedy [i.e., reseating the stricken venire or seating a new panel] may
be appropriate depending on the circumstances at trial"); State ex rel. Skeen v. Tunnell,
768 S.W.2d 765, 767-68 (Tex. App. 1989, no pet.) (holding that the provisions of a state
statute requiring the dismissal of the entire venire whenever there is a Batson violation are
mandatory rather than discretionary).
49. The ease in identifying Batson violations is due to the three-prong burden-shifting
test set out by the Court. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-98. The test is easy for lower courts to
follow because it mirrors the familiar "disparate treatment" test that was created to analyze
discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 94 n.18, 96
n.19, 98 n.21.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
51. Jones, 343 Md. at 594-95, 683 A.2d at 525.
52. Id. at 595, 683 A.2d at 525.
53. Ezell, 909 P.2d at 72 (adopting the "flexible approach" of giving trial judges discretion in fashioning remedies as "the best solution").
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erly challenged juror or striking the venire and beginning jury selec54
tion anew.
Conversely, a few jurisdictions strike the entire venire and start
voir dire over again with a new pool. 5 Support for this remedy is due
to the "lurking danger.., that an unsuccessfully challenged juror may
now bear an animus against the challenger arising from the challenge
itself," which would result in a biased jury.5 6 These states focus primarily on the defendant's right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury,
which they perceive as far more compelling than the equal protection
rights of the stricken jurors.
For example, in State v. McCollum,5" the Supreme Court of North
Carolina held that striking the venire is the best remedy because it
prevents a juror, who has been improperly struck, from returning to
the venire offended by the strike, and thus biased against the party
that struck him.59 The trial judge found that the State had improperly
dismissed three black jurors, and the trial judge rectified the violation
by excusing the three jurors and ordering that jury selection should
begin anew with a fresh panel of prospective jurors.6 ° The Supreme
Court of North Carolina upheld this remedy, even though it may infringe on the equal protection rights of the jurors.6 1
Other states embrace the opposite end of the spectrum, requiring improperly struck jurors to be reseated. 62 For example, in Conerly
v. State,63 the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that trial courts have
only one option when remedying a Batson violation-reseating the juror or jurors. 64 In Conerly, the court held that once the trial judge
determines that the State's explanation does not provide a race-neu54. Jones, 343 Md. at 595-96, 683 A.2d at 525-26.
55. People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 765 (Cal. 1978) (holding that upon a finding of
improper use of peremptory challenges, the trial court "must dismiss the jurors thus far
selected.... must quash any remaining venire ....
[And] a different venire shall be drawn
and the jury selection process may begin anew"); State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144, 159
(N.C. 1993) (holding that striking the venire is the best remedy because it prevents ajuror
who has been improperly struck from returning to the venire offended by the strike and
potentially biased against the party who struck him).
56. Chew v. State, 71 Md. App. 681, 704, 527 A.2d 332, 344 (1987), vacated, 317 Md.
233, 562 A.2d 1270 (1989).
57. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d at 159.
58. 433 S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 1993).
59. Id. at 159.
60. Id. at 158-59.
61. Id. at 159.
62. See, e.g., Conerly v. State, 544 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Miss. 1989) (concluding that improperly dismissed jurors must be reseated).
63. 544 So. 2d 1370 (Miss. 1989).
64. Id. at 1372.
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tral reason for striking a juror, "the trial court [is] obligated to seat
[that juror]."65 These jurisdictions are equally, if not more, concerned with the equal protection rights of the juror as compared to
the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. In United States v. Robinson,6 6 the court emphasized its desire to protect jurors from discrimination by reseating them after they haye been struck improperly.6 7
The court reflected that "when prosecutors excessively use their peremptory challenges to exclude Blacks from the process of jury trials,
corrective action is warranted to make sure that the right of Blacks to
participate in the citizen's role in the administration of criminal justice is not impaired."6 " These courts further justify reseating jurors by
noting that it preserves judicial time and resources, which are wasted
when an entire venire must be discharged.6 9
c. The Evolution of the Batson Remedy in Maryland.-Until
Jones v. State, a Maryland court had never directly ruled on the issue of
the appropriate Batson remedy7 0 Nevertheless, the issue has been discussed indirectly by the Court of Appeals and the lower Maryland
courts. Beginning with the 1987 case, Chew v. State,y1 the Court of
Special Appeals fully adopted the procedural guidelines set out in Batson. y 2 In doing so, the court briefly elaborated on the topic of remedy.7 1 Specifically, the court reflected that "[f]ashioning an
appropriate remedy would appear to fall within the broad discretionary range necessary for the trial judge's effective management of a
trial."7 4 The court suggested that the type of remedy invoked should
depend upon the number of jurors stricken.7 5 The court reasoned
that "[i] f a half a dozen or more of prospective jurors have been unconstitutionally challenged, it may be necessary to dismiss the entire
65. Id.
66. 421 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1976) (mem.).
67. Id. at 474.
68. Id. The court concluded that "the appropriate remedy is to disallow the challenge
of the four Black veniremen and resume the jury selection process with [their] names
included." Id.
69. State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Mo. 1992) (concluding that reseating an improperly struck juror is the preferred remedy for a Batson violation because "U]udicial time
and resources ...are maximized because there is no need to quash the jury and call a new
venire").
70. Jones, 343 Md. at 586, 683 A.2d at 521.
71. 71 Md. App. 681, 527 A-2d 332 (1987), vacated, 317 Md. 233, 562 A.2d 1270 (1989).
72. Id. at 694-704, 527 A.2d at 338-44.
73. Id. at 703-04, 527 A.2d at 343-44.
74. Id. at 704, 527 A.2d at 343.
75. Id., 527 A.2d at 343-44.
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venire and to begin again with a new panel. ' 76 However, the court
noted that if only "a single prospective juror has been unconstitutionally challenged, it may be adequate to reinstate that juror on the venire. '77 The Court of Appeals initiated its discussion of Batson in
Stanley v. State,7 8 in which it similarly observed that " [w] hich remedy to
apply may well be within the discretion of the trial court, depending
79
on the circumstances of the particular case."
The Court of Special Appeals next discussed Batson remedies in
Brashearv. State,8 ° in which the court hinted that if a trial judge "determine [s] that even a single juror was excused for racial reasons, the
jury panel will be considered to be defective."8 1 However, the court
abruptly stopped its discussion at that point.8 2 The court did not go
on to discuss how to remedy the problem of a defective jury, because
it found that under the facts of the case before it, the jury was not
defective.8 3
Four years later, the Court of Appeals continued to tiptoe around
the issue of Batson remedies. In Gilchristv. State,8 4 the court resolved a
controversy involving race-based peremptory strikes without providing
definite solutions to Batson violations.8 5 In Gilchrist, the court upheld
the trial judge's remedy of discharging the entire panel and beginning jury selection anew.8 6 In that case, the peremptory challenges
were conducted in the presence of the jurors, so that each juror knew
which attorney was exercising the strike.87 After defense counsel was
found to have violated Batson by striking improperly five jurors, the
trial court "excused the entire jury pool, including those members...
already chosen, and started jury selection anew with an entirely different pool of potential jurors."8 8 Although the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, it did not endorse any particular
remedy, but simply reasoned that the remedy should stand because
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id., 527 A.2d at 344.
313 Md. 50, 542 A.2d 1267 (1988).
Id. at 62-63 n.8, 542 A.2d at 1273 n.8. The court refused to make a definite ruling

on remedies, claiming that, "[t]hese cases do not require us to give the answer [as to what

constitutes a proper remedy]." Id
80. 90 Md. App. 709, 603 A.2d 901 (1992).
81. Id. at 717, 603 A.2d at 904.
82. Id. at 718, 603 A.2d at 905.
83. Id.
84. 340 Md. 606, 667 A.2d 876 (1995).
85. Id. at 606-28, 667 A.2d 876-87.
86. Id. at 616, 628, 667 A.2d at 880, 887.
87. Id. at 611, 667 A.2d at 878.
88. Id. at 616, 667 A.2d at 880.
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the "examination of the trial court's application of Batson reveals no
89
error."
The reluctance of Maryland's appellate courts to formally approve a particular Batson remedy is further exemplified in Brogden v.
State.9 ° In Brogden, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision to strike the entire venire and call in a new panel
after finding that a Batson violation had occurred."' Once again, a
Maryland appellate court upheld the trial court's decision without discussing the remedy. 2 Instead, the court devoted its opinion to discussing how a motion for a Batson violation is analyzed.9 3 Thus, Jones
v. State offered the Court of Appeals yet another opportunity to determine definitively the appropriate remedy for a Batson violation.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Jones v. State, the Court of Appeals
94
held that the trial court has discretion to fashion a Batson remedy.
Specifically, the court determined that the judge's decision to reseat
improperly stricken jurors was a proper exercise of the court's discretion.9 5 At the outset, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the issue
at hand was not whether the defendant's attorney had committed a
Batson violation.9 6 Rather, the court was only to consider "the conse97
quences and effect of such a violation on the jury selection process.
The court began its analysis by recognizing that the United States
Supreme Court has not established a definitive remedy for trial courts
to apply when a Batson violation is committed, but has instead left the
decision as to remedy to the state and federal courts.9 8 The court
noted that, because the Supreme Court has provided little guidance
in formulating a Batson remedy, it has emphasized that "the facts and
circumstances of a particular case are important considerations in
making that determination." 9 The Court of Appeals adopted this assertion and found that the most relevant facts that must be considered
in determining the appropriate remedy are the defendant's right to a
fair and impartial jury and the equal protection rights of the improp89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 625, 667 A.2d at 885.
102 Md. App. 423, 649 A.2d 1196 (1994).
Id. at 427-32, 649 A.2d at 1198-1201.
Id. at 433, 649 A.2d at 1201.
Id. at 432-33, 649 A.2d at 1201.
Jones, 343 Md. at 605, 683 A.2d at 530.
Id.
Id. at 592, 683 A.2d at 524.
Id
Id. at 594, 683 A.2d at 525.
Id, at 602, 683 A.2d at 529.
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erly stricken juror.1 °0 The court emphasized that a trial court must
equally balance these rights when creating the appropriate Batson
remedy.' 0 ' The court specifically explained that "[t] his need to consider conflicting constitutional rights .

.. militates

in favor of permit-

ting the trial court to tailor the.remedy so as to protect the rights of all
the parties concerned."' 10 2 Therefore, the court concluded that a trial
court must have discretion to fashion a remedy for a Batson violation
so that it may address and resolve the specific harm caused by the
violation under the particular facts of each; case.10 3
The court next turned to the'particular facts ofJones to determine
if the remedy chosen by the trial court redressed the specific harm
caused by the violation.'0 4 The court concluded that "' It] he guiding
factor in this determination [of the appropriate remedy] should be
the likelihood of the juror harboring any prejudice to the violating
10 5
party as a result of being improperly excluded from the panel."'
The court reasoned that a significant part of this inquiry is whether or
not the strikes were conducted in the presence of the juror.1 0 6 The
court explained.that if the strikes occurred in front of the juror,
"'there is the risk that the juror will bear animosity toward the party
who exercised the strike.". 0 7 However, the court noted that if the
attorneys conducted the strikes at a bench conference, outside the
juror's hearing, "'and the circumstances otherwise do not indicate to
the juror that he was struck for improper reasons,"' the likelihood
that the juror will bear prejudice towards the striking party "'is not
present or is minimal."' 0 8
The court observed that, in Jones, the Batson inquiry was conducted outside of the hearing of the jury, and that "nothing in the
record indicat[ed] that the dismissed jurors were aware of the basis
for their being excluded."' 9 Moreover, the court found that, because
100. Id. The court described these rights in detail: "'[A] criminal defendant [has] the
constitutional right to have ajury... selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria...
and an individual juror has the right not to be excluded from a jury on account of race."
Id. (quoting Ellerbee v. State, 450 S.E.2d 443, 448 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)) (second alteration
and second omission in original).
101. Id. at 601-02, 683 A.2d at 528-29.
102. Id. at 602, 683 A.2d at 529.
103. Id. at 602-03, 683 A.2d at 529.
104. Id. at 603, 683 A.2d at 529.
105. Id. (quoting Jones, 105 Md. App. at 274, 659 A.2d at 369) (second alteration in
original).
106. Id.
107. Id. (quotingJones, 105 Md. App. at 274, 659 A.2d at 369).
108. Id. (quoting Jones, 105 Md. App. at 274, 659 A.2d at 369).
109. Id.
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the trial court reseated all of the stricken jurors, including those
struck by the State, neither the stricken jurors nor the rest of the venire could determine which ones were improper. 1 ' Therefore, the
Court of Appeals found that the extent of the affected jurors' knowledge of the strikes was that the trial court had simply "invalidated the
peremptory challenges which [had] been previously exercised.""'
The court further reasoned that, because the jurors did not know that
they were struck for racial reasons, they harbored no prejudice towards the defendant. 1 12 Thus, the appropriate remedy was to reseat
the improperly stricken jurors. 11 3 The court addressed the defense
attorney's contention that the jurors' mere knowledge of which party
struck them was sufficient to cause the improperly challenged jurors
to be biased against Jones.1" The court rejected this argument, determining that more than mere knowledge of who attempted to exclude
the juror is required in order to strike the panel." 5 Instead, the court
16
demanded a showing of prejudice, rather than speculation.'
Finally, the court acknowledged that "[t] here may be... circum-

stances in which the dismissal of the entire venire will be the only viable, effective remedy available."" 7 The court reflected that "[t]hose
instances will occur ordinarily when reseating the improperly stricken
" 8
juror will impair a party's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. '
The court maintained that "[i] n such instances, the court will abuse
its discretion if it does not abort the trial and begin jury selection
anew with a different panel."" 9 Yet, under the facts ofJones, the Court
of Appeals found that the jurors' right not to be excluded from ajury
required the same degree of protection as the defendant's right to an

110. Id. at 603-04, 683 A.2d at 530. The court pointed out that "[the prospective jurors]
certainly were not told that the peremptories exercised by the State were proper and those
exercised by the [defendant] were not." Id.
111. Id. at 604, 683 A.2d at 530 (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. I&
113. Id. at 605, 683 A.2d at 530.
114. Id. at 604, 683 A.2d at 530. Defense counsel argued that "the mere fact of being
challenged... 'may create animosity toward the party exercising the peremptory strike.'"
Id.
115. Id
116. Id. The court explained that "[u]nless a party can demonstrate how he or she has
been prejudiced, that 'party cannot complain that the seating of an improperly challenged
juror violates his or her right to an impartial jury.'" Id (quotingJefferson v. State, 595 So.
2d 38, 41 (Fla. 1992)).
117. Id. at 604-05, 683 A.2d at 530.
118. Id. at 605, 683 A.2d at 530.
119. Id.
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impartial jury. 20 The court thus concluded that the trial judge did
not abuse his discretion by reseating the stricken jurors.12 1
4. Analysis.-In Jones, the Court of Appeals held that a trial
court has discretion to formulate a Batson remedy, and that reseating
five improperly dismissed jurors was a proper exercise of that discretion.'2 2 The decision of the Court of Appeals is consistent with prior
Maryland decisions, which have not provided a definitive Batson remedy.' 2 3 Jones is also in accord with the Supreme Court's ruling in Batson, in which the Court "decline[d] . . . to formulate particular

procedures to be followed" when remedying a Batson violation, leaving
this issue to the discretion of the trial courts.' 2 4 Therefore, under Batson, the Court of Appeals could have mandated or upheld any remedy
that it found to be adequate.
Nonetheless, the remedy chosen by the trial court and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals-reseating the five stricken jurors-is troublesome. This remedy is at odds with the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial because it places venirepersons on the jury
who may have developed a prejudice against the defendant.1 2 5 A
more just remedy would have been a "compromise remedy," in which
the trial judge discharges only those jurors who were improperly
struck, while maintaining the rest of the venire. This would have insured that the jurors did not harbor any resentment or prejudice towards Jones. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of the United States
and the Maryland Court of Appeals have failed to consider this option, contemplating only two remedies-reseating the improperly
stricken jurors or striking the entire panel. 2 6 Furthermore, in affirming the remedy in Jones, the Court of Appeals overemphasized the
rights of the jurors, thereby sacrificing the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. Thus, although Batson was initially decided
to protect a criminal defendant's right to an impartial jury, this purpose has been lost in the past decade, so that today, courts may deprive defendants of their rights in the name of Batson.
a. The Eyes and Ears of the Jury.-The Court of Appeals in
Jones correctly held that the trial judge has discretion to select the
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 602, 605, 683 A.2d at 529, 530.
See supra notes 70-93 and accompanying text.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986).
See Underwood, supra note 8.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 99-100 n.24; Jones, 343 Md. at 601, 683 A.2d at 528.
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remedy that best fits the facts and circumstances of each case. 127 The
Court of Special Appeals explained in Jones.
"It is the trial judge who is in close touch with the racial
mood, be it harmonious or be it tense. .

.

. [He] is posi-

tioned to observe the racial composition of the venire panel
as a whole, a vital fact frequently not committed to the rec1 28
ord and, therefore, unknowable to the reviewing court.'
However, the trial court's discretion should not be absolute. It should
be conditioned on one fact-that the peremptory strikes were not
committed in the presence of the jurors, or made within their hearing. In essence, the Maryland courts should adopt a per se "Eyes and
Ears" rule of automatically discharging improperly struck jurors when
the juror knows the identity of the challenger. This rule, by requiring
the exclusion of a juror with knowledge of the striking party, would
safeguard a defendant's right to a fair trial. In all other circumstances, however, when the strike is committed outside the eyes and
ears of the jury, the trial court may have discretion to fashion a Batson
remedy.
The "Eyes and Ears" rule is essential for a variety of reasons. Primarily, a juror who knows which party is responsible for striking her
may become prejudiced against that party. 129 For example, the juror
may become resentful or offended as a result of her dismissal. 3 ° If
the party that struck the juror were the defendant, the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury would be in127. 343 Md. at 602-03, 683 A.2d at 529.
128. Jones, 105 Md. App. at 268, 659 A.2d at 366 (quoting Bailey v. State, 84 Md. App.
323, 328, 579 A.2d 774, 776 (1990)).
129. See People v. Williams, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769, 771 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1994). The
Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California explained the disadvantage of
reseating a juror under these circumstances: "The detriment ... [in] simply calling the
juror back [who was] wrongly excused, is that it will be too much of a remedy, that it would
certainly prejudice-the juror will be prejudiced in the knowledge against the person who
just removed him." Id. (second alteration in original).
130. See State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144, 159 (N.C. 1993). The McCollum court
explained:
To ask jurors who have been improperly excluded from a jury because of their
race to then return to the jury to remain unaffected by that recent discrimination,
and to render an impartial verdict without prejudice toward either the State or
the defendant, would be to ask them to discharge a duty which would require
near superhuman effort and which would be extremely difficult for a person possessed of any sensitivity whatsoever to carry out successfully. As Batson violations
will always occur at an early stage in the trial before any evidence has been introduced, the simpler, and we think clearly fairer, approach is to begin jury selection
anew with a new panel of prospective jurors who cannot have been affected by
any prior Batson violation.
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fringed. Even if the striking party were the prosecutor, the juror
should still be dismissed because the State has a right to a fair trial and
an unbiased jury as well.'
Due to the infamous reputation that jury duty has acquired in
American society, it may be difficult for most people to imagine how a
person could resent an attorney for relieving her from jury service.
Yet, numerous Americans viewjury duty as an acknowledgment of citizenship.' 3 2 In this sense, they equate jury duty with the right to
vote. 3' This feeling is especially strong among minority groups, particularly African Americans, who have fought throughout history to
gain the formal right to citizenship, as well as the duties and obligations that come along with it.' 34 Therefore, when struck from the
jury, regardless of whether they are aware of the racial basis of the
strike, jurors may become resentful towards the person who struck
them and biased against that party if they are reseated.
In Jones, the defendant asserted the aforementioned argument
and contended that the jurors' "knowledge of who attempted to strike
them is enough of a basis to infer that the improperly challenged jurors were biased against [the defendant]."l"5 However, the Court of
Appeals responded that it was not possible for the stricken jurors to
become prejudiced because they did not know why defense counsel
struck them. 3 6 The court emphasized that the Batson inquiry was
conducted at the bench, outside of the jury's hearing.13 7 Thus, the
court concluded that the jurors' mere knowledge of which attorney
struck them was not enough to compel the trial judge to dismiss
them. 3 ' On the contrary, the mere knowledge of who struck them
could have been enough to make the dismissed jurors prejudiced
against Jones. Jurors might be even more offended, and thus biased
against the defendant, if they do not know why they were struck. A
131. See State v. Walker, 453 N.W.2d 127, 135 n.12 (Wis. 1990) ("[A] challenged juror
[who] is aware of the fact that he or she was challenged by the prosecutor.... should not
be reinstated because there is a substantial likelihood that he or she will have developed a
bias against the prosecutor.").
132. See Underwood, supra note 8, at 746 ("[W]hen the task in question is widely understood as a fundamental aspect of citizenship, as is jury service, then rejection amounts to a
judgment of unfitness for citizenship.").
133. Id. Eligibility for jury service has historically been tied to eligibility for voting. Id.
134. Id. "[W]hen the basis for rejection is race, the rejection becomes part of this country's history of race-based decisionmaking, and acquires additional power to injure for that
reason." Id.
135. Jones, 343 Md. at 604, 683 A.2d at 530.
136. Id. at 603-04, 683 A.2d at 529-30.
137. Id. at 603, 683 A.2d at 529.
138. Id. at 604, 683 A.2d at 530.
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curiousjuror might even begin to conjure up reasons for her dismissal
in her mind. Such a juror might think that the attorney thought that
she was incompetent, unintelligent, or irresponsible, or perhaps that
the attorney did not like the way she dressed. If that juror were reinstated, she would likely harbor feelings of ill will toward that attorney.
Moreover, more credit must be given to the intelligence and astuteness of the common citizen juror. In Jones, the defendant was an
African-American; the defense attorney struck five white jurors; and
the prosecutor then went up to the bench to object to the judge."3 9
The prospective jurors observed all of this, as well as the attorneys
arguing with one another at the bench.14 ° The jurors were able to
examine the attorneys' facial expressions and attitude, even though
they might not have been able to hear what they were saying. Soon
afterwards, the judge recalled the stricken jurors. 14 1 The members of
the venire observed all of these events in Jones and were able to draw
their own conclusions. Most likely, they accurately assessed the situation-the five white jurors were improperly struck by the defendant
for racial reasons.1 42 Thus, mere knowledge of the striking party is
sufficient to establish resentment and bias by the restored juror.
The simplest way of resolving the problem ofjury bias against the
striking party is to conduct the peremptory challenges outside the
presence of the jurors.1 43 It is well established that a trial judge has
144
discretion over the jury selection procedures in the courtroom.
Maryland law upholds the judge's broad authority over jury selection
procedures. 145 Thus, it would be quite easy for a trial judge to adjust
the jury selection procedures followed in his courtroom and require
peremptory strikes to be conducted outside the presence of the jury.

139. Id. at 587-88, 683 A.2d at 521-22.
140. Id. at 587-89, 683 A.2d at 521-22.
141. Id. at 589-90, 683 A.2d at 522-23.
142. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review ofJury Verdicts, 56 U. CI. L. REv. 153, 177 n.98 (1989) ("Although
neither the prosecutor's explanation for the prospective juror's exclusion nor the court's
ruling that this explanation was inadequate might have occurred within the hearing of the
juror, a person excluded from a jury and then restored might well infer the situation.").
143. SeeJefferson v. State, 595 So. 2d 38, 40 (Fla. 1992) ("[T]he trial court in the instant
case conducted the [Batson] inquiry outside the presence of the jury, and, thus, there was
no danger that the improperly challenged juror would bear animosity toward the party
attempting to exercise the peremptory.").
144. United States v. Warren, 982 F.2d 287, 288 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Trial judges have
broad discretion in the jury-selection procedure they use in their courtrooms.").
145. See, e.g., Poole v. State, 295 Md. 167, 187, 453 A.2d 1218, 1229 (1983) (holding that
the manner of conducting voir dire examination lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court).
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This procedure already has gained support in the legal community. 146
For instance, the American Bar Association (ABA) strongly encourages peremptory strikes to be conducted outside the presence of the
jurors. 1 1 7 The ABA Standards advise that "[peremptory] challenges
[should] be presented at the bench, [or] at side-bar" in order "[t]o
avoid the prejudicial effect of exercising challenges in open court."148
b. The Misorderingof Priorities.--TheJones court's decision to
allow the potentially biased jurors to be reseated was primarily motivated by its excessive concern for the rights of the jurors. 149 Specifically, the court equated the rights of the jurors under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment with the defend150
ant's right to a fair and impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment,
and asserted that these two rights must be "balanced" when formulating a remedy to a Batson violation. 15 Accordingly, the court rejected
the remedy of discharging the improperly struck jurors because of its
misplaced anxiety over the jurors' right not to be discriminated
against in jury selection. 5 2 Unfortunately, in doing so, the court has
"misordered its priorities. "153 The court should have instead focused
146. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BYJURY stand. 15-2.7(a)
(3d ed. 1996).
147. See id.
148. Id. stand. 15-2.7 commentary; see also People v. Williams, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769, 77172 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1994) (conducting peremptory challenges at the bench). Another way of conducting peremptory strikes outside the jurors' presence would be to conduct voir dire, and then have the judge, attorneys, clerk, and court reporter leave the
courtroom and go to the judge's chambers to argue over challenges for cause and peremptory strikes in private. Once the judge has approved the challenges, the clerk or judge,
both neutral figures, can inform the jury panel which jurors have been dismissed. See
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 n.8 (1992) ("[Ilt is common practice not to reveal
the identity of the challenging party to the jurors and potential jurors, thus enhancing the
perception that it is the court that has rejected them.").
Alternatively, the judge could dismiss the jurors from the courtroom after the voir dire
and conduct challenges for cause and peremptory strikes in their absence. The court followed this approach in Warren, 982 F.2d at 288. In Warren, the court held that "[t] here is
nothing improper in excusing potential jurors from the courtroom before the parties
make their challenges." Id. The court explained that the attorneys should make seating
charts and take notes during voir dire to keep track of who the jurors are and what answers
they gave to voir dire questions. Id.
149. Jones, 343 Md. at 601-05, 683 A.2d at 528-30.
150. Id. at 601-02, 683 A.2d at 528-29.
151. Id. at 601, 683 A.2d at 528-29. The Court of Appeals held that "thejuror's right not
to be excluded from jury service in a manner violative of his or her equal protection rights
must be balanced against the potential prejudice to the ... defendant, as the striking party,
that reseating the improperly stricken juror or disallowing the strike may entail." Id.
152. Id. at 605, 683 A.2d at 530.
153. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 61 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Thomas was concerned that the majority opinion, which extended the Batson holding to
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its attention on the defendant's right to a fair trial. This is because it
is the defendant whose fate is at stake, not the jurors. As a result, the
rights of the defendant must be the court's predominant concern,
54
and the rights of the jurors should be secondary.
It is well accepted that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
a fair and impartial jury is "fundamental"1'5 5 and is "essential for
preventing miscarriages of justice." '5 6 The fortitude of this right has
15 7
For inbeen recognized since its inception in the common law.
stance, Lord Coke described the pertinence of an impartial jury when
he stated: "'He that is of a jury, must be liber homo, that is, not only a
freeman and not bond, but also one that hath such freedome of mind

as he stands indifferent as he stands unsworne."' 15 8 More importantly,
"the distinctive quality of that right-its very essence-is that every
person put upon trial upon an issue involving his life or his liberty is
entitled to have such issue tried by a jury consisting of unbiased and
unprejudiced persons.11 5 In comparison to the explicit constitutional right to a "fair and impartial jury," there is no express constitutional right to serve on a particular jury. 6 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has not interpreted the Constitution to provide "a juror [the]
equal protection right not to be excluded from a particular case
through peremptory challenge."' 6 1 Therefore, the rights of the five
jurors who were improperly struck in Jones stand on much weaker
prohibit defense attorneys from using racist strikes, "produce[d] a serious misordering of
priorities." Id. Justice Thomas feared that the Court was departing from its prior holdings,
in which the Court "put the rights of defendants foremost." Id. He warned that "[by]
protecting [the rights of the] jurors, [the Court] leaves defendants with less means of
protecting themselves." Id.
154. State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144, 159-60 (N.C. 1993). In State v. McCollum, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina declared that the rights of the defendant were more
important than those of the jury. Id "We recognize and endorse the equal protection
right of prospective jurors explained in detail in Powers. However, we conclude that the
primary focus in a criminal case ... must continue to be upon the goal of achieving a trial
which is fair to both the defendant and the State." Id. at 159.
155. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 154 (1968) (incorporating the Sixth
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure that the right to an impartial jury
is available in "serious" state criminal trials).
156. Id. at 158.
157. People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 754 (Cal. 1978).
158. Id. at 754 n.3 (quoting 1 EnwARD COKE, COMMErTARv UPON LIrrTLETON 155a (reprint 1985) (Francis Hargrave et al. eds., 19th ed. 1832)).
159. Id. at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 48 (1992) ("-[A]n individual juror does not
have a right to sit on any particular petit jury.'" (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409
(1991))).
161. Powers, 499 U.S. at 426 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ground than Jones's long-revered constitutional right to an impartial
jury.
Furthermore, there is a second, more practical reason for placing
the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury above the equal protection rights of the jury. When a defendant is deprived of her right
to a fair and impartial jury, it can result in her incarceration, the ultimate deprivation of freedom. Quite simply, "it is the defendant, not
the jurors, who faces imprisonment or even death. 1 6 2 At the conclusion of his trial, Jones went to jail.1 6 Yet, for the improperly stricken
jurors, whose equal protection rights were violated, the result was
their return to the comfort of their homes and communities. The
repercussions of the violations of these two distinct rights demonstrate
their inequality. Thus, the Court of Appeals incorrectly equated a defendant's rights with those of the improperly stricken jurors.
c. The Compromise Remedy.--In Jones, the defendant's right to
a fair and impartial jury could have been easily safeguarded by discharging only those jurors who were improperly stricken, while keeping the remainder of the venire. This remedy was never considered by
the Circuit Court, the Court of Special Appeals, or the Court of Appeals.16 4 All three of these courts considered just two possible solutions-either dismissing the entire venire or reseating the stricken
jurors. 6 5 Possible remedies, however, are not limited to these two alternatives. The Supreme Court has pronounced its desire to give the
state courts much leeway in the area of fashioning a Batson remedy.' 6 6
Moreover, in Batson, the Supreme Court held that a remedy that
strikes an entire venire is acceptable.' 6 7 Thus, it is highly probable that
the Supreme Court would approve of a "compromise remedy," in
which only a few affected jurors are discharged.
162. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 62 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
163. Jones, 343 Md. at 590, 683 A.2d at 523.
164. Id. at 593, 683 A.2d at 524; Jones, 105 Md. App. at 270-74, 659 A.2d at 367-70.
165. See Jones, 343 Md. at 594-604, 683 A.2d at 525-30; Jones, 105 Md. App. at 269-76, 659
A.2d at 367-70.
166. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 n.24 (1986) (stating that the Court makes
no attempt to instruct ... courts how to best implement [the] holding").
167. Id. The Court stated its approval of the extreme remedy of discharging the entire
venire:
[Wle express no view on whether it is more appropriate in a particular case ...
for the trial court to discharge the venire and select a new jury from a panel not
previously associated with the case ... or to disallow the discriminatory challenges
and resume selection with the improperly challenged jurors reinstated on the
venire.
Id.(citation omitted).
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Those courts that support reseating stricken jurors, including the
Court of Special Appeals, reason that striking the venire is an improper remedy because it wastes judicial time and resources.16 However, if the trial court only dismissed those jurors affected by the
improper strikes, a minimal amount of the court's time would be
wasted. The amount of judicial resources spent would be equivalent
to the amount used to strike jurors for cause. Furthermore, the judicial economy argument is unpersuasive when weighed against a significant constitutional right. Even if extra judicial time and resources
must be spent to dismiss prospective jurors in order to insure that a
defendant receives a fair trial, those resources should not be viewed as
"wasted," but must be perceived as a necessary part of justice.
Courts also argue that discharging the improperly stricken jurors
"would unfairly reward counsel for [its] improper conduct and give
him exactly what he wanted, namely, a different jury panel."16 9 Courts
have worried that "if [they] were to require the trial court to strike the
entire panel in every case of discrimination, then there might be those
parties who would purposefully discriminate in exercising strikes for
the sole purpose of getting a new panel." 170 This argument, however,
is troublesome because it seems to assume that attorneys are dishonest
and deceitful. Courts of law should refrain from asserting legal principles that are based upon the notion that attorneys are untrustworthy
and will attempt to swindle or defraud a judge if permitted. 17 1 Even
so, it is "unlikely ...that many [attorneys] would use [the peremptory

challenge] in so calculated a fashion.

' 172

Nonetheless, this argument

168. Jones, 105 Md. App. at 277, 659 A.2d at 370. The Court of Special Appeals argued
that "[s]tarting the jury selection process over every time there is a Batson violation would
be both burdensome and costly." Id.
169. Id. at 274, 659 A.2d at 369. The Court of Special Appeals was swayed into believing
this mythical possibility by an academic commentator, whom it quoted in its opinion:
"[Iln some situations, the remedy [of discharging the entire panel] might
give the [striking attorney] a broader defacto peremptory challenge than any provided by law. [An attorney] dissatisfied with an initial panel of prospective jurors
...might seek to reduce the presence of minorities through the exercise of peremptory strikes. Were these strikes upheld, the [attorney] would gain a victory;
and were they declared unlawful and the jury selection begun anew, the [attorney] might regard this defeat as a great victory still.
...The [attorney] would in effect have been afforded a power to strike the
entire panel peremptorily."
Id. at 275, 659 A.2d at 370 (quoting Alschuler, supra note 142, at 178) (first and second
alterations in original).
170. Id. at 275, 659 A.2d at 369-70.
171. Alschuler, supra note 142, at 178.
172. Id. Thus, even the creator of this theory doubts that many attorneys lack the ethical
stamina to take advantage of such a remedy. Id. The Court of Special Appeals itself
doubted that attorneys would actually use this tactic to trick the trial judge into ordering a
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cannot apply to the compromise remedy because the trial judge would
not dismiss the entire venire, but would dismiss only those jurors who
were improperly struck.
Moreover, utilizing the compromise remedy would not require
Maryland courts to take a huge leap from their past decisions, which
approved of discharging the entire venire and beginning jury selection anew. In Chew v. State, the Court of Special Appeals suggested
that, in future cases, "it may be necessary to dismiss the venire and to
begin again with a new panel." 7 Similarly, in Gilchrist v. State, the
Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's remedy of discharging the
entire venire and beginning jury selection anew.17 4 Finally, as recently
as 1994, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the remedy of striking
the entire venire in Brogden v. State.1 75 Thus, because dismissing only
the jurors affected by the strikes is a more conservative remedy than
quashing the entire venire, the Maryland courts should find it to be
an acceptable remedy.
5. Conclusion.-The Supreme Court has refused to mandate a
single appropriate remedy for a Batson violation, leaving to the states
the task of determining the fairest remedy.' 7 6 Maryland is a prime
example of the many states that have tiptoed around this controversial
issue, refusing to definitively approve a specific Batson remedy.1 77
Thus, the Court of Appeals had a great degree of leeway in deciding
Jones, and its opinion fell within the constitutional limits created by
Batson and Maryland precedent.
The court, however, failed to appreciate that the Supreme
Court's ruling in Batson was motivated by a strong desire to protect the
defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury.1 78
Yet, in the cases that have succeeded Batson, this original concern for
new trial because "if the entire venire were struck, this might, under some circumstances,
work to penalize the violating party, since the result might be that some of the jurors he
did not strike, and very much wanted on the jury, would be dismissed." Jones, 105 Md. at
275 n.5, 659 A.2d at 369 n.5.
173. 71 Md. App. 681, 704, 527 A.2d 332, 343 (1987), vacated, 317 Md. 233, 562 A.2d
1270 (1989).
174. 340 Md. 606, 623, 667 A.2d 876, 884 (1995). Furthermore, the jury selection procedures used in Gilchristwere very similar to those followed in Jones. As in Jones, the attorneys
in Gilchrist conducted their peremptory challenges in the jurors' presence so that the jurors knew which party had struck them. Id. at 611-12, 667 A.2d at 878.
175. 102 Md. App. 423, 426, 649 A.2d 1196, 1198 (1994).
176. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 n.24 (1986).
177. See supra notes 65-93 and accompanying text.
178. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-87. The Court declared that: "Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it
denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure." Id.
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the defendant's rights has been lost, even though courts, such asJones,
have purported to be following Batson. In Jones, the Court of Appeals
neglected the defendant's right to a fair trial, and, instead, focused its
concern on the equal protection rights of the jurors.1 79 The result
was an infringement of the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. In
order to remain aligned with the Supreme Court's intent in Batson,
and to guard the defendant's fundamental constitutional rights, the
Court of Appeals should have dismissed only those jurors who were
improperly struck. Ultimately, the Supreme Court will be forced to
revisit the issue of Batson violation remedies to ensure that the proper
protection is afforded to a defendant's rights. Hopefully, at that time,
the Court will provide more guidance to lower courts.
MEAGEN

R.

SLEEPER

C. Divergent Methods of Evaluating Constructive Possession Drug
Convictions May Yield Confusion and Disparate Outcomes
In Taylor v. State,1 the Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant's conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance may stand, based on the defendant's presence in a motel room
filled with marijuana smoke and his knowledge that others had used
the drug in that room.2 The court held that mere proximity to marijuana and awareness that it had been smoked did not establish that
the defendant was in constructive possession of the drug.' Taylor was
decided correctly because there was insufficient evidence linking the
defendant to the marijuana.4 In reaching this conclusion, however,
the court failed to harmonize the divergent approaches utilized by the
Court of Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals in cases involving
two or more persons who share constructive possession. Although the
Court of Special Appeals has consistently employed a four-prong test
to evaluate whether an individual is in joint and constructive possession of contraband,5 the Court of Appeals has neither applied the test
nor addressed the Court of Special Appeals's past usage of the test.
This disparity between Maryland's two appellate courts will lead to
179. Jones, 343 Md. at 601-05, 683 A.2d at 528-30.
1. 346 Md. 452, 697 A.2d 462 (1997).
2. Id. at 459, 697 A.2d at 465.
3. Id. at 463, 697 A.2d at 467-68.
4. Id. The evidence presented against Taylor was that he was present in a hotel room
in which marijuana was recently smoked, he was aware that the marijuana was smoked, and
the marijuana was found in a concealed carrying bag belonging to another occupant of the
room. Id., 697 A.2d at 468.
5. See infra text accompanying note 57.
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confusion among trial courts and practitioners regarding the legal
standards necessary to sustain ajoint and constructive possession drug
conviction. Furthermore, the different approaches of the two appellate courts will yield inconsistent reasoning and outcomes in future
constructive possession cases.
1. The Case.--On the morning of June 10, 1995, Richard Jamison Taylor and four of his friends rented a motel room in Ocean City,
Maryland.6 Soon after their arrival, Officer Scott Bernal and another
officer responded to a complaint about a potential controlled substance violation in the room occupied by Taylor and his friends.7 As
the officers and the motel manager approached the room, they detected a strong odor of marijuana in the hallway.' While the officers
stood outside the room for a few minutes, two individuals who were
staying in the room-Kristopher Klein and a juvenile named
Brandy-arrived.9 At the instruction of Officer Bernal, Klein knocked
on the room door and Chris Myers, another occupant of the room,
answered.1" Officer Bernal then identified himself and asked Myers if
marijuana had been smoked in the room." Myers told the officers
that marijuana had not been smoked in the room and, pursuant to
their request, permitted the officers to search the premises.12 When
the officers entered the room, they spotted Taylor lying on the floor
with his head turned away.13 The officers also observed "clouds of
smoke in the room that smelled like marijuana."' 4
Officer Bernal informed Myers that he planned to search the entire room, and again inquired whether there was marijuana in the
room.' 5 Myers then opened a carrying bag and pulled out a bag of
marijuana. 6 Myers told the officers that this was the only marijuana
in the room, and he was subsequently arrested.' 7 When the officers
continued to search the room, Myers retracted his earlier statement
6. Taylor, 346 Md. at 454, 697 A.2d at 463.
7. Id. at 454-55, 697 A.2d at 463; Petitioner's Brief at 2, Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452,
697 A.2d 462 (1997) (No. 101).
8. Taylor, 346 Md. at 455, 697 A.2d at 463.
9. Id. Brandy's surname was not revealed because she was ajuvenile at the time of this
incident. Id. at 455 n.3, 697 A.2d at 463 n.3.
10. Id. at 455, 697 A.2d at 463.
11. Id.
12. Id., 697 A-2d at 463-64.
13. Id., 697 A.2d at 464. Officer Bernal later testified that he could not determine
whether Taylor was asleep or awake. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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and led Officer Bernal to another bag of marijuana located in a multicolored bag.'" The officers also discovered rolling papers inside
Klein's wallet. 9
Officer Bernal testified that Taylor and the other occupants told
him that friends who were not staying in the room had visited earlier
and smoked marijuana in their presence.2" Despite the strong odor of
marijuana, Officer Bernal did not "see anyone smoking marijuana,
the ashtrays were clean, and no marijuana was visible."21
Taylor was charged with possession of marijuana in violation of
Article 27, section 287.22 In a bench trial in the Circuit Court for
Worcester County, Taylor was convicted of possession. 2' The trial
court based the conviction on the fact that Taylor: (1) was in close
proximity to the marijuana; (2) "knew" of the marijuana because people were smoking it in his presence; and (3) had some possessory
right in the premises because he was asleep in the room. 24 The trial
court concluded that the circumstances led to a reasonable inference
that Taylor participated with the others in "the mutual enjoyment of
the contraband. '25 The trial court sentenced Taylor to fifteen days in
the Worcester County jail, but suspended the sentence and imposed
two years unsupervised probation and a fine.2 6
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction in an unreported opinion 27 and applied a four-part test to determine the sufficiency of the evidence. 28 The court ruled that "'discovery of
marijuana in Myers's bags allowed for the inference that appellant
18. Id.
19. Id. at 455-56, 697 A.2d at 464.
20. Id. at 456, 697 A.2d at 464. At trial, Taylor provided a different version of the
events of June 10, 1995. He testified that shortly after his arrival at the motel room, he
went to sleep and was asleep when Officer Bernal entered the room. Taylor testified that,
because he was asleep, he was unaware that anyone had smoked marijuana in the room.
Id. at 456 n.5, 697 A.2d at 464 n.5.
21. Id. at 456, 697 A.2d at 464.
22. Id. Article 27, section 287 provides in pertinent part: "[lt is unlawful for any person ... [t]o possess or administer to another any controlled dangerous substance, unless
such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a
practitioner, while acting in the course of his professional practice." MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 287(a) (1996).
23. Taylor, 346 Md. at 456, 697 A.2d at 464.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Taylor v. State, No. 1603, slip op. at 6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 9, 1996), rev'd, 346
Md. 452, 697 A.2d 462 (1997).
28. Id. at 5. The Court of Special Appeals invoked a four-part test to determine
whether there was sufficient evidence to find joint possession of the contraband. This test,
formulated in Folk v. State, 11 Md. App. 508, 275 A.2d 184 (1971), includes:
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knew of and had shared that supply"' with Myers.29 The court further
explained that Taylor's presence in a room in which marijuana was
recently smoked led to an inference that he had smoked marijuana as
well." ° As support for this inference, the court relied upon its earlier
holdings that a passenger in an automobile containing contraband
may be assumed to have knowledge of the contraband.3 1 The Court
of Appeals granted certiorari to determine whether a defendant's
presence in a room filled with marijuana smoke, coupled with his
knowledge that others had smoked the drug in that room, was sufficient to uphold a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous
substance.3 2
2. Legal Background.-Early constructive possession decisions"3
in criminal drug cases fueled a growing debate among courts regarding the evidence necessary to sustain a constructive possession convic-

tion.34 The main source of confusion
"possession" is that "[i]t is interchangeably
possession and constructive possession which
another that it is difficult to say where one

surrounding the term
used to describe actual
often so shade into one
ends and the other be-

(1) [the] proximity between the defendant and the contraband, (2) the fact that
the contraband was within the view or otherwise within the knowledge of the
defendant, (3) ownership or some possessory right in the premises or the automobile in which the contraband is found, or (4) the presence of circumstances
from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the defendant was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband.
Id. at 518, 275 A.2d at 189.
29. Taylor, 346 Md. at 457, 697 A.2d at 464 (quoting the Court of Special Appeals's
unreported opinion in Taylor).
30. Id.
31. See Pugh v. State, 103 Md. App. 624, 652, 654 A.2d 888, 902 (1995) (asserting that
presence in a vehicle in which hidden contraband was discovered sufficiently showed that
the passenger had knowledge of the contraband); Colin v. State, 101 Md. App. 395, 407,
646 A.2d 1095, 1101 (1994) (stating that the voluntary status of the defendant as a passenger in a vehicle sufficiently demonstrated that he "anticipated 'the mutual enjoyment of
the contraband'").
32. Taylor, 346 Md. at 457, 697 A.2d at 464.
33. See generally Charles H. Whitebread & Ronald Stevens, Constructive Possession in Narcotics Cases: To Have and Have Not, 58 VA. L. REv. 751, 754-55 (1972) (explaining that
California was the forerunner in the constructive possession doctrine due to its early encounter with the drug problem). The first reported prosecution for possession of narcotics "to raise the spectre of constructive possession" was People v. Herbert, 210 P. 276 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1922). Whitebread & Stevens, supra, at 755.
34. See Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 33, at 751 (arguing that cases involving constructive possession of narcotics "have engendered such conceptual confusion and given
rise to so many conflicting rulings 'that for the practitioner the problems are difficult to
understand and apparently for the courts impossible to master"' (quoting United States v.
Holland, 445 F.2d 701, 704 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Tamm, J., concurring))).
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gins." 5 A person who knowingly exercises direct physical control over
a thing is in actual possession of it. 6 A person who, although not in
actual possession, "knowingly has both the power and the intention at
a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through others" is in constructive possession.3 7 Actual possession is "possession which exists as a matter of fact."3 " Constructive
possession, which is often defined as a "legal fiction," predicates liability in situations where possession does not actually exist, but where
39
courts want an individual to have the "legal status of a possessor."
a. Development of Maryland Law.-The statutory definition of
"possession" applicable to drug crimes in Maryland allows possession
convictions to rest on constructive or actual grounds.4" Maryland
courts have interpreted the word "possession," as within the intent of
the statute, to mean "the act or condition of having in or taking into
one's control or holding at one's disposal."4 The Court of Special
Appeals subsequently explained that constructive possession exists
when "an article is taken into a person's control or he holds it at his
disposal but is not on his person so as to be immediate or direct or
physical possession."4 2
Article 27, section 287 states that it is unlawful for any person to
"possess or administer to another any controlled dangerous substance,
unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a practitioner .... " Furthermore, section

287 mandates that any individual who is convicted for possession of
marijuana "shall be punished by a period of imprisonment not to ex44
ceed one (1) year or by a fine not to exceed $1,000.00, or both.
Since the first reported prosecutions for constructive drug possession

35. National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 67 (1914) (discussing the ambiguity of the term "possession" as it relates to property in a safe deposit box).
36. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1163 (6th ed. 1990).
37. United States v. Beverly, 750 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (quoting
United States v. Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 (6th Cir. 1971)).
38. Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 33, at 761.
39. Id. at 762.
40. See MD.ANN. CODE art. 27, § 277(s) (1996) ("'Possession' shall mean the exercise
of actual or constructive dominion or control over a thing by one or more persons.").
41. See Williams v. State, 7 Md. App. 5, 14, 252 A.2d 880, 885 (1969) (detailing the
various ways in which a defendant can be found in possession of narcotics).
42. SeeJason v. State, 9 Md. App. 102, 115, 262 A.2d 774, 781 (1979) (tracing the reasoning from previous decisions to formulate a definition for constructive possession).
43. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 287(a).
44. Id. § 287(e).
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in Maryland,4 5 courts have struggled to develop a consistent and useful framework to assess convictions under the State's statutory scheme.
Many possession decisions, such as Taylor, involved joint defendants who were held to be in joint and constructive possession of contraband.4 6 Joint possession exists where two or more persons share
actual or constructive possession.4 7 Under Maryland law, it iswell setfled that possession of marijuana or contraband drugs need not be
sole possession.4 8 "[T]here may be joint possession and joint control
in several persons. And the duration of the possession and the quantity possessed are not material, nor is it necessary to prove ownership
in the sense of the title."4 Forjoint possession to exist, it is not necessary for a defendant to have a "full partnership" in the contraband.5 °
It is only necessary that the defendant "controlled so much of it as
would be necessary to permit her to take a puff upon a marihuana
cigarette."'" Although this definition seems simple enough, Maryland
appellate courts have differed in their methods of assessing whether
two or more persons exercise joint and constructive possession.
In 1971, the Court of Special Appeals articulated specific guidelines to evaluate cases involving joint and constructive possession. In
Folk v. State52 the court sustained a possession charge against a de45. In Mazer v. State, 212 Md. 60, 127 A.2d 630 (1956), one of its first decisions on
constructive possession of illegal drugs, the Court of Appeals upheld a possession conviction even though the officers discovered the drug in the defendant's car, rather than on
his person. Id. at 67, 127 A.2d at 634. The defendant in Mazer argued that the seized
marijuana did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he put the drug in his car, or
that it was in his possession or under his control. Id. The court explained that
"[r]easonable probability of its connection with the crime alleged, under the circumstances, is the only test of admissibility." Id. As justification for the conviction, the Mazer
court relied on previous cases in which defendants were found to be in constructive possession of unlawful lottery slips. Id.; see Hayette v. State, 199 Md. 140, 144, 85 A.2d 790, 792
(1952) (finding a grocery store owner in possession of lottery slips discovered on the prem-

ises); Shelton v. State, 198 Md. 405, 412-13, 84 A.2d 76, 80 (1951) (upholding a possession
conviction for the owner and operator of a bar and grill in which lottery slips were found).
Although the court never explicitly mentioned the doctrine of constructive possession, the
Mazer decision paved the way for many subsequent decisions involving constructive possession in the drug area.

46. See infra notes 52-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of defendants who
faced charges of this nature.
47. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 839.

48. See Folk v. State, 11 Md. App. 508, 511, 275 A.2d 184, 185-86 (1973) (describing the
circumstances under which joint possession exists); see also MD.ANN. CODE art. 27, § 277(s)
(1996) (explaining that actual or constructive possession can be exercised by more than

one person).
49. Jason v. State, 9 Md. App. 102, 111, 262 A.2d 774, 779 (1970).
50. Folk, 11 Md. App. at 512, 275 A.2d at 186.
51. Id.
52. 11 Md. App. 508, 275 A.2d 184 (1971).
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fendant who was one of six occupants in an automobile clouded with
marijuana smoke."3 Although there was no evidence that the accused
was in direct physical control of the contraband, the court upheld the
conviction because it was clear "that some person or persons in that
automobile were in possession of the contraband marihuana."5 4 In so
concluding, the court reviewed previous decisions of both the Court
of Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals55 that considered joint
possession convictions, and found a "common thread" running
through these decisions.5 6 The court then developed the following
four-part test to assess when a defendant jointly possesses contraband:
1) proximity between the defendant and the contraband, 2)
the fact that the contraband was within the view or otherwise
within the knowledge of the defendant, 3) ownership or
some possessory right in the premises or the automobile in
which the contraband is found, or 4) the presence of circumstances from which a reasonable inference could be drawn
that the defendant was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband.5
In applying these four prongs to the facts of Folk, the court found
sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.5 8 The court ruled that
the proximity prong was fulfilled because the marijuana was "within
arm's length of every other occupant of that automobile."5 9 The
court then drew a "reasonable inference" that the marijuana was
within the knowledge of the defendant because "the peculiar pungent
53. Id. at 511, 275 A.2d at 185. In Folk, an officer approached a vehicle that was parked
in a secluded baseball field. As he walked toward the driver's side, one of the passengers
rolled down the left front window, emitting strong fumes of what the officer detected to be
marijuana. The officer then ordered all of the occupants out of the vehicle and placed
them under arrest. Upon exiting the vehicle, one of the occupants threw an object to the
ground, and a chemical analysis proved the object to be marijuana. Id.
54. Id.
55. See generallyHenson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 204 A.2d 516 (1964) (sustaining a conviction for possession and control of narcotics even though no narcotics were found on the
defendant's person but were found on the premises); Anderson v. State, 9 Md. App. 639,
267 A.2d 302 (1970) (holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession of heroin when the defendant was found in an upstairs bedroom but no
contraband was discovered on his person or in that bedroom); Haley v. State, 7 Md. App.
18, 253 A.2d 424 (1969) (proclaiming that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a
conviction for possession of marijuana because the defendants, who were arrested in the
living room, had no proprietary interest in the premises); Wimberly v. State, 7 Md. App.
302, 254 A.2d 711 (1969) (reversing a conviction for possession because no prohibited
drugs were found in the defendant's physical possession).
56. Folk, 11 Md. App. at 518, 275 A-2d at 189.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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odor filled the interior of a tightly-closed automobile."6 For the "mutual enjoyment" prong, the court concluded that "[e]very item of additional evidentiary data" indicated that the defendant participated
with the other occupants in the mutual use and enjoyment of the marijuana. 61 Since the Folk decision, the Court of Special Appeals has
consistently applied the four-prong test enunciated in Folk to evaluate
the evidentiary sufficiency in joint and constructive drug possession
convictions.6 2 The Court of Appeals, however, in its many joint and
constructive drug possession cases, has embarked on a separate path.
One year after the Court of Special Appeals pronounced its fourprong test in Folk, the Court of Appeals, in Garrison v. State,6" ruled
that the standard to sustain a constructive possession conviction is
whether the evidence "show[s] directly or support[s] a rational inference that the accused did in fact exercise some dominion and control
[solely or jointly] over the prohibited narcotics in the sense contemplated by statute, i.e., that she exercised some restraining or directing
influence over it."64 The court reversed Mrs. Garrison's conviction
because there was no evidence that she was selling narcotics,65
there were no "fresh needle marks" on her arms, 66 she made

60. Id.
61. Id. at 519, 275 A.2d at 189.
62. See Pugh v. State, 103 Md. App. 624, 652, 654 A.2d 888, 902 (1995) (using the Folk
test to find that presence in a vehicle containing hidden contraband sufficiently showed
that the passenger had knowledge of the contraband); Colin v. State, 101 Md. App. 395,
407, 646 A.2d 1095, 1101 (1994) (using the Folk test to hold that the defendant's status as a
passenger in a vehicle was sufficient to establish that he was in constructive possession of
the drugs); Ford v. State, 37 Md. App. 373, 377 A.2d 577 (1977) (applying the Folk test to
hold a passenger in a vehicle in constructive possession of marijuana based on an officer's
testimony that the driver reached for marijuana where the passenger sat); Everhart v. State,
20 Md. App. 71, 315 A.2d 80 (1974) (examining the Folk factors to sustain the defendant's
possession conviction of marijuana when the defendant, one of several tenants, had knowledge of the 78 marijuana plants discovered outside the house), rev'd, 274 Md. 459, 337
A.2d 100 (1975); Peterson v. State, 15 Md. App. 478, 292 A.2d 714 (1972) (applying the
Folk prongs to sustain the defendant's conviction for drug possession when he was one of
four persons inside a narcotics distribution plant).
63. 272 Md. 123, 321 A.2d 767 (1974). In Garrison, police officers searched the premises of Ernest Garrison and his wife, Shirley Garrison, based on probable cause that they
were selling heroin from their home. Id. at 126, 321 A.2d at 769. Upon entering, an
officer saw Mr. Garrison flush a plastic bag down the toilet. Id. The officer, after recovering the bag, learned that it contained heroin. Id. Another officer found Mrs. Garrison in
the rear bedroom, but failed to locate any contraband in that room. Id. at 126-27, 321 A.2d
at 769.
64. Id. at 142, 321 A.2d at 777.
65. Id. at 130, 321 A.2d at 771.
66. Id. The needle marks on Shirley Garrison's arms were ten days to two weeks old.
Id. at 127, 321 A.2d at 769.
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no inculpatory remarks,6 7 and the seized heroin was not in plain
68

view.

In its review of previous decisions involving constructive possession, the Garrison court examined many of the same cases that the
Court of Special Appeals examined one year earlier when it announced its four-prong test in Folk. In doing so, the court somewhat
implied that the Folk test was legitimate when it invoked several factors
from the test, such as whether the drugs were in plain view, 69 and
whether the defendant had a possessory interest in the premises.7 °
However, the Garrison court's failure to acknowledge specifically
whether the Folk factors must be used, or whether they are four factors
to consider, created a division in the manner in which Maryland appellate courts evaluate joint and constructive possession cases.
In State v. Leach,71 the next joint possession case reviewed by the
Court of Appeals, the issue was whether a defendant constructively
possessed the phencyclidine (PCP) found in a closed container in his
brother's one-bedroom apartment.7 2 In reversing the conviction, the
court invoked the Garrisoncourt's reasoning to reiterate that evidence
must support a rational inference that the accused "exercise [d] some
dominion or control" over the prohibited drug. 73 Although scales
and a magnifier were found in plain view, the court dismissed those
items as "intrinsically innocuous" until they are associated with
drugs.7 ' The court also refused to infer that the defendant had joint
dominion and control over the entire apartment and "exercised [a]
restraining or directing influence" over the PCP merely because he
75
had ready access to his brother's apartment.
In Dawkins v. State,76 the Court of Appeals determined that knowledge is a necessary element to sustain a conviction, and the defendant
67. Id. at 130, 321 A.2d at 771.
68. Id. at 131, 321 A.2d at 771. The court also believed that there was no "juxtaposition
between her (in the front bedroom) and the contraband being jettisoned by her husband
in the bathroom." Id. (citations omitted).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 296 Md. 591, 463 A.2d 872 (1983).
72. Id. at 592-93, 463 A.2d at 872-73. After their booking by the police, each brother
gave 3712 Erdman Avenue as his address. Id. at 595, 463 A.2d at 874. At their appearance
before a commissioner, they both provided that same address. Id. The Department of
Motor Vehicles also listed the defendant's address as 3712 Erdman Avenue. Id. Another
individual provided testimony, however, that the defendant lived with her and her daughter at a different address. Id.

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 596, 463 A.2d at 874 (quoting Garrison, 272 Md. at 142, 321 A.2d at 777).
Id.
Id.
313 Md. 638, 547 A.2d 1041 (1988).
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must know of "both the presence and the general character or illicit
nature of the substance. '7 7 The court examined the statutory language and found a strong intention on the part of the General Assembly to require scienter as an element to a possession offense. 78 As
support for the new element, the court recognized that an individual
could not exercise dominion and control over an object of which he
was unaware. 79 The court also stated that "such knowledge may be
proven by circumstantial evidence and by inferences drawn
therefrom."8
One year later, in Livingston v. State,8" the Court of Appeals, in
reversing a possession conviction, applied the newly created knowledge component to decide whether a defendant jointly and constructively possessed contraband. The court held that a passenger in the
back seat of a car did not possess two marijuana seeds discovered on
the floor of the front of the car.82 The court invoked Dawkins to explain that knowledge is a "prerequisite" to exercising dominion and
control.8 3 The mere fact that the defendant sat in the back seat of a
vehicle did not convince the court that the defendant had knowledge
of or exercised "any restraining or directing influence over" the marijuana seeds in the front of the car.84 The court also stated that "relying solely on their proximity, an officer does not possess sufficient
cause to believe that a backseat passenger" possesses the contraband
drugs.8 5 Although it discussed the defendant's proximity to the drugs,
one of the four factors listed in the Folk test, the Livingston court failed
to address the Folk test. Instead, the Livingston court applied the Garrison principle requiring evidence to show a rational inference that control and dominion were exercised.8 6 According to the court, the facts
of the Livingston case permitted no such inference.8 7
Most recently, the Court of Special Appeals reviewed constructive
possession convictions in Colin v. State88 and in Pugh v. State.89 Both

defendants in these cases molded their arguments to satisfy the four77. Id. at 651, 547 A.2d at 1047.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 649, 547 A.2d at 1046.
Id.
Id. at 651, 547 A.2d at 1047.
317 Md. 408, 564 A.2d 414 (1989).
Id. at 409, 564 A.2d at 415.
Id. at 415, 564 A.2d at 418 (citation omitted).
Id. at 415-16, 564 A.2d at 418.
Id. at 409, 564 A.2d at 415.
Id. at 415, 564 A.2d at 418.
Id. at 409, 564 A.2d at 415.
101 Md. App. 395, 646 A.2d 1095 (1994).
103 Md. App. 624, 654 A.2d 888 (1995).

1998]

MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS

factor Folk test.90 In Colin, an officer searched the interior of an automobile and recovered cocaine from underneath the ashtray on the
left rear door.9 ' Colin, who was a passenger in the front seat, argued
that he was not in close proximity to the cocaine because it was found
in the left rear door interior. 92 He also contended that he did not
have knowledge of the cocaine, and, therefore, never "exercised dominion or control over the substance."9 The court held that there
was a sufficient amount of circumstantial evidence to conclude that
Colin constructively possessed the drugs.9 4 For example, Colin gave
the officer a false name. 95 Additionally, Colin acted nervously when
the officers searched the door where the cocaine was found.9 6
Although the cocaine was not in plain view, the court dismissed this
factor as not determinative.9 7 The court also found that because
Colin was a voluntary passenger, he "anticipated 'the mutual enjoys
ment of the contraband.'1
The court in Pugh faced a factual scenario similar to that in Colin.
In fact, the Pugh court essentially invoked the reasoning from Colin to
uphold a possession conviction. 9 9 A notable distinction, however, lies
in the fact that the officers in Pugh discovered the contraband drug in
a tire in the vehicle's trunk,' 0 0 rather than in the ashtray. On appeal
from his possession conviction, the passenger in Pugh argued that he
Based on Pugh's nerhad no knowledge of the concealed cocaine.'
90. See Pugh, 103 Md. App. at 652-53, 654 A.2d at 902 (invoking the reasoning of Colin
to explain why the defendant possessed the contraband drugs); Colin, 101 Md. App. at 406,
646 A.2d at 1100 (discussing whether the drugs were in close proximity, whether the defendant anticipated the mutual enjoyment of the contraband, and whether the drugs were

in plain view).
91. Colin, 101 Md. App. at 399, 646 A.2d at 1097. The rental car in which Colin was a
passenger was stopped by police for pulling in front of the police car and causing the
officer to slam on his brakes. Id. at 398, 646 A.2d at 1096. The rental agreement for the
car listed neither the driver nor the passenger as authorized drivers. Id. Due to the strong
suspicion that this created, the officer decided to search the car. Id.

92. Id. at 407, 646 A.2d at 1100-01.
93. Id., 646 A.2d at 1101 (internal quotation marks omitted).

94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The court found that without this factor, the "circumstantial evidence adds up

to a revealing picture." Id.

98. Id.
99. Pugh v. State, 103 Md. App. 624, 652-53, 654 A.2d 888, 902 (1995).

"In reaching

our conclusion, this Court's discussion in Colin... is instructive." Id.
100. Id. at 634, 654 A.2d at 893. After stopping the vehicle for crossing the center line
of the road, the officer removed the tire from the trunk and noticed that it was "unusually
heavy." Id. He then cut open the tire and discovered "eleven large duct tape packages"
filled with cocaine. Id.

101. Id.
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vousness and the fact that he voluntarily was a passenger in the car,
the court affirmed the jury's conclusion that Pugh knew of the con10 2
cealed cocaine.
3.

The Court's Reasoning.-In Taylor, the Court of Appeals held

that proximity to a controlled dangerous substance and knowledge
that others had used it were insufficient to establish that the defendant constructively possessed the drugs.1 °3 Judge Raker, writing for the
majority, began the analysis by discussing the role of circumstantial
evidence in constructive possession cases.' 0 4 While noting that a conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence of joint or constructive
possession, the court explained that a conviction based on circumstantial evidence alone "cannot be sustained on proof amounting only to
strong suspicion or mere probability."' 105
The court applied established legal precedents on constructive
possession to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to the
conviction.'0 6 The majority devoted most of its analysis to a determination of whether Taylor exercised control over, or had knowledge of,
the concealed marijuana."' The court emphasized that Taylor was
not in exclusive possession of the premises' 0 8 and that the marijuana
was not in plain view. 10 9 In light of these facts, the court relied on
Livingston, Garrison, and Leach to conclude that a "rational inference
cannot be drawn that he possessed the controlled dangerous substance.""' The court then explained that Taylor's presence in a marijuana-smoke-filled room did not show that he exercised dominion or

102. Id. at 653, 654 A.2d at 902.
103. Taylor, 346 Md. at 463, 697 A.2d at 467-68.
104. Id. at 458-59, 697 A.2d at 465.
105. Id. at 458, 697 A.2d at 465.
106. Id. at 459-60, 697 A.2d at 465-66 (citing Livingston v. State, 317 Md. 408, 564 A.2d
414 (1989) (holding that the presence of two marijuana seeds in the front of a car was
insufficient to support a possession conviction for a back-seat passenger); Dawkins v. State,
313 Md. 638, 547 A.2d 1041 (1988) (establishing that the defendant must have knowledge
of the drug for a possession conviction); State v. Leach, 296 Md. 591, 463 A.2d 872 (1983)
(holding that PCP found in a closed container in the apartment of the defendant's brother
insufficient to support a possession conviction, even though the defendant had ready ac-

cess to the premises); Garrison v. State, 272 Md. 123, 321 A.2d 767 (1974) (holding that
the defendant did not exercise sufficient control to support a possession conviction when
she resided in the same house with her husband, who was found flushing heroin down the

toilet)).
107. Id. at 459-61, 697 A.2d at 465-66.
108. Id. at 459, 697 A.2d at 465.
109. Id.
110. Id., 697 A.2d at 465-66.
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control over the drug, l"' nor did it indicate that he was "engaged in
'112
the mutual use or enjoyment of the contraband."
The Taylor court next invoked the reasoning from Dawkins to consider whether the knowledge element of a possession charge was fulfilled.1 1 Based on the evidence presented, the majority believed that
Taylor did not have knowledge of the concealed marijuana.11 4
Although the evidence elicited strong suspicion of Taylor's guilt, the
court asserted that there "must be additional proof of knowledge and
control to sustain a conviction for possession." ' 5 The majority emphasized that while evidence that a person recently smoked marijuana
may establish control over the substance, the smoke-filled room offered inadequate proof to sustain the constructive possession conviction. 1 6 The court explained further that the record clearly shows that
"someone smoked marijuana in the room, not that Petitioner, one of
'
five occupants of the room, smoked marijuana. 17
The court continued its discussion of the control element by reviewing previous decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Court of
Special Appeals involving constructive possession of drugs.1 18 The
Taylor court traced Judge O'Donnell's discussion of constructive possession decisions in Garrisonand then highlighted the main theme in
these cases-that "convictions for possession cannot stand when the
evidence does not establish, nor provides any reasonable inference to
establish, that the accused exercised dominion or control over the
contraband."' 19
The court next discussed Leach to demonstrate that ready access
to the premises where drugs are found does not automatically imply
an exercise of dominion and control over the contraband. 120 The
court also recounted the situation in Livingston, in which the court
held that the defendant's presence in the back seat of a vehicle was
insufficient to demonstrate knowledge of and control over two mari111. Id., 697 A.2d at 466.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 460, 697 A.2d at 466. "As clearly indicated by Dawkins, without knowledge of
the presence of marijuana in the room, it is not possible for Petitioner to have exercised
dominion or control over the marijuana, another required ingredient of the crime of possession." Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 460-61, 697 A.2d at 466.
118. Id. at 461-62, 697 A.2d at 466-67.
119. Id. at 461, 697 A.2d at 467.
120. Id. at 462-63. 697 A.2d at 467.
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juana seeds found in the front seat. 121 Taylor was like the defendants
in Leach and Livingston insofar as he had access to the hotel premises
and maintained no knowledge of the concealed marijuana. Accordingly, the court concluded that Taylor's joint possession of the premises, his proximity to the concealed marijuana, and his awareness that
it was smoked were insufficient to support his conviction. 122 The majority asserted that the evidence could not convince a rational trier of
fact that Taylor exercised a "restraining or directing influence" over
123
the marijuana.

Lastly, the court emphasized that "[t]he conjectures of the trial
judge might be entirely correct ....

Nevertheless, a conviction with-

out proof cannot be sustained.' 1 24 In so concluding, the Court of Appeals failed to enunciate new standards for future decisions involving
constructive possession in the drug area.
4. Analysis.-In Taylor, the Court of Appeals held that mere
proximity to drugs and knowledge of their use were insufficient to
sustain a constructive possession charge absent other indicators of
guilt. 125 Taylor presented a relatively straightforward case that was
properly decided by adhering to established legal principles on possession: the exercise of dominion and control over the contraband
drug and knowledge of the illicit nature of the drug. In correctly deciding the case, however, the court failed to bridge the longstanding
discrepancy in the treatment of constructive possession cases by the
Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals. Although the
Court of Special Appeals has consistently applied the Folk test 126 to
determine whether an individual jointly possesses contraband, the
Court of Appeals failed to acknowledge the test or rule on its validity.
The determination of whether an individual is in joint and constructive possession of contraband often hinges on the facts of a particular case. 1 27 Thus, although the Court of Special Appeals relies on
the Folk test to determine whether a defendant is in joint and constructive possession, its inquiry often extends beyond these four

121. Id. at 463, 697 A.2d at 467.
122. Id., 697 A.2d at 467-68.
123. Id., 697 A.2d at 468.
124. Id. (alteration and ellipsis in original).
125. Id., 697 A.2d at 467-68.
126. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
127. See Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 33, at 766 (asserting that the outcome in
possession cases will continue to "turn on their facts").

1998]

MARYLAND

COURT OF APPEALS

prongs. 28 Many circumstantial factors, such as the nervous behavior
of the defendant, often play a role in assessing whether a possession
conviction should stand. Because no one evidentiary fact or standard
is conclusive, the Court of Appeals is correct not to confine itself to
the Folk test in reviewing joint and constructive possession case. It remains unclear, however, why the Court of Appeals did not seize on an
ideal opportunity to vacate the Folk test when it decided Taylor.
a. Required Elements of Possession.-By recognizing that a rational inference must establish that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the contraband, 129 the Court of Appeals, in
Taylor, aligned itself with its previous decisions on constructive possession. In Garrison,Livingston, and Leach, the court applied this rationale to determine whether defendants, convicted of possession of a
controlled dangerous substance, exercised dominion and control over
the drugs.130 The Taylor court rightly recognized that the facts
amounted to mere "speculation or conjecture" as to whether Taylor
exercised dominion and control over the marijuana. 13 ' The officer
did not observe Taylor smoking the marijuana;132 there was no marijuana found on Taylor or his personal belongings;' and he was not
in exclusive possession of the premises' 34 Accordingly, the court dismissed the control element because a possession conviction requires
more than presence in a room where marijuana was recently
smoked.

1 35

In addition, the court correctly applied the Dawkins reasoning to
find that Taylor did not have knowledge of the concealed marijuana.'3 6 The Taylor court's reasoning is also consistent with Livingston, where the court found that sitting in the back seat of a vehicle
did not show that the passengers had knowledge of the two marijuana
seeds in the front seat.' 37 The Taylor court's conclusion suggests that
the court would have undertaken a different examination of the
128. See Pugh v. State, 103 Md. App. 624, 653, 654 A.2d 888, 902 (1995) (examining
Pugh's nervousness as a controlling factor to affirm his possession conviction); Colin v.
State, 101 Md. App. 395,407, 646 A.2d 1095, 1101 (1994) (focusing on Colin's nervousness
and lying to conclude that he was in constructive possession of the cocaine).
129. Taylor, 346 Md. at 458, 697 A.2d at 465.
130. Id. at 461-63, 697 A.2d at 466-67.
131. Id. at 458, 697 A.2d at 465.
132. Id. at 456, 697 A.2d at 464.
133. Id. at 459, 697 A.2d at 465.
134. Id.
135. Id., 697 A.2d at 466.
136. Id. at 460, 697 A.2d at 466.
137. Livingston v. State, 317 Md. 408, 413-16, 564 A.2d 414, 417-18 (1989).
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knowledge element if the officers failed to discover the concealed marijuana. 13 8 Other grounds would be required to establish the guilt of
at least one person in the room, and the court may have directed its
inquiry more towards whether Taylor had knowledge of the recently
smoked marijuana.

139

b. Differences Between the Court of Special Appeals and the Court
of Appeals.-The Taylor court echoed the Garrison principle when it
required that the evidence "support a rational inference" that the accused exercised dominion and control over the contraband.1 4 ° Judge
O'Donnell first asserted this requirement in Garrisonafter reviewing
previous decisions regarding evidentiary sufficiency to support a constructive possession conviction."' Although Judge O'Donnell examined many of the same decisions reviewed by the Folk court one
year earlier, 1 42 the Garrisoncourt did not elaborate on the legitimacy
of the Folk test. 4 ' By failing to acknowledge the Folk test, the Garrison
court contributed to the lack of clarity that surrounds constructive
drug possession in Maryland today. Following the Garrisondecision,
the Court of Appeals focused on the totality of the circumstances to
review joint and constructive possession convictions in the drug area,
138. See Chan v. State, 78 Md. App. 275, 315, 552 A.2d 1351, 1365 (1989) (asserting that
Folk addressed the problem of establishing the guilt of at least one person out of a group of
possible culprits). In Taylor, however, after the concealed marijuana was discovered and
Myers confessed, the need to select a guilty possessor out of the crowd appears to have
lessened.
139. See Folk v. State, 11 Md. App. 508, 511, 275 A.2d 184, 185 (1971) (upholding a
possession conviction because "some person or persons in that automobile" possessed
contraband).
140. Taylor, 346 Md. at 458, 697 A.2d at 465.
141. Garrison v. State, 272 Md. 123, 128-40, 321 A.2d 767, 770-76 (1974).
142. See supra note 55. See generally Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 204 A.2d 516 (1964)
(sustaining a conviction for possession and control of narcotics even though no narcotics
were found on the defendant's person but were found on the premises); Tucker v. State,
19 Md. App. 39, 308 A.2d 696 (1973) (holding evidence insufficient to establish physical or
constructive possession of heroin when no drugs were found on the defendant and drugs
were secreted); Anderson v. State, 9 Md. App. 639, 267 A.2d 302 (1970) (holding evidence
was legally sufficient to uphold a conviction for possession of heroin when the defendant
was found in an upstairs bedroom but no contraband was discovered on his person or in
that bedroom); Haley v. State, 7 Md. App. 18, 253 A.2d 424 (1969) (holding evidence
insufficient to sustain a possession conviction when none of the defendants had a proprietary interest or prior association with the premises); Wimberly v. State, 7 Md. App. 302, 254
A.2d 711 (1969) (reversing a possession conviction for the defendant, who was one of 12
youths found in a house, because no prohibited drugs were found in his physical
possession).
143. Although the Garrison court did not elaborate on Folk, it did cite the case when
discussing past decisions involving constructive possession of drugs. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
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while invoking the standard announced by the Garrisoncourt.' 4 4 After
Garrison,in contrast, the Court of Special Appeals continued to apply
the Folk test to assess whether a defendant constructively and jointly
possessed contraband drugs.' 4 5 Garrison, therefore, marked the point
at which the Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals diverged in their methods of evaluating constructive possession
convictions.
Because the facts in Taylor resemble those in Folk, Taylor
presented an ideal opportunity for the Court of Appeals to pronounce
its views on the Folk test, thereby bridging the gap in reasoning that
currently exists between the Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals. Although the Taylor court chose not to address the validity of Folk, it did explore many of the factors included in that test. The
court examined whether Taylor was in proximity to the contraband,' 4 6 whether the marijuana was within his plain view,147 whether
he had a possessory right in the premises, 4 ' and whether he participated in the mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband.' 4 9 In doing so, the court examined all of the factors of the Folk test.
Nevertheless, the court failed to recognize explicitly whether trial
courts must apply these factors, or whether they are merely four factors to consider, in deciding whether a defendant has possession of a
controlled dangerous substance.
The Court of Appeals's failure to legitimize the Folk test may indicate the court's unwillingness to confine itself to established criteria.
This goal is certainly legitimate, as many of the decisions in joint and
144. The Garrison court pronounced that to uphold a possession conviction the "evidence must show directly or support a rational inference that the accused did in fact exercise some dominion or control over the prohibited ... drug in the sense contemplated by
the statute, i.e., that [the accused] exercised some restraining or directing influence over
[the contraband.]" Garrison, 272 Md. at 142, 321 A.2d at 777. Since this standard was
articulated in Garrison, the Court of Appeals has applied it to the facts of cases involving
joint and constructive possession. See generally Taylor, 346 Md. at 468, 697 A.2d at 463
(holding that Taylor's presence in a room where marijuana was recently smoked, and his
knowledge that others had smoked marijuana earlier, did not show that he "exercised a
restraining or directly influence" over the drug found in a carrying bag); Livingston v.
State, 317 Md. 408, 415-16, 564 A.2d 414, 418 (1989) (invoking Garrison to hold that the
defendant did not exercise "any restraining or directing influence over" the marijuana
seeds in the front of the car); State v. Leach, 296 Md. 591, 596, 463 A.2d 872, 874 (1983)
(reversing a possession conviction because, although the defendant had ready access to the
apartment, he did not "exhibit a restraining or directing influence over contraband" found
in a closed container in the bedroom dresser and bedroom closet).
145. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
146. Taylor, 346 Md. at 459, 697 A.2d at 465.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id., 697 A.2d at 466.
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constructive possession cases stretch beyond the four factors in Folk.15 0
The determination of whether an individual is in joint and constructive possession involves a multitude of intangible factors that are often
ambiguous.1 5 ' By confining itself to set criteria to evaluate whether a
defendant is in joint and constructive possession, the Court of Special
Appeals is apt to overlook other pivotal factors. 1 52 Furthermore, if
practitioners gear their arguments to pass the Folk test in joint and
constructive possession cases, they too may overlook certain controlling factors. Some commentators have even suggested that the standards articulated by courts to determine whether or not a defendant
constructively possessed contraband often lack objective criteria and
give rise to ad hoc decisionmaking.' 5 3 One judge went so far as to
comment:
Judicial decisions have at best established ill-defined
guidelines as to the evidentiary requirements necessary to
prove constructive possession. Especially in reported cases
growing out of narcotics prosecutions the opinions are usually built upon involved and obscure reasoning which certainly suggests judicial subjectivity. .

.

. Successive cases

enumerate a continuing re-interpretation which can only be
described as judicial whimsy.15 4
While the Folk test provides guidance to assess whether an individual jointly and constructively possesses contraband, it certainly does
not encompass all of the technicalities that may arise in a particular
case. This is perhaps why, in prior decisions involving constructive
possession of drugs, the Court of Appeals focused on the particular
facts of the case while applying the Garrison standard. The court also
examined other relevant factors, some of which are listed in the Folk
test, to determine whether a defendant constructively possessed contraband. In Livingston, the court looked to whether the defendant was
in close proximity to the contraband.' 5 5 The Leach court contemplated the significance of the scales and magnifier that were found in
150. See, e.g., supra note 128 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
152. See Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 33, at 766 (stressing that the risk of adhering
to set rules in deciding possession cases is that the factual inquiry is overlooked).
153. Id. at 752 (arguing that the various tests formulated by the courts to assess whether
a defendant constructively possesses drugs "have failed to provide meaningful response,
clouded judicial decision-making with conclusory labels, and created a morass of confusion
and inconsistency").
154. United States v. Holland, 445 F.2d 701, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Tamm, J.,
concurring).
155. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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plain view. 56 Additionally, the Garrison court grounded its holding
partly on the fact that the drugs were not in the plain view of the
defendant.1 57 Perhaps, in Taylor, the Court of Appeals applied all of
the Folk factors simply because the facts of Taylor were closely analogous to those in Folk. Absent any guidance from the Court of Appeals
on its motives, however, trial courts and practitioners remain uncertain as to the standards that the Maryland appellate courts will use to
15
review a constructive possession conviction. 1
c. Implications of Declining to Adopt or Vacate the Folk Test.Although the Taylor court correctly found that the evidence was insufficient to uphold the defendant's possession conviction, the court
failed to reconcile the case with past divergent decisions of the Court
of Special Appeals. These discrepancies may stem from the inherent
vagueness of the constructive possession doctrine.1 59 Nevertheless,
the variant approaches of the two courts also contribute to illogical
distinctions. By failing to clarify the amount of evidence needed to
sustain a conviction, the Court of Appeals further muddied the constructive possession doctrine in the area of illegal drugs.
As evidenced by the Folk and Taylor cases, the disparate logic used
by the Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals may lead to
contrary conclusions in cases with similar facts. In Folk, the Court of
Special Appeals upheld the defendant's conviction because "[t] he evidence was clear, however, that some person or persons in that automobile were in possession of the contraband marihuana. ' 6 °
Although knowledge was not yet required for a possession offense,16 1
the Folk court found that the defendant was aware of the marijuana
because smoke "filled the interior of a tightly-closed automobile." '6 2
In contrast, the Taylor court believed, even though one of the five occupants in the room had smoked marijuana, that there was insuffi156. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
158. See Brief of Respondent at 7, Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452, 697 A.2d 462 (1997) (No.
101) (urging the Court of Appeals to adopt a "list of pertinent factors for evidentiary rulings concerning constructive possession of drugs... [to] provide a stable foundation from
which judges at the trial and appellate levels" can rule on evidentiary sufficiency).
159. See Whitebread & Stevens, supra note 33, at 751 ("The word 'possession,' though
frequently used in both ordinary speech and at law, remains one of the most elusive and
ambiguous of legal constructs.").
160. Folk v. State, 11 Md. App. 508, 511, 275 A.2d 184, 185 (1971).
161. See Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 547 A.2d 1041 (1988) (holding that the defendant must have knowledge of the prohibited drug in order for a possession conviction to
stand under section 287); see also supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
162. Folk, 11 Md. App. at 518, 275 A.2d at 189.
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cient evidence to suggest that Taylor was that person.1 63 The Taylor
court also side-stepped the issue of Taylor's knowledge that others
smoked marijuana earlier, and instead focused on whether he had
knowledge of the marijuana that was secreted in the carrying bag. 1"
Although the Taylor court may have invoked the criteria articulated in
Folk, it nevertheless differed from that case in how it applied these
criteria.
Furthermore, while Colin and Pugh are distinguishable in that the
officers discovered the contraband in an automobile, the facts in
those cases are analogous to the facts in Taylor. As in Taylor, the drugs
in those cases were concealed, and the defendants argued that they
had no knowledge of the contraband.1 6 5 The Court of Special Appeals upheld the convictions in Colin and Pugh because the defendants acted nervously, and the fact that they were voluntary passengers
showed a participation in the mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband.16 6 The Court of Special Appeals also stressed that the defendants were in close proximity to the contraband. 167 In accord with
its previous reasoning, the Court of Special Appeals invoked these
cases to uphold the possession conviction in Taylor.16
Based on these irreconcilable distinctions, the Taylor decision
may signify that the standards for constructive possession convictions
are becoming more rigid. The Court of Appeals also may have reversed the conviction in Taylor because of where the drugs were found
or how the defendant acted. Nevertheless, by not distinguishing past
cases decided by the Court of Special Appeals, the Taylor court left
practitioners and courts to speculate as to the underlying intentions of
the Court of Appeals.
5. Conclusion.-In Taylor, the Court of Appeals missed an ideal
opportunity to resolve the discrepancy between how the Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals evaluate constructive possession cases in the drug area. By listing the prongs of the Folk test
without acknowledging or vacating the test, the Court of Appeals con163. Taylor, 346 Md. at 460-61, 697 A.2d at 466.
164. Id.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 88-102.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 88-102.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 88-102.
168. See Taylor, No. 1603, slip op. at 5-6 (relying on Pugh v. State, 103 Md. App. 624, 653,
654 A.2d 888, 902 (1995), and Colin v. State, 101 Md. App. 395, 407, 646 A.2d 1095, 1101
(1994), to assert that "under Maryland law, Taylor's presence in a room where marijuana
had recently been smoked leads to the inference that [Taylor] had himself smoked
marijuana").
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tributed to the uncertainty surrounding the constructive possession
doctrine in Maryland. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals's failure to
recognize the Folk test may lead to inconsistent reasoning and outcomes in decisions involving constructive possession convictions. Because no one evidentiary fact or standard is conclusive, the Court of
Appeals should not confine itself to the Folk test to review joint and
constructive possession cases. The Court of Appeals, however, missed
an ideal opportunity to vacate the Folk test when it decided Taylor.
The Taylor decision essentially left the standard for constructive possession in the drug area unchanged. In all likelihood, the Court of
Special Appeals will continue to apply the Folk test, while the Court of
Appeals invokes whatever criteria it deems appropriate to evaluate a
constructive possession conviction. The inconsistencies that result
from this disparity will persist.
DANA

L.

WEINSTEIN
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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Third-Party Liability for Illegal Releases of Pollutantsfrom
Underground Storage Tanks

In JBG/Twinbrook Metro Ltd. Partnership v. Wheeler, the Court of
Appeals restricted the scope of section 4-409(a) of the Environment
Article in a way that limits its application to releases of oil from vessels,
ships, or boats. 2 By interpreting the phrase "oil spillage" differently,
the court could have reached a conclusion that would not have restricted the scope of section 4-409 (a). The court also declined to find
that assumption of risk is a defense to the tort of trespass.' In so finding, the court held that an unintentional, non-negligent act could
form the basis for an action sounding in trespass. 4 The court refused,
however, to adopt assumption of risk as a defense where an individual
purchases property though aware of the possibility of contamination
from the underground migration of gasoline from a leaking storage
tank.5 Nonetheless, the court's holding served the policy goal of attaching third-party liability for damage caused by releases of oil and
other petroleum products.
1. The Case.--On February 8, 1991, after undertaking a preliminary investigation, JBG/Twinbrook Metro Limited Partnership (JBG)
entered into a contract with Equitable Life Assurance Society (Equitable) to purchase a portfolio of investment properties in the Twinbrook Metro area of Montgomery County, including 1901 Chapman
Avenue in Rockville, Maryland.6 The western boundary of the 1901
Chapman Avenue property abuts the eastern boundary of 1901 Rockville Pike. 7 At soie time prior to 1976, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (Chevron) developed the 1901 Rockville Pike property as a gasoline service
station.' In 1976, Chevron leased the property to BobbyJoe Wheeler
and, in 1978, sold the station, including the already-existing gasoline
underground storage tanks (USTs), to him.9

1. 346 Md. 601, 697 A.2d 898 (1997).
2. Id. at 618, 697 A.2d at 907.
3. Id. at 621, 697 A.2d at 909.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 621-22, 697 A.2d at 909.
6. Id. at 606, 697 A.2d at 901.
7. Id. at 605, 697 A.2d at 900. An office building is located on the Chapman Avenue
property, with the building's west wall approximately 100 feet from the boundary with the
Rockville Pike property. Id., 697 A.2d at 901.
8. Id., 697 A.2d at 901.
9. Id. at 605-06, 697 A.2d at 901.
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Chevron supplied Wheeler with gasoline until 1981.10 Between
1982 and 1990, Wheeler operated the station independently of any
single supplier, purchasing gasoline from independent distributors."1
In September 1990, Wheeler entered an agreement with Exxon Co.,
U.S.A. (Exxon) under which he agreed to sell exclusively Exxon products in exchange for Exxon's remodeling the station and installing
12
new USTs and gas pumps.
Two months later, the old USTs were unearthed and removed
under the supervision of the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE). When the tanks were removed, it was discovered that
two of them contained holes. 4 The MDE ordered Wheeler to remove
approximately 1600 tons of contaminated soil from his property and
install monitoring wells to determine the extent of any underground
migration of gasoline. 1" In January 1991, readings from the monitoring wells indicated that gasoline had spread throughout the station
property.1 6 The MDE directed Wheeler to install additional monitoring wells on his property as well as on the adjoining property at 1901
Chapman Avenue, which was then owned by Equitable.' 7
When JBG entered into the contract with Equitable in February
1991, JBG was given sixty days to complete a due diligence analysis of
the 1901 Chapman Avenue property. 18 Hygienetics Inc. (Hygienetics)
was hired by JBG to perform the analysis and submitted an initial report on March 27, 1991, which identified 1901 Chapman Avenue as
having the potential for on-site contamination from off-site sources.' 9
On April 5, Hygienetics reported the discovery of a minimum of 6.5
feet of gasoline in a monitoring well located in the northwest corner
of 1901 Chapman Avenue and surmised that the contamination was
the result of a release of gasoline from a UST at Wheeler's service
station. 2° On April 10, the third and final report prepared by
10. Id. at 606, 697 A.2d at 901.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. See generally MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §§ 1-401 to -407 (1996) (establishing the
Maryland Department of the Environment and defining the duties of the Department
Secretary).
14. Wheeler, 346 Md. at 606, 697 A.2d at 901.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Wheeler also began removing free phase gasoline from the subsurface of the
service station property. Id. Free phase gasoline can float on water, including underground water, and can be carried in the general direction of the water flow. Id. at 605, 697
A.2d at 901.
18. Id. at 606, 697 A.2d at 901.
19. Id. at 607, 697 A.2d at 901.
20. Id. at 607 & n.4, 697 A.2d at 901 & n.4.
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Hygienetics confirmed the existence of two feet of free phase gasoline
at another monitoring well located on the 1901 Chapman Avenue
21
property.
Equitable obtained from the MDE an estimate of $150,000 as the
total cost to clean up both the service station and the Chapman Avenue sites; Equitable offered to indemnify JBG for $150,000 in the
event that Wheeler failed to pay and the MDE went after JBG for the
cost of the cleanup. 22 JBG accepted the indemnity agreement and
took title to the 1901 Chapman Avenue property by a deed dated
April 16, 1991.23 At the time of the closing, JBG believed that the
contamination was confined to the northwest corner of the Chapman
Avenue lot, and that the contamination would be removed.2 4
Although the monitoring wells on the Chapman Avenue property
were relatively free of contamination after JBG took title, the amount
of free phase gasoline increased in the spring of 1992, elevating the
risk that the contamination would spread further onJBG's property.2 5
Subsequently, twelve additional monitoring wells were installed on the
Chapman Avenue property, and by the first quarter of 1993, evidence
existed that the plume of underground gasoline had spread throughout most of the Wheeler service station and approximately one-half of
26
the parking lot on 1901 Chapman Avenue.
In August 1992, JBG filed suit against Wheeler, Exxon, and Chevron, alleging liability under section 4-409(a) of the Environment Article 2 7 and on common law claims of trespass, negligence, and
nuisance. 28 Following ajury trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, Judge Paul A. McGuckian submitted the case to the jury on
special interrogatories that allowed the jury to consider each of the

21. Id. at 607 & n.5, 697 A.2d at 901 & n.5.
22. Id. at 608, 697 A.2d at 902.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 608-09, 697 A.2d at 902. Due to the odor of gasoline on the parking lot, JBG
was forced to install a vapor alarm in the basement of the office building and impose a no
smoking rule on the parking lots. Id. at 609, 697 A.2d at 902.
27. Section 4-409(a) provides: "(a) Liability Generally.-The person responsible for the
oil spillage shall be liable to any other person for any damage to his real or personal property directly caused by the spillage." MD. CODE ANN., ENvR. § 4-409(a) (1996).
28. Wheeler, 346 Md. at 609, 697 A.2d at 902-03. JBG also alleged liability based on
common law strict liability. Id., 697 A.2d at 903. Judge McGuckian of the Montgomery
County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the strict
liability claim. Id. There are three other gasoline service stations in close proximity to the
Chapman Avenue property. Id. at 609 n.6, 697 A.2d at 903 n.6. On appeal JBG did not
contest the strict liability claim. Id. at 609, 697 A.2d at 903.
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four counts separately.2 9 OverJBG's objection, the court also submitted to the jury the question of whether the plaintiff had assumed the
risk of loss as to all the theories of liability other than nuisance.3 0 The
jury found that all of the defendants had violated section 4-409 (a) and
had trespassed on JBG's property, but that no defendant had been
negligent or committed a nuisance.3 1 Most importantly, the jury
found that JBG had "voluntarily assumed the risk of contamination
with full knowledge and understanding at the time it purchased the
1901 Chapman [Avenue] property."3 2 The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the defendants, in effect recognizing assumption of
risk as an affirmative defense to the section 4-409(a) and trespass
claims.3 3 JBG appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.3 4
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari, sua sponte, prior to consideration of the case by the Court of Special Appeals. 5 On appeal,
JBG contended that the circuit court erred in submitting the assumption of risk defense to the jury on the statutory and trespass claims,
while Wheeler, Exxon, and Chevron maintained that the submission
of the defense to the jury was proper. 6 Additionally, Exxon and
Chevron argued that the evidence against them was legally insufficient
to support JBG's claims.3 7
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Assumption of Risk Is a Defense to Negligence.--Assumption
of risk is a defense to a negligence action in Maryland. 38 "'The defense ...rests upon the plaintiff's consent to relieve the defendant of
an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chances of harm
from a particular risk ....

[A] ssumption of risk requires knowledge

29. Id. at 609, 697 A.2d at 903.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 610, 697 A.2d at 903 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Gibson v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418, 226 A.2d 273 (1967). In Gibson, plaintiff suffered a
heart attack when dragging a fuel oil hose through the snow at the request of the defendant oil delivery truck driver. Id. at 419-20, 226 A.2d at 275. The plaintiff alleged that the
oil company and driver were negligent in not "providing sufficient employees" to accomplish the delivery. Id. at 421, 226 A.2d at 275. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff
had assumed the risk of injury by agreeing to assist in the delivery, thereby exposing himself to what should have been an obvious risk. Id.; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 480-98 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the assumption of risk defense).
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and appreciation of the risk, and a voluntary choice to encounter
it."'3 9 An objective standard is employed to determine ifan individual
40
understands the risk involved in an activity.
Generally, assumption of risk is not a defense to intentional
torts. 4 ' In Janelsins v. Button,42 the Court of Special Appeals determined that assumption of risk is not a defense to civil battery. In so
deciding, the court stated:
"Historically, the doctrine of assumption of risk has provided a defense only to actions for negligence. It has little or no
application in the case of intentionalor reckless conduct. The reason is this: While a potential plaintiff who engages in dangerous activity is 'held to have consented to the injurycausing events which are known, apparent or reasonably
foreseeable consequences of the participation . . . partici-

pants do not consent
to acts [by others] which are reckless or
44
intentional. '

After collecting a lengthy list of authorities on the subject, the
Court of Special Appeals stated that the "cases plainly establish that
the doctrine of assumption of risk does not bar recovery for intentional torts.

45

b. Intentional Conduct Is Requiredfor Trespass, but the Trespass
Itself May Be Unintended.--In Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Flippo,4 6 the
Court of Special Appeals considered whether trespass requires some
intentional act. The plaintiff in Flippo, a ten-year-old boy, was severely
39. Gibson, 245 Md. at 421, 226 A.2d at 275 (quoting PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
TORTS § 55, at 303 (2d ed. 1955)).
40. Id.
41. Janelsins v. Button, 102 Md. App. 30, 42, 648 A.2d 1039, 1045 (1994) (stating that
"assumption of risk does not bar recovery for intentional torts"); see also Donahue v. S.J.
Fish & Sons, Inc., No. 539920, 1995 WL 562216 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 1995) (mem.)
(striking assumption of risk from defendant's special defenses to cause of action not
sounding in negligence); Victor v. Sell, 222 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn. 1974) ("Negligence
on the part of the plaintiff is not a defense to an intentional tort. Nor, unless it amounts to
consent, is assumption of risk.").
42. 102 Md. App. 30, 648 A.2d 1039 (1994).
43. Id. at 39, 648 A.2d at 1044. In Janelsins, the defendant became intoxicated while
drinking at the bar where the plaintiff worked. Id. at 34, 648 A.2d at 1041. The plaintiff
voluntarily attempted to assist other bar patrons in placing the defendant in his car to be
driven home. Id. During the attempt, the defendant resisted and kicked the plaintiff in
the mouth, causing him to lose a tooth. Id. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had
assumed the risk of injury by trying to force him into his car. Id. at 35, 648 A.2d at 1042.
44. Id. at 42-43, 648 A.2d at 1045 (ellipses and alteration in original) (quoting Ordway
v. Superior Court, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536, 542 (Ct. App. 1988)).
45. Id. at 42, 648 A.2d at 1045.
46. 112 Md. App. 75, 684 A.2d 456 (1996), affd, 348 Md. 680, 705 A.2d 1144 (1998).
OF
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injured when he grabbed high voltage power lines belonging to Baltimore Gas & Electric (BGE) to steady himself as he began to slip from
a tree he had climbed.4 7 BGE asserted that the plaintiff was a trespasser to whom it owed no duty of care other than to refrain from
wantonly and willfully injuring him.4" In discussing the duty owed to
the plaintiff, the court determined that
one can commit a trespass by entering, intruding, or encroaching on personal property, and no tortious intent, i.e.,
intent to trespass, is required in order for one to be a trespasser. What is required, however, is volition, i.e., a conscious intent to do the act that constitutes the entry onto
someone else's real or personal property. An involuntary entry onto another's property is not a trespass.4 9
The court determined that the plaintiffs grabbing of the electrical
wire was not an intentional act and could not be classified as a
trespass.
Other courts have found that "liability for trespass will not be imposed for an unintentional trespass unless it arises out of defendant's
negligence or the carrying on of an extrahazardous activity." 5 1 In
Hudson v. Peavey Oil Co.,5 2 a case with facts similar to Wheeler, the de-

fendants owned a service station and a UST containing gasoline.5 3
Due to the strong odor of gasoline coming from their own property,
47. Id. at 81, 684 A.2d at 459.
48. Id. BGE argued that the plaintiff was a trespasser not on its real property but on its
personal property, the high voltage wire. Id. at 83, 684 A.2d at 460. The plaintiff was not
trespassing on real property because the tree he had climbed was on the property of a
friend with whom he was playing. Id. at 82, 684 A.2d at 459. Moreover, BGE owned only
an easement to maintain its wires near the tree and had no possessory interest on which to
base a claim for trespass to real property. Id. at 83, 684 A.2d at 459.
49. Id. at 85, 684 A.2d at 461. The court also analyzed case law supporting the proposition that an intentional act is required for a trespass. See id. at 85-86, 684 A.2d at 461
(citing, among other cases, Gallin v. Poulou, 295 P.2d 958, 960-62 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1956) (finding no liability for trespass unless the trespass is intentional); Edgarton v. H.P.
Welch Co., 74 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Mass. 1947) (stating that unintended intrusion upon land
does not constitute trespass); Baker v. Newcomb, 621 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)
(assigning liability for trespass only if intent exists to commit the act); Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co. v. Bailey, 109 N.Y.S.2d 799, 801 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (finding that trespass requires an intentional act); Hudson v. Peavey Oil Co., 566 P.2d 175, 177 (Or. 1977) (refusing to assign
liability for an unintentional trespass unless it arises out of defendant's negligence or an
ultrahazardous activity); General Tel. Co. v. Bi-Co Pavers, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1974, no writ) (stating that trespass requires an intentional act)).
50. Id. at 86-87, 684 A.2d at 461.
51. Hudson, 566 P.2d at 177; see also Edgarton, 74 N.E.2d at 679-80 (stating the rule that,
except where the actor is engaged in an extra-hazardous activity, an unintentional and
non-negligent entry on the land of another is not a trespass).
52. 566 P.2d 175 (Or. 1977).
53. Id. at 176.
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the defendant's neighbors inquired repeatedly concerning the reliability of the tanks. 54 Because the defendants assured their neighbors
that the tanks were not leaking any gasoline, the plaintiffs dug a hole
on their own property to see if they could ascertain the source of the
odor. 55 The plaintiffs discovered free phase gasoline flowing underground from the neighboring service station into the subsurface of
their own property. 56 The Oregon Supreme Court ruled that the defendants neither intentionally trespassed on the plaintiffs property
nor acted negligently. 57 Furthermore, because the court did not consider the storage of gasoline in that particular location to be an ultrahazardous activity, the plaintiffs could not recover in an action for
trespass. 8
As the Oregon Supreme Court stated in Hudson, most courts require the existence of an intentional or negligent act or an ultrahazardous activity to support trespass liability. In Yommer v.
McKenzie, 59 the Maryland Court of Appeals stated that the most crucial
factor in determining whether an activity is ultrahazardous is the "appropriateness of the activity in the particular place where it is being
carried on."6 The activity at issue in Yommer was also the underground storage of gasoline.6 1 The court found the gasoline storage in
that case to be ultrahazardous because of the proximity to the well
from which the plaintiffs were drawing their drinking and bathing
water.6 2
More recently, the Court of Appeals declined to extend the holding in Yommer.6 3 Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A. 64 likewise involved the
storage of gasoline.6 5 In 1986, the plaintiff had leased property from
Earl Wenger. 66 Wenger's previous tenant, Exxon, had installed gasoline storage tanks in 1951 and removed the tanks in 1985 when its
lease was terminated. 67 It was subsequently discovered that the property's subsurface was contaminated with various petroleum products
54. Id.
55. Id.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 178.
255 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969).
Id. at 225, 257 A.2d at 140.
Id. at 221, 257 A.2d at 138.
Id. at 225, 257 A.2d at 140.
See Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 335 Md. 58, 73, 642 A.2d 180, 187 (1994).
335 Md. 58, 642 A.2d 180 (1994).
Id. at 63, 642 A.2d at 182.
Id.
Id.
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that leaked from Exxon's tanks.6" The court stated that, historically,
strict liability for ultrahazardous activities was limited to concurrent
owners of neighboring land.6 9 The court refused to expand the doctrine to include subsequent owners of the same land.7 ° However, in
Blaen Avon Coal Co. v. McCulloh,7 1 the Court of Appeals mentioned in

dicta that "[i] t is well settled that a trespasser, though misled by a bona
fide mistake as to his title, or who has taken every precaution to keep
within his own lines, cannot escape liability for the injury done, being
bound in law to know the limits of his possessions."72 Blaen Avon
Coal Company had mined the land of the plaintiff under the mistaken
belief that it owned the land.7 3 This mistaken belief was based on a
plat of the company's land that indicated incorrectly that the land it
was mining was its own." The court held that although the defendants unintentionally entered the plaintiff's land, the defendants were
still liable for trespass.7 5 In dicta, the court noted that even if a defendant had "taken every precaution to keep within his own lines," the
defendant could be held liable for trespass.7 6
c. Interpretationof the Scope of the Statute.-- Section 4-409 (a) of
the Environment Article, referred to by the Court of Appeals as the
"Private Remedy Section," 77 provides that "[t]he person responsible
for the oil spillage shall be liable to any other person for any damage
'
to his real or personal property directly caused by the spillage. "78
Section 4-410(a) of the Environment Article, referred to by the
Court of Appeals as the "Prohibition, 7 9 prohibits the release of oil
into Maryland's waters.8 0 The Prohibition provides:
Except in case of emergency imperiling life or property, unavoidable accident, collision, or stranding, or as authorized by
a permit issued under § 9-323 of this article, it is unlawful for
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
and its

Id. at 64, 642 A.2d at 182-83.
Id. at 72, 642 A.2d at 186.
Id. at 73, 642 A.2d at 187.
59 Md. 403 (1883).
Id. at 417.
Id. at 414.
Id.
Id. at 417-18.
Id. at 417.
Wheeler, 346 Md. at 611, 697 A.2d at 904 ("In our review we shall refer to § 4-409(a)
antecedents as the 'Private Remedy Section' . ....

78. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 4-409(a) (1996).

79. Wheeler, 346 Md. at 611, 697 A.2d at 904 ("In our review we shall refer to . . .
§ 4-410(a) and its antecedents as the 'Prohibition."').
80. Mo. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 4-410(a) (1996).
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any person to discharge or permit the discharge of oil in any
manner into or on waters of this State. 8 1
The Prohibition was first enacted in 1949.82 As originally enacted, the language in the Prohibition was substantially similar to the
language presently used, except that the Prohibition was expressly
limited to releases from vessels, boats, or ships.8 3
Chapter 243 of the Acts of 1970 recodified the Prohibition without change as Article 96A, section 29(a).4 Chapter 243 also enacted
two new sections, sections 29A and 29B. Section 29A delegated to the
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and the Maryland Port Authority (MPA) the responsibility for developing a program to enable
the State to respond to emergency oil spills in "other waters of the
State.

'85

For the purposes of Article 96A, "waters of the State" was

defined to include "both surface and underground waters within the
boundaries of the State."8 6 Section 29B directed those agencies to
"charge and collect a compensatory fee from the person responsible
87
for the oil spillage" in order to cover cleanup costs.

The predecessor to the Private Remedy Section was enacted in
Chapter 504 of the Acts of 1971.88 Chapter 504 added section 29BC,
which used identical language to the present Private Remedy Section.
According to Section 29BC, "The person responsible for the oil spillage shall be liable to any other person for any damages to his real or
personal property directly caused by the spillage. ' 89 Chapter 504 also
added section 29AB, which required vessels entering the waters of the
state carrying or receiving any bulk cargo of oil to post a bond that
would be forfeited in the event that an oil spill or discharge
occurred.9 0

81. Id.
82. 1949 Md. Laws 239 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 40(a) (1951)).
83. The original statute provided:
Except in case of emergency imperiling life or property, or unavoidable accident,
collision, or stranding, it shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or permit
the discharge of oil in any manner into or upon the waters within the jurisdiction
of the State of Maryland from any vessel, ship or boat of any kind.
Id. (emphasis added).
84. MD. ANN. CODE art. 96A, § 29(a) (Supp. 1971).
85. Id. § 29A.
86. Id. § 2(e).
87. Id. § 29B.
88. 1971 Md. Laws 504 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 96A, § 29BC (Supp. 1971)).
89. MD. ANN. CODE art. 96A, § 29BC. Compare id. with MD. CODE ANN., ENWiR.
§ 4-409(a) (1996) (using identical language).
90. MD. ANN. CODE art. 96A, § 29AB (Supp. 1971).
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The limitation in the Prohibition to releases from vessels, ships,
or boats was removed in 1984.91 However, the language in the Private
Remedy Section remained the same.9 2 Both the Private Remedy Section and the Prohibition were transferred to the new Environment
93
Article in 1987 as sections 4-409 and 4-410, respectively.
Section 4-409(b) was not added until 1990." 4 Section 4-409(b)
added a definition of "underground storage tank" to the subtitle and
required the "owner" of a UST to furnish evidence of financial responsibility for cleanup, corrective action, and "third party liability" to
insure against a release from a UST.9 5 The MDE was to adopt regulations for the owners of USTs to exhibit such financial responsibility.9 6
In adopting these regulations, the MDE incorporated by reference the
Corrective Action Requirements for Owners and Operators of Underground Storage Tanks contained in the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) .
The requirements in the CFR included certain compliance dates
for owners of USTs.9 8 All petroleum marketing firms either owning
1000 or more USTs or reporting a tangible net worth of $20 million
or more were required to demonstrate financial responsibility byJanuary 24, 1989.9 9 Firms owning between 100 and 999 USTs had to
demonstrate financial responsibility by October 26, 1989, while those
owning between thirteen and ninety-nine had to comply by April 26,
1991.00 All other owners of USTs were given a compliance deadline
of December 31, 1993.10
3.

The Court's Reasoning.-

a. Assumption of Risk Is Not a Defense to Trespass.-The Court
of Appeals found that assumption of risk is not a defense to trespass.'1 2 In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals referred to
the Court of Special Appeals's decision in Janelsins v. Button, which

91. See 1984 Md. Laws 182.
92. Wheeler, 346 Md. at 615, 697 A.2d at 905.
93. See 1987 Md. Laws 306.
94. See 1990 Md. Laws 67.
95. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 4-409(b) (1996).
96. Id. § 4-409(b) (2).
97. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 26, § 10.11.01A (1996)
280.116 (1993)).
98. 40 C.F.R. § 280.91.
99. Id. § 280.91 (a).
100. Id. § 280.91(b) & (c).
101. Id. § 280.91(d).
102. Wheeler, 346 Md. at 621-22, 697 A.2d at 909.

(incorporating 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.90-
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collected numerous authorities for the proposition that assumption of
risk is not a defense to an intentional tort.'
The court concluded
summarily, by quoting Janelsins, "'[t]hese cases plainly establish that
the doctrine of assumption of risk does not bar recovery for intentional torts.""0 4
Although the court found that assumption of risk is not a defense
to an intentional tort such as trespass, the court still needed to answer
the defendants' claim that the trespass in this case was not intentional,
but was instead "nonpurposeful."' 5 The court dismissed this argument by stating that the jury had found that none of the defendants
were negligent. 10 6 The court stated that "It] he special verdict on trespass can be reconciled with the special verdict on negligence by interpreting the former as a finding that the entry of the gasoline onto the
plaintiff's land was unintentional and non-negligent."10 7 The court
cited Blaen Avon Coal Co. v. McCulloh for the proposition that a tres108
pass can be both unintended and non-negligent.
b. Section 4-409(a) Limited to Releasesfrom Boats, Ships, and Vessels.-In Wheeler, the Court of Appeals ruled that section 4-409(a) of
the Environment Article could not be used to impose financial liability on the owner of a UST that had leaked gasoline into the subsurface.10 9 Because Wheeler did not meet the regulatory requirements
in the CFR," ° Wheeler was not required to demonstrate financial responsibility until December 31, 1993."' Because the gasoline leakage
andJBG's action to recover for the damages caused by the contamination both occurred prior to December 31, 1993, section 4-409(b) did
not apply to Wheeler." 2 Therefore, the court surmised that JBG's
cause of action rested on section 4-409(a) and not 4-409(b)." 3

103. Id. at 621, 697 A.2d at 908.
104. Id. (alteration in original) (quotingJanelsins v. Button, 102 Md. App. 30, 42, 648
A.2d 1039, 1045 (1994)).
105. Id.; seeJoint Brief of Appellees on Common Issues at 29-30,JBG/Twinbrook Metro
Ltd. Partnership v. Wheeler, 346 Md. 601, 697 A.2d 898 (1997) (No. 80) (arguing that if a
trespass occurred in this case, it was not intentional).
106. Wheeler, 346 Md. at 621, 697 A.2d at 908.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 621, 697 A.2d at 909.
109. Id. at 618, 697 A.2d at 907.
110. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
111. See 40 C.F.R. § 280.91(d) (1993) (requiring all owners of USTs not fitting into one
of three classifications to demonstrate financial responsibility by December 31, 1993); see
also supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
112. Wheeler, 346 Md. at 618, 697 A.2d at 907.
113. Id.
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Because the court found that JBG could have relied only upon
section 4-409 (a), the court conducted a lengthy historical analysis of
that section." 4 The court held that section 4-409(a) is applicable only
to releases from vessels, ships, or boats and does not include USTs. t t5
The court reasoned that "the spillage" referred to in the original enactment of the Private Remedy Section was limited to the spillage
from a vessel, boat, or ship. i" 6 The court reached this conclusion by
noting that such a limited class of spills was the object of the Prohibition when the Private Remedy Section was first enacted as section
29(a) of Article 96A.' 1 7
The court further reasoned that even though the Prohibition's
limitation to vessels, boats, or ships was abrogated in 1984, the expansion in the Prohibition (section 4-410) could not expand the coverage
of the Private Remedy Section. 118 The court stated that in order to
expand the coverage of the Private Remedy Section, the legislature
would have had to have used express language when it revised the
Prohibition.1 19 The Private Remedy Section continued to refer to
"the spillage," which the court explained was limited originally to re12
leases from vessels, ships and boats. 1
The court concluded, therefore, that because section 4-409(b)
was not available to the plaintiff and section 4-409(a) was limited to
releases from vessels, ships, or boats, JBG's statutory cause of action
could not stand.'2 1 Because the statutory action could not stand, the
court did not reach the question of assumption of risk as a defense to
section 4-409.122

114. Id. at 611-18, 697 A.2d at 904-07.
115. Id. at 618, 697 A.2d at 907.
116. Id. at 613, 697 A.2d at 905.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 615, 697 A.2d at 905. The court stated that the expansion in the Prohibition
had the effect of enlarging those acts subject to criminal and administrative sanctions, but
it did not affect the Private Remedy Section. Id.; see MD. CODE ANN., ENiR. § 4-410 (1996)
(stating that except in case of emergency or by permit, "it is unlawful for any person to
discharge . . . oil . . . into or on waters of [Maryland]" (emphasis added)).

119. Wheeler, 346 Md. at 615, 697 A.2d at 905.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 618, 697 A.2d at 907. The court's analysis and holding on this point will not
affect third-party liability in future cases. All of the compliance deadlines have passed, and
section 4-409(b) can be used to impose third-party liability on all UST owners. See MD.
REGS. CODE tit. 26, § 10.11.01A (1996) (incorporating 40 C.F.R. § 280.91 (1996) (setting
compliance deadlines)).
122. Wheeler, 346 Md. at 618, 697 A.2d at 907.
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c. Sufficiency of the Evidence.--The court dismissed Chevron's
1 23
argument that the evidence was insufficient to establish its liability.
The court summarized Chevron's argument, stating that it was based
upon three legally and factually erroneous contentions: 'JBG's
purchase price reflected the market value of the property on the date
of acquisition, that JBG seeks as damages only the post-acquisition
diminution in value, and that there is no evidence that Chevron gasoline crossed the boundary onto 1901 Chapman Avenue afterJBG took
possession."'1 24 The court dealt with each of these arguments in turn,
finding that JBG was not contending that there was no diminution in
value at the time it purchased the property but instead simply that it
did not appreciate the extent of the contamination and diminution.1 2 Second, the court stated that JBG was seeking not just the
post-acquisition diminution in value, but also the $114,000 cost of investigating the underground contamination.126 Third, the court
stated that Chevron's argument failed to recognize the continuing nature of the trespass. 127 Even if the gasoline had entered the property
before April 16, 1991, its "continued presence could be a trespass
1 28
under the theory of trespass on which [the] case was tried.
Conversely, the court found that Exxon had not exhibited sufficient control over the tanks or the gasoline to support liability on the
part of Exxon.12 9 Essentially, JBG argued that the agreements between Exxon and Wheeler were ambiguous with respect to whether
the USTs were owned by Exxon and leased to Wheeler or were owned
solely by Wheeler.'
The court ruled that the interpretation of contracts is a matter of law for the court and found that the tanks were
13
owned by Wheeler from the time they were installed. '
4.

Analysis.-

a. The Trespass Claim.-The Court of Appeals held that assumption of risk is not a defense to trespass. 32 The court primarily
relied on Janelsins v. Button for this holding.1 33 However, the cases
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 626-28, 697 A.2d at 911-12.
Id. at 627, 697 A.2d at 911.
Id., 697 A.2d at 912.
Id. at 627-28, 697 A.2d at 912.
Id. at 628, 697 A.2d at 912.
Id.
Id. at 626, 697 A.2d at 911.
Id. at 625, 697 A.2d at 910-11.
Id. at 625-26, 697 A.2d at 911.
Id. at 621-22, 697 A.2d at 909.
See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
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cited by the court to support its reasoning uniformly involved some
sort of intentional conduct, an element that was missing in the present case. 13 4 The court should have addressed this apparent inconsistency. The court stated that although the trespass in this case was
both unintentional and non-negligent, liability for trespass could1 still
5
attach based on the court's previous holding in Blaen Avon Coal. 1
The court classified the trespass in Wheeler as unintentional and
non-negligent. 1 36 This classification was based on the jury's special
verdict that the defendants were not negligent. 1 37 Although the question of intent was not specifically submitted to the jury, the court
stated that the trespass in this case was not intentional. 1 38 Therefore,
the combination of the court's conclusion and the jury's answer to the
interrogatory made this trespass unintentional and non-negligent.
13 9
However, the court had already ruled out strict liability.
The court cited Blaen Avon Coal for the proposition that a trespass
can be both unintentional and non-negligent. 140 However, the
court's reliance on that case was misplaced. The defendant in Blaen
Avon Coal mistakenly mined coal from the land of another. 4 '
Although the coal company did not intend to commit a trespass in
mining the land of another, it did act intentionally in committing the
actual mining. In other words, it intended its machines and workers
to dig coal and load it into containers. Therefore, the trespass in
Blaen Avon Coal included the "intentional" act as required by the case
law. Wheeler, conversely, did not involve this level of "intention."
The court's reasoning is scant concerning how to justify and explain the special verdict finding Wheeler liable for an unintentional,
non-negligent trespass. In order for Blaen Avon Coal to be applicable
to the facts of the present case, the Wheeler defendants would have had
to have engaged in some type of intentional behavior. The court
failed to address this point. Although Wheeler presumably did not
intend for his gasoline to encroach on his neighbor's property, the
134. Wheeler, 346 Md. at 619-22, 697 A.2d 907-09.
135. Id. at 621, 697 A.2d at 909.
136. Id., 697 A.2d at 908.
137. Id. at 609, 697 A.2d at 903.
138. Id. at 621, 697 A.2d at 908. Although the question of intent was not submitted to
the jury, the jury instructions did state that "[a] trespass occurs when a person ... permits a
substance under that person's control to enter the land of another without authority, privilege or permission." Id. at 618, 697 A.2d at 907. The use of "permits" seems to indicate a
higher level of culpability. However, the court did not explain its reasons for finding that
this trespass was unintentional, and no party objected to the jury instructions. Id.
139. Id. at 609, 697 A.2d at 903.
140. Id. at 621, 697 A.2d at 909.
141. Blaen Avon Coal Co. v. McCulloh, 59 Md. 403, 416 (1883).
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court may have found that another of the station owner's acts was intentional with respect to the trespass. For instance, the court could
have found that placing the gasoline in the UST was sufficiently intentional to support trespass liability. In order to remain consistent with
the existing case law in Maryland, the court should have addressed the
lack of intentional conduct in the present case or tried to find some
act on the part of the defendants that could be considered intentional
with respect to the trespass. It is possible that the court was faced with
a situation in which it knew that Wheeler or Chevron or both should
compensate JBG for the harm caused when the USTs leaked, but was
faced with inconsistent jury verdicts that made it very difficult to
achieve this goal.
Because the court determined that the trespass in this case was
unintentional, the only other possibilities to support trespass liability,
according to the cases cited, would have been negligence and ultrahazardous activity. 14 2 Because the jury found that no defendant
was negligent, 14 3 the only alternative to support trespass liability was
ultrahazardous activity. It is unclear, however, whether the court
would have found the storing of gasoline an ultrahazardous activity
even if it had considered the factors for such a determination.
In Yommer v. McKenzie, 14 4 the Court of Appeals held that the underground storage of gasoline in that case constituted an abnormally
dangerous activity as described in Rylands v. Fletcher.'4 5 The applicability of that holding to the present case is not clear. The court in Yommer stated that perhaps the "most crucial factor [in determining
whether an activity is abnormally dangerous] . . . is the appropriateness of the activity in the particular place where it is being carried
on."' 4 6 In Yommer, the gasoline was being stored in close proximity to
"a well from which a family must draw its water for drinking, bathing
and laundry .... "147 Although the Wheeler court did not discuss the
properties surrounding the USTs in detail, it is unclear if the court
would consider USTs containing gasoline to be an appropriate activity
in this particular location.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals recently declined to extend the
doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher or the holding in Yommer. 148 In Rosen-

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
Wheeler, 346 Md. at 609, 697 A.2d at 903.
255 Md. 220, 224, 257 A.2d 138, 140 (1969).
[1861-73] All E.R. 1 (H.L. 1868).
Yommer, 255 Md. at 225, 257 A.2d at 140.
Id.
See Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 335 Md. 58, 73, 642 A.2d 180, 187 (1993).
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blatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., the court reaffirmed that the most important
consideration when determining whether an activity is abnormally
dangerous is the appropriateness of the activity in the place where it is
being conducted,' 4 9 but refused to find strict liability based on a theory of abnormally dangerous activity. 5 0 The plaintiff in Rosenblatt was
not an owner of adjacent land, but rather was a subsequent owner of
the same land where gasoline had been stored.'5 1 Although the court
refused to base recovery on the theory of strict liability, the dispositive
factor seemed to be that the plaintiff was a subsequent owner of the
same land. The court stated that "[s] ubsequent users ... are able to
avoid the harm completely by inspecting the property prior to
purchasing or leasing it."' 52 In light of these cases, it is difficult to
determine whether the court would have deemed the storage of gasoline in the present case an abnormally dangerous activity given the
surrounding locale. 5 3
In order to be consistent with the case law concerning trespass,
the trespass needed to be based on an intentional or negligent act or
an extrahazardous activity.'
The way in which the special interrogatories were submitted to the jury allowed the finding of trespass without any theory to support such a finding. Perhaps the trial court
could have submitted special interrogatories to the jury that would not
have allowed an unintentional, non-negligent trespass. The court
could have asked the jury if a trespass had occurred. If the jury answered that a trespass had occurred, the court could have asked
whether it was based upon negligent or intentional conduct, thus
avoiding the necessity of reconciling nearly irreconcilable interrogatoies. Instead, the court was faced with a situation in which it knew that
someone other than JBG should pay for the clean up of the contamination but had no theory upon which to base such a holding. The
answers to interrogatories, combined with the lower court's decision,
ruled out negligence, strict liability, and intentional trespass.
b. Section 4-409(a) Could Have Been Interpreted More Broadly.In Wheeler, the Court of Appeals held that section 4-409(a) of the Environment Article applied only to releases of pollutants from boats,

149. Id. at 70, 642 A.2d at 186.
150. Id. at 73, 642 A.2d at 187.
151. Id. at 65, 642 A.2d at 183.
152. Id. at 74, 642 A.2d at 188.
153. Moreover, summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants on a strict
liability claim in this case. Wheeler, 346 Md. at 609, 697 A.2d at 903. Summaryjudgment on
the strict liability claim was not contested by the plaintiffs. Id.
154. See supra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
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ships, and vessels. 15 5 In conducting its historical analysis of the applicability of section 4-409 (a), the court could have determined that section 4-409(a) was not limited to releases from boats, ships, and vessels,
but rather that it was broad enough to include releases from USTs.
Because the court found that section 4-409 (a) was limited to releases
from boats, ships, and vessels, the court turned its analysis to section
4-409(b), dealing with releases from USTs. 156 The court found that
section 4-409(b) did not apply to Wheeler because the compliance
deadlines for the federal regulations requiring financial responsibility
had not passed at the time of the spill or trial. 5 7 The court failed to
address whether Chevron should be considered an "owner" of the
USTs for the purposes of third-party liability.
The court's holding in Wheeler concerning the statutory cause of
action is nearly limited to the facts presented in that case. 1 58 Because
the court held that the private remedies of section 4-409(a) are limited to releases from vessels, ships, or boats, and this was not a release
from a vessel, ship, or boat, section 4-409(a) did not apply to
Wheeler.15 9 Furthermore, because the court found that Wheeler was
not subject to the provisions of section 4-409(b) until after December
16 1
31, 1993, 16 °JBG could not recover for damages under that section.
Therefore, under the court's interpretation of section 4-409, had this
spill occurred after December 31, 1993, or had the responsible party
fallen into one of the other CFR classifications requiring an earlier
demonstration of financial responsibility, the court would have applied section 4-409(b) against the responsible party.
The definition of "the spillage" in section 4-409(a) of the Environment Article was crucial to the determination of this case. The
court limited the definition of "the spillage" to releases from vessels,
ships, or boats based on a historical analysis concerning the meaning
155. Wheeler, 346 Md. at 618, 697 A.2d at 907.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. As mentioned, the discussion of the applicability of section 4-409(a) is moot. See
supra note 121. At the time of trial, only some of the compliance deadlines in the CFR had
passed and the court was faced with deciding only if section 4-409(a) could be used to
impose responsibility for USTs leaks. See 40 C.F.R. § 280.91 (1993). Now, however, all of
the CFR deadlines for demonstrating financial responsibility have expired, and section
4-409(b) can be used to recover damages from owners of USTs that leak. Id. However, the
court left unanswered the question whether assumption of risk is a defense to a section
4-409 cause of action. Wheeler, 346 Md. at 621-22, 697 A.2d at 909.
159. Wheeler, 346 Md. at 615, 697 A.2d at 905.
160. See 40 C.F.R. § 280.91(d) (requiring owners of fewer than 13 USTs to demonstrate
financial responsibility for a release from a UST by December 31, 1993).
161. Wheeler, 346 Md. at 618, 697 A.2d at 907.
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of that phrase.16 2 In making its determination, the court neglected to
consider the legislature's intent in enacting the Maryland Oil Pollu63
tion Control Laws. The legislature had provided for administrative,1
criminal,'
and third-party ramifications' 6 5 for the discharge of oil
into state waters. Given this broad protection for the State as well as
for victims of such spills, it seems clear that the legislature intended to
discourage discharge of oil into state waters without regard to the
party responsible or the original container of the oil. This is even
more plausible because no matter what definition of oil spillage is
adopted, the spillage can occur in any of the "waters of the State." ' 66
"Waters of the State" is defined to include underground as well as
surface waters. 167 It is unlikely that "waters of the State" would be defined to include underground water if liability were intended to be
limited to releases from ships or boats.
Even if the court was unwilling to recognize the legislature's intention to prevent releases of oil no matter where or how they happen,168 a different interpretation of section 4-409(a) that would not
limit its coverage to releases from boats can be made using its predecessor statutes. When originally enacted as section 29BC of then Article 96A in 1971, the language of the Private Remedy Section was
precisely the same as it is now.169 The Private Remedy Section was
preceded by section 29 entitled "Vessels Discharging Oil.' 70 Subsection (a) of that section prohibited the dischargeof oil into the waters of
the state from any vessel, ship or boat.' 7' Immediately after subsection (a) appeared subsection (a-i), which created a duty for "any person either actively or passively participating in the discharge or spilling
of oil into the waters of the state either from a land-based installation...
162. Id. at 611, 697 A.2d at 904.
163. MD. CODE ANN., ENWIR. § 4-408 (1996) (requiring the Department of the Environment to charge and collect a compensatory fee from the person responsible for any oil
spillage).
164. Id. § 4-410(a) (making it unlawful for any person to discharge oil into the waters of
the state except in emergency situations or by permit).
165. Id. § 4-409(a), (b) (requiring owners of USTs to exhibit financial responsibility for
the costs of clean up, corrective action, and third-party liability in the event of a discharge
of oil).
166. Id. § 4-410(a).
167. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 26, § 10.02.04(68) (1996) (defining " ' Waters of the State' [to]
include: (a) Both surface and underground waters within the boundaries of the State subject to its jurisdiction").
168. The statutory language exempts from liability owners who are responsible for spills
due to emergency. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 4-410(a).
169. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 96A, § 29BC (Supp. 1971).
170. Id. § 29.
171. Id.§ 29(a).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 57:642

or from any vessel, ship or boat . . ." to report the incident to the

appropriate federal authority. 172 Section 29A, among other things,
delegated responsibility to the DNR to develop a program to enable
the State to respond to an oil spill in Maryland waters.1 7 ' This section
referred to "oil spillage" and was not limited to releases from ships or
boats. 174 Moreover, "waters of the State" was defined to include underground waters for the purposes of the section. 175 Again, it would
have been nonsensical for the legislature to authorize the DNR to dewaters but limit
velop a program to deal with spills in underground
1 76
the source of the spill to boats and ships.
Section 29BC, the Private Remedy Section, then followed with the
same language that exists today. 177 "The person responsible for the
oil spillage shall be liable to any other person for any damages to his
real or personal property directly caused by the spillage."' 78 The "oil
spillage" in this section refers to the same oil spillage as section 29.179
Because section 29 refers to spillage from a land-based installation
and also refers to underground water, it is not necessarily limited to
releases from ships or boats.
Even if one accepts the court's interpretation of "oil spillage" in
section 4-409(a), Chevron could still have been held liable for JBG's
damage under section 4-409(b). Subsection 4-409(b)(2) requires
"owners" of USTs to demonstrate financial responsibility for the costs
of cleanup, corrective action, and third-party liability in the event of a
discharge. 8 ' "Owner" is defined in section 4-409(b) (1) (i) to include
"any person who causes an underground oil storage tank to be installed."' 1 In summarizing the facts of the case, the Court of Appeals
stated that Chevron "originally developed the [service station] prop172. Id. § 29(a-1) (emphasis added).
173. Id. § 29A
174. Id.
175. Id. § 2.
176. Two sections intervened between the language in section 29A and 29BC. Section
29AB required ships entering the waters of Maryland to post a bond to cover the costs of
cleanup and other fees in the event of a release of oil. Id. § 29AB(a). Although referring
to the bond required for vessels, this section contained no language limiting the phrase
"oil spillage" to a release from boats or ships. The following section, entitled "Compensatory Fee for Oil Spillage," permitted the Maryland Port Authority and the Department of
Natural Resources to collect a compensatory fee from the person responsible for the "oil
spillage." Id. § 29BC. The language in this section did not change the meaning of "oil
spillage."
177. Id.§ 29BC.
178. Id.
179. Id. § 29.
180. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 4-409(b) (2) (1996).

181. Id.§ 4-409(b)(1)(i).
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erty. ' 1 2 Presumably, Chevron installed the tank and was an "owner"
of it for the purposes of liability under section 4-409(b). In that case,
Chevron also would have had to have demonstrated financial responsibility in preparation for a spill.18 3 Chevron may, therefore, have
been subject to an earlier compliance date if it owned the requisite
number of USTs or reported sufficient net wealth.1 84 If Chevron
owned more than 1000 USTs or reported a tangible net worth in excess of $20 million, it would have had to have demonstrated financial
responsibility by January 24, 1989.185 If Chevron owned between 100
and 999 USTs, it would have had to have complied with the financial
responsibility regulations by October 26, 1989.186 Both of these com187
pliance dates preceded JBG's action and the removal of the USTs.
Therefore, if subject to either of the first two CFR sections, Chevron
could have been held liable as an owner of the tanks under section
4-409(b) and the CFR provisions.1 88 Even if Chevron owned only between thirteen and ninety-nine USTs, it would have been subject to
on April
the financial responsibility and third-party liability provisions
1 89
26, 1991, a full sixteen months prior to JBG's action.
c. Policy Implications of the Outcome.-Even though the court's
decision in this case provides scant analytical framework, the final disposition serves the environmental policy goals at issue. Applying the
defense of assumption of risk would have thwarted the policy goal of
many environmental statutes as well as tort law in general.1 90 If the
policy of tort law is to "make a fair adjustment of the conflicting claims
182. Wheeler, 346 Md. at 605, 697 A.2d at 901.
183. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 4-409(b) (2).
184. 40 C.F.R. § 280.91 (a)-(c) (1993).
185. Id. § 280.91(a).
186. Id. § 280.91(b).
187. The court's discussion of the relevance of the compliance dates does not indicate
what conditions must be present before liability would attach under section 4-409(b).
Wheeler, 346 Md. at 617-18, 697 A.2d at 907. Presumably, the court would require at least
that the action for damages not be instituted before the compliance deadline. Alternatively, the court might require that the spill have occurred after the compliance deadline.
188. Exxon never owned the USTs. Wheeler, 346 Md. at 626, 697 A.2d at 911. First, the
court explained that Exxon did not own or have sufficient control over the tanks for trespass liability to attach. Id. at 622-27, 697 A.2d at 909-11. Second, although Chevron
presented a causation argument that is beyond the scope of this Note, there was no evidence that the tanks had leaked after Exxon installed the new tanks. Id. at 626-28, 697
A.2d at 911-12.
189. 40 C.F.R. § 280.91(c) (1993).
190. The assumption of risk defense has been rejected in a number of states by either
case law or statute. See Donahue v. S.J. Fish & Sons, Inc., No. 539920, 1995 WL 562216, at
*2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 1995) (explaining the repudiation of the defense in negligence law).

836

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 57:642

of the litigating parties,"1 9 ' the cost of righting wrongs should be

placed on the individual who caused the harm.' 9 2 Similarly, section
4-402 of the Environment Article, entitled "Declaration of Public Policy," states that it is Maryland public policy to "improve, conserve, and
manage the quality of the waters of the State and protect, maintain,
and improve the quality of [the] water."1 1

3

This policy can be served

by at least three methods, all of which are incorporated into Maryland
law: criminal sanctions, administrative regulations, and third-party liability for those responsible for discharging oil into the waters of the
state.' 9 4

Allowing owners of contaminated property to use assumption of
risk as a defense to third-party liability claims would circumvent the
policy goal of "improving and managing" the quality of water in the
state. Holding purchasers of property responsible for the cleanup
cost for environmental hazards of which they have knowledge would
discourage purchasers from conducting thorough due diligence analyses or other investigations aimed at discovering environmental contamination. For instance, if the court had found assumption of risk to
be a competent defense to the trespass committed by Wheeler in the
present case, JBG would have been better off not discovering the gasoline contamination, thereby avoiding the possibility that such knowledge would defeat a claim for cleanup costs or diminution in property
value. Such a result would not promote remediation of properties
where contamination has occurred. Under such a system, Maryland's
goal of "improving" the quality of waters of the state would be
thwarted. Individuals would be discouraged from discovering
hazards, and thus from cleaning them up or from buying the
property.
In addition, the waters of the state will not be "maintained" under
a system where parties may not be held liable for damage caused by
dangerous substances emanating from their properties if they are discovered. In order to at least "maintain" the purity of Maryland's
water, discharges of pollutants must be discouraged. In order to discourage the discharge of pollutants, liability should be assigned to the
party responsible for the damage. Normally, if two or more parties
are responsible or the responsible party cannot be ascertained, the
party in the best position to prevent the specific harm should be held
191. W. PAGE KEETON
ed. 1984).
192. Id. § 1, at 6.

ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

193. MD.CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 4-402 (1996).

194. See supra notes 163-165 and accompanying text.

§ 3, at 15 (5th
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liable. 19 5 In this case, Wheeler and Chevron were both in a better
position than JBG or Equitable to prevent gasoline from leaking from
the tanks and damaging the service station as well as the Chapman
Avenue property. Such prevention could have been accomplished
either by groundwater and soil sampling or by frequent audits of gasoline inventory to account for all of the gasoline put into the tanks.
Alternatively, Wheeler and Chevron could have independently obtained insurance in the event damage occurred from gasoline migration. Both Wheeler and Chevron were in a better position than JBG
or Equitable to assess the amount of insurance that would have been
sufficient.
5. Conclusion.-The court's holding concerning the availability
of section 4-409 (a) has no prospective application, because the expiration of the compliance deadlines in the CFR has made section
4-409(b) available for recovery for damage caused by underground
storage tanks. Still, the court should have read section 4-409 (a) more
broadly.
The court should have addressed more clearly how trespass liability attached in this case, as presumably no intentional act was involved.
Attaching trespass liability in cases like Weelerwould make it easier for
innocent property owners to recover for damage caused by the migration of subsurface petroleum products. The court's holding that assumption of risk is not a defense to trespasses like the one in this case
advances Maryland's public policy. A contrary holding allowing polluters to escape liability under an assumption of risk defense would
discourage parties from investigating and discovering potential environmental hazards, and it would shift the burden of cleanup and reduced property value to innocent third parties. Still, the court should
have clearly stated whether it was rejecting assumption of risk as an
affirmative defense to any sort of trespass.
MICHAEL C.

WOODRUFF

195. See Leatherman v. Riverside Village, 676 So. 2d 1180, 1183-84 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
(increasing the share of liability of the party in the best position to prevent the harm); M-T
Petroleum, Inc. v. Burris, 926 S.W.2d 814, 816-17 (Tex. App. 1996, no writ) (considering
which party was in the best position to prevent the harm when analyzing liability).
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EVIDENCE

Maryland Narrowly Limits the Statements Against Interest Exception to
the Hearsay Rule

In State v. Matusky,' the Court of Appeals held that a trial court
judge should analyze statements against interest on a statement-bystatement basis and exclude collateral portions of the declaration that
are not directly self-incriminating.2 The court rooted its conclusion in
the rationale behind the statement against interest exception to the
hearsay rule, which is "that the declarant would not make a statement
adverse to his or her penal interest unless that declarant believed it to
be true."3 However, whether this rationale applies to those portions
of the hearsay declaration that may not be directly self-incriminating
has been the subject of debate for courts and commentators alike.'
The Court of Appeals concluded that neutral, collateral statements do
not exhibit the same qualities of reliability and trustworthiness exhibited by directly self-inculpatory statements and are therefore inadmissible.5 In adopting this rationale, the court limited the role of trial
court judges to that of breaking down declarations into separate parts
and determining whether each individual declaration is against interest.' In so holding, the Court of Appeals virtually eliminated the fundamental evidentiary purpose of the statement against interest
exception to the hearsay rule, and severely limited the discretion of
trial court judges regarding the admissibility of such statements.
1. 343 Md. 467, 682 A.2d 694 (1996).
2. Id. at 485, 682 A.2d at 702-03. The declaration against interest exception is governed by Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-804(b) (3), which states, in pertinent part:
(b) Hearsay Exceptions.-The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if
the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(3) Statement Against Interest.-A statement which was at the time of its making so contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, so tended to
subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or so tended to render invalid a
claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless the person believed it to
be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
MD. R. 5-804(b) (3) (emphasis added).
3. Matusky, 343 Md. at 477, 682 A.2d at 699 (citing State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 11,
526 A.2d 955, 959 (1987)).
4. See id. at 477-78, 682 A.2d at 699.
5. Id. at 485, 682 A.2d at 703.
6. See id. at 492, 682 A.2d at 706 ("[W]hen ruling upon the admission of a narrative
under this rule, a trial court must break down the narrative and determine the separate
admissibility of each single declaration or remark." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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1. The Case.-In May 1993, Michael Stewart Matusky was indicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on two counts of
first-degree murder in connection with the deaths of Gertrude and
Pamela Poffel.7 During the initial investigation by the police, Richard
Dean White, Pamela Poffel's estranged husband, and Rebecca
Marchewka, White's fiancee, were questioned.8 Marchewka corroborated White's account that White spent the day of the murders with
her. However, she eventually came forward to the police with new
information told to her by White;9 these statements implicated
Matusky as the murderer.1" Marchewka gave the following testimony
regarding the statements made to her by White:
[MARCHEWKA]: [White] laid down in the bed and told me
that he had something that he wanted to tell me but he
couldn't and I asked him why and he said because it would
hurt me. And I asked him to tell me any way.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: When you asked him to tell you did
he, in fact, tell you something?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor.
[THE COURT]: Objection noted for the record and
overruled.
[MARCHEWKA]: Yes, he did.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: What did he tell you, tell the ladies
and gentlemen of the jury.
[MARCHEWKA]: He told me that he knew who killed Pam
and Trudy [Gertrude] Poffel and I asked him who and he
said Michael Matusky and I asked him how he knew and he
said because he was in the car.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Did he indicate whose car he was
in?
[MARCHEWKA]: Michael's.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Did he indicate to you how he got
to Pam and Trudy's residence in Michael's car?
[MARCHEWKA]: He said he drove.
7. Id. at 470, 682 A.2d at 695.
8. Id. at 470-71, 682 A.2d at 695.
9. Id. at 471, 682 A.2d at 695. When White and Marchewka were questioned by the
police a few days after the murders, White told the police he knew nothing about the

murders. Matusky v. State, 105 Md. App. 389, 391, 660 A.2d 935, 936 (1995), affd, 343 Md.
467, 682 A.2d 694 (1996). White also told the police that, on the day of the murders, he
and Marchewka had spent the entire day together. Id. White had asked Marchewka to
corroborate this story, e.'plaining to her that he had been drinking on the day in question
and his "probation would be violated if the [police] found out what he was really doing on

that day." Id. at 391-92, 660 A.2d at 936 (internal quotation marks omitted).
10. Matusky, 343 Md. at 471, 682 A.2d at 695.
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[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Did he tell you where he had been
prior to going to Pam and Trudy's?
[MARCHEWKA]: Yes, they had been at The Pit and at
Wargo's [local bars].
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Did he tell you what occurred at
Wargo's?
[MARCHEWKA]: Yes, he said that he and Michael had a discussion, that Michael wants to kill Pam and Trudy because of
what he did, what they did to Ted and he said he tried to talk
Michael out of it.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: This conversation occurred prior
to going to the Poffels?
[MARCHEWKA]: Yes.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Did Richard say whether or not he
went inside the house?
[MARCHEWKA]: He said no, he sat in the car.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Did he tell you what he did after
that?
[MARCHEWKA]: Said they drove away.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: When he told you that what was
your reaction?
[MARCHEWKA]: I was very upset, it's hard for me to
believe.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: When Richard saw how upset you
were what did he say or do?
[MARCHEWKA]: He was concerned about who I was going
to tell, what I was going to do with the information.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:

...

[D]id you discuss with Richard

his involvement and what happened?
[MARCHEWKA]: Yes, but he said that he didn't-he didn't
do anything wrong, that he was just in the car and I tried to
tell 1him
that he was considered an accomplice and he said
1
no.
Both the State and defense counsel sought a pre-trial ruling on
the admissibility of Marchewka's testimony regarding what White had
told her.12 The court denied the defense's motion to exclude White's
declaration."i
11. Id. at 472-74, 682 A.2d at 696-97.
12. Id. at 471, 682 A.2d at 696.
13. Id. At this hearing, the court did not receive Marchewka's testimony for its consideration. The court did inform the State that the declaration might later be excluded depending on Marchewka's live testimony. Id.
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Immediately before trial, the court again considered the potential admissibility of Marchewka's testimony regarding White's statement. 4 After hearing Marchewka's testimony outside the jury's
presence, as well as arguments from counsel, the court again con15
cluded that the declaration would be admissible at trial.
6
In January 1994, Michael Stewart Matusky was tried for murder.'
White refused to testify at Matusky's trial, citing his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. 7 The invocation of this privilege
deemed White an "unavailable" declarant."8 Absent White's testimony, the State's key witness was Marchewka, 19 who testified as to the
statements made by White after the murders."° The jury convicted
Matusky of first-degree murder, and the court sentenced him to two
life terms, without the possibility of parole.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling that
Marchewka's testimony was admissible, finding that the trial judge
should have excluded the statements in White's declaration identifying Matusky as the killer and supplying Matusky's motive for the
murders. 1 During its review, the Court of Special Appeals was confronted with several recent judicial decisions interpreting various aspects of the statement against interest exception.2 2 In its ruling, the
14. Id.
15. Id. In concluding that the declaration was admissible, the court stated:
I find, from a reasonable person standard, as [the State's Attorney] articulated,
would know that there is something against your pecuniary, proprietary or penal
interests by discussing a homicide or violent act and then driving someone to the
place where that act was to be carried out and driving them away, then giving a
statement to the police which was a truthful statement ....
Id. at 471-72, 682 A.2d at 696.
16. Id. at 472, 682 A.2d at 696.
17. Matusky, 105 Md. App. at 393, 660 A.2d at 937.
18. Id.; see also MD.R. 5-80 4 (a) (1) (including in the definition of "unavailability" those
situations in which the declarant "is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of
privilege").
19. Matusky, 343 Md. at 472, 682 A.2d at 696.
20. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 11.
21. Matusky, 105 Md. App. at 402-03, 660 A.2d at 941.
22. Id at 398, 660 A.2d at 939. "Eighteen days after . . . [the] ruling [by the trial
judge], the Court of Appeals filed Simmons v. State, 333 Md. 547, 636 A.2d 463 (1994),
holding that the declaration against penal interest is not-as a matter of Maryland evidence law-a 'firmly rooted' exception to the rule against hearsay." Matusky, 105 Md. App.
at 398, 660 A.2d at 939 (citing Simmons, 333 Md. at 558-59, 636 A.2d at 469). Seventy-seven
days after the ruling, in Wilson v. State, 334 Md. 313, 639 A.2d 125 (1994), the Court of
Appeals held that a declaration against penal interest is "'presumptively unreliable.'"
Matusky, 105 Md. App. a: 398, 660 A.2d at 939 (quoting Wilson, 334 Md. at 335, 639 A.2d at
136). One hundred sixty-eight days after the ruling, the United States Supreme Court
decided Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994), holding that "trial judges must
exclude whatever, non-self-inculpatory statements are contained in an otherwise admissible
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court considered whether there were sufficient indicia of reliability to
admit any of the statements White made to Marchewka. 23 In order to
make this determination, the court stated that the trial judge was required to examine the declaration as a whole, as well as the totality of
circumstances under which the declarant made his statements. 24 According to the court, the trial court should consider the declarant's
"expectation of confidentiality,"25 as well as whether "[a]ny reasonable person would appreciate the disserving nature of such a
declaration. 2 6
Applying these criteria to the present case, the Court of Special
Appeals acknowledged that certain portions of White's statements to
Marchewka had a disserving quality and were, therefore, admissible
under the statement against interest exception.2 7 However, as to
those portions of White's statement in which Matusky was identified as
the killer and his motive for the murders was identified, the court
found that these should have been excluded from the proffered declaration. 28 The court reasoned that these statements were "simply not
self-inculpatory as to White.

29

The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to answer the question,
"Under the hearsay exception for a declaration against penal interest,
is the admissible statement the extended declaration or only those remarks that are individually self-inculpatory?" 3 °
2. Legal Background. -The rules of evidence concerning hearsay
are premised on the theory that "out-of-court statements are subject to
particular hazards." 31 Some of these out-of-court statements, however,
declaration against penal interest." Matusky, 105 Md. App. at 398, 660 A.2d at 939 (citing
Williamson, 512 U.S. at 598-601).
23. Matusky, 105 Md. App. at 402, 660 A.2d at 941.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing Agnew v. State, 51 Md. App. 614, 628, 446 A.2d 425, 434 (1982)).
26. Id.
27. Id. White's acknowledgment that he knew of Matusky's intent to murder the victims when he drove him to and from the Poffel residence was, in the court's opinion, a
disserving statement. Id.
28. Id. at 402-03, 660 A.2d at 941.
29. Id. at 403, 660 A.2d at 941.
30. Matusky, 343 Md. at 476, 682 A.2d at 698.
31. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994). The "hazards" of which
Justice O'Connor wrote include: "[tihe declarant might be lying; he might have misperceived the events which he relates; he might have faulty memory; his words might be
misunderstood or taken out of context by the listener." Id. In court proceedings, these
hazards are said to be minimized by such safeguards as "the oath, the witness' awareness of
the gravity of the proceedings, the jury's ability to observe the witness' demeanor, and,
most importantly, the right of the opponent to cross-examine ...." Id. Of course, none of
these safeguards can exist when presented with a hearsay statement against interest. For
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are less susceptible to hearsay dangers and therefore are excepted
from the general rule against hearsay.3 2 Originally, defining and determining the scope of an exception to the hearsay rule simply required discovering a case that had deemed such evidence
admissible. 3 The scope of a newly noted exception was "more likely
to be determined by some casual, arbitrary, or accidental circumstance involved in an early case than by an inquiry into a theory of
distinguishing some hearsay from that generally excluded."3 4
a. The Common Law Inception of the Statement Against Interest
Exception.-The rule against hearsay evolved in England during the
eighteenth century. 5 At that time, courts developed an exception to
the hearsay rule for declarations against interest in cases where the
declarant had since died or otherwise become unavailable as a witness.3 6 The exception was
based upon the grounds (1) that the hearsay rule might exclude the only available evidence, and result in great injustice unless exception were made, and (2) that no person
would be likely to make such a statement unless true, and
hence the statement would be free enough from the risk of
untrustworthiness to make the requirement of cross-examination a work of supererogation. 7
In the early nineteenth century, however, the exception was limited. 8 Upon consideration of certain cases involving the declarations
of deceased clergymen,3 9 a rule was established that in order for an
out-of-court declaration to be deemed admissible, that declaration
example, upon cross-examination of hearsay testimony, "the opponent cannot challenge
the veracity of the facts asserted because the witness can only report what the declarant
said." Jay L. Hack, Note, DeclarationsAgainst Penal Interest: Standards of Admissibility Under
an Emerging Majority Rule, 56 B.U. L. REv. 148, 150 (1976). In addition, the jury can only
observe the witness's demeanor and perhaps assess whether the witness seems to be telling
the truth, when in fact what is most crucial is the truthfulness of the declarant's statements
being recounted by the witness. The safeguards of the oath and an awareness of the gravity
of the proceedings are wholly lost on the out-of-court declarant.
32. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 598.
33. See Bernard S. Jefferson, DeclarationsAgainst Interest: An Exception to the HearsayRule,
58 HARv. L. REV. 1, 1 (1944).
34. Id
35. Thomas v. State, 186 Md. 446, 448, 47 A.2d 43, 45 (1946).
36. Id. at 448-49, 47 A.2d at 45.
37. Id. at 449, 47 A.2d at 45.
38. See id.

39. See id (citing the Berkeley Peerage Case and the Sussex Peerage Case to illustrate the
development of the declarations against interest exception to the hearsay rule). In the
Berkeley Peerage Case, 171 Eng. Rep. 128 (H.L. 1811), the court held that a witness could not
testify as to a declaration made by a clergyman who died before trial. In the Sussex Peerage
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40
must be against the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest.
However, a confession of guilt was not considered to fall within the
technical declarations against interest exception to the hearsay rule.4 1
The theory supporting an exception to the hearsay rule for statements
against pecuniary interest is that one is unlikely to admit something
that is against his "pecuniary or proprietary interest" unless it is true.4 2
Many courts in the early development of the statement against
interest exception required four factors to be present:

(1) the declarant must be dead; (2) the declaration must be
against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant; (3) the declaration must be of a fact or facts which were
immediately cognizable by the declarant personally; and (4)
the declarant must not have had a probable motive to falsify
the fact declared.
These four requirements still exist, in some form, in modem applications of the exception.4 4
Whether the declarant is in fact aware that his. statements are
against his interest is the key inquiry for this exception to the rule
against hearsay. 45 There are two ways to establish the existence of
such awareness. A subjective determination could be made of the declarant's state of mind: did that particular declarant know the statement was against his interest at the time it was made?46 An alternate
method is to measure awareness by an objective test: would a reasonable man in the declarant's shoes believe his statement to be against
his own interest?4 7 Between the objective and subjective methods of
assessment, one view holds that, because the circumstances surroundCase, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H.L. 1844), the court held that the son of a deceased clergyman
could not testify as to his father's statements.
40. Thomas, 186 Md. at 449, 47 A.2d at 45.
41. Id.
42. Jefferson, supra note 33, at 8.
43. Id at 1.
44. See, e.g., State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 14, 526 A.2d 955, 960 (1987) (examining the
implications of the declarant's motive to falsify on the potential admissibility of a statement
against interest); McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 279-280, at 824-27 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d
ed. 1984) (discussing the requirement that there should not be any indication of a motive
to falsify by the declarant, as well as the now standardized requirement of unavailability of
the declarant).
45. SeeJefferson, supra note 33, at 17 (explaining that "it is not the fact that the declaration is against interest but the awareness of that fact by the declarant which gives the statement significance"). This makes logical sense, for the reliability inherent in the concept
that one would not say anything against one's own interest unless it were true depends on
the declarant's knowledge that said statement is against his interest.
46. Id. at 22.
47. Id.
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ing the making of the declaration may not give any indication of the
actual knowledge of the declarant, an objective inquiry may be a more
practical tool with which to categorize a statement as one that is
against interest.4 8 Of course, if it could be shown that the particular
declarant did not believe the declaration to be against his interest, the
declaration lacks the probability of trustworthiness required in order
to be admissible.4 9
b.

The Maryland Tradition.-Foralmost two decades, Mary-

land has recognized the declaration against interest exception to the
rule against hearsay.5" Traditionally, the exception "was limited to
declarations against pecuniary or proprietary interest."" However, in
Harris v. State,52 the court expanded the exception for statements
against interest to include those statements that rendered one liable
to criminal punishment.5 3 The declaration at issue in Harris took
place in a prison recreation yard, where the declarant bragged about
forcing the defendant to commit the crime for which the defendant
had been convicted.5 4 Although the State argued that such a declaration was not admissible under the statement against interest exception
because it was not against the declarant's pecuniary interest, 55 the
Court of Special Appeals reasoned:
The distinction between statements relating to penal matters
and those relating to material ones lies in the belief that the
admission of an acknowledgment of facts rendering one liable to criminal punishment would, unlike an acknowledgment of a debt, open the "door to a flood of perjured
witnesses falsely testifying to confessions that were never
56
made.

The court justified this expansion by referring to the "inherent indicium of trustworthiness" that accompanies a declaration against one's
48. Id.
49. Id. at 23.
50. See Agnew v. State, 51 Md. App. 614, 625-26, 446 A.2d 425, 432-33 (1982) ("The
death blow to the former judicial policy of prohibiting the admission of such declarations
[against interest] was efficiently administered by this Court in Harrisv. State, 40 Md. App.
58, 387 A.2d 1152 (1978), which held that exclusion of a declaration against penal interest
was reversible error." (footnote omitted)).
51. Hams, 40 Md. App. at 62, 387 A.2d at 1154.
52. 40 Md. App. 58, 387 A.2d 1152 (1978).
53. Id. at 62-63, 65, 387 A.2d at 1154-55, 1156.
54. Id. at 61, 387 A.2d at 1154.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 62, 387 A.2d at 1154 (quoting McCoRIicK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EviDENCE § 278, at 674 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter McCoRMtCK'S
HANDBOOK]).
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penal interest.5 7 Focusing on trustworthiness as the rationale behind
the exception, the court concluded that statements against interest
should be excluded when there is evidence that they are "untrustworthy, frivolous or collusive."5 8
As emphasized in Agnew v. State,59 the task of determining the
probability of trustworthiness of the statement is the province of the
trial judge. 60 In Agnew, the declarations were made by persons allegedly involved in a bribery scheme with former Vice President of the
United States Spiro T. Agnew. 6 ' The court held that it is the duty of
the trier of fact to determine the weight accorded any admitted statement, but this duty is to be performed only after the judge determines
any proffered statement's probability of trustworthiness.6 2
In concluding that the statements at issue were properly admit6
ted, 3 the Court of Special Appeals analyzed them using six factors:
(1) the statement's potential of actually jeopardizing a penal interest;
(2) whether the statement was against a penal interest at the time it
was made; (3) the declarant's perception of the disserving quality of
the statement; (4) the relation between the relevant portion of the
declaration and its disserving character; (5) the lack of probable motive to falsify the declaration; and (6) whether the declarant was acting
as a reasonable person. 4 In considering the third factor, the court
decided that "there was no need to separate the disserving portions of
the declarations from neutral or self-serving portions. "65 The court
reasoned that the declarants' implicating themselves with the defendant in one criminal scheme carrying the same penalty for all involved
was enough to allow the entire statement to be admitted.6 6
57. Id at 65, 387 A.2d at 1156.
58. Id, As the court stated, "[t]o hold otherwise would serve to usurp the traditional
role of the jury as the trier-of-fact and . .. deprive an accused of his right to due process
under the law." I&
59. 51 Md. App. 614, 446 A.2d 425 (1982).
60. Id. at 628, 446 A.2d at 434.
61. See id.at 616-17, 446 A.2d at 427-28 (listing as one of the issues on appeal whether
the sworn statements of Agnew's co-conspirators were properly admitted into evidence).
Superficially, the statements were somewhat in furtherance of the declarants' interest, for
they were made to the authorities in hopes of gaining favor for their own cases. Id. at 630,
446 A.2d at 434-35. As the court explained, "[t] he penal interests of the declarants are
somewhat clouded by the self-serving patina of their admissions and allegations, inferences
and innuendoes." Id. at 629-30, 446 A.2d at 434.
62. Id at 628-29, 446 A.2d at 434.
63. Id. at 630, 446 A.2d at 435.
64. Id. at 628, 446 A.2d at 433-34 (citing Hack, supra note 31, at 154-55).
65. Id. at 641, 446 A.2d at 440.
66. Id,at 641-42, 446 A.2d at 440. The court acknowledged that "[t]he problem of
statements that are both self-serving and disserving to [the] declarant has divided treatise
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The Maryland courts next addressed the issue of admissibility of
statements against interest in State v. Standifur.6 7 Standifur was a
landmark decision in Maryland because it was the first reported case
dealing with the statement against penal interest exception as it
applied to the admissibility of inculpatory hearsay introduced by the
State against a criminal defendant.6 8 In Standifur, the Court of Appeals held that the statement in question was not sufficiently reliable
to be admitted for the purpose of inculpating an accused in a criminal
case. 69 In so holding, the court established that "[t] he circumstances
surrounding the making of [a] statement must be carefully analyzed
to determine the likelihood that the statement was truthful."7" Because of the problems of proof, the court stated that
the party urging [the] exception is not required to prove the
actual state of mind of the declarant but must prove sufficient surrounding facts from which the trial judge may inferentially determine what the state of mind of a reasonable
person would have been under the same or similar
circumstances. 7 '
writers." Id at 641 n.24, 446 A.2d at 440 n.24. One view is to admit the entire statement.
I& (citing 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAls AT COMMON LAW § 1465, at 271 (3d
ed. 1940)). Another view supports admitting disserving and collateral portions, but not
those parts that are expressly self-serving. Id (citing McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK, supra note
56, § 279, at 675-77).

67. 310 Md. 3, 526 A.2d 955 (1987). In Standifur, the declaration in question was made
to a state trooper concerning the declarant's purchase of a shotgun from the defendants,
who were charged with housebreaking and theft of the gun. Id. at 6-7, 526 A.2d at 956.
The declaration was found to be against interest because the declarant believed the gun
was stolen at the time he made the statement, thereby exposing himself to potential criminal liability. Id at 8, 526 A.2d at 957. According to the trial judge, the statement was also
corroborated by other evidence, and therefore was sufficiently trustworthy and important
as to be admissible. Id at 8-9, 526 A.2d at 957. The Court of Special Appeals reversed,
applying the six factors analyzed in Agnew. Standifur v. State, 64 Md. App. 570, 583-88, 497
A.2d 1164, 1171-73 (1985), affd, 310 Md. 3, 526 A.2d 955 (1987); see supra text accompanying note 64.
68. Standifur, 64 Md. App. at 582, 497 A.2d at 1170. Although the statements made in
Agnew also inculpated the defendant, they were different because they inculpated both the
declarants and the defendant in a common scheme of criminal behavior. See supra text
accompanying notes 61, 66. In Standifur, the declarant may have implicated himself in
receiving stolen property, but the defendants were being charged with housebreaking and
theft. See supra note 67. Therefore, they were not involved in the same criminal behavior.
69. Standifur, 310 Md. at 20, 526 A.2d at 963.
70. Id. at 12, 526 A.2d at 959. In the case at hand, the court noted that the declarant
.obviously feared the possibility of violation of his parole, and apparently wished to curry
favor with the authorities." Id at 20, 526 A.2d at 963. This "motive of personal gain" was
not the death knell for the declaration at issue, but was "an important fact to be considered" when examining the totality of the circumstances. Id
71. Id. at 12, 526 A.2d at 959. The court conceded "this test is essentially objective,"
and the "reasonable" standard encompasses a "non-aberrant reaction by one in the [declarant's] circumstances." Id.
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In issuing its decision, the Standifur court defined the two forms
that an inculpatory statement may take: collateral statements 72 and
noncollateral statements. 73 The court concluded that collateral statements so closely connected with the statements against interest as to
74
be equally trustworthy are admissible as declarations against interest.
In Brown v. State,75 the Court of Appeals applied the test developed in Standifur.76 The statements in question were made by the declarant at his own probation violation hearing,
and then were used
77
against Brown, the declarant's co-defendant.

72. See id. at 16, 526 A.2d at 961 ("A collateral inculpatory declaration is one in which
the inculpatory material is not found in the portion of the statement directly against the
declarant's interest, but instead appears in another portion of the statement.").
73. See id. at 15-16, 526 A.2d at 961 ("A noncollateral statement is one in which the facts
inculpating the defendant are found in the portion of the statement directly against the
declarant's interest.").
74. Id. at 17, 526 A.2d at 962. According to the court, "the nexus required between the
collateral statement and the material inculpatory to the declarant is subject to more exacting scrutiny in criminal than in civil cases." Id. at 16, 526 A.2d at 961.
The court also enunciated a specific test for the admissibility of statements against
interest:
[A] trial judge . . . must carefully consider the content of the statement in the
light of all known and relevant circumstances surrounding the making of the
statement and all relevant information concerning the declarant, and determine
whether the statement was in fact against the declarant's penal interest and
whether a reasonable person in the situation of the declarant would have perceived that it was against his penal interest at the time it was made. The trial
judge should then consider whether there are present any other facts or circumstances, including those indicating a motive to falsify on the part of the declarant,
that so cut against the presumption of reliability normally attending a declaration
against interest that the statements should not be admitted. A statement against
interest that survives this analysis, and those related statements so closely connected with it as to be equally trustworthy, are admissible as declarations against
interest.
Id. at 17, 526 A.2d at 962. In applying this test to the facts of Standifur,the court concluded
that the statement should not have been admitted as a declaration against penal interest.
Id. The court specifically found "the evidence insufficient to prove that a reasonable person in [the declarant's] position would have understood the disserving nature of the statement when he made it." Id.
75. 317 Md. 417, 564 A.2d 772 (1989).
76. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
77. Brown, 317 Md. at 419-21, 564 A.2d at 773. The declarant testified at his own hearing and at the trial of his accomplice; this testimony implicated Brown, the defendant in
the current case. Id. When the State tried to force the declarant to testify against Brown,
he did not cooperate. Id. at 420, 564 A.2d at 773. The State instead offered transcripts of
the testimony given earlier by the declarant, which the trial judge admitted. Id. at 420-21,
564 A.2d at 773. Brown maintained that this earlier testimony was inadmissible as hearsay
because it did not qualify under the statement against interest exception. Id. at 421, 564
A.2d at 774.
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The Brown court found certain portions of these statements to be
obviously self-serving, and thus unreliable. 7 The court, therefore, declared the statements "collateral" and held that they were inadmissible
as statements against interest.7 9 According to the court, the circumstances implied that the declarant might "have been motivated by the
desire to curry favor with the authorities, and by the desire to reduce
his own culpability."" ° The presumed reliability required by the
81
Standifur inquiry was lacking in the declaration in Brown.
c. The Federal Rule Concerning Statements Against Interest.Maryland's appellate courts have accorded some deference to the
federal cases ruling on the admissibility of statements against interest
under the Federal Rules of Evidence.8 2 In fact, Maryland Rule 5-804
itself is derived from Federal Rule of Evidence 804.83
The principal federal case dealing with the statement against interest exception is Williamson v. United States.14 In Williamson, the
Supreme Court held that the federal exception to the hearsay rule for
statements against penal interest does not allow admission of non-selfinculpatory statements, even if they are made within a broader narra-

78. Id,at 425, 564 A.2d at 776.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 424, 564 A.2d at 775. The court explained that these are motives that "we
have identified as frequently present in these situations, and which combine to make 'inevitably suspect' statements of this type." Id. (quoting State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 13, 526
A.2d 955, 960 (1987)).
81. See id at 425, 564 A.2d at 776 ("The presumed reliability that would surround such
a statement if it were given as an inextricable part of a true declaration against penal interest is lacking.").
82. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 334 Md. 313, 322-28, 639 A.2d 125, 129-32 (1994) (using
Supreme Court cases to determine when incriminating statements are admissible under
exceptions to the hearsay rule); Simmons v. State, 333 Md. 547, 556, 636 A.2d 463, 467
(1994) ("[The Supreme] Court [has] held that cross-examination of a hearsay declarant
can be dispensed with when a party demonstrates: (1) the necessity of introducing the outof-court statement, and (2) the out-of-court statement bears adequate indicia of reliability."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Standifur, 310 Md. at 15, 526 A.2d at 961 (determining that "[t]he message to be gleaned from the [federal] cases and from the history of the
federal rule is clear-inculpatory statements of an accomplice no longer involved in the
criminal enterprise are inherently suspect and the particular circumstances surrounding
the making of such statements must be carefully examined" (footnote omitted)).
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (3) defines statements against interest as:
Statement[s] which... at the time of [their] making ...so far tended to subject
the declarant to ... criminal liability ...

that a reasonable person in the declar-

ant's position would not have made the statement[s] unless believing [them] to
be true.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3).

83. See MD.R. 5-804 ("This rule is derived from [Federal Rule of Evidence] 804.").
84. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
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ive that is generally self-inculpatory. 8 5 The court reasoned that "[t]he
fact that a person is making a broadly self-inculpatory confession does
not make more credible the confession's non-self-inculpatory parts. '"86
Like the Court of Appeals in Brown,8 7 the majority in Williamson
acknowledged that a declarant who is in custody may make a statement admitting guilt for a crime and implicating another person in
order to curry favor with the authorities."8 Such a statement could fail
to qualify as a statement against interest because it would in fact be
more promotional of the declarant's interest, under the circumstances, than against.8 9 The Williamson Court found it necessary to
remand to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit so that just
such an inquiry could be made into the motivation behind certain
statements made by the declarant.9"
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia noted that "a declarant's
statement is not magically transformed from a statement against penal
interest into one that is inadmissible merely because the declarant
names another person or implicates a possible co-defendant."9 1 However, Justice Scalia did acknowledge that the declarant's finger-pointing, in effect shifting the focus of blame off himself, would be a
consideration in assessing whether his statements qualify as suffi92
ciently against interest.

85. Id. at 600, In Williamson, the declarant, Harris, made statements to a Drug Enforcement Administration special agent implicating himself and the defendant in the transport
of illegal drugs. Id. at 596. The district court ruled that the agent could testify as to what
the declarant had said to him. Id. at 597-98. The district court reasoned:
First, defendant Harris' statements clearly implicated himself, and therefore,
are against his penal interest.
Second, defendant Harris, the declarant, is unavailable.
And third.., there are sufficient corroborating circumstances in this case to
ensure the trustworthiness of his testimony.
Id. at 598 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Id. at 599. The court continued, "[o]ne of the most effective ways to lie is to mix
falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its selfinculpatory nature." Id at 599-600.
87. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
88. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 601 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3) advisory committee's
note). The court also stated that, "[o]n the other hand, the same words spoken under
different circumstances, e.g., to an acquaintance, would have no difficulty in qualifying."
Id. at 601-02 (quoting FED. R. Evil. 804(b) (3) advisory committee's note).
89. Cf id. at 603 (stating that confessions of arrested accomplices, if truly self-inculpatory rather than merely an attempt to shift blame or curry favor, may be admissible).
90. See id. at 604 (noting that the record did not indicate that the necessary inquiry had
been conducted into whether each of the statements in the declarant's confession were
truly self-inculpatory).
91. Id, at 606 (Scalia, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 607.
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Justice Ginsburg also recognized the untrustworthiness of statements implicating other persons.9 3 In her concurring opinion,Justice
Ginsburg concluded that none of the declarant's statements fit within
the exception for statements against interest.9 4 She explained that
the declarant's arguably inculpatory statements were "too closely intertwined" with his self-serving declarations to be considered
trustworthy.9 5
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion examined the various approaches to the admissibility of collateral statements. 96 Justice Kennedy conducted an extensive analysis that concluded that there
should not be "a rule excluding all statements collateral or related to
the specific words against penal interest."9 7 Justice Kennedy reasoned
that Congress would not have intended the penal interest exception
to have "so little effect with respect to statements that inculpate the
accused." 8
Despite the strong opinions on both the state and federal level
concerning the admissibility of statements against interest, the stage
was set for a resolution of the different schools of thought into a more
definitive approach to the hearsay rule exception.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In State v. Matusky, the Court of Appeals held that, under Maryland Rule 5-804(b) (3),99 a trial court
should admit only those portions of a hearsay declaration that truly

93. Id. at 607-08 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 608.
95. Id Justice Ginsburg explained that Harris's declaration "admitted involvement,
but did so in a way that minimized his own role and shifted blame to [the co-defendant]."
Id
96. Id. at 611-12 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy discussed
the theories of Wigmore, McCormick, and Jefferson. Id, According to Wigmore, the entire statement should be admitted because "'the statement may be accepted, not merely as
to the specific fact against interest, but also as to every fact contained in the same statement.'" Id. at 612 (quoting 5 WIGMORE, supra note 66, § 1465, at 271). McCormick, on the
other hand, argued for the admissibility of collateral statements of a neutral character, but
the exclusion of collateral statements of a self-serving character. Id, (citing CHARLEs T.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 256, at 552-53 (1954)). Under Jefferson's approach, "neither collateral neutral nor collateral self-serving statements would be
admissible." Id (citing Jefferson, supra note 33, at 62-63). Jefferson maintained that "the
reliability of a statement against interest stems only from the disserving fact stated," and
therefore, "should be confined 'to the proof of the [specific] fact which is against interest.'" Id (quoting Jefferson, supra note 33, at 62-63).
97. Id at 615 (emphasis added).
98. Id at 617. Justice Kennedy concluded that the statement against interest exception
allows admission of statements collateral to the precise words against interest. Id.
99. For the text of this rule, see supra note 2.
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incriminate the declarant t0 0 The court began its analysis by identifying the key issue-whether the rationale underlying the statement
against interest exception applies to other portions of a hearsay declaration that do not directly implicate the declarant. 10 1 The court then
proceeded by describing the different viewpoints regarding the admissibility of collateral statements. 10 2 The remainder of the court's reasoning can be divided into three major areas: (1) the court's previous
decision in Standifur, (2) the application of that decision to the Brown
case; and (3) the Supreme Court's analysis of the federal statement
against interest exception as applied in Williamson.
The court noted its holding in Standifur, whereby a statement
against interest that survives the threshold analysis conducted by the
trial judge, and those related statements so closely connected with it as
to be equally trustworthy, are admissible as declarations against interest.' 3 Applying the Standifur analysis to the instant case, the Court of
Appeals found that the trial court had failed to parse the hearsay declaration to admit only those individual statements that were contrary
to the declarant's penal interests. 10 4 The court explained that those
portions of the declaration that did not directly incriminate the declarant were not as trustworthy as the self-incriminating statements,
and therefore, should not have been admitted. 0 5 The court emphasized that the principal consideration on which the trial court should
focus is whether there was any indication of a motive to falsify on the
part of the declarant." °6
The Court of Appeals next addressed the effect of Maryland Rule
5-804(b) (3) on the scope of the declaration against penal interest exception.1 0 7 The court began this discussion by introducing the recent
Supreme Court decision in Williamson v. United States,108 which did not
rely on Maryland Rule 5-804(b) (3), but instead on its federal counter100. Matusky, 343 Md. at 492, 682 A.2d at 706.
101. Id. at 477-78, 682 A.2d at 699.
102. See id. at 478-79, 682 A.2d at 699 (discussing the views of Wigmore, Jefferson, and
McCormick). For details of these commentators' views on the admissibility of collateral
statements, see supra note 96.
103. Matusky, 343 Md. at 479-82, 682 A.2d at 699-701 (citing State v. Standifur, 310 Md.
3, 17, 526 A.2d 955, 962 (1987)).
104. Id. at 484-85, 682 A.2d at 702. The court "agree[d] with the Court of Special Appeals that the trial court erroneously admitted Marchewka's testimony in toto rather than
analyzing the declaration statement by statement to determine whether collateral portions
of [the declaration] should [have been] redacted." Id. at 485, 682 A.2d at 702-03.
105. Id. at 485, 682 A.2d at 703.
106. Id. at 486, 682 A.2d at 703 (quoting Standifur, 310 Md. at 17, 526 A.2d at 962).
107. Id. For the full text of Maryland Rule 5-804(b) (3), see supra note 2.
108. See supra notes 84-98 and accompanying text.
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part, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3).109 The Court of Appeals
conceded that Williamson was "not binding," for "it does not rely on
federal constitutional principles." '
The court, however, adopted
Williamson as Maryland law,11 1 and discussed the ways in which that
decision was consistent with Standifur. The court found that the distinction between Williamson and Standifur was that, with the advent of
Williamson, the connection or proximity between the purely self-inculpatory statements in a declaration and those statements collateral to
them no longer factored into consideration for admissibility.1 12 The
Matusky court then declared the rule for trial courts to follow when
determining whether to admit the declaration as a statement against
interest:
"[W] hen ruling upon the admission of a narrative under this
rule, a trial court must break down the narrative and determine the separate admissibility of each 'single declaration or
remark."' The test for admissibility to be applied to each
statement within a declaration is whether a reasonable person in the declarant's circumstances would have believed the
statement was1 3adverse to his or her penal interest at the time
it was made.1

109. Matusky, 343 Md. at 486, 682 A.2d at 703. The Court of Appeals did acknowledge
that Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (3) closely corresponds to Maryland Rule
5-804(b)(3). Id. In fact, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and Maryland Rule
5-804(b) (3) are virtually identical, the only differences being a matter of a word here or
there, or the tense of a verb.
To illustrate how minor the differences are between the two rules, the following is the
text of Maryland Rule 5-804(b) (3); any differences in wording of its federal counterpart,
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (3), are noted in brackets:
Statement Against Interest.-A statement which was at the time of its making so
[far] contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, [or] so [far]
tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or so tended to render
invalid [or to render invalid] a claim by the declarant against another, that a
reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement
unless the person believed it to be true [unless believing it to be true]. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
See MD.R. 5-804(b) (3); FED. R. Evm. 804(b) (3).
110. Matusky, 343 Md. at 490, 682 A.2d at 705.
111. Id Other states have adopted the analysis in Williamson. Id.; see, e.g., Smith v. State,
647 A.2d 1083, 1088 (Del. 1994) ("Although not bound by the Supreme Court's interpretation of [Federal Rule of Evidence] 804(b) (3) in construing our identical [rule], . . . [w]e
findJustice O'Connor's reasoning to be persuasive and we therefore adopt it in construing
the Delaware rule.").
112. Matusky, 343 Md. at 491, 682 A.2d at 705-06.
113. Id,at 492, 682 A.2d at 706 (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Mason, 460 S.E.2d
36, 45 (W. Va. 1995) (quoting Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994))).
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The court concluded by explaining that "the trial court erroneously permitted Marchewka to testify to the entire conversation she
had with White."' 1 4 Although the trial court may have determined
correctly that White's declaration was adverse to his penal interest, l 5
the court held that those portions of the declaration that did not directly incriminate White, such as the identification of Matusky as the
murderer and the indication of Matusky's motive, were "not as trustworthy as self-incriminating statements, because they serve[d] to shift
blame from White to Matusky."11 6 Therefore, the Court of Appeals
decided that those portions of the declaration should have been
redacted. 7
4. Analysis.-In State v. Matusky, the Court of Appeals held that,
under the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule,
trial courts may admit only those parts of a declaration that a reasonable person in the declarant's circumstances would have believed
were adverse to his or her penal interest at the time they were
made."' The court reached this conclusion by reconciling Standifur
and Williamson, cases interpreting the exception on two different
levels." 9 By requiring the trial judge to parse the declaration into
separate categories of self-serving and disserving statements, 2 ° the
Court of Appeals limited the discretion of the trial court to determine
whether to apply the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule. In addition, collateral statements usually embody those portions of a declaration that directly implicate the defendant in a
particular case.' 2 ' Excluding collateral statements results in the exclusion of almost all pertinent inculpatory statements, statements that
hold the same indicia of reliability as the rest of the declaration. 1 22 In
adopting the Williamson approach, the Court of Appeals has virtually
114. Id.
115. Id. at 485, 682 A.2d at 702.
116. Id., 682 A.2d at 703.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 492, 682 A.2d at 706.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 67-74 and 84-98.
120. See Matusky, 343 Md. at 492, 682 A.2d at 706.
121. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 616 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment) ("'[M]ost statements inculpating a defendant are only collateral to the
portion of the declarant's statement that is against his own penal interest."' (alteration in
original) (quoting Andrew R. Keller, Note, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and
the Confrontation Clause, 83 COLUM. L. Rsv. 159, 163 (1983))).
122. See id. ("As commentators have recognized, 'the exclusion of collateral statements
would cause the exclusion of almost all inculpatory statements."' (quoting Michael D.
Bergeisen, Comment, FederalRule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1207 (1978))).
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eliminated the fundamental evidentiary purpose of the statement
against interest exception to the hearsay rule, which is to admit reliable hearsay evidence.
a. Reconciling Standifur and Williamson.-The Court of Appeals's decision in Matusky embodied the interpretation and reconciliation of precedents from two different courts. The court first
considered its own 1987 decision in State v. Standifur. The court also
chose to rely on the Supreme Court case of Williamson v. United States,
which interpreted the federal counterpart to Maryland's statement
against interest exception. 1 23 The Maryland Rule of Evidence and the
Federal Rule of Evidence concerning the statement against interest
exception are virtually identical in language and form. t 24 However,
the two cases interpreting these respective rules came to different conclusions.125 How then did the Court of Appeals, in Matusky, reconcile

Standifur and Williamson to come to what it considered a logical
conclusion?
The statement against interest exception, as articulated in
Standifur, involved the inquiry into many factors, especially all of the
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement. 126 Part of
the determination to be made by the trial judge was whether a reasonable person would appreciate the disserving nature of such a declara12
tion. 127 This was to be determined by the totality of circumstances. 1
The Standifurcourt held that "a statement against interest that survives
this [multi-factor analysis by the trial judge], and those related statements so closely connected with it as to be equally trustworthy, are
2
admissible as declarations against interest.'
123. See supra text accompanying notes 110-111 (discussing the Matusky court's adoption
of Williamson).
124. See generally MD.R. 5-804(b) (3); FED. R. EviD. 804(b) (3); see also supra note 109
(noting the specific differences between the two rules).
125. See supra text accompanying note 74 (explaining the Standifur court's conclusion as
to the admissibility of collateral statements); supra text accompanying note 85 (explaining
the Supreme Court's holding in Williamson).
126. State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 12, 526 A.2d 955, 959 (1987).
127. Id. at 13, 526 A.2d at 959-60.
128. Id. at 12, 526 A.2d at 959. The trial judge in Matusky found that, under the totality
of circumstances, a reasonable person in White's position would realize that he was making
a declaration against his penal interest. Matusky, 105 Md. App. at 402, 660 A.2d at 941.
The Court of Special Appeals declared that this finding was not clearly erroneous, for the
statements made by White that were truly self-inculpatory were admissible under the declaration against interest exception to the rule against hearsay. Id.
129. Standifur, 310 Md. at 17, 526 A.2d at 962; see also supra note 74 (quoting the
Standifur test). The Standifur court, in applying this analysis, concluded that "[the declarant's] statement should not have been admitted as a declaration against penal interest."
310 Md. at 17, 526 A.2d at 962. The court explained, "[W]e believe the evidence insuffi-
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However, the Court of Appeals's decision in Standifurdid not provide the only framework for the court's subsequent decision in
Matusky. The Supreme Court's opinion in Williamson also provided a
backdrop for the Court of Appeals's current interpretation of the exception.1 3 ° In Williamson, the Supreme Court took a completely different view of the trial judge's role, as well as the potential
admissibility of collateral statements "connected" with the statements
against interest. First, the trial court judge must admit only those
parts of the declaration which are sufficiently against the declarant's
penal interest that a reasonable person in the declarant's position
would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. 1 '
This is a fact-intensive inquiry, according to the Supreme Court; it
requires careful consideration of all the circumstances surrounding
1 32
the criminal activity involved.
Although the Court of Appeals, in Standifur, also declared that
the statement against interest must be evaluated in light of all the surrounding circumstances, l3 3 there is a difference in how the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court view the admissibility of collateral
statements. The Supreme Court explained, "The fact that a statement
is self-inculpatory does make it more reliable; but the fact that a statement is collateral to a self-inculpatory statement says nothing at all
about the collateral statement's reliability."13 4 In other words,
although the Court of Appeals found that collateral statements so
closely connected to the statements against interest were admissible,
the Supreme Court found otherwise.
In Matusky, the Court of Appeals attempted to reconcile the tests
for admissibility under Standifurand Williamson by stating that the central distinction between the approaches of the two cases is that "'proximity' between the self-inculpatory and 'collateral' portions of one
declaration no longer guarantees admissibility. ' 13 5 This misleading
cient to prove that a reasonable person in [the declarant's] position would have understood the disserving nature of the statement when he made it. Additionally, we conclude
that the totality of circumstances under which the statement was made militate [s] against a
finding of the requisite reliability." Id.
130. See Matusky, 343 Md. at 486-91, 682 A.2d at 703-05 (noting that the court "shall
adopt [the analysis in Williamson] as part of Maryland law").
131. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 603-04 (1994).
132. Id. at 604.
133. See supra note 74.
134. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600. The court explained that other parts of the declarant's
confession, especially parts that implicated Williamson, did little to subject the declarant
himself to criminal liability. Id. at 604. Whether or not these portions were truly selfinculpatory is for the trial judge to decide. Id.
135. Matusky, 343 Md. at 491, 682 A.2d at 705-06.
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statement minimizes the distinction between Standifurand Williamson.
In fact, the difference between the two precedents in their approach
to the admissibility, or non-admissibility, of collateral statements embodies one of the critical issues that has surrounded the statement
against interest exception since its inception in Maryland. In both
Williamson and Standifur,a truly self-inculpatory statement would open
the door of admissibility as a declaration against interest. The difference between them, however, centers around what happens once this
door is open. With the Standifur approach, once a self-inculpatory
statement opens the door, those related statements "so closely connected with it as to be equally trustworthy" are allowed through the
door as well. 1" 6 The Williamson approach is markedly different. The
Williamson majority would open the door only for those statements
137
which are truly self-inculpatory, and shut the door to anything else.
With the Williamson view, no matter how closely connected any other
statement is to the self-inculpatory statement, whether by some substantial connection or merely by temporal proximity, nothing else will
get through the door of admissibility besides the sole self-inculpatory
statement.
There is some confusion as to the Matusky court's reconciliation
of these distinct views on collateral statements. The Court of Appeals
explained in Matusky that its prior decision in Standifur adopted the
federal rule as Maryland common law, prior to adoption of the Maryland Rules of Evidence. 3 ' The Matusky court also acknowledged that
"Standifur was decided without the benefit of the Williamson decision."1 ' However, if Standifur adopted the federal rule, the Standifur
court should have come to the same conclusion as the Supreme Court
in Williamson and declared that all non-self-inculpatory statements are
inadmissible. 4 ° Instead, the Standifur court found that non-self-inculpatory statements are admissible if they are so closely connected with
the statement against interest as to be equally trustworthy.'4 1
The question remains why the Matusky court deferred to the
Supreme Court's position on collateral statements rather than its own
136. State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 17, 526 A.2d 955, 962 (1987).
137. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600 ("We see no reason why collateral statements ...
should be treated any differently from other hearsay statements that are generally
excluded.").
138. Matusky, 343 Md. at 491, 682 A.2d at 705.
139. Id.
140. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 594 (holding that the exception to the hearsay rule for
statements against penal interest does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory
statements).
141. Standifur, 310 Md. at 17, 526 A.2d at 962.
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previous approach taken in Standifur. The court does not give a clear
answer to this question, but instead invokes a quote from a decision of
the Delaware Supreme Court explaining that neutral collateral statements do not enjoy the guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness
required for hearsay statements to be admissible. 142 The court concluded that, "'when ruling upon the admission of a narrative under
this rule, a trial court must break down the narrative and determine
1'
the separate admissibility of each "single declaration or remark."'

43

Because Standifur was decided without the benefit of Williamson,1 4 4 would Standifur itself have been decided differently had it
reached the Court of Appeals just seven years later? The court indicated that it would. However, the Matusky court did not identify the
catalyst for its switch in approach, aside from indicating its deference
to Williamson.
Matusky strips a trial judge of the discretion to determine the surrounding circumstances of collateral statements, and whether they are
so intertwined as to be trustworthy enough for admissibility.1 45 By
considering each phrase of the declaration in a vacuum to determine
its self-inculpatory nature, the trial judge, at the direction of the Court
of Appeals, is doing a disservice to the statement against interest
exception.
b. Eliminationof the EvidentiaryPurposes of the Statement Against
Interest Exception.-Both the Supreme Court, in Williamson, and the
Court of Appeals, in Matusky, imply that an "open-door" policy on collateral statements defeats the underlying rationale of the hearsay exception for statements against interest. 146 Reliability and
trustworthiness, as the principal bases for the exception, must be
found in all admitted statements. 147 Because of the inherent dangers
of hearsay, it is critical that these factors be present in every admitted
142. Matusky, 343 Md. at 491, 682 A.2d at 706 (quoting Smith v. State, 647 A.2d 1083,
1088 (Del. 1994) (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600)).
143. Id. at 492, 682 A.2d at 706 (quoting State v. Mason, 460 S.E.2d 36, 45 (W. Va. 1995)
(quoting Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599)).
144. See supra text accompanying note 139.
145. See Matusky, 343 Md. at 492 n.16, 682 A.2d at 706 n.16. The court explained its
interpretation of Williamson as follows: "[A] finding that an inculpatory portion is closely
related to an against-interest portion will not itself warrant... admissibility. Each admitted
statement or portion of statements must be found to be against the penal interests of the
declarant." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600 (noting that "the fact that a statement is collateral to
a self-inculpatory statement says nothing at all about the collateral statement's reliability");
Matusky, 343 Md. at 491, 682 A.2d at 706 (explaining that there needs to be "some special
indicia of reliability and trustworthiness" for a statement to be admissible).
147. Matusky, 343 Md. at 491, 682 A.2d at 706.
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statement. Furthermore, the presence of these factors cannot be determined by simple temporal proximity to statements that are sufficiently against interest to be declared reliable and admissible. 4' 8
In the development of the statement against interest exception,
as well as in prior examinations of the admissibility of collateral statements, no court has issued an airtight declaration that all collateral
statements are admissible. Collateral statements have never been admitted freely or without scrutiny. In fact, reliability and trustworthiness have been adamantly required of collateral statements. 4' 9
It is ironic that, with respect to the threshold requirements of
reliability and trustworthiness for admission of declarations against interest, Standifurand Williamson are alike. Both opinions declared that
reliability is to be determined by careful consideration of all known
facts and circumstances.1 50 Both opinions also establish that matter
that is self-serving must be excluded."' Lastly, both opinions rely on
the objective "reasonable person" test to determine whether the declarant's statement was indeed against interest, and whether she appreciated its self-inculpatory nature.1 5 2 Yet, the results of the two cases
are markedly different: While Standifur allows the admission of collat1 53
eral statements, Williamson does not.
In his concurring opinion in Williamson, Justice Kennedy identified three sources that demonstrate that Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b) (3), upon which the Maryland Rule of Evidence is based,1 54 allows the admission of certain collateral statements. 155 First, the Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (3)
indicates that collateral statements should be admissible. 156 The Advisory Committee's Note explicitly states, "Ordinarily the third-party
confession is thought of in terms of exculpating the accused, but this
is by no means always or necessarily the case: it may include state-

148. See id. at 495, 682 A.2d at 707 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting) ("Proximity is not the test
for admissibility under Standifur. .. ").
149. See supra note 74 (quoting the Standifur test for admissibility of collateral statements, which emphasizes reliability and trustworthiness). Collateral statements, too, could
be approached with the reasonable person test and pass. If a reasonable man would consider an entire declaration to be against interest, would not this include the collateral
statements contained within the declaration?
150. Matusky, 343 Md. at 493-94, 682 A.2d at 707 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
151. Id,at 494, 682 A.2d at 707.
152. Id.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 74 and 85.
154. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
155. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 614 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment).
156. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3) advisory committee's note).

860

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 57:642

ments implicating him, and under the general theory of declarations
against interest they would be admissible as related statements." 15 7 If

the text of the rule itself does not make clear whether collateral statements are admissible, the Advisory Committee's Note is the next logical place to turn for guidance. 15 The majority in Williamson believed
that the Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3) provided no guidance.' 5 9 However, the language of the
Advisory Committee's Note directly addresses the factual situation of
Williamson, as well as Matusky: the declarant's confession included
statements implicating the accused.' 6 ° The Advisory Committee's
Note is unambiguous in concluding that those portions implicating
the accused, "under the general theory of declarations against interest," should be admissible as related statements.' 6 '
The second source Justice Kennedy cited as support for the admissibility of collateral statements was the common law application of
the exception. 6 2 Justice Kennedy noted, "Absent contrary indications, we can presume that Congress intended the principles and
terms used in the Federal Rules of Evidence to be applied as they were
at common law.' 6' According to common law tradition, "'[f]rom the
very beginning of [the statement against interest] exception, it has
been held that a declaration against interest is admissible, not only to
prove the disserving fact stated, but also to prove other facts contained
in collateral statements connected with the disserving statement. '164
There is no indication that Congress intended to bury the common
law rule when it enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (3).165
Therefore, the common law remains a guiding force in the interpreta157. FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3) advisory committee's note. But see Williamson, 512 U.S. at
602 (reasoning that "the policy expressed in the Rule's text points clearly enough in one

direction that it outweighs whatever force the Notes may have").
158. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 614 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("When
as here the text of a Rule of Evidence does not answer a question that must be answered in
order to apply the Rule, and when the Advisory Committee's Note does answer the ques-

tion, our practice indicates that we should pay attention to the Advisory Committee's
Note.").
159. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 602 (explaining that the language of the Advisory Committee's Note "is not particularly clear").
160. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11 (detailing the declarations at issue in
Matusky); supra note 85 (describing the declarations at issue in Williamson).
161. FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3) advisory committee's note.
162. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 614-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
163. Id. at 615.
164. Id, (quoting Jefferson, supra note 33, at 57).
165. Id. (noting that "Congress legislated against the common-law background allowing
admission of some collateral statements, and I would not assume that Congress gave the
common-law rule a silent burial in Rule 804(b) (3)").
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tion and application of the statement against interest exception in
Maryland.
Justice Kennedy further argued that Rule 804(b) (3) must allow
the admission of some collateral statements because, if not, almost 1all
66
inculpatory statements sought to be admitted would be excluded.
Assuming arguendo that Rule 804(b) (3) did not allow collateral statements: Would Congress enact a statute with virtually no practical
use?16 7 Justice Kennedy explained:
[I] t is likely to be the rare case where the precise self-inculpatory words of the declarant, without more, also inculpate the
defendant. I would not presume that Congress intended the
effect
penal interest exception to the Rule to have so little 168
with respect to statements that inculpate the accused.
Establishing a bright-line rule excluding all collateral statements, no
matter what their role was in the particular declaration in question,
would certainly result in an "arbitrary rejection of valuable evidence.' 69 In the case at hand, for example, excluding the statements
implicating Matusky and giving his motives for the murders would
greatly diminish the State's case. The only other evidence against
Matusky was a bloody shoeprint found at the crime scene that was
consistent with the size and style of a pair of shoes belonging to
Matusky 7 ° Although the sufficiency of the evidence against the defendant should not be one of the considerations in determining the
admissibility of a statement against interest, the evidentiary purpose of
the exception should not be disregarded if the collateral statements
include the same indicia of reliability as the self-inculpatory portions
of the declaration.
The statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule "provide [s] for the admission of certain hearsay statements that display
indicia of reliability sufficient to overcome the normal dangers of admitting hearsay evidence."'' The two main cases relied upon by the
Matusky court, Williamson and Standifur, have reiterated this purpose.' 7 2 So the question remains why, in light of that purpose, collat166. Id. at 616 (quoting Bergeisen, supra note 122, at 1207).
167. See id at 614 (noting "the general presumption that Congress does not enact statutes that have almost no effect").
168. Id at 617.
169. Id. (quoting Hack, supra note 31, at 166).
170. Matusky, 343 Md. at 475, 682 A.2d at 697.
171. Hack, supra note 31, at 148.
172. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 598 (noting that hearsay exceptions exist for certain outof-court statements that are less subject to the hazards of unreliability); State v. Standifur,
310 Md. 3, 17, 526 A.2d 955, 962 (1987) (explaining that a statement should be examined
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eral statements with sufficient "indicia of reliability" may not enjoy
admission as well as truly self-inculpatory statements.
The admissibility of collateral statements also brings up the issue
of whether the declaration against interest exception was meant to
implicate a set of rules for the declaration as a whole to be admissible,
or whether those rules were to be required of each separate statement
within the proffered declaration. The word "statement" as applied in
the statement against interest exception must be defined before any
determination can be made as to whether a statement should be
parsed. In Williamson, the Court examined this very issue.1 73 Defining
statement as "a report or narrative" versus "a single declaration or remark" results in two very different views of the statements against interest exception."' If the term "statement" is considered a report, the
exception would seem to apply to the entire proffered declaration,
including those portions not directly self-inculpatory.1 75 On the other
hand, if the term is considered to encompass simply a single remark,
then parsing a declaration for specific self-inculpatory parts and admitting only those makes sense in keeping with the principle behind
76
the "statements" against interest exception.'
In Matusky, defining the term "statement" as either an extended
declaration or a single remark should yield the same result: the admissibility of the identification of Matusky and his motive for the
murders as told to Marchewka by White. 17 7 Judge Rodowsky explained, in his dissent, that these portions "are important, integrated
parts of White's declaration against penal interest.' 7 The subsequent incriminating portions of the conversation between White and
Matusky would not be incriminating but for the portions that the majority of the court would consider non-self-incriminating.1 79 While a
to see if there are any facts or circumstances that "cut against the presumption of reliability
normally attending a declaration against interest").
173. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599 (discussing the possible meanings of "statement" as applied in the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule).
174. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcrIoNARy 2229 (1993) (defining "state-

ment" as, among other things, both of these variants).
175. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599.
176. See id. (noting that defining the word "statement" as "a single declaration or remark" would make the exception cover the admission of only those declarations within the
confession that are "individually self-inculpatory").
177. See Matusky, 343 Md. at 496, 682 A.2d at 708 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting) (noting that
even a statement by statement parsing of [the declaration] . .. results in the admissibility"
of these portions).
178. Id.
179. See id. at 496 n.3, 682 A.2d at 708 n.3. Judge Rodowsky wrote:
I understand the majority of this Court to hold that any reference to Matusky is
inadmissible, and not simply the conclusory statement that Matusky was the mur-
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statement does not necessarily require reading in the entirety in order
to make sense, collateral portions not directly self-inculpatory would
provide the context necessary in order to appreciate the inculpatory
nature of the whole.
In Williamson, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, took the
perspective that the connection between those remarks that are truly
self-inculpatory and those that are not should be viewed with a suspicious eye. t18 Justice O'Connor stated in plain language, "The fact that
a person is making a broadly self-inculpatory confession does not
make more credible the confession's non-self-inculpatory parts. "181
"One of the most effective ways to lie," Justice O'Connor acknowledged, "is to mix falsehood with truth .
"..."182
This is the reason,
however, that the statement against interest exception has required an
inquiry into the totality of circumstances surrounding the making of
the declaration, as well as the intricacies of the declaration itself.
The collateral statements at issue in Matusky are critical to White's
declaration against interest.' 83 In dissent, Judge Rodowsky illustrated
an effective way to test whether the statements deemed collateral and
inadmissible were actually integral parts of White's declaration against
interest:
In that analytical framework a prosecutor would be seeking
to convict White of being a principal in the second degree to
murder based on White's admission as a party opponent that
White met someone in a bar whom White did not know, that
that person said that he wanted to murder Trudy and Pam
[Poffel] for reasons that were not expressed, and that White

derer that appears at the beginning of White's conversation with Marchewka....
[1]f White's conversation with Marchewka had stopped at that point, the conclusory statement would not be admissible because White had not yet made any
declarations against penal interest. Later incriminating portions of the conversation support the conclusion expressed earlier.
Id.
180. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599.
181. Id. Justice O'Connor also explained, "[s]elf-exculpatory statements are exactly the
ones which people are most likely to make even when they are false; and mere proximity to
other, self-inculpatory, statements does not increase the plausibility of the self-exculpatory
statements." Id- at 600; see alsoJefferson, supra note 33, at 62 (explaining that "the presence of the declaration against interest does not add to the trustworthiness of neutral and
self-serving statements").
182. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599-600.
183. Matusky, 343 Md. at 496, 682 A.2d at 708 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting).
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drove 4 the stranger to the [Poffel] home in the stranger's
car.

18

Dismissing the collateral statements from the declaration takes away
its inherently incriminating aspect. 18 5 When a self-inculpatory "'statement is made under circumstances fairly indicating the declarant's
' 186
sincerity and accuracy,' the entire statement should be admitted."
In fact, frequently the portion of a declaration that is self-inculpatory to the declarant, if considered by itself, has no relevance to any
issue in the case against the defendant. 8 . For example, in Matusky,
the fact that White listened as some person explained his motive for
killing the Poffels, and then drove this person to the Poffels' home
and waited in the car, would have no relevance to the case against
Matusky if Matusky were not the unidentified person.
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals greatly altered the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule as applied in Maryland trial courts. In State v. Matusky, the court made clear that the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the corresponding Federal Rule of
Evidence weighed heavily in the court's decision. The court also held
that non-self-inculpatory statements contained within a declaration
against interest are no longer admissible, regardless of their indicia of
trustworthiness and reliability. Such a decision evades the original rationale behind the statement against interest exception-that such
statements were inherently reliable because a person would not make
such a declaration unless he believed it to be true. The non-self-inculpatory portions of a broad self-inculpatory declaration still may enjoy
the requisite indications of trustworthiness. However, the Matusky
court's decision does not allow the leeway necessary to ensure the admissibility of valuable evidence that may fall within the narrow category of "collateral" statements.
REBECCA L. DUBIN

184. Id. at 497, 682 A.2d at 708. AsJudge Rodowsky so eloquently noted, "[tlo a reasonable person, the expurgated version sounds more like the statement of a mentally disturbed individual than a declaration against penal interest." Id., 682 A.2d at 708-09.
185. Cf Jefferson, supra note 33, at 62 (arguing that if collateral statements were made
Oadmissible, this "would get around the familiar doctrine that the confession of a co-defendant is not admissible against the other defendant").
186. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 612 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 5
WIGMORE, supra note 66, § 1465, at 271).
187. SeeJefferson, supra note 33, at 57.
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B.

Closing the Door on the Residual Hearsay Exception

In State v. Walker,1 the Court of Appeals addressed, for the first
time, the application of the residual hearsay exception under the
newly codified Maryland Rules of Evidence. 2 The court held that the
trial court had erred in admitting out-of-court statements by the defendant's wife under the residual exception because there were no
exceptional circumstances to justify admission.3 The majority failed,
however, to offer any clear guidance as to what factors a trial court
should consider in determining whether exceptional circumstances
exist to merit application of the residual hearsay exception. In failing
to provide such guidance, the Court of Appeals has likely made the
standard for exceptional circumstances unattainable, and in so doing,
has effectively closed the door on Maryland's residual hearsay
exception.4
1. The Case.--On June 10, 1994, Jose Iraheta, a Hispanic male,
was accosted while riding his bicycle along Twinbrook Parkway in
Montgomery County, Maryland.' The assailant, a black male wearing
a green, hooded shirt with the hood pulled tightly over his head,
pushed Iraheta down and robbed him of sixty dollars at knife-point.6
The victim reported the robbery to the police but told the officers that
he was not able to see the face of the assailant.7
On June 11, 1994, Robin Hammond (Ms. Walker) and Larry
Walker walked down Twinbrook Parkway in the same area where the
Iraheta robbery occurred.' A police car passed them, and Mr. Walker
attempted to hide his face.9 When Ms. Walker questioned him about
his behavior, the respondent told her that he had robbed a Hispanic
man of sixty dollars the night before in the same area.10 The next
day, while in the company of Ms. Walker, the respondent retrieved the
1. 345 Md. 293, 691 A.2d 1341 (1997).
2. Id. at 318-20, 691 A.2d at 1353-54.
3. Id. at 330, 691 A.2d at 1359.
4. See id. at 346-47, 691 A.2d at 1367 (Chasanow,J., dissenting) ("If the same unattainable standard for 'exceptional circumstances' [is used in future cases] .... then Maryland
has no residual exceptions.").
5. Walker, 345 Md. at 296, 691 A.2d at 1342.
6. Id.
7. Walker v. State, 107 Md. App. 502, 512, 668 A.2d 990, 994-95 (1995), affd, 345 Md.
293, 691 A.2d 1341 (1997).
8. Walker, 345 Md. at 296, 691 A.2d at 1342. Robin Hammond later became Robin
Walker, Larry's wife, id. at 297, 691 A.2d at 1343, and will be referred to as Ms. Walker
hereinafter.
9. Id. at 296, 691 A.2d at 1342.
10. Id.
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hooded green sweatshirt that he said he had been wearing during the
robbery and threw it into a dumpster.1 1
Between June 11 and 15, 1994, Ms. Walker contacted the police
and relayed Mr. Walker's confession to two different detectives. 12 Ms.
Walker told the detectives that the respondent was the father of her
children and that she and Mr. Walker had lived together "intermittently" since 1989.1' However, in March 1994, Ms. Walker had moved
that Mr.
out of the residence they shared because she believed
14
kids."
the
on
influence
bad
a
"was
use
drug
Walker's
Five days later, Mr. Walker was arrested for the robbery of Jose
Iraheta on the basis of Ms. Walker's statements.15 Before the start of
the trial, which was set for January 12, 1995, Ms. Walker told the
State's Attorney that she and Mr. Walker had been married on September 1, 1994.16 Ms. Walker further informed the State's Attorney
that she intended to invoke her spousal privilege' 7 and would not testify against her husband. 1 8 The State moved to have Ms. Walker's
signed statements admitted.' 9 The respondent objected on the
ground that the statements were hearsay and did not fall within any of
the exceptions to the hearsay rule.2 0
Relying on the residual exception to the hearsay rule extant
under Rule 5-804(b) (5) of the Maryland Rules of Evidence, 2 1 and on
11. Id.
12. Id. at 296-97, 691 A.2d at 1342. Both detectives reduced her statements to writing,
and Ms. Walker eventually signed both versions. Id. at 297, 691 A.2d at 1342.
13. Id. at 297, 691 A.2d at 1342.
14. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Walker, 107 Md. App. at 512-15, 668 A.2d at 994-96.
16. Walker, 345 Md. at 297, 691 A.2d at 1343.
17. Id. In Maryland, a person cannot be compelled to testify as an adverse witness
against his or her spouse in a criminal proceeding, except in certain domestic abuse proceedings. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (Supp. 1997).
18. Walker, 345 Md. at 297, 691 A.2d at 1343.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 297-98, 691 A.2d at 1343. At the hearing, defense counsel stated that it was
his "understanding that Ms. Walker made her statement to the police 'because she wanted
[respondent] to get some help for his drug problem.'" Id. at 297, 691 A.2d at 1343 (alteration in original). To this assertion the prosecutor replied, "'I believe that is accurate.'" Id.
The court noted that there was "nothing in the record to indicate why Ms. Walker made
the statements." Id. at 297 n.2, 691 A.2d at 1343 n.2.
21. Maryland's residual hearsay exception provides that:
Under exceptional circumstances, the following are not excluded by the
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is unavailable as a witness: A statement
not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes
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the res gestae exception applied in Metz v. State,2 2 the trial court allowed the statements to be admitted against Mr. Walker. 23 In applying the residual exception, the trial court found that Ms. Walker was
unavailable because she exercised her privilege not to testify against
her husband:
The court concluded that ... the situation was "unique."

It held that the statements were being offered as evidence of
a material fact and that they were more probative of that fact
than any other evidence that the State was able to procure
through reasonable efforts.

. .

. It further found that the

general purpose of the rules and the interest ofjustice would
best be served by admission of the 24statements and that the
statements appeared to be reliable.
The court also held that, alternatively, Metz could be relied upon to
support the admission of a non-testifying spouse's out-of-court statements against a hearsay objection. 25 Mr. Walker was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and sentenced to fifteen years in prison.2 6
The Court of Special Appeals reviewed de novo all aspects of the
trial judge's evidentiary ruling. 27 The appellate court reversed the
of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. A statement may not be admitted under this exception
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity
to prepare to meet it, the intention to offer the statement and the particulars of
it, including the name and address of the declarant.
MD. R. 5-804(b) (5); see also infra note 57 (comparing the Maryland residual hearsay exceptions to their federal counterparts).
22. 9 Md. App. 15, 262 A.2d 331 (1970). In Metz v. State, Mr. Metz had been charged
with assaulting his wife. Id. at 17, 262 A.2d at 332. Mrs. Metz exercised her spousal privilege and declined to testify against her husband at trial. Id. The court allowed the police
officer who was called to the scene to testify about what he saw when he arrived and to
recount a statement that Mrs. Metz had uttered. Id. at 17-18, 262 A.2d at 332-33. On
appeal, Mr. Metz argued that his wife's statement should not have been admitted because
it was covered by privilege and, alternatively, because it was hearsay. Id. at 18, 262 A.2d at
333. The hearsay issue had not been preserved on appeal, but the Court of Special Appeals did express its view, in dicta, that the statement was "part of the res gestae." Id. at 1920, 262 A.2d at 333-34. Res gestae has been used to describe a remark that is made spontaneously or contemporaneously with the transaction to which it relates, thus inherently carrying with it a degree of credibility. See Burkowske v. Church Hosp. Corp., 50 Md. App.
515, 520, 439 A.2d 40, 44 (1982) (discussing the use of the res gestae exception to the
hearsay rule), overruled in part by B & K Rentals & Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co.,
324 Md. 147, 596 A.2d 640 (1991).
23. Walker, 345 Md. at 298, 691 A.2d at 1343.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 303, 691 A.2d at 1345.
26. Id. at 295, 691 A.2d at 1342.
27. Walker, 107 Md. App. at 517, 668 A.2d at 997.
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judgment, stating that the trial court had committed three reversible
2
errors in connection with Ms. Walker's statements to the police. 1
First, the court held that the trial court had erred in admitting the
evidence because the trial court had failed to make a clear finding
that exceptional circumstances existed. 29 Second, the Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court had failed to consider all of the
relevant factors in determining whether the statements to the police
possessed circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.3 ° The trial
court was directed, on remand, to make specific findings as to each of
the elements in Rule 5-804(b) (5)." a Third, the appellate court con-

cluded, if those conditions were satisfied, the trial court was then to
consider whether the statement would have been admissible under
common law-an analysis that the trial court failed to undertake in
the initial trial.3 2
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider whether the
statements were wrongfully admitted under the residual exception to
the hearsay rule.33
2. Legal Background.-With the possible exception of a trial by
jury, "there is, perhaps, nothing more esteemed in our Anglo-Ameri-

28. Id. at 526-28, 668 A.2d at 1002-03. The Court of Special Appeals also addressed the
respondent's contention that because the crime occurred before July 1, 1994, the effective
date of the new rules of evidence, Rule 5-804(b) (5) was inapplicable. Id. at 522, 668 A.2d
at 999-1000. Because the trial began afterJuly 1, 1994, the court concluded that the new
rules of evidence were applicable. Id. at 522-23, 668 A.2d at 1000. The initial inquiry was
whether the evidence was admissible under Rule 5-804(b) (5); if the court concluded that it
was, then the court would proceed to a second inquiry to determine whether the evidence
also would have been admissible under preexisting common law. Id. The Court of Special
Appeals based this analysis on the conditional language used by the Court of Appeals in
the order formally adopting the Maryland Rules of Evidence, codified at Title 5 of the
Maryland Rules. Id. The Court of Appeals explained:
[Title 5 rules] shall take effectJuly 1, 1994 and shall apply in all trials and hearings commenced on or after that date; provided, however, that ... no evidence
shall be admitted against a defendant in a criminal action in proof of a crime
committed prior toJuly 1, 1994, unless that evidence would have been admissible
under the law and Rules in effect on June 30, 1994.
Id. at 522, 688 A.2d at 1000 (ellipsis in original) (quoting the language of the Court of
Appeals's Order adopting Title 5 (the Maryland Rules of Evidence)).
29. Id. at 526-27, 668 A.2d at 1002.
30. Id. at 526, 530-32, 668 A.2d at 1002, 1004-05.
31. Id. at 532, 668 A.2d at 1004.
32. Id. at 522-23, 535, 668 A.2d at 1000, 1006; see also supra note 28 (discussing the
conditional language used by the Court of Appeals in formally adopting the Maryland
Rules of Evidence).
33. Walker, 345 Md. at 295-96, 691 A.2d at 1342.
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can law of evidence than the rule against hearsay." 4 Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted." 5 As scholars have noted, "The principal reason to exclude hearsay evidence is to safeguard against unreliable second-hand accusations."3 6 Before there was a rule against hearsay, a
person could be tried and convicted by a statement made out of court
without being allowed to confront the accuser.3 This "tale of tale" or
"story out of another man's mouth" was greatly criticized, and the rule
prohibiting hearsay was recognized by the end of the seventeenth
century. s
Nevertheless, almost immediately after courts started recognizing
the rule against hearsay, they also recognized the equally compelling
need for exceptions to the rule, because, as was discovered, hearsay
exceptions saved time and provided the court with flexibility.39 These
exceptions, however, have developed in a haphazard manner; "a picture of the hearsay rule with its exceptions would resemble an oldfashioned crazy quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings
by cubists, futurists and surrealists."4 0 In this area of law, there is the
unique combination of stringent application of the rule prohibiting
hearsay with liberal application of the exceptions.4 1
34. James E. Beaver, The Residual Hearsay Exception Reconsidered, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
787, 788 (1993) (construing 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 1364(11) (9), at 28 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)). Wigmore heralded the rule
against hearsay as the "most characteristic rule of the Anglo-American law of evidence-a
rule which may be esteemed, next to jury trial, the greatest contribution of that eminently
practical legal system to the world's methods of procedure." 5 WIGMORE, supra,
§ 1364(11) (9), at 28.
35. MD. R. 5-801(c).
36. Howard S. Chasanow &Jos6 Felip6 Anderson, The Residual HearsayExceptions: Maryland's Lukewarm Welcome, 24 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994).
37. See Beaver, supra note 34, at 788. The conviction and execution of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603 for an act of high treason played a large part in the development of the
hearsay rule. Id. Raleigh was convicted largely on the evidence of a statement from an
alleged fellow conspirator, Lord Cobham, who later recanted his confession. Id.
38. Chasanow & Anderson, supra note 36, at 6. The rule against hearsay facilitates the
cross-examination of the accuser. Id. at 7.
39. See id. at 7 ("Some early exceptions included involuntary utterances, regular entries
into shopbooks, and dying declarations." (footnotes omitted)).
40. Edmund M. Morgan & John MacArthur Maguire, Looking Backward and Forwardat
Evidence, 50 HARv. L. REV. 909, 921 (1937).
41. See Chasanow & Anderson, supra note 36, at 8 ("[E]xceptions to the general rule
against hearsay were necessary to provide flexibility to the courts, but the unique combination of harsh applications of the rule and liberal exceptions to the rule [has] created
controversy.").
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Developing hearsay exceptions one case at a time caused so many
difficulties in judicial proceedings that it was one of the primary reasons for the codification of the rules of evidence in both state and
federal courts.4 2 As a matter of both federal and state law, hearsay is
generally inadmissible unless it falls within one of the exceptions to
the hearsay rule.4 3
a. History of the Residual Hearsay Exception in Federal Courts.The earliest documented case recognizing the concept of a catch-all
or residual hearsay exception was G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub.
Co.44 In G. & C. Merriam, the issue was whether Ogilvie, the compiler
of a dictionary, had based his book on Webster's Dictionary.4 5 The
only evidence was Ogilvie's preface to the dictionary, which had been
published sixty-three years before the trial.4 6 Judge Learned Hand,
relying on Wigmore's then recently published treatise,4 7 noted that
there occasionally will be forms of hearsay that do not fit within the
recognized exceptions but that, nevertheless, "fulfill[ ] both the requisites of an exception of the hearsay rule, necessity and circumstantial
guarant[ees] of trustworthiness."4" Because this was the best evidence
on the subject and the matter could not be analyzed with any other
evidence, Ogilvie's preface to the dictionary was admitted as
evidence.4 9
The true origin of the federal residual hearsay exception, however, is usually traced to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Dallas County v.
Commercial Union Assurance Co.5" In that case, a clock tower on top of
the Dallas County Courthouse had collapsed and fallen through the
roof, causing severe damage. 5 ' The plaintiff contended that the collapse was caused by a recent lightning strike, which would allow the
42. Id. at 8-9.
43. Id. at 6. "The Supreme Court has recognized dying declarations, prior testimony,
business records, public records, excited utterances, statements made seeking medical
treatment, and co-conspirator statements as 'firmly rooted' exceptions to the hearsay rule."
Id. at 4 n.1l.
44. 207 F. 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1913).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 517-18.
47. See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRiALs AT
COMMON LAW (1st ed. 1905).
48. G. & C. Merriam, 207 F. at 518. Judge Learned Hand continued: "[E]veryone else
is dead who ever knew anything about the matter and could intelligently tell us what the
fact is.... As to the trustworthiness of the testimony, it has the guaranty of the occasion, at
which there was no motive for fabrication." Id.
49. See id. ("Surely the law is not so unreasonable as [not to admit the evidence].").
50. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).
51. Id. at 390.
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plaintiff to collect on its insurance policy.5 2 The defendant insurance
company's experts testified that the courthouse had collapsed due to
poor design, gradual deterioration, and faulty construction, and that
the charring was due to a long-ago fire.5 3 The issue in Dallas County
centered around the admissibility of a newspaper article offered by
the insurance company as proof that the courthouse had been damaged by fire in 1901, and not, as the plaintiff contended, by a recent
lightning bolt.5 4 The trial judge admitted the newspaper article despite plaintiff's objections that it was hearsay and not admissible under
any recognized exception to the hearsay doctrine.5 5 The court of appeals held that the newspaper article was admissible because it was
"necessary and trustworthy, relevant and material, and its admission
[was] within the trial judge's exercise of discretion in holding the
hearing within reasonable bounds."5 6
The factors detailed in Dallas County were used in the creation of
what are now the federal residual exceptions to the hearsay rule.5 7
52. Id. Dallas County had insurance coverage for damage caused by fire or lightning,
and several residents reported that a bolt of lightning had hit the tower five days earlier.
Id. There was evidence of charring on top of the tower, but the insurance company alleged that the clock tower collapsed due to faulty design. Id.
53. Id. To prove this point, the insurance company introduced a copy of the Morning
Times of Selma from June 1901, which carried an article describing a fire at the courthouse
while it was still under construction. Id. at 390-91.
54. Id. at 391; see also supra note 53.
55. Dallas County, 286 F.2d at 391. The plaintiff contended that the newspaper article
was not a business record nor an ancient document, and therefore did not fall within
either of those exceptions to the hearsay rule. Id.
56. Id. at 398. The court further explained that the article was "more reliable, more
trustworthy, [and] more competent evidence than the testimony of a witness called to the
stand fifty-eight years later." Id. at 397. The court also noted that a local newspaper reporter would be highly unlikely to falsify a story widely known to the community, because
by so doing, he would subject himself and the paper to embarrassment. Id.
57. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24) (providing a residual hearsay exception if the declarant is
available as a witness); FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (5) (providing a residual hearsay exception if
the declarant is unavailable); see also Walker, 345 Md. at 314-15, 691 A.2d at 1351 (discussing
the history of the codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence). The Senate Judiciary
Committee cited Dallas County as an example in which "there are certain exceptional circumstances where evidence which is found by a court to have guarantees of trustworthiness
equivalent to or exceeding the guarantees reflected by the presently listed exceptions, and
to have a high degree of prolativeness [sic] and necessity could properly be admissible." S.
REP. No. 93-1277, at 19 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7065.
The State of Maryland added the "under exceptional circumstances" requirement to
its residual hearsay exceptions. See MD. R. 5-803(b) (24); MD. R. 5-804(b)(5). Otherwise,
the text of the Maryland Rules is almost identical to that of the Federal Rules. See FED. R.
EVID. 803(24); FED. R. E'AD. 804(b)(5); MD.R. 5-803(b)(24); MD. R. 5-804(b)(5). Federal
Rule 803(24) and Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(24) differ, respectively, from Federal Rule
804(b) (5) and Maryland Rule 5-804(b) (5) only in that the former leave out the requirement that the declarant be "unavailable."
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Notably, however, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the residual exceptions cautions that these exceptions are intended to "be used very rarely, and only in exceptional
circumstances.

15

'

Despite the cautionary note included with the fed-

eral residual hearsay exceptions, the rules have been used liberally by
many federal courts. 9
b. History of the Common Law Residual Hearsay Exceptions in
Maryland Courts.-Although Maryland courts never formally embraced the approach intimated in Dallas County,6" Maryland case law
reflects a moderately flexible approach to the application of a residual
exception to the hearsay rule.6 1 The Court of Appeals has acknowledged that courts are free to create additional hearsay exceptions and
are sometimes required to admit hearsay that does not fall within any
of the recognized exceptions, but the court has deferred to the legislature for any decisions that would require a liberal exception to the
62
traditional hearsay rules.
58. S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 20 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7066. In
justifying the residual exception, the Committee stated that "the well recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule[ ] may not encompass every situation in which the reliability and
appropriateness of a particular piece of hearsay evidence make clear that it should be
heard and considered by the trier of fact." Id. at 7065; see also Beaver, supra note 34, at 79293 (discussing the creation of the federal residual hearsay exception).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Medico, 557 F.2d 309, 313-17 (2d Cir. 1988) (approving
the admission into evidence under FED. R. EvIo. 804(b) (5) of the double hearsay identification of the defendant's getaway car); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 90-91 (1st Cir.
1979) (upholding the trial court's admission of a lawyer's affidavit under FED. R. EVID.
804(b) (5) despite severe questions about the trustworthiness of the affidavit and the lack
of the required notice); United States v. laconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554, 559-60 (E.D.N.Y.)
(upholding a trial court's admission into evidence of hearsay), affid, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir.
1976); see also infra note 183 (discussing Medico and laconetti).
60. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961). One commentator explained the importance of Dallas County in this way:
The importance of Dallas County is not just that it established a lenient test
for admissibility-an analysis of the statement's necessity and trustworthinessbut also that it represented the outer limits ofjudicial discretion: a court is empowered to admit otherwise inadmissible hearsay on a case-by-case basis, without
resorting to a class exception or creating a new class exception.
Joseph W. Rand, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: The Futile and Misguided
Attempt to RestrainJudicialDiscretion, 80 GEO. L.J. 873, 876 (1992).
61. But cf.Jeffrey E. Greene, Note, Residual Hearsay Exceptions: A New Opening?, 54 MD.
L. REV. 1100, 1100 (1995) ("In a significant change from Maryland's common law, the
newly adopted Maryland Rules of Evidence provide for the admission of hearsay evidence
that does not fall within one of the commonly recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule."
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
62. See Chasanow & Anderson, supra note 36, at 21-22 (discussing the "healthy reluctance" of Maryland's appellate courts to create new hearsay exceptions); cf Cassidy v. State,
74 Md. App. 1, 8, 536 A.2d 666, 669 (1988) ("Maryland, in the common law tradition, is
more rigorous and orthodox in its approach to hearsay exceptions.").
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In Fosterv. State,6" the Court of Appeals reversed a trial judge for
his failure to admit hearsay evidence that did not fall under any of
Maryland's common law exceptions to the rule against hearsay.6 4 The
Court of Appeals held that the testimony had to be admitted because
the excluded testimony was necessary to the accused's defense and
had sufficient indicia of reliability. 65 In a concurring opinion, Judge
Eldridge stated that the constitutional question should never have
been reached; instead, the testimony should have been admissible as a
67
matter of state evidence law. 6 6 Judge Eldridge cited G. & C. Merriam
6
8
and Dallas County to support his contention that hearsay evidence,
even if it does not fall within one of the recognized exceptions, may
be admitted if "it meets the requirements of necessity and
reliability."6"
In Brown v. State,7" the Court of Appeals appeared to expand the
application of the residual hearsay exception. Brown involved a probation revocation hearing in which the defendant contended that the
evidence against him was inadmissible hearsay and "contravened his
due process right to confront witnesses against him."7" Due to the
constitutional challenge, the Court of Appeals performed a multi-level
analysis, in which it concluded that the proffered hearsay was so vital
63. 297 Md. 191, 464 A.2d 986 (1983). Respondent Foster, on trial for the murder of a
motel manager, tried to show that her husband could have committed the crime. Id. at
195-96, 464 A.2d at 988-89. The husband admitted to having several confrontations with
the victim, but he denied verbally threatening her. Id. at 199-200, 464 A.2d at 991. To
impeach her husband's testimony, the respondent called a friend of the victim who testified that Foster's husband had recently threatened to kill the victim. Id. at 200, 464 A.2d at
991.
64. Id. at 210-12, 220, 464 A.2d at 996-97, 1001.
65. Id. at 210-12, 464 A.2d at 996-97. The court held that the failure to admit the
evidence would deprive the accused of her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of
law. Id.
66. Id. at 230, 464 A.2d at 1006 (Eldridge, J., concurring). Judge Eldridge was concurring in the court's denial of a motion for reconsideration. See id.
67. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 50-56, 60 and accompanying text.
69. Foster, 297 Md. at 231-34, 464 A.2d at 1007-08 (Eldridge, J., concurring). Judge
Eldridge did express his reluctance to extend this position to admit any hearsay evidence
that is necessary and trustworthy, because Rule 803(24) of the Federal Rules of Evidence
had "led to some excesses with which [he] could not agree." Id. at 234, 464 A.2d at 1008.
70. 317 Md. 417, 564 A.2d 772 (1989).
71. Id. at 419, 564 A.2d at 773. The violation of the condition of Brown's probation
was that he allegedly possessed two guns. Id. Robin Bruce, the key witness relied upon by
the State to prove that a probation violation had occurred, refused to testify against Brown
at the revocation hearing despite his having already implicated Brown at Bruce's own sentencing. Id. at 419-20, 564 A.2d at 773. The State offered transcripts of the testimony given
by Bruce from his trial, and Brown was subsequently found to be in violation of his probation. Id. at 420-21, 564 A.2d at 773-74.
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to the issue of guilt that the "indicia of reliability must be substantial
to justify its admission when it cannot qualify under any of the firmly
established exceptions to the hearsay rule."72 The court noted that
the formal rules of evidence are not applicable in probation revocation hearings.7 3 While the Court of Appeals did not expressly adopt
the residual hearsay exception, it suggested that hearsay evidence
could be admitted if certain criteria were met:
The proposition that hearsay evidence may be sufficiently reliable to justify its admission where necessary to further the cause ofjustice, even though it does not fall within a
recognized exception, is not new. This general principle has
now achieved recognition in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The rule that reasonably reliable hearsay evidence may be
admitted in probation revocation
hearings is a logical exten74
proposition.
that
of
sion
The Court of Appeals next addressed the residual hearsay exception in Tyler v. State.7 ' The State suggested that the "highly unusual
circumstances" of the case called for the application of the residual
hearsay exception. 76 The Court of Appeals cited Brown to support the

72. Id. at 426, 564 A.2d at 776.
73. See id. at 421-22, 564 A.2d at 774-75.
74. Id. at 426, 564 A.2d at 776 (citing, among other authoritative sources, G. & C.
Merriam and Dallas County for the "combination of necessity and circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness sufficient to justify admission of hearsay evidence"). The court found
that the hearsay evidence against Brown did not possess "sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," and thus was inadmissible. Id. at 427-28, 564 A.2d at 777.
75. 342 Md. 766, 679 A.2d 1127 (1996). Petitioners Jerry Tyler and Gerald Eiland had
been charged with murder, tried as co-defendants, and convicted. Id. at 769, 679 A.2d at
1129. The convictions were reversed because of the State's misuse of its peremptory challenges; on remand, Tyler and Eiland had their cases severed. Id. Eiland was tried first,
blamed the entire shooting on Tyler, and was acquitted. Id. at 769-70, 679 A.2d at 1129.
Tyler took the stand at his second trial and blamed the shooting entirely on Eiland. Id.
When Eiland was called to the stand, he refused to testify, and the State sought to admit as
evidence the transcript from Eiland's testimony at his own trial. Id. at 771-73, 679 A.2d at
1130-31. After Tyler objected to the evidence as hearsay, the trial judge ruled that it was
admissible under the "former testimony" exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 773, 679
A.2d at 1131. Tyler was later convicted. Id. The Court of Special Appeals upheld the
conviction, although it held that the testimony was admissible as a "prior inconsistent statement," and not as former testimony. Id. at 773-75, 679 A.2d at 1131-32. The court acknowledged that it was seeking to "push[ ] out... the envelope" in order to prevent these
two defendants from making a "laughingstock... of the criminal justice system." Tyler v.
State, 105 Md. App. 495, 516-17, 660 A.2d 986, 996-97 (1995) (en banc), rev'd, 342 Md. 766,
679 A.2d 1127 (1996).
76. Tyler, 342 Md. at 780, 679 A.2d at 1134.
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availability of this exception.7 7 Because the State had not preserved
this issue for appeal, the Court of Appeals did not need to rule on the
possible admissibility of this evidence under the residual exception.7 8
The court nonetheless addressed the merits of the claim and stated
that the proffered testimony would not be admissible because
it did
79
trustworthiness.
of
"guarantees
requisite
the
not possess
c. Maryland's Rules of Evidence.--Despite the decision to develop a state code of evidence shortly after the codification of the Federal Rules in 1976,8" the Maryland Rules of Evidence did not become
effective until July 1, 1994.81 One of the most difficult decisions for
the court was whether to adopt some form of the residual hearsay
exceptions.8 2 The Court of Appeals voted to adopt the residual exceptions, using the federal language, but it placed introductory language
in both Rule 5-803(b) (24) and Rule 5-804(b) (5) that stated that the
exception should be used "[u]nder exceptional circumstances." 83 In
addition, the Maryland Rules Committee included a note to Rule
5-803 that was similar to the Federal Committee Note, stating that the
residual exceptions should be "used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.

84

77. Id. The Court of Appeals also referred to the residual hearsay exceptions that had
recently been promulgated as Rules 5-803(b)(24) and 5-804(b)(5) of the Maryland Rules
of Evidence. Id.
78. Id. at 780-81, 679 A.2d at 1134.
79. Id. at 781, 679 A.2d at 1134 (citing MD. R. 5-803(b) (24); MD. R. 5-804(b) (5)).
80. See Chasanow & Anderson, supra note 36, at 21-23 (discussing the development of
the Maryland Rules of Evidence). In 1976, the Maryland Rules Committee was formed by
the Court of Appeals to begin work on developing a code of evidence. Id. at 23. However,
the court decided not to proceed with the project until 1988, when approximately 35 states
had already codified rules of evidence. Walker, 345 Md. at 317, 691 A.2d at 1352. In December 1993, the Court of Appeals voted to adopt the proposed codification of the rules.
See Chasanow & Anderson, supra note 36, at 23.
81. Chasanow & Anderson, supra note 36, at 1.
82. See Greene, supra note 61, at 1102 (discussing the history of the Maryland Rules of
Evidence). In 1993, the Evidence Subcommittee of the Maryland Rules Committee recommended not including the residual exceptions in the Maryland Rules of Evidence. Id. The
full Committee was evenly divided when a motion to reject the Subcommittee's recommendation to exclude the residual exceptions was made. Id.
83. Id. Maryland Rules 5-803(b) (24) and 5-804(b) (5) are identical except that the latter requires the declarant to be "unavailable." See supra note 57 (comparing the Maryland
residual hearsay exceptions with their federal counterparts).
84. The Committee Note for Rule 5-803 states:
The residual exceptions provided by Rule 5-803(b) (24) and Rule 5-804(b) (5) do
not contemplate an unfettered exercise ofjudicial discretion, but they do provide
for treating new and presently unanticipated situations which demonstrate a trustworthiness within the spirit of the specifically stated exceptions. Within this
framework, room is left for growth and development of the law of evidence in the
hearsay area, consistently with the broad purposes expressed in Rule 5-102.

876
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Court of Appeals began its analysis in Walker by dismissing the trial court's reliance on Metz, and reiterating that the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule is no longer
part of Maryland's law of evidence. 5 The court denied the existence
of a common law residual exception to the hearsay rule. 6 It stated
that although, prior to 1994, "on rare occasion" the court had allowed
"hearsay statements that did not fall within any of the recognized categorical exceptions to be admitted, [it] had never formally or directly
recognized a general residual exception to the hearsay rule, much less
''
defined the scope or contour of such an exception. 7
The court discussed Foster,"s Brown, 9 and Tyler9 in detail to refute the State's contention that it had recognized a residual exception
equivalent in scope to Rule 5-804(b) (5).g" The court emphasized that
it was not without the authority to craft new exceptions to the hearsay
rule, but simply had not done so before the adoption of the Rules of
Evidence. 2 The court also stated that although it had "in a few opinIt is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used very rarely,
and only in exceptional circumstances. The Committee does not intend to establish a broad license for trial judges to admit hearsay statements that do not fall
within one of the other exceptions contained in Rules 5-803 and 5-804(b). The
residual exceptions are not meant to authorize major judicial revisions of the
hearsay rule, including its present exceptions. Such major revisions are best accomplished by amendments to the Rule itself. It is intended that in any case in
which evidence is sought to be admitted under these subsections, the trial judge
will exercise no less care, reflection, and caution than the courts did under the
common law in establishing the now-recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule.
MD. R. 5-803 committee note; accordS. REP. No. 93-1277, at 18-20 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7065-66 (discussing the Senate's reasons for adopting the residual hearsay exceptions while cautioning against overuse of the exceptions). The second paragraph
in the Committee Note for Maryland Rule 5-803 is identical to one of the paragraphs in the
Senate Report.
85. Walker, 345 Md. at 303-04, 691 A.2d at 1345-46; see also supra note 22 (discussing
Metz and the res gestae exception). The court cited both B & K Rentals & Sales Co. v.
Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 324 Md. 147, 596 A.2d 640 (1991), and Cassidy v. State, 74 Md.
App. 1, 536 A.2d 666 (1988), to support its finding that the Court of Appeals had previously abolished reliance on the res gestae exception. Walker, 345 Md. at 304, 691 A.2d at
1346.
86. Walker, 345 Md. at 304, 691 A.2d at 1346.
87. Id.
88. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
91. Walker, 345 Md. at 304-09, 691 A.2d at 1346-49.
92. Id. at 309-10, 691 A.2d at 1349. The court explained:
None of this is to say.., that the common law of evidence ... [is] entirely
static ....

The essence of the common law-indeed the heart of its enduring

value and majesty-is its flexibility, its potential and allowance for development
and growth, and that is as much the case with respect to the law of evidence, and
the hearsay rule in particular, as it is in other areas of the law.
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ions, cited or discussed [Federal Rules of Evidence] 803(24) and
804(b) (5) and cases such as Dallas County that applied ajudicially-fashioned residual exception,"
it had "not formally embraced them as part
3
of Maryland law."

After an extensive discussion of the history of both the Federal
and Maryland Rules of Evidence,9 4 the Court of Appeals applied Maryland Rule 5-804(b) (5)," and it stated that there are six conditions
that must be satisfied for hearsay evidence to be admissible under this
rule:
1) the witness must be "unavailable"
2) there must be "exceptional circumstances";
3) the statement must not be specifically covered by any
of the other exceptions;
4) it must have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness";
5) the court must determine that (i) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact, (ii) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can produce through
reasonable efforts, and (iii) the general purposes of the rules
and the interests ofjustice will best be served by admission of
the statement into evidence; and
6) the proponent of the statement has given the requi96
site advance notice of its intention to use the statement.
The Court of Appeals concluded that there was no dispute over
the unavailability of the witness, that the statement was not covered by
any other exception, and that advance notice had been given.97 The
respondent had not challenged the trial court's finding that the statement was offered as a material fact, it was more probative on point
than any other evidence, and the interests of justice would best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence.9" The Court of
Appeals determined that the central issues in the case were whether
Id.
93. Id. at 310, 691 A.2d at 1349.
94. Id. at 310-18, 691 A-2d at 1349-53.
95. Id. at 318-30, 691 A.2d at 1353-59.
96. Id. at 318-19, 691 A.2d at 1353-54 (footnote omitted).
97. Id. at 319-20, 691 A.2d at 1354. Ms. Walker was "'unavailable' to the State as a
witness; the State never suggested that her statement was specifically covered by any of the
categorical exceptions"; and notice was never brought up by the respondent. Id.
98. Id. at 320, 691 A.2d at 1354.
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there were "exceptional circumstances" and whether the statement
had "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."9 9
To address these issues, the court needed to determine what findings, if any, a trial court must make regarding the admission of evidence under the residual exception."' 0 First, the Court of Appeals
held that the trial court must be clear about whether it is admitting
evidence under the residual exception."' 1 Although the text of Maryland Rule 5-804(b) (5) only requires the trial court to find (1) whether
the statement is being offered as evidence of a material fact, (2)
whether the statement is more probative on point than any other evidence, and (3) whether the general purposes of the rules of evidence
and the interests of justice will best be served by admitting the evidence, the Court of Appeals determined that "it is incumbent on the
trial court to make a specific finding, on the record, as to each [of the
six] conditional element[s]." a°2 The Court of Appeals determined
that the trial court did not, however, need
to explain on the record
0 3
how it arrived at each of the findings.
Second, the Court of Appeals turned to the appropriate standard
of review.' 0 4 The court stated that rulings concerning the admissibility of evidence often involve discretion on the part of the trial court
05
and that, ordinarily, such rulings will not be disturbed on appeal.1
However, the Court of Appeals stated that it was unwilling "to accord
the same broad discretion to the ultimate decision to admit evidence
under the residual exception."10 6 The Court of Appeals held that
some trial court determinations-i.e., factual and discretionary deter99. Id. The court also stated that implicit in these two issues was the question "whether
the court erred in concluding that the general purpose of the rules and the interests of
justice would best be served by admission of Ms. Walker's statement." Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 321, 691 A.2d at 1354.
102. Id., 691 A.2d at 1355. The Court of Appeals stated that "the trial court [had] considered [each of] the six conditions and found that each was satisfied." Id. at 322, 691 A.2d
at 1355; see also supra text accompanying note 96 (setting forth these six elements).
103. Walker, 345 Md. at 322, 691 A.2d at 1355. The Court of Special Appeals, in its
analysis of this case, expressed as its principal concern that the trial court must explain how
it arrived at each of the conditions. Id. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that there is
some authority for the proposition that the trial courts must make these explanations, but

noted that "failure to do so [does not] necessarily require[ ] remand or reversal." Id. If
the record is insufficient to allow the appellate court to undertake an effective review, then
a lack of explanation by the trial court may cause a reversal. Id. at 324, 691 A.2d at 1356.
104. Id. at 324, 691 A.2d at 1356.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 324-25, 691 A.2d at 1356. The Court of Appeals explained its intent in adopting Maryland Rules 5-803(b) (24) and 5-804(b) (5): "We desired that the development of
new hearsay exceptions be tightly controlled by us, and that is not feasible under an abuse
of discretion standard of review." Id. at 325, 691 A.2d at 1356.
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minations that guide courts in arriving at conclusions of law-will still
be subject to a clearly erroneous or abuse of discretion standard, but
that the appellate courts will apply a de novo standard of review to the
legal conclusion regarding whether the evidence should be admitted
10 7
under the residual exception.
Finally, the Court of Appeals reviewed the substantive issues in
the case, addressing first whether there were exceptional circumstances. 10 8 The court stated that it had previously defined "exceptional circumstances" in the accompanying Committee Note as "'new
and presently unanticipated situations."' 10 9 In the instant case, the
court noted that "[t]he only circumstance that has even been suggested as being exceptional .

.

. is the fact that Ms. Walker married

respondent after she spoke to the detectives and then invoked her
privilege not to testify against him."1 1 The court discussed the
spousal immunity privilege, which Ms. Walker invoked to prevent the
State from compelling her to testify,1 1 ' and determined that the exercise of a privilege based on "legislatively declared public policy" cannot constitute an exceptional circumstance. 2 Having found no
exceptional circumstances to support the admission of Ms. Walker's
statements, the Court of Appeals refused to consider whether the
statement possessed equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness."'
Therefore, it affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special
114
Appeals.
107. Id. at 325, 691 A.2d at 1356. If the subsidiary findings made by a trial court are
"purely factual or discretionary," then the less stringent clearly erroneous standard of review will be applied to these findings. Id.
108. Id. This is the second requirement that must be met. See supra text accompanying
note 96. The first requirement, that the defendant be unavailable, was met because Ms.
Walker invoked her spousal immunity privilege and would not testify against her husband.
See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
109. Walker, 345 Md. at 325, 691 A.2d at 1357 (quoting MD. R 5-803 committee note);
accord supra note 84 and accompanying text (providing the language of the committee
note).
110. Walker, 345 Md. at 326-27, 691 A.2d at 1357.
111. Id. at 327-30, 691 A.2d at 1358-59 (referencing MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC.

§ 9-106 (Supp. 1997)). With few exceptions, the referenced statute excludes a person from
being compelled to testify as an adverse witness against her spouse in a criminal proceeding. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-106; accord Walker, 345 Md. at 327, 691 A.2d
at 1357.
112. Walker, 345 Md. at 329, 691 A.2d at 1359 ("[W]e fall to see how the exercise of a
privilege based on legislatively declared public policy that predated the rule by nearly 30
years can constitute such an exceptional circumstance. There is nothing 'unique' or exceptional about a spouse invoking his or her statutory privilege.").
113. Id. at 330, 691 A.2d at 1359.
114. Id.
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4. Analysis.-Within the development of the Maryland common
law, the Court of Appeals had always been wary of allowing trial courts
to admit evidence under the residual hearsay exception,' 15 and the
Walker court made it clear that it had never formally recognized a
catch-all exception to the rule against hearsay.1 16 Because the
residual exception appears in the adopted Maryland Rules of Evidence, it would seem that the Court of Appeals opened the door to
evidence which would have been ruled inadmissible at common
law." 7 However, in its first opportunity to address the applicability of
the exception, the Court of Appeals appears to have slammed the
door shut, even though this case presented a "textbook example of
the kind of hearsay evidence that should be admitted.""'
The Court of Appeals desired a "carefully limited residual exception,"1 1 9 because it did not approve of the "expansive manner in
which some federal courts had been construing the residual exception. '"20 To accomplish this, while drafting the rule providing for a
residual hearsay exception, a2 1 the court included the exceptional circumstances 122 requirement along with an "extensive" committee
note, 12 1 "leav[ing] no doubt that the Maryland residual exceptions are
more restrictive than their federal counterparts. 1 24 In Walker, the
Court of Appeals appears to have chosen this exceptional circumstances requirement as the means by which it will retain tight control
over the use of the residual hearsay exception in an effort to achieve
uniformity and predictability in the exception's application.
By choosing to retain tight control over the development and implementation of the residual hearsay exception, the Court of Appeals
has strayed from the original purpose of the residual exception detailed in Dallas County, which is to allow evidence to be admitted if it is
necessary and trustworthy. 1 5 The Court of Appeals should examine
the circumstances that collectively allow a statement to meet the requisites of the residual hearsay exception, rather than analyze each of the
115. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
117. See Greene, supra note 61, at 1113 ("While it is unlikely that the exceptions will be
used on any regular basis, there is the potential to open the door to evidence previously
inadmissible.").
118. Walker, 345 Md. at 331, 691 A.2d at 1359 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
119. Walker, 345 Md. at 318, 691 A.2d at 1353.
120. Id. at 317, 691 A.2d at 1352.
121. MD. R. 5-803(b) (24); MD. R. 5-804(b) (5).
122. See MD.R. 5-803(b) (24); MD. R. 5-804(b) (5).
123. See MD. R. 5-803(b) (24) committee note.
124. Chasanow & Anderson, supra note 36, at 25.
125. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
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elements independently. 1 26 Moreover, trial courts would best be
served if, rather than using the exceptional circumstances requirement, the Court of Appeals used some of the tools already in place to
predictability in the application of
achieve its goal of uniformity and
127
the residual hearsay exception.
a. By Applying the "Exceptional Circumstances" Requirement
Stringently, the Court of Appeals Has Strayedfrom the OriginalIntent of the
Residual Exceptions.-The Court of Appeals held that there were no
exceptional circumstances surrounding the hearsay statements offered into evidence in Walker, and thus the court affirmed the Court
of Special Appeals's reversal of the trial court on the ground that the
statements did not fall within the residual exception. 12 In its analysis,
the Court of Appeals's majority did not explain "what could constitute
exceptional circumstances or even what factors should be used to determine exceptional circumstances."12 9 Judge Wilner, writing for the
court, conceded that the Court of Appeals was unable to indicate what
would constitute such circumstances, as it did not possess a "crystal
ball"'"°-i.e., it was unable to -foretell which of an infinite number of
possible scenarios (or salient characteristics thereof) should bear on
an exceptional circumstances analysis. Instead, the majority opinion
offered a vague definition: "those rare situations that were not anticipated" when the rules were adopted.'
This definition offers absolutely no guidance to trial courts in the application of this rule, except
to suggest strongly that evidence is not going to be admitted under
the residual exception.

13 2

The majority offered only one hint in its opinion that it might
have ruled that this case presented exceptional circumstances: "Lurking here, perhaps, is some discomfort with the fact that respondent
and Ms. Walker married after she made her statement but before
trial."' 33 Because the State did not contend that the marriage was a
sham arranged solely to preclude Ms. Walker from testifying, the
Court of Appeals did not have to address this issue.'
In dicta, the
126. See infra notes 144-156 and accompanying text.
127. See infta notes 157-187 and accompanying text.
128. Walker, 345 Md. at 330, 691 A.2d at 1359.
129. Id. at 340, 691 A.2d at 1364 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
130. Walker, 345 Md. at 326, 691 A.2d at 1357.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 340, 691 A.2d at 1364 (Chasanow, J., dissenting) ("Surely the kind of
exceptional circumstances envisioned by the majority are not things like the hearsay declarant had natural green hair and spoke fifteen languages.").
133. Walker, 345 Md. at 329-30, 691 A-2d at 1359.
134. Id. at 330, 691 A.2d at 1359.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 57:642

court stated that a sham marriage "could arguably constitute an exceptional circumstance.' 35 Despite the dissent's contention that
Walker presented "a textbook example of the kind of hearsay evidence
that should be admitted,"1" 6 by prefacing its analysis with "arguably,"
the Court of Appeals seemed to shy away from explicitly stating that
even a sham marriage would constitute exceptional circumstances.
In its unwavering effort to retain tight control over the use of the
residual exception, the Court of Appeals appeared to forget, or perhaps disregard, the true purpose of the residual exception. If the exception were applied in the manner in which it was originally
developed (i.e., as Judge Learned Hand applied it in G. & C. Merriam1 3 7 and as the Fifth Circuit applied it in Dallas County'), Ms.
Walker's statements would be admitted because her statements "fulfill [ ] both the requisites of an exception of the hearsay rule, necessity
and circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness."' 3 9 Dissenting in
Walker, Judge Chasanow explained:
Occasionally there are forms of hearsay that do not fit within
the codified hearsay exceptions or pigeonholes but that
should be admitted in the interests ofjustice and because the
hearsay has at least the same circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness and the same necessity inherent in the codified exceptions. In these exceptional circumstances, we
compare the proffered hearsay to the reasons for creating a
hearsay exception ....140

Applying Maryland common law, the Court of Appeals previously acknowledged the validity of this reasoning in Foster,Brown, and Tyler. 4'
Now that the residual exception has formally been codified, the Court
of Appeals appears to forget the origin of, and the reason for, the
exception. Admittedly, the Court of Appeals intended to limit the use
of the exception,' 4 2 but the underlying reason for having any residual
exception is based on the reasoning espoused in G. & C. Merriam and
Dallas County.'43
135. Id.
136. Id. at 331, 691 A.2d at 1359 (Chasanow,J., dissenting).
137. G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co., 207 F. 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1913); see also
supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
138. Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961);
see also supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
139. G. & C. Merriam, 207 F. at 518.
140. Walker, 345 Md. at 340-41, 691 A.2d at 1364 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
141. See supra notes 63-79 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 119-124 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 137-140 and accompanying text.
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b. Application of the Residual Hearsay Exception in Walker.The majority divided the rule into six different factors that had to be
met in order for evidence to be admitted under the residual exception.1 44 Rather than analyzing each of these elements independently,
the court should have looked at "[t]he circumstances that, collectively,
ma[d] e Ms. Walker's hearsay statements exceptional, trustworthy, and
deserving of admission."1 4' 5 Exceptional circumstances should not
necessarily constitute a separate requirement, but can be found expressly in the rest of the rule. The exceptional circumstance in the
instant case is that Ms. Walker's statements do not fall under any of
the exceptions; yet, they still satisfy the necessity and trustworthiness
requirements.
There are several circumstances that indicate that this hearsay
was both necessary and trustworthy. First, Ms. Walker indicated that
she gave the statements to the police because she wanted Mr. Walker
to "get some help for his drug problem." '4 6 Ms. Walker initiated the
interview with the police; this supports the spontaneity of her statements. 14 7 The extensive details of Ms. Walker's statement indicate
that she must have talked to the robber or to the victim. Because the
victim did not speak English, Ms. Walker clearly must have talked to
the robber.14 In addition, the interview was in her parents' home, in

144. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
145. Walker, 345 Md. at 343, 691 A.2d at 1365 (Chasanow, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Judge Chasanow listed five circumstances that made Ms. Walker's hearsay statements
both exceptional and trustworthy:
1. Ms. Walker's motives were to get help for her husband's drug problem, inspiring
her to tell the truth to the police.
2. Ms. Walker most likely knew that a false statement to the police could have resulted
in her imprisonment.
3. If she lied, this would have been revealed once the victim told the police that Mr.
Walker was not the robber.
4. Ms. Walker related extensive details of the robbery, conclusively indicating that she
must have talked to the robber or the victim. Because the victim did not speak English, she
could not have talked to him. Therefore, because the robber was a male (i.e., not Ms.
Walker herself), the only possibility is that the robber confessed, in great detail, to Ms.
Walker.
5. Mr. Walker could have called his wife to the stand to refute the statements if the
police had inaccurately recorded them.
Id. at 343-344, 691 A.2d at 1365-66.
146. Walker, 345 Md. at 297, 691 A.2d at 1343; see also supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
147. Walker, 107 Md. App. at 530-31, 668 A.2d at 1004.
148. See supra note 145.
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a non-hostile environment, and Ms. Walker had no reason to lie to the
police because she was not a suspect in the case. 49
The Court of Appeals expressed concern that the federal courts'
broad application of the residual exceptions would threaten to swallow the rule against hearsay.1 5 0 While federal courts may have gone
too far in their expansive use of the exception, the Court of Appeals
seems adamant about going just as far the other way in its restriction
of the use of the residual exception. In the interests of justice, the
Court of Appeals should settle somewhere in the middle and apply
the residual exceptions as they were originally articulated in G. & C.
Merriam1 5 1 and Dallas County.1 52 If this approach were used, Ms.
Walker's statements would be admitted in the interests of justice, because the statements were both necessary for Mr. Walker's prosecution and trustworthy to the extent that they contained circumstantial
guarantees.
The admission of Ms. Walker's statement would also satisfy the
residual exception's requirement that the general purposes of the
rules and the interests ofjustice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. 53 Although Ms. Walker is statutorily protected from having to testify against her husband,1 5 4 admitting into
149. Walker, 107 Md. App. at 531, 668 A.2d at 1004. The Court of Appeals did not
consider the trustworthiness or necessity of Ms. Walker's statements because it had concluded that the exceptional circumstances requirement had not been met. Walker, 345
Md. at 330, 691 A.2d at 1359. However, the Court of Special Appeals did point out some
facts that called into question the trustworthiness of Ms. Walker's statements: She waited
four days before calling the police; there may have been other personal reasons why Ms.
Walker would want to fabricate a story against her husband; and it is unclear how having
Mr. Walker arrested would provide help for his drug problem. Walker, 107 Md. App. at
531, 668 A.2d at 1004.
150. The Court of Appeals, "aware of that [federal] experience, expressly chose not to"
construe the rule liberally. Walker, 345 Md. at 326, 691 A.2d at 1357. One commentator
discussed the State of Washington's refusal to adopt the residual exceptions when it codified its rules of evidence: "By refusing to adopt the residual exceptions, Washington State
has avoided the dangers that come with the use of such an amorphous exception. The
residuals are a 'Trojan Horse' that has been set upon the judiciary to wreak havoc and to
emasculate the rule against hearsay." Beaver, supra note 34, at 794. But see Rand, supra
note 60, at 874 ("Congress's failed attempt to limit judicial discretion in this area should
not be lamented, however; if the requirements were interpreted strictly, they would too
severely restrain the common-law authority and discretion of trial judges.").
151. G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co., 207 F. 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1913); see also
supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
152. Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961);
see also supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
153. See MD. R. 5-804(b) (5) (C) (requiring that "the general purposes of these rules and
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence").
154. See MD.CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (Supp. 1997); see also supra notes 17,
111 and accompanying text.
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evidence her previous statements made to the police would not
weaken this privilege. Ms. Walker is only unavailable as a witness to
the State.1 55 If her statements were admitted, Mr. Walker would still
have the opportunity to cross-examine and impeach her. If the statements were untruthful or not recorded properly, Ms. Walker could
have testified and refuted the evidence.15 6 Therefore, the interests of
justice would best be served by allowing these statements into
evidence.
c. Using the Tools That Are Already in Place.-Although the
Court of Appeals may have gone too far in its desire to maintain tight
control over the development and application of the new hearsay exceptions, its goal of providing "uniformity and predictability in the
admission of [the] residual hearsay exception" is laudable.1 5 7 The
Court of Appeals fears that if the trial courts have too much discretion
in applying this standard, "flatly inconsistent decisions" would defeat
the goal of a "well-defined jurisprudence. 1

58

However, the Court of

Appeals appears to have unnecessarily chosen the exceptional circumstances requirement as the vehicle to achieve this goal. Instead, the
court could simply rely on some of the tools that are already in place
to retain tighter control. Such tools include plenary review, requiring
specific findings of fact, and strictly applying some of the other requirements in the rule that would offer trial courts real guidance.
(1) De Novo Review. -Federal appellate courts typically apply
an abuse of discretion standard of review for the residual exception, 159 and they have shown great reluctance in overturning a trial
judge's decision."' The Court of Appeals has stated that it is "unwilling ... to accord the same broad discretion to the ultimate decision to
admit evidence under the residual exception." ' 61 De novo appellate
155. Walker, 345 Md. at 344, 691 A.2d at 1366 (ChasanowJ., dissenting) ("[T] he spouse
of a person on trial for a crime may not be compelled to testify as an adverse witness ....
(quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (1995) (ellipsis in original))).
156. Judge Chasanow explained: "If Ms. Walker's hearsay statements were admitted into
evidence, Mr. Walker... could call her to refute the statements if they were untruthful or
inaccurately recorded by the police." Id. at 344, 691 A.2d at 1366.
157. Id. at 333, 691 A.2d at 1360.
158. Walker, 345 Md. at 325, 691 A.2d at 1356 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord
Beaver, supra note 34, at 790-91 ("The [federal] residual hearsay exceptions threaten to
swallow the hearsay rule ....
[C]atchall exceptions weaken the rule against hearsay, and
...
the policy of fostering fair trials is best advanced by excluding the catchall exceptions
from the Rules of Evidence." (footnotes omitted)).
159. Walker, 345 Md. at 333-34, 691 A.2d at 1361 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 333, 691 A.2d at 1360.
161. Walker, 345 Md. at 324-25, 691 A.2d at 1356.
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review allows the heightened appellate scrutiny that the court feels is
necessary to prevent inconsistent decisions 1 62 and promotes the dein the trial courts' admission of
sired "uniformity and predictability"
163
residual exception hearsay.
Most appellate courts do not consider themselves to be in the
business of policing trials for evidentiary errors.1 64 This lack of desire
to scrutinize trial courts' evidentiary decisions can be even more pronounced in the review of evidence admitted under the residual exception. In the text of the rule, terms such as "circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness" trigger a deferential standard of review, with appellate courts sometimes using this phrase themselves to justify findings
of harmless error at the margins of the exceptions. 165 Many trial
judges use the catchall exceptions as a safety valve when tough decisions must be made, knowing that the appellate court will likely up166
hold the decision under the abuse of discretion standard.
Appellate courts have a great deal of difficulty holding that trial
judges abuse their discretion, because this can be an indictment of the
trial judge's competency and professionalism, and judges do not like
1 67
to chastise their colleagues.
The Court of Appeals has expressly chosen not to use the abuse
of discretion standard, because it recognizes the dangers of using a
deferential standard of review.' 6 ' Therefore, it will use the de novo
standard to review evidence admitted under the residual exceptions."' With this increased level of scrutiny, "there should be little
danger that the residual exceptions will be abused or will swallow up

162. Id. at 325, 691 A.2d at 1356.
163. Id. at 333, 691 A.2d at 1360 (Chasanow, J., dissenting). Judge Chasanow agreed
with the majority that there is a need for "uniformity and predictability in the admission of
[the] residual hearsay exception." Id.
164. Cf Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has It Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial
Decision?, 76 MINN. L. REv. 473, 491 & n.52 (1992) (explaining that after judges "creatively
apply" the residual exceptions, appellate courts will review the "fact-contingent applications of [the] doctrine with great deference").
165. Id. at 491-92.
166. See Myrna S. Raeder, Commentary, A Response to Professor Swift: The Hearsay Rule at
Work: Has It Been Abolished De Facto by JudicialDiscretion?, 76 MINN. L. REv. 507, 514 (1992)
("The categorical hearsay exceptions currently appear to act as a security blanket; ajudge's
careful analysis of these hearsay exceptions is often an academic exercise which masks the
erosion of the hearsay ban under the guise of the discretionary catchall exceptions.").
167. See id. at 518 ("Finding an abuse of discretion is an indictment of the trial judge's
behavior which is absent from an abstract pronouncement that the judge misapplied the
law.").
168. See supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text.
169. Walker, 345 Md. at 325, 691 A.2d at 1356.
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the general hearsay prohibition." a 0 Because trial courts should now
be cognizant that appellate courts will be taking a close look at the
application of the residual exception, there should no longer be a
need for appellate courts to use "exceptional circumstances" to strike
down a lower court's ruling. The "exceptional circumstances" requirement is in the text of the rule, but because of its amorphous
nature, it should not be the sole determinative factor precluding evidence from being admitted. The court should look at factors that
collectively make statements admissible under the residual
exceptions. 7 1
(2) Specific Findings of Fact.-To assist the appellate courts in
their plenary review, the Court of Appeals should insist that the trial
courts specifically state the findings of fact for each of the requirements under the rule. In Walker, the Court of Appeals determined
that the trial court had to make findings on the record as to each of
the conditional elements.' 72 It declined to go further and follow the
dictates of the Court of Special Appeals in Walker, which would require reversal if a trial judge failed to announce subsidiary findings
and conclusions.'
The Court of Appeals acknowledged the merit of
174
the Court of Special Appeals's desire for more restrictive findings,
and it should have followed the Court of Special Appeals and other
jurisdictions
that have required trial courts to record specific
5
17

findings.

One of the principal proponents of requiring specific findings
was the Senate Judiciary Committee, which in its approval of the federal exception requested that trial courts announce the special facts
170. Id. at 334, 691 A.2d at 1361 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
171. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
173. 107 Md. App. at 526-27, 660 A.2d at 1002; see also Walker, 345 Md. at 322, 691 A.2d
at 1355-56.
174. See Walker, 345 Md. at 322, 691 A.2d at 1355 ("Although there is some authority for
the proposition that trial courts must make such a [detailed] record, we do not believe that
the failure to do so necessarily requires remand or reversal.").
175. See, e.g., Mutuelles Unies v. Kroll & Linstrom, 957 F.2d 707, 713 (9th Cir. 1992)
("The district court erred by not making a specific finding that the . . . declaration was
admissible under Rule 804(b) (5)."); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896
F.2d 1542, 1552 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Pursuant to Rule 803(24), the district court must make
specific findings regarding the requisite elements of the exception."); State v. Nelson, 777
P.2d 479, 482 (Utah 1989) ("The court must make findings detailing its reasoning in admitting a statement under [the state's residual hearsay exception]."); see also United States
v. Hinkson, 632 F.2d 382, 385 (4th Cir. 1980) (affirming the trial court on other grounds,
but stating that the failure of the district court to make specific findings would
"[o]rdinarily" require remand).
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and circumstances justifying the admission of evidence under the
residual exception. 176 A number of federal and state appellate courts
have required these detailed findings, but if faced with a lack of sufficient detail, "have proceeded to examine the record and determine
177
for themselves whether the disputed evidence was admissible.
The Court of Appeals could, and should, strictly require the trial
court to make subsidiary findings, refusing to bow to pressure from
the legal community to view the record without these findings. 17 At
least one state appellate court has reversed a case because the trial
court failed to detail its reasoning for admitting an out-of-court statement.179 Requiring a trial court to announce the factors it considered, the weight it gave to those factors, and the reasoning process it
employed, would necessarily result in a more careful application of
the residual exception. And, in reviewing a trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of evidence, an appellate court would be able
to make more uniform decisions if it knew what factors the trial court
relied on in rendering its decision.
(3) Probative Value Requirement.-If the Court of Appeals

wants to give trial courts actual guidance via the requirements of the
residual exceptions rule, instead of relying solely on strict appellate
review, it can point to the text of the rule, which commands that any
evidence proffered must be the most probative on point.8 0 The
Court of Appeals could accomplish its goal of limiting the application
of the residual exceptions by setting this hurdle very high.' 8 1 Making
the judge specifically find why the proffered evidence is more probative than other evidence, and strictly requiring that there is no other

176. S. RFP. No. 93-1277, at 20 (1974), reprinted in, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7066. "In
order to establish a well-defined jurisprudence, the special facts and circumstances which,
in the court's judgment, indicates that the statement has a sufficiently high degree of trustworthiness and necessity to justify its admission should be stated on the record." Id.
177. Walker, 345 Md. at 323, 691 A.2d at 1355-56.
178. At least at the outset, this requirement would cause more remands and further
congest Maryland's trial courts.
179. See Nelson, 777 P.2d at 482.
180. See MD. R. 5-804(b) (5) (B) ("[T]he statement [must be] more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts . .

").

181. See Greene, supra note 61, at 1112 n.86 ("A strict application of such a standard
would eliminate all redundant evidence and place a heavy burden on proponents to show
why the evidence in question is essential to their case."). But see Beaver, supra note 34, at
794-95 ("Advocates for the exception ... erroneously believed that the exceptions could be
adequately controlled by adding strict requirements for admission.").
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evidence available through reasonable efforts, should effectively limit
the rule.18 2
Although the probative value requirement has been abused by
the federal courts, t8 ' in the instant case, there should be no doubt
that the trial court correctly found that Ms. Walker's statements were
"evidence of a material fact" and more probative than any other evidence the State could have procured through reasonable means.18 4
The Court of Special Appeals noted that these statements "were the
only evidence of [Walker's] criminal agency." ' 5 Not only were the
statements a material fact and the most probative evidence- they
were the only probative evidence available. In contrast to federal cases
in which the probative value requirement has been abused,18 6 the trial
court in Walker did not admit evidence that was "more or less proba182. Cf Myrna S. Raeder, The Effect of the Catchalls on CriminalDefendants: Little Red Riding Hood Meets the Hearsay Wolf and Is Devoured, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rxv. 925, 936 (1992) ("The
only restriction that may have stemmed the [federal] catchall tide is the requirement that
the statement be more probative . . .than any other evidence that the proponent can
procure through reasonable means.").
183. One commentator explained: "[T]his provision has rarely been viewed as imposing any additional condition on the catchalls... [as] demonstrated by the large number of
decisions finding the admission of catchall hearsay to be harmless error." Id. For example,
in United States v. laconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 540 F.2d 574 (2d. Cir. 1976),
the jury found a government contract inspector guilty of soliciting and accepting a bribe.
Id. at 555. The crucial issue in the trial centered around a conversation between the defendant and the chief witness for the prosecution. Id. Because there was an outright conflict of credibility between the defendant and the chief witness, the court deemed the
testimony of two rebuttal witnesses the most powerful evidence on this issue and admitted
the testimony into evidence. Id. at 559-60. The court upheld the admission of the testimony, "even though it was no more probative-in fact, it was less probative-than the
testimony of the Government's witness." Scott M. Lewis, The ResidualExceptions to theFederal
Hearsay Rule: Shuffling the Wild Cards, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 101, 115 n.99 (1983); cf MD.R.
5-804(b) (5) (B) (requiring that the hearsay evidence be "more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence").
In United States v. Medico, 557 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1977), the out-of-court identification of
a bank robbery suspect's getaway car was admitted under Rule 804(b) (5). Id. at 316. After
the robbers fled, a man sitting outside the bank called out the make and license number of
the car to a bank customer standing at the door. Id. at 313. The customer then relayed the
information through the glass to a bank employee named Carmody, who was the in-court
witness. Id. The court admitted this double hearsay, although it seemed to ignore the
probative value requirement, as there was ample in-court identification of the defendant
himself, as well as the car. Id. at 318. One commentator went so far as to state, "Far from
being the only evidence available on this issue, it was the worst evidence the Government
procured." Lewis, supra, at 113. The standard typically used in federal courts appears to be
.more or less probative" or "somewhat helpful," both of which are gross distortions of the
more probative" language of the rule. Id.
184. These requirements are set forth in Rule 5-804(b)(5) (A), (B) of the Maryland
Rules of Evidence.
185. Walker, 107 Md. App. at 532 n.15, 668 A.2d at 1005 n.15.
186. See supra note 183.
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tive" or "somewhat helpful,"' 8 7 but instead admitted evidence that met
the strict textual requirements of the rule.
5. Conclusion.-The use of the exceptional circumstances requirement to retain tight control over the residual hearsay exception
is puzzling. The difficulty in defining "exceptional circumstances" will
make it troublesome for trial judges to utilize the rule appropriately
and will thereby defeat the goals of uniformity and predictability. The
federal courts have been inconsistent in their application of the
residual exceptions because the standards for admissibility are
vague.1 88 Because the Court of Appeals apparently desires much
tighter control over the residual exceptions than the federal appellate
courts have exhibited, it would have seemed logical to have changed
the wording in the rule to eliminate this ambiguity.18 9 Instead, the
court added more vague language-"under exceptional circumstances"-to a rule that was already poorly written. 90
Instead of providing a straightforward test of whether a hearsay
statement is necessary and trustworthy, and should thus be admitted,
the requirements imposed by the Court of Appeals are unrealistic
hoops through which trial judges are forced to jump.1"' The court
already has the means to restrain the use of the residual hearsay exceptions, namely through de novo review, 1 92 requiring specific findings of fact,' 9 3 and strictly enforcing the probative value
requirement. 19 4 The Court of Appeals has chosen instead to enforce
the "exceptional circumstances" requirement strictly-enforcement
that is likely to cause considerable confusion in Maryland's trial
courts. By choosing not to apply the rule in this case, despite the
"textbook example of the kind of hearsay evidence that should be ad-

187. See Lewis, supra note 183, at 113 (discussing the more relaxed standard being applied by federal courts with respect to the probativity requirement).
188. Beaver, supra note 34, at 820 (concluding that those vague standards have "allowed
trial judges to expand upon traditional hearsay exceptions unduly").
189. See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 182, at 950 (offering several approaches to revising the
wording of the residual exceptions).
190. See Rand, supra note 60, at 880 ("The problem with the residual exceptions as finally adopted, though, is that they are poorly drafted and unrealistically stringent.").
191. See id. at 874 (explaining why the federal residual exceptions have caused courts to
rebel and distort the exceptions as worded).
192. See supra notes 159-171 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 172-179 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 180-187 and accompanying text.
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mitted,"' 9 5 the Court of Appeals has effectively closed the door on the
residual hearsay exception.
BARRY HERMAN

195. Walker, 345 Md. at 331, 691 A.2d at 1359 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
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FAMILY LAW

Limiting JudicialModification Power over Spousal Support Agreements

In Shapiro v. Shapiro,1 the Court of Appeals held that a spousal
support agreement that precluded judicial modification except upon
the happening of a stated event properly invoked the statutory exception to the rule of modifiability of spousal support agreements as provided in section 8-103(c) of the Family Law Article. 2 In so doing, the
court rejected the all-or-nothing approach to court modification
taken by the Court of Special Appeals in its disposition of the case.3
The court also overruled the decision of the Court of Special Appeals
in Langley v. Langley4 to the extent that it conflicted with the statute's
interpretation as announced in Shapiro.5 In striking down the intermediate appellate court's construction of section 8-103(c), the Court
of Appeals emphasized the importance of effectuating the intent of
the parties to a spousal agreement.6 Consequently, the court's holding is more reflective of a commitment to general contract principles
than to an accurate assessment of the statute's meaning and purpose.
Nevertheless, Shapiroclarifies the law, left uncertain by Langley, regarding the propriety of partially modifiable spousal support agreements.
The decision will, therefore, assist divorcing couples in fashioning
spousal support arrangements.
1. The Case.-Debra and David Shapiro separated in December
1985, after thirteen years of marriage. 7 In May 1988, the couple entered into a marital settlement agreement (the Agreement) that pro1. 346 Md. 648, 697 A.2d 1342 (1997).
2. Id. at 665, 697 A.2d at 1351. Section 8-103(c) provides:
The court may modify any provision of a deed, agreement, or settlement with
respect to alimony or spousal support executed on or after April 13, 1976, regardless of how the provision is stated, unless there is:
(1) an express waiver of alimony or spousal support; or
(2) a provision that specifically states that the provisions with respect to alimony or spousal support are not subject to any court modification.
MD. CODE ANN., FIAm. LAw § 8-103(c) (1991).

3. Shapiro, 346 Md. at 655, 697 A.2d at 1345.
4. 88 Md. App. 535, 596 A.2d 89 (1991), overruled by Shapiro v. Shapiro, 346 Md. 648,
697 A.2d 1342 (1997).
5. Shapiro, 346 Md. at 665, 697 A.2d at 1351 ("To the extent that Langley is inconsistent with our holding in this case, it is overruled.").

6. Id. at 664, 697 A.2d at 1350.
7. Shapiro v. Shapiro, No. 1841, slip op. at 2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 28, 1995) (per
curiam), affd in part and rev'd in part, 346 Md. 648, 697 A.2d 1342 (1997). The marriage
produced four children: Sara, born September 4, 1973; Laura, born November 11, 1975;
Ann, born June 7, 1979; and Jonathan, born January 7, 1982. Shapiro, 346 Md. at 651, 697
A.2d at 1343.
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vided for both child and spousal support payments by Mr. Shapiro. 8
The Agreement also stated that the spousal support payments would
not be subject to court modification unless Mr. Shapiro became disabled, as defined by his disability insurance policy. 9 The judgment for
divorce, granted to the parties by the Circuit Court for Howard
County, incorporated the Agreement." °
Sixteen months after the divorce, Mr. Shapiro petitioned the circuit court for relief that included rescission of the Agreement and
modification of the spousal support payments. 1 Ms. Shapiro responded with a motion to dismiss, claiming that Mr. Shapiro had not
stated sufficient grounds for rescission of the Agreement and that the
spousal support provisions of the Agreement were not subject to modification by the court. 2 Ms. Shapiro's motion was granted."3 Mr. Shapiro then filed a motion for reconsideration of the order that
dismissed his request for modification of spousal support, and the
4
court held a hearing on that matter.'
Relying on the Court of Special Appeals's interpretation of section 8-103(c) of the Family Law Article in Langley v. Langley,1 5 the circuit court held that the spousal support payments were subject to
court modification despite the Agreement's express provision to the

8. Shapiro, 346 Md. at 651, 697 A.2d at 1343. Mr. Shapiro's agreement to pay child
support included payment of each child's college tuition, room, and board, in addition to
monthly payments of $250 for each child. Id. at 652, 697 A.2d at 1344. Mr. Shapiro's
agreement to pay spousal support included monthly payments of $2,500 until January 1,
2009, when the monthly payments would be reduced to $1,250. Id. at 651, 697 A.2d at
1343.
9. Id. at 652, 697 A.2d at 1343-44. The Agreement provided, in pertinent part:
"Said alimony payments shall not be modified by the Court except in the event that Husband shall become temporarily or permanently disabled as defined in Husband's
current disability insurance policy. In the event of such disability, Husband shall
have the right to submit the issue of alimony to arbitration under the rules of the
American Arbitration Association or some similarly recognized arbitration association. The provisions of this paragiaph will not apply if Husband and Wife agree
to support modifications as a result of any disability. The level of support preceding Husband's disability shall remain in effect until said arbitration has resulted
in the binding recommendation of a new support figure."
Id.
10. Id. at 651, 697 A.2d at 1343.
11. Id. at 652, 697 A.2d at 1344.
12. Shapiro, No. 1841, slip op. at 3.
13. Id.
14. Brief of Petitioner at 3, Shapiro v. Shapiro, 346 Md. 648, 697 A.2d 1342 (1997) (No.
123).
15. 88 Md. App. 535, 54041, 596 A.2d 89, 92 (1991), overruled by Shapiro v. Shapiro,
346 Md. 648, 665, 697 A.2d 1342, 1351 (1997).
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contrary.1 6 The Court of Special Appeals approved the circuit court's
application of Langley and affirmed the lower court's ruling. 17 The
intermediate appellate court found that the Langley court's construction of the statute required that the spousal support provisions of a
separation agreement be either entirely modifiable or entirely nonmodifiable.'" Thus, the court concluded that the paragraph in the
Agreement providing for modification in the event of Mr. Shapiro's
disablement rendered the entire Agreement modifiable with regard
to spousal support.' 9 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to review whether the Agreement was modifiable under section 8-103(c). 2"
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Section 8-103(c).-The language in section 8-103(c) of the
Family Law Article construed by the Shapiro court evolved out of Chapter 849 of the Acts of 1975.21 Prior to that legislation, only spousal
support payments fitting the definition of technical alimony2 2 were
subject to court modification. 21 Courts considered all other forms of
spousal support to be contractual and therefore modifiable only to
16. Shapiro, 346 Md. at 652-53, 697 A.2d at 1344. Remaining issues pending before the
court, including possible modification of spousal support, were set for hearing. Brief of
Petitioner at 3, Shapiro (No. 123). At trial, Mr. Shapiro presented evidence that the attractiveness, for tax purposes, of spousal support as opposed to child support motivated the
allocation of payments for spousal support and child support. Shapiro, 346 Md. at 654, 697
A.2d at 1345. Persuaded by this evidence, the court entered ajudgment onJuly 31, 1992,
ordering that the spousal support provisions of the Agreement be considered child support for purposes of any further construction of the Agreement by the court. Id. at 654-55,
697 A.2d at 1345. The court allowed Mr. Shapiro an offset against his monthly child and
spousal support obligations to the extent he paid college education expenses in accordance with the Agreement. Brief of Petitioner at 3-4, Shapiro (No. 123).
17. Shapiro, 346 Md. at 655, 697 A.2d at 1345.
18. Shapiro, No. 1841, slip op. at 8-9.
19. Shapiro, 346 Md. at 652, 697 A.2d at 1344. The court also held that the recharacterization of spousal support as child support was not in error. Id. at 655, 697 A.2d at 1345.
20. Id. at 655, 697 A.2d at 1345. The court also granted certiorari to review the propriety of the circuit court's revision of the agreement. Id.
21. Id. at 658, 697 A.2d at 1347.
22. See, e.g., Horsey v. Horsey, 329 Md. 392, 410, 620 A.2d 305, 314-15 (1993) (defining
technical alimony as "a periodic allowance for spousal support, payable under a judicial
decree, which terminates upon the death of either spouse or upon the remarriage of the
spouse receiving the payments or upon the reconciliation and cohabitation of the parties"
and noting that a "court exercising equitable jurisdiction has authority to modify its prior
award of technical alimony" (citations omitted)).
23. See Shapiro, 346 Md. at 658, 697 A.2d at 1347 (stating that the statute was "enacted
to overturn the rule . . . under which technical alimony was modifiable but contractual
spousal support was not").
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the extent allowed by contract law.24 The distinction between technical alimony and contractual support sometimes led to unsatisfactory
results when divorcing parties labeled support payments "alimony" in
their agreements, but did not fully describe them as such.2 5 In these
instances parties were left with no recourse in the courts with respect
26
to modification of spousal support.
To solve this problem, Chapter 849 of the Acts of 1975 eliminated
the distinction between technical alimony and contractual support in
the court modification context. 27 The legislation amended Article 16,
section 28, which in its original form recognized the validity of separation agreements and provided for judicial modification of child custody agreements. 8 Language was added to the existing statutory
framework to allow court modification of support, maintenance, property rights, and personal rights between a husband and a wife, and
also to allow divorcing parties to preclude court modification of their
agreement. 29 However, Chapter 849 sparked criticism that it swept
too broadly in including personal and property rights within the judicial modification power and in permitting contractual preclusion of
judicial modification of child custody and support arrangements.3 °
24. See Horsey, 329 Md. at 418-20, 620 A.2d at 318-20 (discussing, in terms of contract
law, the possible judicial modification of a spousal support agreement that was not technical alimony and was entered into prior to 1976); Simpson v. Simpson, 18 Md. App. 626,
631, 308 A-2d 410, 414 (1973) (describing as "contractual" spousal support payments not
constituting technical alimony), superseded by MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 8-103 (1991).
25. See, e.g., Simpson, 18 Md. App. at 631, 308 A.2d at 414 (holding that though the
parties to a support agreement named the support payments "alimony" in their agreement,
their failure to provide for termination of payments on the death of the payor placed the
payments outside of a court's power to modify). The court explained, "That the parties
called them alimony did not make them so." Id.
26. See, e.g., id. at 631-32, 308 A.2d at 414 (noting that the lower court judge "properly
declined to terminate or modify the payments ... since he had no power to do so" (footnote omitted)).
27. Shapiro, 346 Md. at 658, 697 A.2d at 1347.
28. Id. at 658-59, 697 A-2d at 1347; MD. ANN. CODE, art. 16, § 28 (1957).
29. Shapiro, 346 Md. at 659, 697 A.2d at 1347. Chapter 849 stated in pertinent part:
[P]rovided, that whenever any such deed or agreement shall make provision
for or in any manner affect the care, custody, education or maintenance of any
infant child or children of the parties, or shall make provision for or in any manner
affect support, maintenance, property rights, or personal rights between the husband and
wife, the court shall have the right to modify such deed or agreement in respect to
such infants as to the court may seem proper, looking always to the best interests
of such infants, or in respect to support, maintenance, property rights, or personal
rights between the husband and wife regardless of the manner in which the provisions are
expressed or stated unless the provisions or the deed, agreement, or settlement specifically
state that they are not subject to any court modification.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 1975 Md. Laws 849).
30. Id. at 660, 697 A.2d at 1348.
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This criticism led to Chapter 849's revision by the enactment of Chapter 170 of the Acts of 1976.31 The separation of the provisions dealing
with spousal support from those dealing with child custody and support, and the addition of a provision allowing contractual waiver of
spousal support, remedied the perceived problems in the 1975
legislation. 2
As a result of Chapter 296 of the Acts of 1984, the 1975 and 1976
enactments were restyled, without substantive change, into subsections (b) and (c) respectively of section 8-103 of the Family Law Article.3 3 The statute provides, in pertinent part:
(c) Certain exceptions for provision concerning alimony or
support of spouse.-The court may modify any provision of a
deed, agreement, or settlement with respect to alimony or
spousal support executed on or after April 13, 1976, regardless of how the provision is stated, unless there is:
(1) an express waiver of alimony or spousal support; or
(2) a provision that specifically states that the provisions
with respect to alimony or spousal support are not subject to any court modification.34
Four years after the codification of section 8-103, the Court of Special
35
Appeals limited the scope of the statute in Mendelson v. Mendelson.
In that case, the court distinguished between separation agreements
31. Id.
32. Id. Chapter 170 stated in pertinent part:
Furthermore, any provision in the deed or agreement in respect to alimony, support and maintenance of the husband or wife is subject to modification by the
court to the extent the court deems just and proper regardless of the manner in
which the provisions with respect to the alimony, support and maintenance are
expressed or stated unless there is an express waiver of alimony, support and
maintenance by the husband or wife or unless the provisions of the deed, agreement, or settlement specifically state that the provisions with respect to the alimony, support and maintenance of the husband or wife are not subject to any
court modification.
Id. (quoting 1976 Md. Laws 170).
33. Id. at 661, 697 A.2d at 1348-49.
34. MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAw § 8-103(c) (1991). Subsection (b) provides:
(b) Exceptionfor provision concerning support of spouse.-The court may modify
any provision of a deed, agreement, or settlement with respect to spousal support
executed on or after January 1, 1976, regardless of how the provision is stated,
unless there is a provision that specifically states that the provisions with respect
to spousal support are not subject to any court modification.
Id. § 8-103(b). The 1975 and 1976 enactments were separately presented as subsections
(b) and (c) because the enactments addressed slightly different subject matter and had
different effective dates. See Shapiro, 346 Md. at 661, 697 A.2d at 1348-49.
35. 75 Md. App. 486, 541 A.2d 1331 (1988), superseded by MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw
§ 8-105(b) (1991).
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that are incorporated into a divorce decree and those that are merged
into a divorce decree, holding that only the latter could be modified
under section 8-103.6 The General Assembly, however, promptly
7
overruled Mendelson in 1990 with the passage of section 8-105(b).1
This statute eliminated the often confusing distinction between incorporation and merger for the purpose of court modification."8 The
combined effect of section 8-105(b) and section 8-103 broadened judicial power over spousal support agreements.3 9 At the same time, however, section 8-103(c) (2) limited this power by allowing an exception
to modification when parties indicated in their agreement that
spousal support payments could not be modified by courts.4'
The 1991 Court of Special Appeals decision in Langley v. Langley4 1
marked the first discussion of section 8-103(c) (2) in a reported opinion.4 2 In that case, the court considered a spousal support agreement
that provided for modification in the event that the payor-spouse, Mr.
Langley, was to become unemployed.4" Mrs. Langley argued that because the agreement specified an instance in which the support payments could be modified, the agreement should be non-modifiable in
all other circumstances.4 " However, the Langley agreement contained
36. Id. at 498-99, 541 A.2d at 1337. An incorporated agreement may be described as a
"hybrid of contract and court order." Doris Del Tosto Brogan, Divorce Settlement Agreements:
The Problem of Merger or Incorporationand the Status of the Agreement in Relation to the Decree, 67
NEB. L. REv. 235, 245 (1988). The agreement is incorporated because it is presented to the
court and made part of the divorce decree. Id. However, it continues to exist as an independent contract as well. Mendelson, 75 Md. App. at 499, 541 A.2d at 1337. In contrast,
when an agreement is merged, "the contract is extinguished and the rights and obligations
of the parties arise from the decree exclusively." Brogan, supra, at 245.
37. The statute provides, in pertinent part: "The court may modify any provision of a
deed, agreement, or settlement that is: (1) incorporated, whether or not merged, into a
divorce decree; and (2) subject to modification under § 8-103 of this subtitle." MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-105(b) (1991).
38. See Shapiro, 346 Md. at 678, 697 A.2d at 1357 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) ("'This bill is
expressly intended to overrule the holding of the Court of Special Appeals in Mendelson v.
Mendelson.'" (quoting the Floor Report of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee on
Senate Bill 541 of the 1989 General Assembly)).
39. See id. at 677, 697 A.2d at 1357 (stating that "[t]he General Assembly obviously
believed that, in the context of spousal support, courts should have broader power to modify agreements").
40. See supra note 2.
41. 88 Md. App. 535, 596 A.2d 89 (1991), overruled by Shapiro v. Shapiro, 346 Md. 648,
697 A.2d 1342 (1997).
42. Brief of Petitioner at 23, Shapiro (No. 123).
43. Langley, 88 Md. App. at 537, 596 A.2d at 90. The agreement in Langley provided for
court modification "[i]n the event the Husband becomes unemployed and his income
becomes substantially less than during the time of his employment," but contained no
language specifically limiting judicial modification. Id.
44. Id. at 541, 596 A.2d at 92.
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no language specifically precluding judicial modification in other circumstances.4 5 The court determined that the agreement's provision
for modification upon a stated occurrence (in this case, Mr. Langley's
being unemployed) did not invoke the exception to the rule of court
modifiability as provided in section 8-103(c)(2).46 As a result, the
court held that the agreement was fully modifiable.4" Declaring that
"[s]ection 8-103(c) is unambiguous, 4 8 the court concluded that
"[w]ithout the requisite definitive statement [precluding any modification, the Langleys'] agreement is subject to modification by the
court."'

The court in Langley referred several times to the need for a specific statement precluding any modification, implying that the requisite statement must preclude all modification in order to be effective
under the statute.5 ° However, the court also noted that the agreement lacked a statement precluding "the court from modifying the
support obligation under other circumstances."5 1 This portion of the
opinion, conversely, suggests that the court may have permitted the
agreement to be only partially modifiable if the agreement specifically
precluded modification in other circumstances. Thus, the Langley
court never addressed directly the propriety of partial modifiability.
b. Principles of Statutory Interpretation.-In Kaczorowski v.
Mayor of Baltimore,52 the Court of Appeals recognized problems inherent in statutory interpretation and articulated a framework for statutory construction.5 3 Before the decision in that case, the court had
been criticized for manipulating the canons of interpretation to
achieve the desired outcome. 54 Recognizing this criticism, in Kaczorowski, the court stated, "U]ust as in the science of Physics every action
has an equal and opposite reaction, so it seems that every canon of
statutory construction has an equal and opposite canon."5 5 Nonethe45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 540, 596 A.2d at 92.
49. Id. at 541, 596 A.2d at 92.
50. Id. at 540-41, 596 A.2d at 92.
51. Id. at 541, 596 A.2d at 92.
52. 309 Md. 505, 525 A.2d 628 (1987).
53. Id. at 512-13, 525 A.2d at 631-32.
54. See Melvin J. Sykes, A Modest Proposalfor a Change in Maryland's Statutes Quo, 43 MD.
L. REv. 647, 649 (1984) (asserting that the canons of interpretation employed by the Court
of Appeals "are mere boilerplate and should be abandoned").
55. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 512, 525 A.2d at 631. The court in Kaczorowski quoted
Sykes's law review article, implicitly recognizing the merit of the criticism. Id.; see alsoJack
Schwartz & Amanda Stakem Conn, The Court of Appeals at the Cocktail Party: The Use and
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less, the court defended the utility of the canons of construction, explaining that "properly used, they afford an opportunity for
principled decision making, as opposed to ad hoc judicial
legislation."5 6
The court asserted that its primary aim in interpreting a statute is
to give effect to the "objective, goal, or purpose" behind the law."
Furthermore, it stated that the words of the statute must be the starting point in divining legislative intent. 8 The court noted that the
plain meaning rule "comports with common sense, because what the
legislature has written in an effort to achieve a goal is a natural ingredient of analysis to determine that goal."59 The court then explained
that when a statute "'contains an ambiguity, courts consider not only
the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment."' 60 Accordingly, a court may "'consider the consequences
resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one
which is inconsistent with common sense."' 6 1 Finally, the court
pointed out that the plain meaning rule should not be so strictly applied that the context in which the language of a statute appears is
ignored.62
In cases decided after Kaczorowski, the Court of Appeals applied
the principles of interpretation enunciated in that seminal case. 63 For
instance, in Polomski v. Mayor of Baltimore,' the court reiterated that
effectuating legislative intent is the primary goal in interpreting a statute and that the language of the statute provides the starting point for

Misuse of Legislative History, 54 MD. L. REv. 432, 433 (1995) (characterizing the decision in
Kaczorowski as a direct response to the criticisms made by Sykes in his 1984 article).
56. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 512, 525 A.2d at 631.
57. Id. at 513, 525 A.2d at 632.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730, 732
(1986)).
61. Id. (quoting Tucker, 308 Md. at 75, 517 A.2d at 732).
62. Id. at 514, 525 A.2d at 632. Thus, the court may consider "'external manifestations,'" such as "a bill's title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it
passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and
other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal." Id.
at 515, 525 A.2d at 632.
63. Schwartz & Conn, supra note 55, at 437 ("In the seven years since Kaczorowski, the
Court of Appeals has not wavered from its commitment to the approach expounded in
that case.").
64. 344 Md. 70, 684 A.2d 1338 (1996).
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analysis.6 5 Citing Kaczorowski, the court stated, "where the legislative
will is not immediately apparent from the language of the statute, we
66
employ the canons of statutory construction to guide our inquiry.
However, the court also asserted that when "the language of the statute is clear, further analysis of legislative intent ordinarily is not required, and we give the words of the statute their ordinary and
common meaning within the context in which they are used."6 7 Thus,
the court confirmed the primacy of the plain meaning rule.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Shapiro, the Court of Appeals held
that section 8-103(c) permits a spousal support agreement to preclude
court modification in certain instances while allowing court modification in other instances.68 The court began its consideration by examining section 8-103(c) and scrutinizing the language in the portion of
subsection (c) (2) that provides an exception to the rule of court
modifiability when there is "'a provision that specifically states... that
the provisions with respect to alimony or spousal support are not subject to any court modification.' 69 Specifically, it found the statute
ambiguous as to whether "the provisions" must refer to all, or may
70
refer to only some, of the provisions of a spousal support agreement.
In an effort to resolve the statutory ambiguity, the court reviewed
the evolution of the language in section 8-103(c) from the 1975 enactment until the statute's codification in 1984.71 Again, the court focused on the use of the words "provision" and "provisions. "72 It noted
that the pertinent part of the 1976 enactment stated the exception to
modifiability in the following manner: "unless the provisions of the
agreement... specifically state that the provisions with respect to
are not subject to any court modification."7 3 The
...support ....

...

court found that the exclusive use of the plural form in the 1976 ex74
ception "created a semantic ambiguity as to the number intended.
Referencing a Maryland rule of interpretation that states "' [t] he singular always includes the plural, and vice versa, except where such
65. Id. at 75, 684 A.2d at 1340.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citations omitted).
68. Shapiro, 346 Md. at 665, 697 A.2d at 1351.
69. Id. at 656, 697 A.2d at 1346 (ellipsis in original) (quoting MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw
§ 8-103(c)(2) (1991)).
70. Id. at 656-57, 697 A.2d at 1346.
71. Id. at 658-62, 697 A.2d at 1347-49.
72. Id. at 661, 697 A.2d at 1349.
73. Id. at 660, 697 A.2d at 1348 (quoting Chapter 170 of the Acts of 1976).
74. Id. at 661, 697 A.2d at 1348.
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construction would be unreasonable' ''75 the court reasoned that the
statute's exception might be read to say, "unless a provision of the...
agreement .. specifically states a provision with respect to ...support
...is not subject to any court modification." 76 The court, therefore,

determined that the 1976 legislation might be interpreted to allow
divorcing parties to "specifically state exclusion from modifiability
provision by provision., 77 Redirecting its analysis to section 8-103(c),
the court explained that in changing the wording of the exception to
modifiability from "provision" to "provisions," the legislature did not
intend to change the statute substantively. 78 Thus, the court consupport the construccluded that the statute did not "unambiguously
79
tion applied by the courts below."

Having addressed the statute's ambiguity, the court noted, "We
have uncovered nothing in the legislative history that indicates that
the General Assembly ever focused on the issue with which we are
here concerned."8 ° The court next looked to legislative intent for guidance in determining the proper construction of section 8-103(c). 1
The court asserted that "[t] he ultimate purpose [of the statute] was to
prevent the unintended results under separation agreements that
were produced by the technical alimony-contractual support dichotomy." 2 Therefore, the court decided that the intermediate appellate
court's interpretation of the statute was incorrect because it led to a
frustration of the parties' intent.8 3 Stating "[w]e [do not] discern in
this statute.., an intent to perpetuate the all or nothing approach to
modifiability that characterized [the] prior law,"84 the court held that
the Shapiros' spousal support agreement properly invoked the statutory exception to judicial modifiability.8 5 Finally, after finding the
Agreement non-modifiable under section 8-103(c), and noting that
75. Id. at 657, 697 A.2d at 1346 (alteration in original) (quoting MD.ANN. CODE art. 1,
§ 8 (1996)).
76. Id. at 661, 697 A.2d at 1348 (omissions in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
77. Id.
78. See id. at 661-62, 697 A.2d at 1349 ("A legislative intent supporting the interpretation of the courts below cannot be derived from the change between the 1976 language
and the Code Revision language.").
79. Id. at 663, 697 A.2d at 1349.
80. Id.
81. Id., 697 A.2d at 1349-50.
82. Id., 697 A.2d at 1349.
83. See id., 697 A.2d at 1350 (noting that to accept the interpretation of the courts
below would be trading the frustration of one form of contractual intent for the frustration
of another).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 665, 697 A.2d at 1351.
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no other ground for modification was asserted, the court struck down
the revisions made to the Agreement by the circuit court.8 6
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Eldridge sharply criticized the majority's interpretation of section 8-103(c), describing the court's analysis as "novel and confusing."8 7 Agreeing with the lower court's
reading of the statute, Judge Eldridge stated, "the statutory language
is unmistakably clear . . . [and] [o]nly the most tortured reading

could find an ambiguity in this language." 8 He also asserted that the
majority's interpretation of section 8-103(c) disregarded the legislature's purpose of increasing the judicial modification power.8 9 Finally, Judge Eldridge explained that because the General Assembly
had not altered the Langley court's reading of section 8-103(c), the
legislature had agreed to the decision's narrow interpretation of the
statute. 90 Judge Eldridge noted that "where the General Assembly has
acquiesced in the judicial construction of a statute, there is a strong
presumption that the legislative intent has been correctly
interpreted."9 1
4. Analysis.-In Shapiro, the Court of Appeals departed from a
history of considering spousal support agreements either fully modifiable or fully non-modifiable by the courts.9 2 In holding that Mr. Shapiro's support obligations could be modified only upon his
disablement, the court gave full effect to the intent of the parties as
evidenced by the words of their Agreement.9" In reaching its conclusion, however, the court settled on a reading of section 8-103 (c) that is
at odds with the statute's plain meaning and that may frustrate the
General Assembly's purpose in enacting the statute. Nevertheless, the
decision provides guidance to divorcing couples, as it clarifies the law
regarding the propriety of partially modifiable support agreements.
a. The Plain Meaning of Section 8-103(c).---Contrary to the
court's finding, the phrase "the provisions with respect to alimony or
spousal support" has just one meaning.9 4 Specifically, the phrase de86. Id. at 666-67, 697 A.2d at 1351.
87. Id. at 678, 697 A.2d at 1357 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 672, 697 A.2d at 1354.
89. Id. at 676-77, 697 A.2d at 1356-57 ("The majority opinion, with its reliance on traditional contract principles, wholly fails to give effect to the Legislature's clear purpose of
greatly increasing judicial modification authority.").
90. Id. at 677, 697 A.2d at 1357.
91. Id.
92. 346 Md. at 663, 697 A.2d at 1350.
93. Id. at 665, 697 A.2d at 1351.
94. Id. at 669, 697 A.2d at 1353 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
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notes all of the support or alimony provisions of an agreement."5 As
Judge Eldridge pointed out in his dissent, the majority's contention
that "the provisions" might refer to some but not all of the spousal
support provisions of an agreement runs contrary to the general rule
that "in speaking of the component parts of any document .... the

use of the plural term without limitation is all inclusive."9 6 Significantly, previous opinions of the Court of Appeals support this usage of
language.9 7 Additionally, much of the language in section 8-103(c)
tends to rebut the court's conclusion that the statute permits partial
modifiability.9 8 For instance, the statute allows modification of a
spousal support provision "regardless of how the provision is stated,"
unless the subsection (c) (2) exception is invoked.9 9 The quoted
phrase suggests a broad judicial power to modify spousal support
agreements, despite the particular wording of an agreement. 1' Also,
the word "any" preceding the words "court modification" implies that
the legislature intended an all-or-nothing approach to modification.
Indeed, the word loses much of its relevance if it does not apply to a
spousal support agreement in its entirety. For Judge Eldridge, the
presence of the word "any" in subsection (c) (2) evidenced "lt] he Legislature's rejection of selected or partial modifiability."'10
Despite the clarity of section 8-103(c), the court engaged in a detailed review of earlier legislative language in an effort to uncover the
proper interpretation of the statute. 1°2 This exercise was unnecessary,
because when "the language of the statute is clear... [the court gives]
the words of the statute their ordinary and common meaning within
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 670, 697 A.2d at 1353 (citing Scott v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 345 Md. 251,
253-55, 691 A.2d 1320, 1321-22 (1997) (using the phrase "the provisions of the loan agreement" to refer to all of the provisions); Polomski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 344 Md. 70, 75,
684 A.2d 1338, 1340 (1996) (referring to all of the language of a statute by stating "the
language of the statute"); Ward Elec. Servs., Inc. v. Property & Cas. Ins. Guar. Corp., 325
Md. 1, 8, 599 A.2d 81, 84 (1991) (referring to the "words of the statute" to mean all of the
words)).
98. See id. at 671, 697 A.2d at 1353 (stating that "the normal meaning of the words in
§ 8-103 clearly refutes the majority's holding").
99. MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAw § 8-103(c) (1991).
100. Judge Eldridge argued that through this phrase, "[tihe General Assembly thus
made it clear that the wording of a particular provision concerning alimony or spousal
support was immaterial," and that "judicial modifiability of any provision could be precluded only if there was a specific statement that the provisions, without limitation, could
not be judicially modified." Shapiro, 346 Md. at 670, 697 A.2d at 1353 (Eldridge, J.,
dissenting).
101. Id. at 668-69, 697 A.2d at 1352.
102. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
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the context in which they are used."' 3 While the plain meaning rule
"is not rigid,"1 4 and a court may consider other factors in the determination of statutory meaning, the actual language of the statute must
remain the primary guide."0 5 In Shapiro, the court did not need to
look beyond the words of the statute, because the plain meaning provides a sensible construction of the law. Moreover, the court's analysis
of the legislative background did little to elucidate the proper interpretation of the statute. Instead, the court obscured the clarity of section 8-103(c) through its complicated grammatical dissection of the
earlier enactments.
b. The LegislativeIntent Behind Section 8-103(c).-Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Shapiro found support for their
opposing interpretations of section 8-103(c) in the legislative intent
behind the statute, illustrating the aphorism that legislative intent is
often whatever the court wishes it to be. 106 The majority believed the
General Assembly enacted section 8-103(c) "to fulfill expectations
based on the parties' agreement."'0 7 In contrast, the dissent saw in
the statute "a clear legislative intent favoring broad judicial authority
08
to modify agreements with regard to alimony or spousal support."
Implicit in this disagreement over legislative intent is the tension between competing values: an individual's freedom to contract and the
public policy interests in regulating that freedom.' 9 Unfortunately,
the opinion of the court failed to acknowledge this tension. Further103. Polomski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 344 Md. 70, 75, 684 A.2d 1338, 1340 (1996) (citations omitted).
104. Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987).
105. See id. (explaining that the need to look beyond the words of a statute arises when
"'a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity'" (quoting Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730, 732
(1986))).
106. Sykes, supra note 54, at 652 ("Most courts and advocates have recognized that the
search for intent is an illusory quest because intent is a meaningless metaphor for a nonexistent state of mind."). Sykes stated that although the ascertainment of legislative intent is
the primary aim of statutory construction, "[t]he search for actual intent.., is a myth." Id.
at 650. He explained:
The legislature is not an individual with a will but an institution composed of
many individuals, each with a distinct mind and personality. The legislature produces a product reflecting many different intentions and purposes. Psychoanalysts cannot always tell why individuals do the things they do; certainly inferring
an overall intent from any group action is at a minimum more problematic.
Id. at 650-51.
107. Shapiro, 346 Md. at 663, 697 A.2d at 1349.
108. Id. at 668, 697 A.2d at 1352 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
109. See Brogan, supra note 36, at 237 (identifying the conflicting interests in contractual
freedom and in judicial power over the incidents of divorce as a source of problems in the
law governing divorce settlement agreements).
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more, in its commitment to general contract principles, the court
overlooked the possibility that the General Assembly might have
wished to restrict these principles in the area of spousal support
agreements.
Indeed, substantial policy considerations weigh against treating a
spousal support agreement as "any other contract.""' This is because
such agreements are formed within a context that "deviates substantially from the competitive, arm's length bargaining between strangers
in which standard bargaining principles were designed to operate.""'
Specifically, divorcing couples are often under extraordinary stress
and may not be fully able to anticipate and provide for changed circumstances in their agreement.1 12 Additionally, parties to a separation agreement are particularly susceptible to undue influence during
the negotiation process." 3 Thus, courts have a special interest in
preventing "the marketplace mentality in marriage dissolution," and
ensuring the continued fairness of support agreements."l 4
c. Langley's Interpretation of Section 8-103(c).-Although the
court overruled Langley to the extent that the decision conflicted with
its interpretation of section 8-103(c)," 5 Langley may be easily distinguished from Shapiro. Unlike the agreement construed in Shapiro, the
agreement found modifiable in Langley contained no language
prohibiting judicial modification." 6 This is significant because even if
the court in Langley had stipulated to the propriety of partial
This tension between competing values has led to great variance and confusion in the
laws of other states. See id. ("[T] he law of contracting between spouses has evolved as an
ambiguous body of decisions that provides precious little guidance to lawyers and layper-

sons attempting to guide and direct their affairs."); Sally Burnett Sharp, Semantics asJurisprudence: The Elevation of Form over Substance in the Treatment of SeparationAgreements in North
Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REv. 319, 320 (1991) (asserting that "in virtually every state, marital
settlement agreements have given rise to a body of case law that is at best confusing, and at
times nothing less than impenetrable").
110. See Sally Burnett Sharp, FairnessStandards and SeparationAgreements: A Word of Caution on ContractualFreedom, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1399, 1405 (1984) (arguing that contract
principles "have often failed to provide adequate safeguards in the family law setting
against either unfair results or unfair procedures").
111. Id. at 1406.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1405. The interest of courts in retaining jurisdiction over spousal support
agreements probably underlies the General Assembly's specific overruling of Mendelson by
enacting section 8-105(b), as that statute extended judicial power over such agreements.
See supra note 37 and ac-ompanying text.
115. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
116. Langley v. Langley, 88 Md. App. 535, 541, 596 A.2d 89, 92 (1991), overruled by Shapiro v. Shapiro, 346 Md. 648, 697 A.2d 1342 (1997).
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modifiability, the Langleys' agreement's failure to state explicitly that
the agreement was not modifiable in other circumstances would have
still left it modifiable under the statute. Therefore, it is unlikely that
Langley would have been decided differently under the Shapiro court's
construction of section 8-103(c). Additionally, Langley offered an ambiguous reading of section 8-103(b) that belies the significance of the
General Assembly's acquiescence in the Langley decision. Specifically,
the Langley opinion failed to indicate whether the Langleys' agreement would have satisfied the statutory exception had it included language precluding modification in other circumstances.1 17 The
majority in Shapiro properly noted that Langley may be read "in two
different ways" with respect to that question.1 1 Therefore, in overruling Langley, the Court of Appeals clarified the law more than it significantly changed the law.
5. Conclusion.-The Shapiro court's interpretation of section
8-103(c) enhances the contracting power of divorcing parties by allowing them to select circumstances under which stated portions of
their spousal support agreements may and may not be judicially modified. Such individuals will not have to decide, as they may have had to
under Langley, whether or not their spousal support arrangements will
be entirely modifiable or entirely non-modifiable. Consequently, in
the future, more divorcing couples will use the statutory exception to
modifiability, placing an increased number of spousal support agreements beyond the purview of the courts.
The Shapiro decision nonetheless rests on a construction of section 8-103(c) that runs contrary to the plain meaning of the statute
and possibly contradicts the legislative intent behind it. Ultimately,
the correctness of the court's holding in Shapiro will be tested in the
General Assembly where it may either suffer the fate of Mendelson and
be overruled by statute, or through legislative acquiescence, endure as
Maryland law.
EFFIE D.

COLOGER

117. Shapiro, 346 Md. at 654, 697 A.2d at 1345; see also supra text accompanying notes 5051.
118. Shapiro, 346 Md. at 654, 697 A.2d at 1344.
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IX.

A.

HEALTH CARE

Making a Minor Case for Major Medical Expenses: Expanding a
Child's Right to Sue for Pre-Majority Medical Expenses Caused by
Third-Party Negligence

A recent Court of Appeals decision in Johns Hopkins Hospital v.
Pepper' makes it easier for a negligently injured child to recover premajority' medical expenses even if the statute of limitations3 bars a
suit for medical expenses by the child's parents.4 Refining its holding
in Garay v. Overholtzer,5 the Peppercourt expanded a child's right to sue
by concluding that a negligently injured minor does not have to prove
that his parents are indigent in order to assert his own claim for medical expenses.6 The Pepper decision will affect future negligence cases
in two major ways. First, it will give negligently injured children a
broader exception from the general rule that medical expense claims
vest solely with parents.7 Second, the holding will allow parents who
fail to file timely lawsuits to circumvent a procedural limitation that
would otherwise insulate tortfeasors from full financial liability for
negligent acts. Although the Pepper rule may inadvertently reward
plaintiffs who sleep on their rights to sue, it will nonetheless furnish
relief in a manner consistent with Maryland's "necessaries" doctrine'
and with public policies designed to force wrongdoers-rather than
taxpayers-to bear the cost of injuries caused by tortious conduct.9

1. 346 Md. 679, 697 A.2d 1358 (1997).
2. In Maryland, a child reaches majority when he attains the age of 18 years. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 1, § 24 (1996).

3. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-101 (1995) (requiring plaintiffs to file
civil actions within three years from the date a cause of action arises).
4. Pepper, 346 Md. at 705, 697 A.2d at 1371.
5. 332 Md. 339, 631 A-2d 429 (1993).
6. Pepper, 346 Md. at 701, 697 A.2d at 1369.
7. See Garay, 332 Md. at 346, 631 A.2d at 432 (recognizing that the cause of action for
medical expenses of a negligently injured child normally vests with the parents of that
child); Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 528, 174 A.2d 339, 342 (1961) ("[O]rdinarily
there arises in the parent or parents of [an] infant a right of action for ... [the] doctors'
bills and medical and hospital expenses necessarily and reasonably incurred by the parent
for the treatment of the injuries.. . ."); Herbert v. Whittle, 69 Md. App. 273, 295, 517 A.2d
358, 369 (1986) (observing that, when a minor is injured by the negligent act of a third
party, a cause of action accrues to the parent for medical expenses).
8. See Garay, 332 Md. at 367, 631 A.2d at 443 (holding that a minor who becomes
financially responsible for his own necessaries, including medical expenses, is entitled to
bring a claim to recover those expenses).
9. See infra notes 116-118 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy rationale for compensatory damages.
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1. The Case.-Travis Pepper was born on January 6, 1987 at Easton Memorial Hospital, where he suffered from severe heart and lung
abnormalities. 10 Travis's attending physicians decided to transfer him
to Johns Hopkins Hospital (Hopkins) in Baltimore City.'1 After examining Travis, Hopkins surgeons concluded that he should undergo
two separate surgical procedures-one to correct blood flow between
his heart and his pulmonary artery, and another to repair a hole that
allowed blood to flow between the right and left ventricles of his
heart.' 2 Travis was four months old when he underwent the first operation in April 1987.13 He experienced post-operative complications
that ultimately led to cardiac arrest. 4 Doctors were able to revive
Travis, but he suffered severe neurological impairment as a result of
oxygen deprivation during his arrest. 5 The second proposed surgery
16
was never performed.
On March 23, 1993, Terry and Linda Pepper, Travis's parents,
filed suit, as next friends' 7 on Travis's behalf, against Hopkins in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City. 18 They sought damages and alleged
that Hopkins, through its employees, negligently failed to treat Travis
(Count I) and that Hopkins failed to adequately inform the Peppers
of the risks involved with Travis's surgery (Counts IV and V).' 9 Terry
and Linda Pepper brought individual claims alleging negligence and
seeking, inter alia, recovery of medical expenses (Counts II and III),
and they included a claim as joint claimants for loss of consortium
20
(Count VI).

Hopkins successfully argued in a summary judgment motion that
Terry and Linda Pepper's claims were barred by the applicable threeyear statute of limitations, because any cause of action they might have
10. Pepper, 346 Md. at 684, 697 A.2d at 1360.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. A "next friend" is similar to a guardian ad litem and is one who acts for the benefit
of a minor who is unable to manage his own lawsuit. BLACK'S LAW DicTIoNARY 724 (6th ed.
1991).
18. Pepper,346 Md. at 685, 697 A.2d at 1361. Maryland's Health Claims Arbitration Act
ordinarily requires persons having a claim against a health care provider to submit the
claim to administrative arbitration before filing suit. See MD. CoDE ANN., CTs. &JUD. PROC.
§ 3-2A-04 (1995). However, both the Peppers and Hopkins agreed to waive administrative
arbitration pursuant to section 3-2A-06A of the same article.
19. Pepper, 346 Md. at 685, 697 A.2d at 1361.
20. Id.
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had arose six years prior to the filing of their suit." Hence, only
Travis's claims of negligent care and lack of informed consent
survived. 2
On March 9, 1994, the Peppers submitted a pretrial memorandum, which stated there would be no amendments to Travis's original
complaint. 23 Nonetheless, they filed an amended complaint*on June
13, 1994, adding to Travis's original negligence claim an allegation
that, among other things, "'Terry and Linda Pepper [] are financially
unable to provide for the past and future care and treatment Travis
will require and need .... ,,,24 The trial court struck the amended
25
complaint, stating that it was untimely.
On the first day of the trial, Hopkins moved in limine to exclude
evidence related to medical expenses incurred by Travis Pepper or his
parents. 26 Hopkins asserted that, according to the holding in Garay,
any claim for pre-majority medical expenses belonged solely to the
parents of an injured child. 27 Consequently, Hopkins argued that, because Terry and Linda Pepper's claims were barred by the statute of
limitations, Travis's pre-majority medical expenses should be excluded as irrelevant. 21 In addition, Hopkins argued that, because
Maryland law requires parents to support an incapacitated and unemancipated adult child, 29 and because Travis would always be incapacitated, Travis would never be able to assert his own pre- or postmajority claim for medical expenses."0 The Peppers, on the other
hand, argued that Garay recognized four exceptions to the general

21. Id.; see also MD.CODE ANIN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-101 ("A civil action at law shall be
filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code
provides a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced.").
22. Pepper, 346 Md. at 686, 697 A.2d at 1361.
23. Id.
24. Id. (alteration and ellipsis in original) (quoting the June 13, 1994 amendments).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.; accord Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 346, 631 A.2d 429, 432 (1993) (observing that Maryland law recognizes that the cause of action of medical expenses of a
negligently injured child generally belongs to the parents of that child). However, Hopkins incorrectly suggested that Garay held that claims for pre-majority medical expenses
belong exclusively to parents. Garay, in fact, held that certain circumstances would enable a
negligently injured minor child to assert a claim on his own. Id. at 374, 631 A.2d at 446-47.
28. Pepper, 346 Md. at 686, 697 A.2d at 1361.
29. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 13-102(b) (1991) (requiring parents with sufficient
financial means to provide care to a destitute adult child).
30. Pepper, 346 Md. at 686, 697 A.2d at 1361.
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rule that claims for pre-majority medical expenses vest only with parents, and that at least two of the exceptions applied to Travis's case.
The trial court rejected the Peppers' assertions and granted Hopkins's motion in limine based on its finding that none of the Garay
exceptions applied to the case. The trial court specifically determined
that the Peppers did not satisfy the necessaries exception because they
failed to prove that they were indigent. 3 2 Thus, the case went to trial
both on the negligence count and on the issue of Travis's damages,
which were limited to his lost future income and non-economic damages.33 The jury returned a verdict in Travis's favor for $750,000, but
the court reduced the figure to $350,000 pursuant to a statutory noneconomic damages cap.34 However, the jury did not award any damages for lost future earnings because it found that Travis would not
live to an age at which he could become gainfully employed.3 5
The Peppers appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, claiming,
among other things, that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of Travis's medical expenses even though the Peppers made a
sufficient showing under the Garay necessaries exception 36 that they
31. Id. at 686-87, 697 A.2d at 1361-62; see also Garay, 332 Md. at 374, 631 A.2d at 446-47
(recognizing that a minor is entitled to bring a claim for pre-majority medical expenses if
he can show that "he or his estate either has paid or will be individually responsible to pay
for medical expenses: (1) by emancipation, (2) by death or incompetence of his parents,
(3) as necessaries for which his parents are unable or unwilling to pay [the 'necessaries
exception'], or (4) by operation of a statute"). The Peppers specifically argued that the
"necessaries" and "operation of statute" exceptions applied to Travis's case, because they
were unable to pay for Travis's medical necessaries and because they automatically waived
their right to sue in favor of Travis when they filed a claim for medical expenses on his
behalf. Pepper, 346 Md. at 686-87, 697 A.2d at 1362.
32. Pepper, 346 Md. at 700, 697 A.2d at 1369.
33. Id. at 687, 697 A.2d at 1362. In an action for personal injury, non-economic damages refer to damages for "pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of consortium, or other non-pecuniary injury." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 11-108(a)(1)(i) (1995).
34. Pepper, 346 Md. at 687, 697 A.2d at 1362; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC.
§ 11-108(b) (limiting non-economic damages awards to $350,000 in personal injury actions
occurring on or afterJuly 1, 1986).
35. Pepper, 346 Md. at 687, 697 A.2d at 1362.
36. In Maryland, the doctrine of necessaries enables minors to avoid contracts they
make with adults because of a presumption that unequal bargaining power exists between
a child and an adult. See generally Monumental Bldg. Ass'n v. Herman, 33 Md. 128 (1870)
(discussing how, at common law, persons under the age of 21 will not be bound by contracts they make for non-necessities because of a longstanding view that minors need protection from older persons who possess more experience in contractual dealings).
However, the presumption of unequal bargaining power ceases to operate when children
contract for "necessaries," such as board, clothing, medical aid, and education. Id. at 131.
In those instances, children can be held liable for necessaries furnished to them if parents
refuse or are unable to pay for them. Garay, 332 Md. at 368, 631 A.2d at 444.
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were unable to pay the majority of those expenses. 3 7 Hopkins contended that, even if Travis had a right to recover his own medical expenses, pleading rules required that his original complaint contain an
explanation as to how Travis's cause of action fell within the Garay
necessaries exception. 3 ' Because the complaint did not contain such
an explanation, Hopkins argued, it failed to state a proper claim for
medical expenses upon which Travis could recover.3 9
The Court of Special Appeals found that the Peppers had indeed
offered adequate evidence that they were unable to pay Travis's medical expenses, 40 and that the pleading stated Travis's cause of action
for medical expenses with enough specificity to enable a jury to consider his claim.4 1 In addition, the Court of Special Appeals found that
the jury's decision to deny recovery for Travis's post-majority medical
expenses was erroneously based on a finding that he would not live
long enough to become gainfully employed.4 2 According to the opinion, the decision should have instead been based on a consideration
of whether Travis would live to reach the age of eighteen.43 Citing
these errors, the Court of Special Appeals remanded the case for a
new trial on the amount of damages Travis was entitled to recover, if
any, for pre- and post-majority medical expenses.4 4
Hopkins next appealed to the Court of Appeals, which granted
certiorari to determine whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in
remanding Travis's claim for medical expenses.4"
2. Legal Background.--Priorto Garay, Maryland courts adhered
to the general rule that claims for a negligently injured child's premajority medical expenses belonged to the parents of that child.4 6
Other jurisdictions have also held that only the parents of a negligently injured child have a right to recover medical expenses. 47 Two
37. Pepper v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 111 Md. App. 49, 66-67, 680 A.2d 532, 540-41
(1996), affd, 346 Md. 679, 697 A.2d 1358 (1997).
38. Id. at 68 n.11, 680 A.2d at 541 n.11.
39. Id. at 68-69, 680 A.2d at 541-42.
40. Id. at 67, 680 A.2d at 541.
41. Id. at 69, 680 A.2d at 542.
42. Id. at 72-73, 680 A.2d at 543-44.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 80, 680 A.2d at 547.
45. Pepper, 346 Md. at 692, 697 A.2d at 1364.
46. See Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 346, 631 A.2d 429, 432 (1993); Hudson v.
Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 528, 174 A.2d 339, 342 (1961); Herbert v. Whittle, 69 Md. App. 273,
295, 517 A.2d 358, 369 (1986).
47. See, e.g., Stokes v. United States, 444 F.2d 69, 70 (4th Cir. 1971) (observing that,
under North Carolina law, the parents of a negligently injured child have the right to sue
to recover "expenses incurred for necessary medical treatment for the child's injuries");
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traditional rationales underlie rules that vest medical expense claims
solely in parents: First, because parents have a duty to pay a minor
child's medical expenses, it is equitable to allow only parents to re48
cover from the tortfeasor for the loss they have actually suffered;
second, by limiting the cause of action to the parents, the law prevents
"double recovery by children and their parents."4 9
Garay was the first Maryland case to expressly reject the notion
that the right to recover medical expenses belongs exclusively to the
parents of a negligently injured child.5" In Garay, an injured child
and his parents sued a negligent driver more than five years after their
cause of action* arose.5 1 The original complaint contained both a
claim by the child, through his mother as next friend, for injuries sustained in the accident and a claim by the child's parents (the Garays)
for pre-majority medical expenses resulting from those injuries.52
The defendant successfully moved to dismiss the parents' claim
for medical expenses because the parents filed their claim beyond the
three-year statute of limitations.5 3 The Garays immediately amended
their son's complaint to include a more specific claim for pre- and
post-majority medical expenses. 4 According to the Garay court, the
defendant then moved to dismiss the amended complaint by asserting
that the right to bring a cause of action to recover the sums
expended for medical care rests solely with the parents of
the minor, that the minor is under no legal obligation to pay
for his medical care, that the minor lacks standing to pursue
a claim for recovery of sums expended for his medical care,
and that, because the parents' claim for medical expenses is
Foster v. Foster, 142 S.E.2d 638, 641 (N.C. 1965) (holding that the right to recover "expenses of necessary medical treatment" vests in the parent of a negligently injured child).
See generally Mark A. Reiter, Note, "Look Mom, I Can Do It on My Own": A Child's Independent
Right to Recover Medical Expenses in Missouri, 61 Mo. L. REv. 705 (1996) (noting that, prior to
1995, Missouri case law held that only parents had a right to recover for their child's medical expenses).
48. See Hudson, 226 Md. at 528, 174 A.2d at 342 ("[T]he parent who has actually incurred the obligatioh to pay for such medical services is entitled to recover for them .... ");
Reiter, supra note 47, at 705 (explaining that Missouri law allows a negligently injured child
to recover damages for personal injury and parents to recover damages for the child's
medical expenses in order to ensure that the party who actually suffers a particular loss
recovers that loss from a wrongdoer).
49. Reiter, supra note 47, at 705.
50. See Garay, 332 Md. at 374, 631 A.2d at 446-47 (holding that exceptions exist to the
general rule that only parents may make a claim for pre-majority medical expenses of their
negligently injured child).
51. Id. at 343-44, 631 A.2d at 431-32.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 344, 631 A.2d at 431.
54. Id. at 345, 631 A.2d at 431.
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barred by limitations, an attempt by the minor to bring
55 the
claim amounts to an invalid assignment of the claim.
The trial judge again granted the defendant's motion to dismiss.5 6
The Garays appealed the dismissal to the Court of Special Appeals,
but prior to the intermediate appeal, the Court of Appeals issued a
writ of certiorari to decide whether a negligently injured child can
make his own claim for medical expenses.5 7
The Court of Appeals's analysis centered around three basic issues: (1) whether compulsory joinder rules required the parents to
join in their son's claim, thereby enabling the Garays' claim for medical expenses to be tolled during their child's minority; (2) whether
the Garays had properly waived and assigned their claim for medical
expenses to their son; and (3) whether the minor had independent
standing to bring the claim for medical expenses.5 8
The court answered the first of the three issues in the negative,
stating that "the parents' claim for medical expenses is not required to
be joined in the same action brought by the injured minor to recover
for its own personal injuries."59 Consequently, the court found meritless the Garays' assertion that their claim for medical expenses could
be tolled along with their child's claim.6"
As to the second issue, the court held that, even if the parents
could waive the right to recover medical expenses in favor of their
minor child, a waiver would take effect only if the parents had filed a
claim for medical expenses on behalf of the child within the threeyear limitations period.6 1 Because the Garays failed to waive their
claim for medical expenses within the limitations period, they forfeited the opportunity to waive the claim and assign it to their son.6 2
The Garay court presented its critical holding when it addressed
the third issue-whether the Garays' son had independent standing
to bring a claim for pre-majority medical expenses. The court observed that, under most circumstances, the right to recover medical
expenses vests with the parents of a negligently injured minor.6" However, the court flatly rejected the assertion that a "child can never re55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id., 631 A.2d at 432.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 349-50, 631 A.2d at 434.
Id. at 353, 631 A.2d at 436.
Id.
Id. at 365, 631 A.2d at 442.
Id.
Id. (citing Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 530, 174 A.2d 339, 343 (1961)).
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cover medical expenses" '64 and stated that " [i] n limited circumstances,
a minor may be individually held liable for his medical expenses, and
in those circumstances, the minor must, of necessity, be allowed to
recover those medical expenses. "65
The court explained that the right of parents to recover medical
expenses stems from the statutory duty imposed on parents to care for
a child.6 6 Ordinarily, the duty makes parents "contractually liable for
medical expenses incurred on the child's behalf. ' 67 Nevertheless, the
court decided to follow the reasoning of Moses v. Akers,68 a Virginia
case that set forth four circumstances, each of which constitutes an
exception to the general rule that parents possess the exclusive right to
recover a minor's pre-majority medical expenses. 69 This decision created a new Maryland rule for medical expense claims by negligently
injured minors. Put simply, the Garay court held that a child may
make his own claim for medical expenses if he can show that "he or
his estate either has paid or will be individually responsible to pay for
medical expenses: (1) by emancipation, (2) by death or incompetence of his parents, (3) as necessaries for which his parents are unable or unwilling to pay, or (4) by operation of statute. "70
Accordingly, the court found that the lower court had erred in dismissing the Garays' amended complaint for pre- and post-majority
medical expenses, and it reversed and remanded the case for a trial to
64.
65.
66.
(Supp.
child's
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 368-69, 631 A.2d at 444 (construing MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-203(b) (1)
1996) (making parents of a minor child 'joinly and severally responsible for the
support, care, nurture, welfare, and education")).
Id.
122 S.E.2d 864 (Va. 1961).
Similar to the Garay exceptions, the Moses court stated that a minor child could

recover medical expenses in any of the following circumstances:

(1) he has paid or agreed to pay the expenses; or (2) he alone is responsible by
reason of his emancipation or the death or incompetency of his parents; or (3)
the parent has waived the tight of recovery in favor of the infant; or (4) recovery
therefore is permitted by statute.

Id. at 866.
70. Garay, 332 Md. at 374, 631 A.2d at 446-47. The court opined that the Garays' son
might be liable to pay his medical expenses based specifically on the third and fourth

factors. Id. at 371-73, 631 A.2d at 445-46. Based on the facts presented, the court believed
that the child could be held liable to pay his medical expenses under the doctrine of

necessaries. Id. at 371, 631 A.2d at 445. The court also noted that because a Maryland
statute could make the child subject to a hospital lien on a portion of his recovery, it would
be "unfair to disallow a claim by a minor child for medical expenses, but to then subject

that minor child's recovery to the hospital lien." Id. at 373, 631 A.2d at 446 (referring to
the 1990 version of MD. CODE ANN., COM. Lw II § 16-601 (Supp. 1997), which allows a
hospital to create a lien against a wrongfully injured patient's damages award in order to
satisfy the patient's unpaid hospital bills).
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determine whether the Garays' son could recover those expenses
under the newly declared exceptions. 7 '
Although Garay was the first Maryland case to define exceptions
to the general rule that the right to sue for medical expenses vests
solely in the parents of a negligently injured child, the court's expansion of a child's right to recover medical expenses comports with recent trends in other jurisdictions. For example, in 1995, the Missouri
Supreme Court "took a significant step in furthering a child's right to
fully recover for medical injuries" 72 by holding in Boley v. Knowles73
that the right to maintain an action to recover medical expenses vests
jointly in the parents and the child."4 The Boley court also held that a
negligently injured child may recover medical expenses even though
the statute of limitations bars the parents' claim for such expenses.75
Like the Garay court, the Boley court based its decision partly on the
necessaries doctrine and partly on the existence of a state statute that
permitted hospitals to claim a lien upon the proceeds of a child's action for injuries. 76 By contrast, other courts have held that when parents allow the statute of limitations to expire, their failure to make a
claim for medical expenses automatically operates as a formal waiver
of the claim in favor of the child.7 7 Hence, prior to Pepper, case law in
Maryland and elsewhere acknowledged, in some form, a negligently
injured child's right to sue for pre-majority medical expenses. However, prior to Pepper, Maryland law remained unclear as to what circumstances would trigger the Garay necessaries exception.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Pepper, the Court of Appeals observed that the Peppers were barred from making or waiving a claim
71. Id. at 374, 631 A.2d at 447.
72. Reiter, supra note 47, at 705.
73. 905 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1995) (en banc).
74. Id. at 90. Like Garay, Boly was a medical malpractice action seeking to recover
medical expenses in the injured child's own name. Id. at 87.
75. Id. at 90.
76. Id. at 89.
77. See McNeill v. United States, 519 F. Supp. 283, 291 (D.S.C. 1981) ("By not asserting
within the two-year statutory period any right that they may have had to recover... the
parents have absolutely and irrevocably waived any right that they may have had in that
respect. This does not, however, bar the infant nor does it excuse liability."); Myer v. Dyer,
643 A.2d 1382, 1387 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993) ("[The parents] chose to file their action well
beyond the statute of limitations and it was clearly barred. By their action, the adult parents have waived their claims for medical expenses. A separate claim now exists on behalf
ofJennifer, the child, for such expenses."). But see Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 365,
631 A.2d 429, 442 (1993) (concluding that, absent a formal waiver within the three-year
limitations period, a parent's failure to file a claim within the statute of limitations does
not, in and of itself, operate as a waiver of the parental claim and an automatic assignment
of the parental claim to the minor child).
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for medical expenses because they failed to do either within the threeyear limitations period. 7' Nonetheless, the court reiterated its holding in Garay that a negligently injured child may assert a claim for
medical expenses under the necessaries exception when parents show
they cannot afford to pay for the child's necessary medical care. 79 According to the opinion, the child's claim under the necessaries exception will be preserved even when the statute of limitations bars a
parental claim for medical expenses.8 0 Most importantly, the Pepper
court specifically rejected parental indigence as a prerequisite to a
child's right to recover medical expenses.8 1
Hopkins argued that Travis had no standing to sue for medical
expenses, because Travis could not suffer a justiciable injury "unless
and until [his] Parents . . .[were] unable to provide for his needs," 2

thereby making the child legally responsible for his own medical expenses under the necessaries exception." In other words, Hopkins
asserted that, unless the Peppers could show they had no financial
resources that could pay for medical expenses actually incurred,Travis
could not maintain an action for pre-majority medical expenses in his
own name. The court disagreed, stating that its holding in Garay precludes pre-majority medical expense claims by a minor only when the
child's parents have the means to furnish necessary medical care and
fail to sue the tortfeasor within the three-year limitation period. 4 The
Pepper court explained:
[W]e think a minor child's showing that his or her parents
were in the past, are presently, or in the future will become,
financially unable to meet his or her medical needs, sufficiently triggers that child's right to recover medical expenses
in his or her own name from a wrongdoer. That a child is
presently not liable for such expenses is irrelevant.8 "
The opinion articulated a nonexhaustive list of possible factors
that should be used to determine whether parents can afford to pay
for necessary medical care:

78. Pepper,346 Md. at 696-97, 697 A.2d at 1366-67.
79. Id. at 705, 697 A.2d at 1371.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 701, 697 A.2d at 1369.
82. Brief of Petitioner at 27, Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Pepper, 346 Md. 679, 697 A.2d
1358 (1997) (No. 108).
83. Id. at 27-33.
84. Pepper, 346 Md. at 701, 697 A.2d at 1369.
85. Id. at 695-96, 697 A.2d at 1366 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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Whether or not parents are able to afford necessary medical
care for their negligently injured minor child will vary from
case to case according to the circumstances of the parties involved, including, but not limited to, parental income, existing financial assets and obligations, the number of
children in the family, available insurance coverage, the cost
of living and inflation rate, whether or not both parents
work, or are even capable of working in light of the child's
injuries, and other
economic and non-economic factors too
86
numerous to list.

Note that the court stressed that the enumerated factors would
"vary from case to case." The court also observed that additional factors such as the "nature of the injury and the duration and manner of
treatment" would make it impossible for the court to adopt a "bright
line" rule for determining whether parents can afford to pay for a
negligently injured child's necessary medical care. 7
The court then considered evidence proffered by the Peppers
concerning their financial situation. 8 Based on that evidence, the
court found a "meaningful dispute" as to whether the Peppers could
afford to meet all of Travis's medical needs:
[W] e find it difficult to imagine that a family of substantial
means could bear the financial burden of his care. The Peppers claim a yearly income of approximately $21,000, and
have one other child. Pre-majority medical expenses for
Travis are alleged to be slightly in excess of 1.1 million dollars ....

[A] cursory review of the record reveals that Terry

and Linda Pepper are, at some level, financially incapable of
providing all of Travis's medical necessaries.8 9
Thus, the court rejected the argument that if the family had any
resources left to pay for Travis's past and present medical costs, Travis

86. Id. at 701, 697 A.2d at 1369.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 702-04, 697 A.2d at 1369-71. The evidence included the following: (1) Linda
Pepper no longer worked outside the home, because she had to stay home to care for
Travis; (2) the Peppers had a net monthly income of $1,537.75 and had monthly expenses
of $2,289; (3) the Peppers did not have an individual savings account; (4) the Peppers'
income was insufficient to pay for Travis's future medical needs; (5) Travis was not receiving necessary medical services and equipment; (6) expert testimony indicated that Travis's
medical needs for the remainder of his life would exceed $7,600,000; and (7) the Peppers
indicated that they were unwilling to provide for Travis's medical expenses if they required
the Peppers to sell their home, to tap into their retirement savings, or to access their older
son's college fund. Id.
89. Id. at 704-05, 697 A.2d at 1371.
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could not maintain his cause of action.9" The court, in dicta, explained that public policy and justice would not be served if courts
allowed negligently injured children to be "twice victimized" by construing the necessaries exception as narrowly as Hopkins suggested.9"
It opined that a child who might ultimately be liable to pay for medical necessaries-because his parents could no longer afford themshould not have to go uncompensated simply because the parents
failed to make a timely claim for medical expenses.9 2 Therefore, the
court found that, under the circumstances presented, Travis deserved
a new trial on damages, which would include a consideration of preand post-majority medical expenses.9 3
4. Analysis.-After Pepper, a negligently injured child in Maryland does not have to prove that his parents are indigent-that is,
lacking means to pay for any of the medical care provided to the
child-in order to assert his own claim for medical expenses under
the Garay necessaries exception.9 4 It is enough for the child's parents
to show that they cannot afford all of the child's necessary medical expenses." This clarification of Garay expands a negligently injured
child's right to sue for pre-majority medical expenses by allowing foreseeable parental inability to pay, rather than actual indigence, to trigger the Garay necessaries exception.9 6 The Pepper result may enable
parents to circumvent the statute of limitations more easily when they
fail to make a timely claim for medical expenses. Nonetheless, the
holding is a reasonable outcome in light of the State's interest in preserving an injured person's right to sue for damages, making
tortfeasors accountable for their actions, and enabling families to remain self-sufficient.
a. Implications for the Statute of Limitations.-- One arguable
drawback to the Pepper decision is that it will render the statute of
limitations useless against parents who sleep on their right to sue for
their children's medical expenses. Several policy implications underlie statutes of limitations:
90. Id. Rather than basing an assessment of financial incapacity on whether the Peppers could afford to pay for any of Travis's medical expenses, the court indicated that such
an assessment should rest on whether the parents are incapable of paying the estimated
cost of all of the child's medical necessaries. Id.
91. Id. at 695, 697 A.2d at 1366.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 705, 697 A.2d at 1371.
94. See id. at 701, 697 A.2d at 1369.
95. See id. at 704-05, 697 A.2d at 1371.
96. See id.
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[O] ne of the purposes of such statutes is to assure fairness to
a potential defendant by . . .encouraging promptness in
prosecuting actions; suppressing stale or fraudulent claims;
avoiding inconvenience that may stem from delay, such as
loss of evidence, fading of memories, and disappearance of
witnesses; and providing the ability to plan for the future
without the uncertainty inherent in potential liability.9 7
Limitations periods also protect plaintiffs who exercise diligence in
pursuing claims and "promote judicial economy."98 Thus, if children
can sue for medical expenses several years after they have been negligently injured, the tortfeasor will suffer a disadvantage. However, defendants already face such a dilemma when torts involve minors.
Under Maryland law, the statute of limitations is generally tolled for
minors until three years after the minor reaches the age of majority.9 9
If a child has a cause of action at the age of eight, for example, a
defendant receives notice that he may face liability thirteen years
later, after the child turns eighteen. The Pepper result, although inconvenient for defendants, is consistent with other cases that have
held that the statute of limitations tolls for minors.10 0 In this respect,
Pepperoffers no less protection for defendants than the existing tolling
provision of the statute of limitations.
Furthermore, the court has attempted to lessen the impact of the
statute of limitations in other cases when doing so promotes fairness
and equity. In Pierce v. Johns-ManvilleSales Corp., 0 the court ruled in
favor of a plaintiff who discovered he had lung cancer more than six
years after he developed an initial cause of action for asbestos exposure. 0 2 When the plaintiff later discovered that he had lung cancer,
97. Pierce v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 665, 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1983);
accordCrown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352 (1983) ("Limitations periods are
intended to put defendants on notice of adverse claims.. . ."); Reed v. Sweeney, 62 Md.
App. 231, 235, 488 A.2d 1016, 1018 (1985) (stating that statutes of limitations are designed
to protect potential defendants from "surprise" actions that inhibit the ability to fashion a
defense).
98. Pierce, 296 Md. at 665, 464 A.2d at 1026. The statute of limitations protects plaintiffs and achieves judicial economy by forcing plaintiffs to file timely actions, thereby reducing the likelihood that resources will be expended inefficiently on stale causes of action for
which evidence and witnesses may be difficult to find. See id.
99. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-201 (1995).
100. See, e.g.,
Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 374, 631 A.2d 429, 446 (1993) ("[Any
claim for medical expenses incurred after the minor reaches the age of majority clearly
belongs to the minor, and as to those expenses, the statute of limitations is tolled by
§ 5-201 of the Courts Article."); Abrams v. City of Rockville, 88 Md. App. 588, 595-96, 596
A.2d 116, 119 (1991) (recognizing that Maryland's statute of limitations tolls for a minor
until after the child reaches the age of majority).
101. 296 Md. 656, 464 A.2d 1020 (1983).
102. Id. at 669, 464 A.2d at 1028.
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he sued the manufacturer of the asbestos products to which he had
been exposed."0 3 The court considered the defendant's argument
that the plaintiff's second claim should be subject to a limitations period based on the original cause of action. Specifically, the defendant
asserted that the later claim relied on the same underlying facts of the
earlier claim. 01 4 Nevertheless, the court ultimately determined that
the resulting "unfairness" to the plaintiff outweighed the need to preserve the limitations period for the defendants; 10 5 hence, the court
applied the "discovery rule"'0 6 and allowed the plaintiff to make a
claim for damages related to his lung cancer more than six years after
10 7
his initial cause of action arose.
Like the situation in Pierce, a strong argument exists that Travis
Pepper could not have "discovered" his own cause of action for medical expenses until his claim actually came into existence through his
parents' inability to meet all of his present and future medical necessaries. Hence, it would have been unfair to subject Travis's separate
claim for medical expenses to the three-year limitations period that
applied to his parents. The Peppercourt alluded to this need for a fair
application of the law when it stated that "public policy and justice"
demanded that Travis Pepper receive the right to assert his claim
under the circumstances, notwithstanding the limitations bar to his
parents' claim for medical expenses.'O'
Other courts have expanded statutory limitations periods in cases
involving negligently injured children far more than did the court in
Pepper. In fact, some jurisdictions go so far as to allow parents to benefit from the same tolling provisions that apply to their minor children."0 9 In those jurisdictions, parents can ostensibly neglect to file
103. Id. at 661, 464 A.2d at 1023-24.
104. Id. at 663, 464 A.2d at 1025.
105. Id. at 667-68, 464 A.2d at 1027.
106. Id. at 663-64, 464 A.2d at 1025. Under the discovery rule, a cause of action arises
for a latent disease when the plaintiff knew or should have known the nature and cause of
the harm done to him. Id. (citing Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83,
394 A.2d 299, 306 (1978)). The rationale behind the rule is that plaintiffs should not be
penalized for failing to assert claims they did not know existed. Id. at 664, 464 A.2d at
1025.
107. Id. at 667-68, 464 A.2d at 1027.
108. Pepper, 346 Md. at 695, 697 A.2d at 1366.
109. See, e.g., Manley v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 339 N.W.2d 205, 211-12 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that a parent's cause of action for medical expenses derives from the
minor child's cause of action for injuries and is thus protected by the statutory tolling
provisions for minors); Rost v. Board of Educ., 347 A.2d 811, 812 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1975) (finding a parent's claim for medical expenses to be subject to the same statute-oflimitations tolling provision as that of the child's claim); Vedutis v. Tesi, 343 A.2d 171, 176
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (noting, in actions where parents joined claims for medical
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lawsuits within the limitations period and, nevertheless, make their
own claim for medical expenses years after the limitations period has
run. 10 Nowhere in Pepper did the court suggest that the Peppers
could have tolled their claims along with Travis's. To the contrary,
the court expressly found that the parental claims were separate and
indeed subject to the three-year statute of limitations."' Thus,
although Peppermay enable parents to circumvent the statute of limitations if they meet certain criteria, such a circumvention must rest
solely on the existence of a genuine cause of action for the negligently
injured child." 2 If none exists, parents will still be barred from asserting a claim for medical expenses beyond the three-year limitations
period,"' thereby eliminating any risk of double recovery by parents
and child for the same loss.
Moreover, it seems absurd to say that an interest in protecting
defendants from aged claims should, alone, outweigh the interest of a
negligently injured minor in asserting a "newly discovered" claim for
medical expenses against the party responsible for causing his injuries. Such an approach would contradict the long-held legal view that
tortiously injured persons have a right to pursue damages in court." 4
By interpreting Garay in a manner that makes it easier for a child vicexpenses with children's claims for injuries, that it would contravene the purpose of the
tolling statute to subject the parents to a different limitations period than the child), affd
sub nom. Vedutis v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 362 A.2d 51 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976). See generallyJohn H. Derrick, Annotation, Tolling of Statute of Limitations, on Account
of Minority of Injured Child, as Applicable to Parent's or Guardian'sRight of Action Arising out of
Same Injury, 49 A.L.R.4TH 216 (1986 & Supp. 1997) (citing cases that have held that the
claims of parents of negligently injured children, under certain circumstances, may be
tolled pursuant to statutes that toll the children's claims until the age of majority, as well as
citing cases that have held to the contrary).
110. See, e.g., Manley, 339 N.W.2d at 211 (allowing parents of a negligently injured child
to make a claim for expenses resulting from the child's injuries even though they failed to
file their claim within the one-year limitations period); Vedutis, 343 A.2d at 174-75 (permitting parents of a negligently injured child to file their claim three years after their cause of
action arose, even though the statute of limitations required plaintiffs to file such suits
within two years).
111. Pepper, 346 Md. at 696-97, 697 A.2d at 1367.
112. See id. at 696, 697 A.2d at 1366 (stating that parental claims that are barred by the
statute of limitations cannot be "implicitly assigned to the minor child").
113. See id. (explaining that parents who fail to file timely claims will still be unable to
sue-either on their own behalf or on behalf of their minor child-for medical expenses
they have paid or can afford to pay in the future).
114. The Maryland Declaration of Rights provides as follows:
[E]very man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought to have
remedy by the course of the Law of the land, and ought to have justice and right,
freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according
to the Law of the land.
MD. CONST. DECL. oF RTs. art. 19.
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tim of medical negligence to make a valid claim for medical expenses,
the court enables the person who suffers or who will suffer economic
injury to receive compensation for her loss. In so doing, the court
remains faithful to the idea that "the party that suffered the loss
[should be able to] recover from the tortfeasor for that specific
"

lOSS. 1115

The court's decision also reinforces the public policy interest of
making tortious actors liable for the injuries caused by their wrongful
conduct.1 1 6 In Maryland and elsewhere, tort damages force wrongdoers to compensate their victims"1 7 and, in punitive-damages cases, can
influence individuals to act within established standards of conduct.11 8
If hospitals, physicians, or other individuals have increased exposure
to liability for injuries caused to minors as a result of negligence, they
may monitor their conduct in the future more closely to avoid paying
compensatory and punitive-damages awards. A contrary argument exists that, in the medical context, increased exposure to liability will
result in a "medical malpractice crisis" similar to that experienced in
the late seventies and early eighties. 1 9 But that argument has little
merit when one considers that Pepper does not give child victims of
medical malpractice an "automatic" right to sue on their own for premajority medical expenses. The child or party suing on the child's
behalf will still have to prove that the claim falls within the Garay
necessaries exception before the claim can be heard.1 2 ° Furthermore,
the assumption that parents will use Pepper as an excuse to sleep on
their rights to sue for medical expenses ignores the reality that, in
most cases, parents of greater financial means than the Peppers will
115. Reiter, supra note 47, at 705.
116. SeeCampbellv. State, 293 Md. 438, 450-51, 444 A.2d 1034,1041 (1982) ("Tort law is
primarily concerned with who shall bear the burden of loss ....").
117. See Weishaar v. Canestrale, 241 Md. 676, 685, 217 A.2d 525, 530-31 (1966) ("'Damages are supposed to compensate the injured person for the wrong which has been done
him.'" (quoting Guido v. Hudson Transit Lines, 178 F.2d 740, 742 (3d Cir. 1950) (citing
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 910 (1939)))); Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 69 Md. App. 124, 137, 516
A.2d 990, 997 (1986) ("The award of compensatory damages is an attempt to make the
plaintiff whole again by monetary compensation."); see also Morrissette v. Boiseau, 91 A.2d

130, 131 (D.C. 1952) (noting that compensatory damages are designed to repair actual
damage that the plaintiff suffered due to the defendant's wrongful conduct).

118. See, e.g., Yarema, 69 Md. App. at 137, 516 A.2d at 997 (observing that punitive damages are awarded "to punish the wrongdoer to teach him not to repeat his wrongful conduct and to deter others from engaging in the same conduct" (internal quotation marks

omitted)).
119. See generally Nancy E. Leibowitz, Casenote, 16 U. BALT.L. Rv. 571 (1987) (discussing contentions that a specific expansion of the limitations period as to medical negligence
suits caused an overwhelming volume of medical malpractice cases).
120. See supra note 31 for a discussion of the Garay necessaries exception.
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find less risk in making a parental claim for medical expenses within
three years than in letting the limitations period expire, hoping to
satisfy the necessaries exception later.
b. Interest in Avoiding Taxpayer Burden.-The court's decision
in Pepperalso makes sense in light of the State's interest in promoting
the self-sufficiency of families. In recent years, Maryland has been at
the forefront of a nationwide movement to curb dependency on public assistance programs. 2 1 Taken literally, however, Hopkins's approach to the necessaries exception would. likely force many families
of negligently injured children to use public assistance programs to
pay for medical expenses, even though third parties tortiously caused
the injuries.1 2 2 The Hopkins approach would require parents to show
that they have expended all available financial resources on a negligently injured child's medical expenses before the child could qualify
to make his own claim for those expenses.12 Such a requirement
would compel families in the Peppers' situation to deplete all income
in order to qualify as "unable to pay" under the necessaries exception.
Once the parents qualified as unable to pay, the child could then sue
in his own name to recover medical expenses. However, it could take
many months or even years for a child plaintiff to win a civil judgment
in his favor, depending upon the length of the court's docket. 124 In
the meantime, the family would likely have to seek some form of public assistance to fund the child's medical expenses.
121. See, e.g., Robert A. Erlandson, Welfare Recipients "Grab Brass Ring" Woodlawn Women
Train to Become Paramedics, BALIMORE SUN, Aug. 29, 1997, at 3B, available in 1997 WL
5527453 (commenting on a work-training program aimed at helping women to work their
way off the welfare rolls); Peter Jensen, Glendening Seeks Limit on Welfare, BA1TIMORuE SUN,
Feb. 8, 1996, at 1A, available in 1996 WL 6604081 (discussing Maryland's push to remove
individuals from welfare programs by forcing them back to work).
122. According to the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene's most recent Medical Assistance Program report, the State spent more than $600 million on medical assistance programs for persons under the age of 21 in 1995. That figure represented
more than 27% of all payments made by the State's Medical Assistance Program. MARYLAND MED. Assis-r. PROGRAM, THE YEAR IN REVIEW: FiscAL YEAR 1995, at 42 (1996).
Although the State does not keep statistics on the number of public assistance program
payments made to families with children who have extraordinary medical bills, it is reasonable to believe that a family that depletes its finances to pay for a negligently injured child's
medical bills might eventually have to access public assistance funds.
123. See Brief of Petitioner at 25-26, Pepper (No. 108) (contending that a "minor does not
suffer ajusticiable injury until his parents are unable to meet his medical expenses and he
becomes responsible for them under the doctrine of necessaries").
124. Cf Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Trial byJury or Judge: Which Is Speedier, 79JuoICATURE 176, 178 (1996) (stating that the average judge-tried civil trial spends
755 days on the docket and that the average jury-tried civil trial remains on the docket 678
days).
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On the other hand, if parents can show that they cannot pay for
all of the child's necessary medical expenses without first having to
show that they are indigent, the child's claims could be heard before
the parents became destitute. Thus, parents could retain some means
of providing support to their families and use subsequent awards to
the negligently injured child to pay for that child's medical expenses.
In fact, the Peppercourt addressed the need to avoid a rule that would
force families to rely on public assistance programs when it implied its
desire to prevent "the taxpayer [from bearing] a5 financial burden that
12
rightfully should be borne by the tortfeasor."
Because Pepper's holding should only bear on cases of extraordinary medical expenses, the families who will actually benefit from Pepper will be those facing incredible medical bills-bills that could easily
deplete a family's income or savings. 126 By providing an avenue for
the injured child to recover pre-majority medical expenses, Pepperprovides those families with an alternative to becoming dependent upon
public assistance. 127 As a result, Pepper furthers the State's policy of
lessening dependence on public assistance programs.
5. Conclusion.-Pepper'soutcome may increase a negligent actor's exposure to liability for an injured child's medical expenses, but
that result is not necessarily an undesirable one under circumstances
analogous to the Pepper case. Furthermore, although Pepper may enable parents to circumvent the statute of limitations, the court's decision limits such a possibility to cases in which a negligently injured
minor has no other means of receiving and paying for all of the past,
present, and future costs of necessary medical treatment for which he
is financially responsible. 121 In fact, if parents fail to make a claim for
medical expenses within the statute-of-limitations period and possess
125. Pepper, 346 Md. at 701, 697 A.2d at 1369.
126. In Travis's case, estimates placed medical expenses in the millions of dollars,
thereby making it impossible for his parents to afford the total expense of his necessary
medical care. Id. at 704, 697 A.2d at 1371. However, if the medical expenses were in the
thousands of dollars, for example, the Peppers may not have been able to prove that they
could not afford necessary medical care for Travis. If the Peppers could not show an inability to pay, they would have never qualified under the necessaries exception. See id. at
701, 697 A.2d at 1369 (determining that parents cannot benefit from the Garay necessaries
exception if they possess the means to pay for the child's necessary medical and related
care).
127. Instead of turning to public assistance programs, a family could use damages
awards to pay for the injured child's medical necessaries. In fact, the Court of Special
Appeals alluded to this desirable alternative when it stated that "[t]ort recovery is designed,
inter alia, to prevent an injured party from becoming destitute and a burden upon innocent parties." Pepper, 111 Md. App. at 71, 680 A.2d at 543.
128. See Pepper, 346 Md. at 694, 697 A.2d at 1365-66.
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the financial means to provide all of the medical care their minor
child needs, they will not fall within the Pepper rule. 129 , Consequently,
Pepper makes sense from both a policy and a moral perspective: It
makes tortfeasors accountable for their negligent acts, helps families
to remain self-sufficient, and protects the rights of negligently injured
children who would otherwise suffer because of their parents' failure
to comply with the statute of limitations.
ALLISON

B.

L.

ALEXANDER

Preventing Medical Malpractice Claimantsfrom Evading the Certificate
of Merit Requirement Under the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act

In Goicochea v. Langworthy,' the Court of Appeals effectively prevented a plaintiff from circumventing the requirements of the Maryland Health Care Malpractice Claims Act 2 (the Act).' In holding that
the facts alleged by the respondent were insufficient to distinguish the
action from a traditional medical malpractice claim,4 the court closed
a potential loophole in the arbitration process for medical malpractice claimants who cannot, or will not, obtain a certificate of a qualified expert (also known as a certificate of merit).' Furthermore, the
Court of Appeals clarified the process by which trial courts should
determine whether a claim is subject to the Act.6 Most importantly,
129. See id. at 701, 697 A.2d at 1369.
1. 345 Md. 719, 694 A.2d 474 (1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 321 (1997).
2. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1995 & Supp. 1997).
3. Goicochea, 345 Md. at 721-22, 694 A.2d at 476.
4. See id. at 729, 694 A.2d at 479 (concluding that the factual allegations made by
Langworthy did not distinguish his claim from a medical malpractice claim, because the
allegations "fail[ed] to set forth any factual basis upon which the circuit court could properly conclude that Goicochea's actions.., were totally unrelated to the performance of a
routine hernia examination").
5. Id. The Act requires that a potential plaintiff obtain a certificate of qualified expert
before filing a medical malpractice claim. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 3-2A-04(b) (1) (i) (Supp. 1997) (stating that, unless the sole issue is a lack of informed
consent, a claim against a health care provider shall be dismissed if a claimant "fails to file
a certificate of a qualified expert... attesting to departure from standards of care, and that
the departure from standards of care is the proximate cause of the alleged injury"). The
certificate of qualified expert is commonly referred to by practitioners as the certificate of
merit. See Terry L. Trimble, Note, Delegates Deliver a Deathblow to Maryland's Health Claims
Arbitration System, 55 MD. L. REv. 893, 898 & n.45 (1996) (discussing in detail the development and requirements of the certificate of qualified expert).
6. See Goicochea, 345 Md. at 727-29, 694 A.2d at 478-79 (applying the test constructed
inJewell v. Malamet, 322 Md. 262, 271-75, 587 A.2d 474, 479-80 (1991), to the facts alleged
by Langworthy in a logical, straightforward manner to determine whether Langworthy's
claim was subject to the Act); see also infra notes 78-90 (discussing Jewell); infra notes 144152 and accompanying text (discussing the analyses of the Court of Special Appeals and
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however, the decision in Goicochea demonstrated how the court balances the competing policy goals of compensating legitimate tort
claims and reducing the cost of medical malpractice litigation.7
1. The Case.-On November 27, 1992, after developing pain in
his right groin, John Langworthy visited Dr. Juvenal Goicochea for a
hernia examination in Dr. Goicochea's office in Bethesda, Maryland.'
Although Langworthy consented to the examination, 9 he later
claimed that Dr. Goicochea exceeded the scope of a routine hernia
examination and thereby committed assault and battery. 10 Specifically, Langworthy alleged that Goicochea maliciously and violently
jammed an index finger into Langworthy's left spermatic cord and
inguinal canal, causing permanent injury and pain to his left groin
area. "1
Fourteen months after the allegedly tortious medical examination, Langworthy filed a statement of claim pursuant to the Act.' 2 The
claim alleged that Dr. Goicochea maliciously injured Langworthy during the course of the examination and that, as a result, Langworthy
experienced chronic groin pain, abnormal swelling, and laceration of
soft tissues around his left spermatic cord."3 Because Langworthy
the Court of Appeals regarding the facts in Goicochea, and comparing these analyses with
the odd result in Jewell).
7. See infra notes 153-163 and accompanying text (analyzing this balance and concluding that the court tipped the balance in favor of defendants).
8. Goicochea, 345 Md. at 722, 694 A.2d at 476; Langworthy v. Goicochea, 106 Md. App.
265, 268, 664 A.2d 422, 423 (1995), revd, 345 Md. 719, 694 A.2d 474, cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
321 (1997).
9. Goicochea, 345 Md. at 722, 694 A.2d at 476.
10. In his brief to the Court of Appeals, Langworthy stated:
[Dr. Goicochea] very adroitly put on a pair of surgical gloves. Turning to face his
victim with the doctor's malice aforethought, the petitioner said, "I am going to
examine the left side first."
With malice aforethought, Goicochea sat on the stool, tensely cocked his left
index finger "like a scalpel" and . .. violently, brutally and deliberately rammed,
jammed, stabbed, gouged, gored, traumatized, tortured, battered and abused
Langworthy's left spermatic cord and inguinal canal ... for approximately five
(5) minutes.
Brief of Respondent at 10-11, Goicochea v. Langworthy, 345 Md. 719, 694 A.2d 474 (1997)
(No. 106).
11. See id. at 11-12 (describing allegedly malicious conduct and permanently painful
injuries); see also supra note 10.
12. See Brief of Petitioner at 2, Goicochea v. Langworthy, 345 Md. 719, 694 A.2d 474
(1997) (No. 106) (noting that Langworthy filed his claim with the Health Claims Arbitration Office on January 10, 1994); see supra note 5 (detailing the requirements of MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(b)(1)(i) (Supp. 1997)).
13. Goicochea, 345 Md. at 722, 694 A.2d at 476; see also Brief of Respondent at 17,
Goicochea (No. 106) (describing Langworthy's alleged injuries in detail).
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failed to file a certificate of qualified expert, the Health Claims Arbitration Office (HCAO) dismissed his claim.14 Before the claim was
dismissed, however, Langworthy filed a complaint in the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County, alleging assault and battery. 15 As a result,
Dr. Goicochea later argued before the Court of Appeals that Langworthy "apparently realized that he would be unable to substantiate his
claim of medical malpractice through a Certificate of Qualified Expert and thus attempted to circumvent this requirement by filing a
Complaint in [circuit court]."16
In the circuit court, Dr. Goicochea filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Langworthy's claim was subject to arbitration as a condition
precedent to filing suit.' 7 Thus, at issue was whether Langworthy's
claim of assault and battery should have proceeded directly to the circuit court as an intentional tort, or whether his claim alleged a "medical injury" under the Act, thus requiring arbitration before pursuing a
malpractice claim in the circuit court.18 According to Goicochea, the
facts alleged by Langworthy did not sufficiently distinguish the claim
from traditional medical malpractice, and the claim was therefore subject to the certificate requirement of the Act. 9 The circuit court concurred with Dr. Goicochea and dismissed the complaint.2" The court
concluded that the facts alleged in the complaint were insufficient to
remove it from the purview of the Act." Furthermore, the court concluded that because the HCAO had already dismissed Langworthy's
claim, it would be inappropriate to stay the tort action until the conclusion of further arbitration proceedings.2 2
14. See Goicochea, 345 Md. at 722, 694 A.2d at 476 (indicating that a certificate of qualified expert is a requirement under Mn. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(b)(1)(i));
see also supra note 5 (detailing the requirements of section 3-2A-04(b) (1) (i)).
15. Goicochea, 345 Md. at 722, 694 A.2d at 476. Remarkably, Langworthy represented
himself pro se throughout the entire process of arbitrating, litigating, and appealing his
claim. See Brief of Respondent at 12-14, Goicochea (No. 106) (explaining that Langworthy
filed a pro se claim because an attorney refused to represent him without a certificate of
merit). This was not the first time John Langworthy has taken a pro se claim from a circuit
court to the Court of Appeals. See Langworthy v. State, 284 Md. 588, 591, 399 A.2d 578, 580
(1979) (noting Langworthy's pro se appeal in a case in which he successfully interposed
the defense of insanity to a rape conviction, and considering whether Langworthy's appeal
was improperly dismissed by the intermediate appellate court).
16. Brief of Petitioner at 1, Goicochea (No. 106).
17. Goicochea, 345 Md. at 723, 694 A.2d at 476.
18. See id. at 721, 694 A.2d at 476.
19. Id. at 724, 694 A.2d at 477; see also Brief of Petitioner at 12-13, Goicochea (No. 106).
20. See Goicochea, 345 Md. at 723, 694 A.2d at 476. The circuit court reasoned that
because Langworthy alleged that the assault and battery arose during the providing of
health care by a physician, the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act applied to his claim. Id.
21. Id
22. Id.

MARYLAND LAW REviEW

[VOL. 57:642

In the Court of Special Appeals, Langworthy argued that the circuit court should have exercised jurisdiction over his claim of assault
and battery.2" Langworthy contended that the assault and battery did
not constitute a medical injury as defined by statute and that his
24
claim, therefore, should proceed directly to trial without arbitration.
He entreated the appellate court to vacate the decision and remand
the case to circuit court, arguing that Dr. Goicochea's actions constituted gratuitous acts of torture with no medical validity.2 5 Neither the
circuit court nor the HCAO expressly determined whether Langworthy's claim arose out of a medical injury or a gratuitous act.2 6 As a
result, the Court of Special Appeals held that "because Langworthy
asserts .

.

. [a claim] for assault and battery, the circuit court should

determine whether Langworthy's claim is based on an alleged gratuitous act that obviously was not part of the medical treatment." 27 The
Court of Special Appeals therefore vacated the judgment of the circuit
court and remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance
with its opinion.2 8

23. See Langworthy, 106 Md. App. at 269, 664 A.2d at 424. Section 3-2A-02(a) of the
Courts andJudicial Proceedings Article provides that "[a]1l claims ... by a person against a
health care provider for medical injury allegedly suffered by the person ... are subject to
and shall be governed by the provisions of this subtitle." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC.
§ 3-2A-02(a) (1995). In addition, section 3-2A-01 (f) defines a "medical injury" as an "injury
arising or resulting from the rendering or failure to render health care." Id. § 3-2A-01 (f).
24. See Langworthy, 106 Md. App. at 269, 664 A.2d at 424.
25. See id. at 273, 664 A.2d at 426; see also Brief of Respondent at 14, 35-36, Goicochea
(No. 106) (arguing to the Court of Appeals that Goicochea had acted with "unlawful malice and gratuitous purpose" and with "no conceivable medical validity"). Langworthy
researched the topic of torture at the National Library of Medicine in Bethesda, Maryland.
Id. at 14. Based on his research, Langworthy claimed before the Court of Appeals that
"South American fascist dictatorships like the State of Peru where Goicochea obtained his
State-sponsored medical degree have been practising the medical torture of communists,
libertines and other nonconformists." Id. at 14-15. At various points in his brief to the
Court of Appeals, Langworthy compared Dr. Goicochea to the following: (1) a doctor who
performed an abortion on a mother against her will, id. at 19, (2) a Nazi war criminal who
performed nonconsensual sterilizations on prisoners (the scope of Langworthy's presentation included the Nuremberg Code and other international human rights documents), id.
at 21, (3) a doctor who raped his patient after obtaining consent to a medical procedure,
id. at 23, (4) a doctor who took off his pants and "climbed on top" of his patient (and later
claimed it was medically valid treatment), id. at 25, and finally, (5) convicted serial killer
Jeffrey Dahmer, who used surprise tactics to stun his victims, id. at 32.
26. See Langworthy, 106 Md. App. at 273, 664 A.2d at 426. Dr. Goicochea argued before
the Court of Appeals, however, that because HCAO heard and eventually dismissed Langworthy's claim, by implication the HCAO determined the claim was within its purview. See
Brief of Petitioner at 8, Goicochea (No. 106).
27. Langworthy, 106 Md. App. at 275, 664 A.2d at 427.
28. Id.
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The Court of Appeals granted certiorari 29 to determine whether
Langworthy's intentional tort claim fell within the ambit of the Act."°
2. Legal Background.-Maryland,like many other states, enacted
legislation directed at curing the medical malpractice insurance crisis
of the late 1960s and early 1970s. While the Maryland legislature created a statute that utilized arbitration, and later the certificate of merit
requirement, as the primary tools to combat the high cost of health
care litigation, l other jurisdictions enacted legislation combining a
variety of tools for the same purpose. Some of these tools included
shortening the limitations period, setting up medical review panels
and committees, creating damage caps, and creating patient compensation funds.3 " The Maryland statute and the statutes enacted in
other jurisdictions share the recurring question whether an action
based on non-professional negligence or intentional tort falls within
the purview of a medical malpractice statute. In Maryland, courts
have had a difficult time producing a clear answer to this question.
a. Maryland'sResponse to Health Care Litigation.--In 1976, the
Maryland General Assembly enacted the Health Care Malpractice
Claims Act33 in response to the medical malpractice insurance crisis of
the late 1960s and early 1970s. 4 The legislators attempted to devise a
statute that would protect legitimate tort claimants while simultaneously reducing the number of frivolous medical malpractice suits
filed.35 Despite attempts to identify clearly which claims are covered
29. Goicochea v. Langworthy, 340 Md. 649, 667 A.2d 897 (1995).
30. Goicochea, 345 Md. at 721, 694 A.2d at 476.
31. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (describing the requirement of nonbinding arbitration and the certificate of merit requirement placed on litigants).
32. See infra note 92 and accompanying text (listing various medical malpractice statutes and their requirements, and noting that they share a similar scope and purpose to the
Maryland statute).
33. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1995 & Supp. 1997); see also
supra notes 5, 12, 14, 23 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of the Act).
34. See Trimble, supra note 5, passim (discussing the background of the medical malpractice crisis, the creation and evolution of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act, and
the effect of the unilateral waiver on health claims arbitration in Maryland); see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Medical MalpracticeReform: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 36 MD. L. REv. 489, 490
(1977) (describing the increase in severity and frequency of medical malpractice claims).
The fact that the dominant medical insurer in Maryland ceased offering medical malpractice insurance in the mid-1970s caused considerable apprehension in the legislature.
See Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 280-81, 385 A.2d 57, 61 (1977) (recognizing
that the Act was created in response to the medical malpractice insurance crisis and that
the crisis was precipitated by the dominant medical insurer's ceasing to offer medical malpractice insurance despite a dramatic rate increase).
35. See Johnson, 282 Md. at 308, 385 A.2d at 76 (describing the purpose of the Act).
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by the Act, the Court of Appeals has been forced periodically to
redraw the line between claims intended for arbitration and claims
intended for trial. 6 As a result, the cases on point have often been
unclear and subject to misapplication.
The Act requires claimants to submit to nonbinding arbitration
as a condition precedent to filing suit against a health care provider.38
However, because of the enactment of section 3-2A-06B of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article in 1995, 3 0 any party may waive this
requirement and proceed to circuit court, provided the parties have
filed a certificate of merit.4" In effect, the 1995 amendment to the Act
eviscerated the requirement of nonbinding arbitration. 4' Nevertheless, the Act still requires the certificate of merit,4 2 and this tool has
43
proven to be a strong impediment to frivolous suits.

36. See Goicochea, 345 Md. at 727, 694 A.2d at 478 ("Jewell v. Malamet clarified the holding in Nichols v. Wilson, concerning the circumstances under which intentional torts... are
covered by the Act." (citation omitted)); Jewell v. Malamet, 322 Md. 262, 265-67, 587 A.2d
474, 475-76 (1991) (discussing the legislative history of the Act and the court's struggle to
distinguish between cases covered by the Act and those outside its purview); Nichols v.
Wilson, 296 Md. 154, 155, 460 A.2d 57, 58 (1983) ("Once again we are called upon to
determine what type claim against a health care provider is covered by the Health Care
Malpractice Claims Act ..

").

37. See Cannon v. McKen, 296 Md. 27, 44, 459 A.2d 196, 205 (1983) (Davidson, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out a contradiction in the holding of the majority, and stating that
"the omission ... of any allegation relating to the essential characteristic distinguishing
medical malpractice from [other] negligence ... inevitably leads to the conclusion that the
claim... is not based upon medical malpractice, but rather ... upon [other] negligence");
infra notes 139-153 and accompanying text (describing the inconsistent approach adopted
in Jewell and its subsequent clarification in Goicochea).
38. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 3-2A-02(a) (1995); see alsoJohnson, 282 Md.
at 283-84, 385 A.2d at 63 (stating that the Act "in essence requires that malpractice disputes
be submitted to nonbinding arbitration as a condition precedent to the institution of a
court action").
39. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 3-2A-06B (Supp. 1997) (effective October
1, 1995).
40. See id.; see also Trimble, supra note 5, at 893 (recognizing that the General Assembly
unanimously enacted the new section during the 1995 session); supra note 5 (describing
the certificate of merit).
41. See Trimble, supra note 5, at 893 (stating that under the 1995 amendment "parties
are likely to waive the overwhelming majority of cases, effectively destroying the health
claims arbitration system"); see also infra note 169 (citing the statistics for claim filings in
1996 and 1997, and concluding that the unilateral waiver has had an enormous impact on
the arbitration process).
42. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PRoc. § 3-2A-04(b) (1) (i) (1995).
43. See Trimble, supra note 5, at 907 (illustrating how the certificate of merit requirement reduced the number of medical malpractice claims following the Act's enactment in
1986).
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Periodic challenges have been leveled against the Act. The early
challenges alleged constitutional defects,4 4 but in later cases the questions have been primarily jurisdictional.4 5 Beginning with Attorney
General v. Johnson,4 6 the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality
of the Act.4 7 Johnson concerned a wrongful death action against physicians in a hospital.4" The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment
that the Act was unconstitutional because they could not immediately
file a medical malpractice action in circuit court against the physicians.49 The court concluded that the creation of a condition precedent to filing suit neither violated the rights of medical malpractice
claimants to jury trials5" nor deprived them of equal protection of the
laws.5 1
After Johnson, the Court of Appeals addressed a more specific
challenge to the language of the Act in Oxtoby v. McGowan, 2 a case
involving an injury alleged to have occurred before the Act became
effective.5" Because the claimants questioned the jurisdiction of the
Act, they proceeded directly to circuit court without arbitration.5 4
The court reasoned that although an arbitration panel was not an administrative agency, the requirement that a claimant submit to arbitration before proceeding to circuit court was analogous to the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies.5 5 Under this doctrine, a liti44. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 277, 385 A.2d 57, 59 (1978) (recognizing the issue before the court to be whether the Act was "constitutionally infirm").
45. See infra notes 154-155 and accompanying text (listing cases that have considered
the jurisdiction of the Act).
46. 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978).
47. Id. at 277, 385 A.2d at 59.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 299, 385 A.2d at 71; see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII (declaring that "the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved"); MD. CONsT. DECL. OF RTS. art. 5 (stating that "the
Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by
Jury").
51. Johnson, 282 Md. at 309, 385 A.2d at 77; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (declaring
that "[n]o State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws"); MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTs. art. 24 (stating that "no man ought to be... deprived

of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land").
The Court of Appeals also held that the Act did not violate the separation of powers doctrine. The court determined that the Act did not vest judicial power in an administrative
agency, and that the Act, therefore, did not violate the doctrine that the powers of the
three branches of government be forever separate and distinct. Johnson, 282 Md. at 283-84,
385 A.2d at 63.
52. 294 Md. 83, 447 A.2d 860 (1982).
53. Id. at 85, 447 A.2d at 862 (noting that the Act "shall take effectJuly 1, 1976"); accord
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 3-2A-01 (effective July 1, 1976).

54. Oxtoby, 294 Md. at 86, 447 A.2d at 862.
55. Id. at 91, 447 A.2d at 865.
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gant must pursue the specially created statutory remedy before resorting to an action in the courts.5 6 Moreover, the Oxtoby court remarked
that if a litigant fails to pursue the statutorily mandated procedures,
then the court will, of its own motion, vacate the judgment and order
the action dismissed.5 7 Despite this strong language, unless presented
with evidence supporting the circuit court's decision to permit the
case to proceed without arbitration, the Oxtoby court could not conclude that the trial court erred in proceeding with the case.5" The
court made this decision because it could not determine whether the
cancer that led to the death of the plaintiffs wife developed prior to
July 1, 1976." 9 If the cancer developed after July 1, 1976, then the
claim would need to go through arbitration as required by the Act.60
The trial judge, who ruled that the action could proceed to circuit
court, did not include a statement of facts in his ruling. 6 1 Therefore,
the appellate court assumed that there had been sufficient evidence at
the time of trial for the trial judge to conclude that the cancer developed before July 1, 1976.62 As a result of this insufficient record, the
appellate court reasoned that, even though the requirement of nonbinding arbitration was analogous to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, the appellate court could not conclude that
the trial court erred in allowing the claim to proceed.6 3
In the cases following Oxtoby, the court began to determine on a
case-by-case basis which claims fell under the Act and which claims
could proceed directly to circuit court.6 4 In Cannon v. McKen,6 ' the
claimant, Gloria Cannon, filed suit in circuit court, alleging that the
defendant breached a duty to exercise reasonable care when Cannon
was injured by wall-mounted x-ray equipment that fell on her.66 Can56. I&
57. Id
58. Id. at 92, 447 A.2d at 865.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Goicochea, 345 Md. at 721, 694 A.2d at 476 (identifying the issue before the
court as whether a claim was subject to the arbitration requirements of the Act); Jewell v.
Malamet, 322 Md. 262, 267, 587 A.2d 474, 476 (1991) (same); Brown v. Rabbitt, 300 Md.
171, 172, 476 A.2d 1167, 1168 (1984) (same); Nichols v. Wilson, 296 Md. 154, 155, 460
A.2d 57, 58 (1983) (same); Cannon v. McKen, 296 Md. 27, 28, 459 A.2d 196, 197 (1983)
(same).
65. 296 Md. 27, 459 A.2d 196 (1983).
66. Id at 29, 459 A.2d at 198. Cannon also sued based on the fact that the x-ray equipment was defective and unreasonably dangerous. Id The last count of her complaint
stressed that Dr. McKen warranted that the wall-mounted x-ray equipment was safe and fit
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non argued that her action did not arise from the rendering or failure
to render health care, and that it therefore could not be a medical
injury as defined by the Act. 6 7 The Act defines a "medical injury" as
an "injury arising or resulting from the rendering or failure to render
health care."6 8 The Court of Appeals explained the legislative policy
behind the Act:
[T] he legislature intended to include in the scope of the Act
only those claims for damages done to or suffered by a person originating from, in pertinent part, the giving of or failure to give health care. In our view, the legislature did not
intend that claims for damages against a health care provider, arising from non-professional circumstances where
there was no violation of the provider's professional duty to
exercise care, to be covered by the Act. It is patent that the
legislature intended only those claims which the courts have
traditionally69viewed as professional malpractice to be covered
by the Act.
In keeping with legislative intent, the court held that the Act did not
cover claims involving a health care provider's failure to exercise reasonable care in non-professional situations.7y In so holding, the court
announced an exception to the general jurisdiction of the Act: If a
complaint alleges facts that an injury occurred from a health care provider's negligence in a non-professional situation,7 1then the claim
should proceed to circuit court without arbitration.
Two months later, the court heard Nichols v. Wilson,72 in which
the principal issue was whether factual allegations of assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress removed a claim
from the purview of the Act. 73 Quoting language from Cannon, the

for reasonably foreseeable use in a dental office. Id. After the x-ray equipment fell on top
of her, Cannon asserted that Dr. McKen breached this warranty. Id. at 30, 459 A.2d at 198.
67. Id. at 31, 459 A.2d at 199.
68. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-01 (f) (1995); see also supra note 23 (dis-

cussing provisions of the Act addressing "medical injury").
69. Cannon, 296 Md. at 34, 459 A.2d at 200 (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 36-37, 459 A.2d at 201. The court concluded that the scope of the Act included only claims originating from the giving of or failure to give health care. Id. Furthermore, the court described non-professional situations as ones in which there were no
violations of a health care provider's professional duty to exercise care. Id.
71. Id.
72. 296 Md. 154, 460 A.2d 57 (1983).
73. Id at 155-57, 460 A.2d at 58-59. The claimants in Nichols sued based on three
counts, including negligence, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Id. at 155, 460 A.2d at 58. They reduced the damages claimed on the negligence
count from $10,000 to $5000; therefore, they argued they should not be subject to arbitration under the Act, because they did not exceed the $5000 statutory threshold for profes-
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court reiterated that only claims for violations of a health care provider's professional duty to exercise care fall within the Act.7 1 In her
complaint, Nichols alleged:
Before suture removal and while Evaun M. Nichols was being
held down, without provocation, Edward Earl Wilson, M.D.,
intentionally, violently, maliciously, wantonly, and recklessly
struck with his hand the left cheek of Evaun M. Nichols with
great force causing [her] to suffer and sustain serious, painful and permanent injuries to her body, severe mental
anguish and shock to her body systems, and other damages
and injuries.75
The court concluded that such allegations were not within the purview of the Act because the legislature did not intend such a claim to
proceed differently than any other intentional tort, even though it occurred during the rendering of health care. 76 Thus, the court created
a second exception to the general jurisdiction of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act: After Nichols, it followed that if a physician allegedly maliciously injured a claimant during the rendering of health
care, and the alleged conduct had no possible medical validity, then
the Act was inapplicable. 7
Eight years later, in Jewell v. Malamet,71 the court revisited the issue of whether and in what circumstances the allegations of an intentional tort might remove a claim from the purview of the Act. 7 9 In her
complaint, Marlene Jewell alleged that when Dr. Malamet first examined her, the following incidents occurred:
While the gown was completely pulled up, he . .. push [ed]
on [her] stomach and then around her groin muscles. After
pushing on the groin muscles and saying, "is that sore, is that
sional negligence damages. Id; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-02 (a)
(1995) (indicating that all medical malpractice claims in which the damages sought exceed
the concurrent jurisdiction of the district court must first proceed through arbitration).
The defendant argued that claimant's three separate counts were based on one continuous
occurrence and that, therefore, the damages from the counts other than negligence
should count toward the statutory threshold for arbitration. Nichols, 296 Md. at 160, 460
A.2d at 60. The court, however, found that none of the counts were within the Act, and it
therefore reversed and remanded the case "to proceed as a normal tort case." Id, at 161,
460 A.2d at 61.
74. Nichols, 296 Md. at 161, 460 A.2d at 61.
75. Id. at 155-56 n.2, 460 A.2d at 58 n.2.
76. Id. at 161, 460 A.2d at 61.
77. See id (stating that "[i]n no way can it be said that the legislature intended [an
intentional, malicious, wanton, and reckless act] to be within the Act even though such
action took place during the rendering of health care").
78. 322 Md. 262, 587 A.2d 474 (1991).
79. Id. at 267, 587 A.2d at 476.
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sore," he then started to fondle her around the lips of the
vagina. Malamet inserted his finger up into the vagina, not
wearing a rubber glove or any protective equipment, and
then continued asking if [she] was sore. °
In his second examination, Dr. Malamet allegedly requested Jewell to
pull down her pants and underwear to her knees and lie on the examining table bent over on her stomach. 8 ' Jewell claimed he proceeded
to fondle the area in and around her vagina and buttocks, again without rubber gloves or protective equipment.8 2 Jewell also claimed that
after making her sit up, the doctor then pulled up her sweatshirt and
bra and fondled her breasts, ostensibly to determine muscle pain in
83
the area of the chest.
The circuit court dismissed the claim, holding that the factual
context determined proper jurisdiction of the claim and that, under
the "totality of the circumstances," the claim Jewell filed originated
from the rendering of health care. 4
The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial judge that the factual
context, and not the label of the claim, determined jurisdiction.8 5
The court then considered whetherJewell's claims arose out of a medical injury. 6 During oral argument, the court noted that if Dr.
Malamet conceded that the alleged procedures had no medical validity, then the action would proceed in circuit court as a regular tort
action. 8 7 Because the court discovered that Dr. Malamet planned to
use expert testimony to show that the purported fondling of Jewell's
breasts was part of a medically valid treatment,88 the court determined
that it could not conclude as a matter of law that the allegations were

80. Id at 268, 587 A.2d at 477.
81. Id
82. Id
83. Id at 268-69, 587 A.2d at 477.
84. Id at 271, 587 A.2d at 479.
85. Id at 271-72, 587 A.2d at 479. The court remarked that it did "not believe that the
mere fact that the challenged conduct arose during the course of a consensual physical
examination by a physician [was] decisive of jurisdiction." Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 275, 587 A.2d at 480.
88. Id. Only after the court pressed the defendant did he concede that his defense
would include expert testimony tending to show that the alleged conduct did not deviate
from the standard of care. Id. Furthermore, in its brief to the court as amicus curiae, the
HCAO requested reversal of the circuit court decision, because that court determined that
arbitration was not the proper forum in which to place Jewell's claim. Id. at 274, 587 A.2d
at 480. Disregarding the HCAO, the court remanded the case to circuit court so that the
court below could stay the tort action until the conclusion of further arbitration proceedings. Id. at 276, 587 A.2d at 481.
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free from the requirements of the Act."9 In this manner, the court
clarified Nichols. when an injury was not clearly gratuitous and intentional, the claim would be subject to arbitration, unless the physician
conceded that the alleged conduct was not a medically valid part of
treatment. 90
Although the Jewell court clarified Nichols by focusing on the jurisdictional inquiry on the factual basis for allegations rather than on
mere labels, it still left the policy behind the decision unstated. Without a clear statement of policy underlying these decisions, it is difficult
to predict which claims will be treated as mere labels and which claims
will be treated as having a sufficient factual basis to be removed from
the Act. Meanwhile, in other jurisdictions similar questions have
arisen regarding the jurisdiction of medical malpractice statutes, despite the fact that these jurisdictions often used methods in addition
to or other than arbitration to reduce the cost of health care
litigation.
b. Other Jurisdictions' Responses to Health Care Litigation.Outside Maryland, several courts have addressed the issue of whether
intentional torts allegedly committed by health care providers should
fall within the purview of state medical malpractice statutes." Medical
89. Id. at 275, 587 A.2d at 481.
90. I& at 274-75, 587 A.2d at 480-81.
91. See, e.g., Montagino v. Canale, 792 F.2d 554, 556 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the
three-year medical malpractice statute of limitations in Louisiana applied even when a
plaintiff alleged an intentional tort); Herrera v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. Rptr. 553, 556-57
(Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a medical malpractice action, under California's Medical
Injury Compensation Act, can include theories other than negligence, including intentional torts); Robbins v. Orlando, H.M.A., Inc., 683 So. 2d 664, 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (holding that an allegation that a weight-loss program intentionally failed to inform
a participant of its connection to a psychiatric facility and falsely represented the participant as being clinically depressed to her insurance company did not fall under a medical
malpractice statute requiring pre-suit screening); Murphy v. Mortell, 684 N.E.2d 1185,
1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that an allegation that a hospital technician molested a
patient while she was unconscious was not a claim for medical malpractice within the scope
of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act); Doe ex rel. Roe v. Madison Ctr. Hosp., 652 N.E.2d
101, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that an allegation that a mental health counselor
coerced a minor patient into sexual intercourse, resulting in her contracting a venereal
disease, did not fall under coverage of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act); Van Sice v.
Sentany, 595 N.E.2d 264, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a patient's claim of battery, consisting of allegations that a physician failed to disclose fully inherent risks and
alternatives to proposed treatment and as a result failed to obtain informed consent, fell
within the scope of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act); Jones v. Wilkin, 905 P.2d 166,
168 (Nev. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that intentional tort claims brought against health
care providers for allegedly providing false information of possible drug offenses to the
Nevada Department of Investigation did not fall within Nevada's medical malpractice
statute).
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malpractice statutes in other jurisdictions share a similar scope and
purpose to that of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act in Maryland;9 2 this could explain why many courts in these jurisdictions have
followed similar approaches to dealing with claims of intentional torts
committed by health care providers. 3
For example, in Murphy v. Mortell,9 4 the Indiana Court of Appeals
held that a patient's claim that a respiratory therapy technician molested her while she was restrained and unconscious did not fall within
the ambit of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act.9 5 The court
pointed out that the allegations brought by the patient did not describe the rendering of professional services.9 6 On the contrary, the
court determined that the allegations created questions of fact for a
jury to resolve without application of the medical standard of care. 7
The Indiana Court of Appeals determined the proper jurisdiction
of the claim by examining the substance of the allegations.9" Furthermore, the court stated that "[t]he [Indiana] Medical Malpractice Act
does not specifically exclude intentional torts from the definition of
malpractice; however, the Act pertains to curative or salutary conduct of
92. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982) (encouraging and facilitating arbitration of medical malpractice claims by specifying uniform language to be used in binding
arbitration agreements); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.101 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998) (providing
for a medical review committee to review medical malpractice complaints during a presuit
screening period); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-12-1-1 to 27-12-18-1 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1997)
(establishing a cap on damages in medical malpractice cases, providing for a patient compensation fund, and requiring the presentation of a medical malpractice claim to a medical review panel before commencing suit); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:5628 (West Supp. 1997)
(establishing a one-year statute of limitations period for medical malpractice cases); NEv.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 41A.016 (Michie 1996) (requiring submission of medical malpractice
cases to a screening panel before suit may be filed).
93. See Robbins, 683 So. 2d at 665 (stating that "whether a plaintiff must give the requisite presuit notice outlined in [a Florida medical malpractice statute] is fact dependent"
and that allegations determine whether the claim arises out of a rendering or a failure to
render health care services); Liles v. P.I.A. Medfield, Inc., 681 So. 2d 711, 712 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (examining whether a claim for the tort of false imprisonment involved the
rendering of medical care or services); Murphy, 684 N.E.2d at 1188 (stating that the court
looks to the substance of the claim to determine the applicability of Indiana's Act and
concluding that allegations that a health care provider molested an unconscious and restrained patient did not constitute the rendering of professional health services nor did it
have a curative purpose); Madison Ctr. Hosp., 652 N.E.2d at 104 (holding that allegations of
sexual assault of a psychiatric patient by a counselor did not fall under Indiana's Act); Jones,
905 P.2d at 168 (concluding that allegations did not describe medical malpractice under
the Nevada statute, because the patient did not accuse health care providers of "failing to
use reasonable care, skill or knowledge when they diagnosed and treated her back pain").
94. 684 N.E.2d 1185 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
95. Id. at 1188.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.

938

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 57:642

a health care provider within his or her professional capacity."9 9 As a result
of its examination, the Indiana Court of Appeals determined that the
injury was not for a therapeutic purpose. Therefore, the court concluded, the injury was not due to medical malpractice and should not
fall under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act.' 0 0
Similarly, in Jones v. Wilkin,' 0° the Supreme Court of Nevada permitted a patient to bring an intentional tort action against health care
providers in district court Without first submitting her claim to the
Nevada Medical Legal Screening Panel. 10 2 In Jones, the court stressed
that the patient did not accuse the defendants of "failing to use reasonable care, skill or knowledge when they diagnosed and treated her
back pain."10 ' The court thus examined whether the claim arose during the rendering of or failure to render health care.10 4 Because the
court concluded that the alleged conduct did not involve the rendering of or failure to render medical services, it held that the claim did
not fall Within the purview of Nevada's medical malpractice statute.10 5
Both Within Maryland and without, questions ofjurisdiction have
plagued state health care malpractice statutes. Within Maryland, the
addition of the unilateral waiver provision has severely limited the Act,
but challenges to the Act's jurisdiction continue.10 6 Because the unilateral waiver provision allows either party to waive arbitration under
the Act, most cases proceed directly to circuit court.10 7 Nevertheless,
parties who fail to obtain a certificate of merit still face a substantial
obstacle to judicial resolution of their claims. 10 8 Some, like the respondent in Goicochea, may try to avoid the requirements of the Act by
labeling a medical malpractice action as a claim of intentional tort.10 9
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. 905 P.2d 166 (Nev. 1995) (per curiam).
102. Id. at 167-68.
103. Id. at 167.
104. Id
105. Id. at 168.
106. See infra notes 169-170 and accompanying text (explaining that the unilateral
waiver eviscerated the Act and that the prospects of repeal grow stronger each year).
107. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the unilateral
waiver on health claims arbitration in Maryland); infra note 169 and accompanying text
(reporting statistics from the Health Claims Arbitration Office and concluding that the
future of health claims arbitration in Maryland grows dimmer each year).
108. See infta notes 134-136 and accompanying text (describing how the certificate of
merit deters claims that lack an adequate factual basis).
109. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting the argument of Dr. Goicochea
that Langworthy attempted to circumvent the certificate of merit requirement under the
Act by filing a claim for assault and battery in circuit court).
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Goicochea v. Langworthy, the Court
of Appeals held that the plaintiff, John Langworthy, provided inadequate factual allegations to remove his claim from the purview of the
Health Care Malpractice Claims Act. 1 Applying the analysis first articulated in Jewell, the court could not conclude that "Goicochea's actions had no conceivable medical validity or were totally unrelated to
the performance of a routine hernia examination." '' Accordingly,
the Court of Appeals dismissed Langworthy's appeal, reversed the
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, and ordered the lower
court to affirm the judgment of the trial court." 2
The Court of Appeals recognized that malpractice claims must be
submitted to arbitration as a condition precedent to maintaining a
tort action in circuit court."13 The court asserted that the critical
question was whether the alleged assault and battery constituted a
"medical injury" under the Act.1 14 The court focused the first part of
its discussion on the meaning of this phrase. 1 5 In particular, the
court relied on Cannon to articulate the principle that a medical injury
includes traditional forms of medical malpractice," 6 but does not include injuries that occur when a health care provider is not engaged
7
in providing medical care."
Using the factual analysis constructed in Jewell, the court examined the circumstances under which allegations that a physician
committed an assault and battery will remove a claim from the Act."'
The court stated that if the alleged injury was inflicted "during the
rendering of medical services," and the alleged conduct of the physician had any conceivable medical validity in relation to the treatment
provided, then the claim would be subject to the provisions of the
Act." 9 On the other hand, if the conduct alleged was clearly not re110. Goicochea, 345 Md. at 729, 694 A.2d at 479.
111. Id; see alsoJewell v. Malamet, 322 Md. 262, 275, 587 A.2d 474, 480-81 (1991) (analyzing whether or not Dr. Malamet's conduct could have had any conceivable medical
validity).
112. Goicochea, 345 Md. at 730, 694 A.2d at 480.
113. Id at 725-26, 694 A.2d at 477-78.
114. Id at 726, 694 A.2d at 478; see also supra note 5 (setting forth the definition of
"medical injury" under the Act).
115. See Goicochea, 345 Md. at 725-27, 694 A.2d at 477-78 (describing the background of
the Act and considering the meaning of the term in the context of case law).
116. See i& at 726, 694 A.2d at 478 (quoting language from Cannon v. McKen to determine what actions fall within the meaning of the phrase "medical injury"); see also Cannon
v. McKen, 296 Md. 27, 34, 459 A.2d 196, 200 (1983) (indicating that a medical injury is one
that "originat[es] from, in pertinent part, the giving or failure to give health care").
117. Goicochea, 345 Md. at 726, 694 A.2d at 478.
118. Id. at 728, 694 A.2d at 479.
119. Id.
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lated to the medical services rendered, or was "completely lacking in
medical validity," then, the court concluded, the matter should proceed directly to circuit court. 120 Because Langworthy failed to provide
sufficient factual allegations on which to distinguish his claim from a
traditional medical malpractice action, the court determined that his
12 1
claim was subject to the provisions of the Act.
In considering the factual allegations against Dr. Goicochea, the
court remarked that he obviously had to apply some amount of force
to perform a hernia examination. 12 2 Because Langworthy claimed the
injury resulted from excessive force applied to his spermatic cord, the
court determined that it could not properly conclude that Dr.
Goicochea's actions "had no medical validity or were totally unrelated
to the performance of a routine hernia examination. '"12' Finally, the
court stressed that a claimant cannot remove a claim from the Act
merely by adding the adjectives "malicious" or "willful.'

1 24

The court presented its analysis in logical, straightforward steps.
First, the court recognized the principle that the factual context in
which the injury occurred determines the proper forum for making
an initial determination as to whether the claim alleges a "medical
injury. 1 25 Second, the court stated that the Act is implicated whenever a plaintiff is injured during the rendering of health care, regardless of whether the complaint sounds in negligence or in intentional
tort.12 6 Third, because the Act is implicated whenever health care is
rendered, the court required that, in such situations, trial courts
should determine whether the factual allegations remove the claim
from coverage of the Act. 1 27 In a single paragraph, the Court of Appeals clarified the factual analysis articulated in Jewell, as follows:
Consequently, under Jewell, the determination of the
proper initial forum for cases involving allegations of intentional torts committed by health care providers depends
upon the factual context in which the tort was allegedly committed. Where the plaintiff alleges that he or she was injured
by a health care provider during the rendering of medical
treatment or services, the Act is implicated, regardless of
whether the claim sounds in negligence or intentional tort.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id. at 729, 694 A.2d at 479.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 728, 694 A.2d at 479.
Id.
Id.
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When confronted with such a claim, the trial court must determine if the plaintiff's factual allegations remove the claim
from the Act's coverage. If the complaint sets forth facts
showing that the claimed injury was not inflicted during the
rendering of medical services, or that the injury resulted
from conduct completely lacking in medical validity in relation to the medical care rendered, the Act is inapplicable,
and the action may proceed without first resorting to
arbitration. 128

In short, if a claim does not arise during the rendering or failure to
render health care, then it is not subject to the Act. Likewise, if an
injury results from conduct that has no conceivable medical validity in
relation to the care given, it is also not subject to the Act. But if the
trial court is uncertain whether the factual allegations remove a claim
from the Act, the court should not exercise its jurisdiction over the
action.12 9 Rather, the trial court should allow the HCAO to hear the
claim and make an initial determination as to whether or not the
13 °
claim alleges a "medical injury."
4.

Analysis.-In Goicochea v. Langworthy, the Court of Appeals

held that a medical malpractice claim cannot avoid the requirements
of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act "simply by adding the adjectives 'malicious' or 'willful."'" 3 The court reasoned that such labels, without a substantial factual basis, do not distinguish an
intentional tort from professional negligence.13 2 The court also clarified the proper analysis under the test articulated in Jewell.'3 3
From a policy standpoint, this decision is important because it
illustrates how the court balances two competing policy goals: compensating legitimate tort claimants and reducing the cost of medical
malpractice litigation. 3 By precluding plaintiffs from simply labeling
128. Id
129. Id. at 728-29, 694 A.2d at 479.
130. Id. at 729, 694 A.2d at 479.
131. Id.
132. See id. ("Langworthy fails to set forth any factual basis upon which the court could
properly conclude that Goicochea's actions had no conceivable medical validity or were
totally unrelated to the performance of a routine hernia examination.").
133. See id. (importing the factual analysis provided in Jewell, but constructing it in clear
steps and in a single paragraph); see also supra note 111 (setting forth the Jewell analysis);
supra notes 125-130 and accompanying text (presenting Goicochea's clear, simple steps).
134. These policies can be inferred from the way in which the court applied the test that
determines whether a claim falls under the Act or should proceed to circuit court. See
Goicochea, 345 Md. at 728, 694 A.2d at 479. The court reinforced the idea that only claimants with legitimate causes of action should proceed in either forum: "A plaintiff may not
remove a medical malpractice action from the ambit of the statute simply by adding the
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an injury "intentional" without an adequate factual basis, the court
restricted access to the judicial system to only those claimants who
obtain a certificate of merit. 13 5 This decision should, therefore, conserve judicial resources for claimants with legitimate injuries as well as
reduce the number of frivolous suits filed. 3 6 Accordingly, the decision of the court flows reasonably from
the manifest purpose of the
13 7
Health Care Malpractice Claims Act.
a. Clarifying theJewell Test.-One way in which Goicocheafurthers the policy of reducing the cost of medical malpractice litigation
is that lower courts now have a more intelligible approach to determine whether a health care claim should be arbitrated first or
whether the claim should proceed directly to trial. While the Jewell
court announced the test used to determine the proper initialforum
for a health care claim, its presentation of the test was scattered

adjectives 'malicious' or 'willful."' Id. at 729, 694 A.2d at 479. Because Langworthy did not
obtain a certificate of merit, the court had no choice but to dismiss his claim. See id. at 72930, 694 A.2d at 480. Thus, a frivolous claim was taken out of the court system in the course
of deciding whether the facts alleged could properly remove the claim from the purview of
the Act. Id.
For a closer look at the development of these policies, see Attorney General v. Johnson,
282 Md. 274, 306-08, 385 A.2d 57, 76-77 (1978). See also Trimble, supra note 5, at 898 &
n.45 (stating that the General Assembly attempted to "curtail meritless claims by requiring
that a plaintiff provide [a certificate of merit]").
135. See Goicochea, 345 Md. at 729-30, 694 A.2d at 479-80 (indicating that, normally,
when a claim subject to the Act is filed in circuit court, the court should stay the civil action
until the conclusion of any pending arbitration proceedings, but noting that when the
HCAO has dismissed a case for failure to file a certificate of merit, immediate dismissal of
the claim is appropriate).
Of course, if the plaintiff genuinely has a claim against a health care provider for nonprofessional negligence or intentional tort and the plaintiff can factually distinguish her
claim from a traditional medical malpractice action, then the claim should proceed directly to circuit court. See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
136. This prediction is based on common sense. If claimants, or their attorneys, know
that they cannot get around the certificate of merit requirement by alleging intentional
torts with no sufficient bases, then they will be less apt to bring such suits because the costs
associated with these cases will outweigh the probabilities of success.
137. In Johnson, the Court of Appeals remarked that the trial court found the legislation
"ambiguous as to the precise purpose arbitration would serve." Johnson, 282 Md. at 307,
385 A.2d at 76. But, somewhat equivocally, the trial court also observed that "the announced purpose of the Act-to reduce the cost of medical malpractice claims, thus reducing the cost of liability insurance and stabilizing the [health care] market-justified
distinguishing the treatment of medical malpractice claims from other tort liability claims."
Id. at 308, 385 A.2d at 76; see also infra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the
purpose of the Act and citing support for the proposition that the manifest purpose of the
Act is to reduce the cost of medical malpractice claims).

1998]

MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS

throughout various parts of the opinion.' 3 In Goicochea, on the other
hand, the test was articulated in a single paragraph 39 and was treated
carefully, one step at a time. 140 The court examined Langworthy's
complaint and concluded that it was based on the alleged application
of excessive force during a hernia examination.14 ' This conduct
could not be removed from the Act simply by being labeled
"willful." 14 2

It seems likely that the Court of Appeals chose to review the factual analysis of Goicochea under the Jewell test in order to address the
mistaken conclusion of the Court of Special Appeals that "a claimant
with a legitimate assault and battery claim will never be able to have his
case heard." 4 ' The Court of Special Appeals interpreted Jewell to
mean that when a patient is injured while receiving medical treatment-even if the injury arose from an incident unrelated to valid
medical treatment-the patient must file with the HCAO. 1" As the
Court of Appeals demonstrated through its step-by-step analysis, however, that interpretation of Jewell was too broad.'4 5
By making the test easier to follow, Goicochea will reduce litigation
expenses incurred by both plaintiffs and medical care providers.
Plaintiffs will not be forced to get a certificate of merit if they can
provide sufficient factual allegations that demonstrate the injury was
not inflicted during the rendering of health care or that the injurycausing conduct had no medical validity in relation to the care pro138. SeeJewell v. Malamet, 322 Md. 262, 271-75, 587 A.2d 474, 479-81 (1991) (analyzing
the facts alleged byJewell to determine whetherJewell's claim belonged in circuit court or
was subject to the Act); see also supra note 111 (setting forth the Jewell analysis).
139. See Goicochea, 345 Md. at 727-28, 694 A.2d at 478-79 (outlining the factual analysis
first constructed in Jewel); see also supra text accompanying note 128 (quoting Goicochea's
concisely articulated paragraph).
140. See Goicochea, 345 Md. at 727-28, 694 A.2d at 478-79; see also supra notes 125-130 and
accompanying text (presenting Goicochea's clear, simple steps).
141. See Goicochea, 345 Md. at 729, 694 A.2d at 479 ("The asserted cause of Langworthy's
injury was that Goicochea allegedly applied too much force.").
142. Id.
143. Langworthy, 106 Md. App. at 275, 664 A.2d at 427 (emphasis added).
144. See id. at 274, 664 A.2d at 427 (concluding that, when a claimant is injured while
receiving medical care, she must file with the HCAO, even if the claim is unquestionably
one for assault and battery). The Court of Special Appeals based this interpretation on the
fact that the court in Jewell instructed the parties to return to the HCAO so that the HCAO
could determine whether the claim was for medical injury. See id.
145. See Goicochea, 345 Md. at 728, 694 A.2d at 479 (stating that the court in Jewell recognized that a plaintiff can bring an action in circuit court against a physician for assault and
battery); accordJewell v. Malamet, 322 Md. 262, 275, 587 A.2d 474, 481 (1991) (stating that
"if counsel had conceded that the conduct complained of had no conceivable validity as
part of the examination being conducted, the resolution of the case would be for the trier
of fact in the circuit court as an action for assault and battery").

944

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 57:642

vided. 4 6 Because the factual analysis constructed in Goicocheawas applied correctly, it resolves any confusion created by the unusual result
reached in Jewell. 47
'
The Jewell opinion is unsatisfying because it created a sensible
test, but applied the test to the facts in an illogical manner. The result
was illogical because, given the facts alleged in the complaint, the
court should have found that the physician's conduct had no medical
validity in relation to the *examination performed.1 4
Under
Goicochea's rearticulation of the Jewell test, it is likely that the Jewell
court would have reached this result.
In Jewell, the plaintiff alleged that she was sexually assaulted during the course of two examinations. 149 Among other things, the plaintiff alleged that during the examinations, the physician fondled her
breasts and vagina without wearing protective gloves.15 0 Under the
Goicochea analysis, the court would have rigorously examined the factual context of the complaint and the HCAO amicus curiae brief sup51
porting the jurisdiction of the circuit court.'
This more fact-intensive approach to the case, coupled with the
application of the Jewell test, would have culminated in a more satisfying result than that actually reached in Jewell. Applying the test incorrectly, as the Jewell court did, would actually lead to an increase in the
cost of medical malpractice litigation. Such claims are more likely to
be appealed or return to circuit court at the conclusion of future arbitration proceedings because the result does not follow logically from
the application of the test to the factual allegations. Particularly in
cases like Jewell, in which the HCAO filed an amicus brief arguing that
146. See Goicochea, 345 Md. at 728, 694 A.2d at 479 (ruling that a complaint setting forth
a sufficient factual basis to support a theory of intentional tort may proceed to circuit court
without being subject to the Act).
147. SeeJewell, 322 Md. at 274-75, 587 A.2d at 480 (analyzing the facts of the case, but
failing to conclude that the injury described byJewell was not a "medical injury").
148. See id. at 267-69, 274, 587 A.2d at 477, 480 (describing the facts alleged in the
complaint and noting that the HCAO felt that the claim should have proceeded to litigation, not arbitration).
149. Id. at 267-68, 587 A.2d at 477.
150. Id. at 268, 587 A.2d at 477; see also supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text
(describing the facts alleged in the Jewell complaint).
151. Cf. Goicochea, 345 Md. at 729, 694 A.2d at 479 (examining the substance of Langworthy's claim with care and in detail); supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the Goicochea analysis to the facts alleged in Langworthy's
complaint). Even assuming Jewell wanted to proceed in arbitration, one wonders if she
could have obtained a certificate of merit, because she did not complain of a demonstrable
physical injury; rather, she merely asserted general injuries and emotional pain. SeeJewel
322 Md. at 269, 587 A.2d at 477. Note, however, that the HCAO submitted an amicus
curiae brief that sided with the plaintiff in Jewell. See id. at 274, 587 A.2d at 480.
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Jewell's claim belonged in circuit court, it seems like a waste of taxpayer dollars to remand such a claim to the HCAO for consideration
when the claim will almost certainly be sent back to circuit court. By
contrast, Goicochea clarified the Jewell test and minimized the chance of
such misapplication, because the result of Goicochea aligned the application of the test to the factual allegations. 15 2 With a more coherent
and succinct factual analysis, the Act's implied policy goals-redressing legitimate tort claims and reducing the cost of health care
litigation-become more ascertainable.
b. Balancing Policy Goals.-In Attorney General v. Johnson, the
court determined that the purpose of the Health Care Malpractice
Claims Act was "to reduce the cost of medical malpractice claims."'5 3
In subsequent cases, the court approved this understanding of the
Act's purpose.' 5 4 The legislature apparently hoped that nonbinding
arbitration would be less expensive than litigation and that it would
hasten claim resolution. 155 While it has been debated whether the Act
has actually succeeded in these areas, 156 the opinion rendered in
Goicocheafurthers the underlying policy of the Act in at least two ways:
compensating plaintiffs with legitimate tort claims and reducing the
cost of medical malpractice litigation.
(1) Compensating Plaintiffs with Legitimate Tort Claims.--One
policy goal that concerns the court is compensating legitimate tort
claims and thereby distributing justice fairly. This is the underpinning

152. See Goicochea, 345 Md. at 729, 694 A.2d at 479 (applying the analysis first constructed in Jewell with more careful attention to the factual context of the case than was
exemplified by the Jewell court); see also supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the factual analysis to Langworthy's allegations in Goicochea).
153. 282 Md. 274, 308, 385 A-2d 57, 76 (1978); accord supra note 134 (inferringjudicially
recognized policies from the application of the Jewell test in Goicochea); supra note 137
(describing the ambiguity of the Act and the interpretation of legislative intent by the
court).
154. SeeJewell 322 Md. at 265-66, 587 A.2d at 478 (stating that "the Legislature was 'reacting to a medical malpractice insurance "crisis"'"); Nichols v. Wilson, 296 Md. 154, 16061, 460 A.2d 57, 60-61 (1983) (same); Cannon v. McKen, 296 Md. 27, 33-34, 459 A.2d 196,
200 (1983) (same); Oxtoby v. McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 98, 447 A.2d 860, 868 (1982) (same).
155. SeeJohnson, 282 Md. at 308, 385 A.2d at 77 (noting a trial judge who explained that
the Act bears a fair and substantial relationship to the purpose of rapid and less expensive
claim resolution).
156. Compare Trimble, supra note 5, at 919 (noting that "[t]he great success of [the Act]
was.., that it deterred many potential claimants from pursuing their claims") with Paul C.
Weiler, The Casefor No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REv. 908, 915 (1993) (stating that
when "[v]iewed as a form of insurance, the malpractice regime has major flaws").
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of public confidence in the judiciary. 5 7 Although the Goicochea opinion does not explicitly recognize the need to compensate legitimate
tort claims, this concern underlies the court's emphasis on whether
the physician's conduct was "completely lacking in medical validity in
relation to the medical care rendered."1 58 If the conduct bears no
medically valid relation to the treatment rendered, then the court will
accept the plaintiff's argument and direct the claim to circuit court
for resolution.
A legitimate intentional tort claim (or a claim of non-professional
negligence), on the other hand, should not be subject to the requirements of the Act. This is because such a claim was not the concern of
the legislature when the statute was enacted.'5 9 Nonetheless, if the
conduct is arguably medically valid in relation to the treatment rendered, then the court will balance the need to redress legitimate injuries with the need to reduce the cost of medical malpractice litigation.
There can be no doubt that Goicochea tipped the scales heavily in
favor of the Act. Under the Goicochea analysis, when physician conduct bears some medically valid relation to the treatment rendered, it
necessarily falls within the category of claims that the statute was intended to address. Thus, the threshold that health care providers
must meet in order to have a claim fall within the purview of the Act is
quite low.
Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, if the underlying policy
of compensating legitimate tort claims is to have any weight at all, the
court must carefully analyze the conduct in terms of its "medical validity." For example, the fact that, in Jewell, the physician was alleged to
have conducted a digital examination of the plaintiffs vagina while he
was not wearing protective gloves should have indicated to the court
that the conduct lacked medical validity.' 6 ° Simply because conduct
has some relation to the medical treatment rendered does not necessarily mean that it is per se medically valid. As a result of this gap in

157. See WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL 55 (2d ed. 1991) ('Justice cannot be fully satisfied without an opinion that explains the manner in which the
decision was reached ....
Without [an] appearance of fairness, the confidence in the
system so necessary to its continued success cannot be maintained.").
158. Goicochea, 345 Md. at 728, 694 A.2d at 479.
159. See supranotes 70-77 and accompanying text (describing the legislative policy of the
Act and discussing the relationship between the medical validity of the alleged conduct of
a provider and whether a claim of intentional tort will be subject to the requirements of
the Act).
160. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text (describing the alleged sexual
assault).
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the court's reasoning, the phrase "medically valid" needs to be explored further in future cases.
(2) Reducing the Cost of Medical Malpractice Litigation.--On
the other side of the balance, the Goicochea decision will lead to a reduction in the number of frivolous medical malpractice lawsuits confronting the courts, and such a reduction will comport with the intent
of the statute as divined by the court.1 6 ' Goicochea sends an unambiguous message to claimants without a certificate of merit: Unless they
can sufficiently distinguish a tort claim from professional negligence,
they have no alternative but to terminate prosecution of the case.' 6 2
Because this creates a difficult standard to meet for plaintiffs with
skimpy claims against health care providers, the opinion discourages
frivolous lawsuits. The opinion eliminates from consideration those
claims that have neither a certificate of merit nor an adequate factual
basis to support a theory other than professional negligence. Furthermore, because the factual analysis employed by trial courts is intelligible under Goicochea, the policies underlying their decisions will be
more readily ascertainable. Again, had the court in Goicochea chosen
to discuss the policy reasons behind its decision, the clarification of
the Jewell test would have been even more apparent. However, as a
result of the reduction in frivolous claims and the attendant decrease
in the cost of medical malpractice litigation, the decision in Goicochea
is entirely consistent with the purpose of the Health Care Malpractice
Claims Act as intended by the General Assembly and divined by the
Court of Appeals.' 6 3
5. Conclusion.-Goicocheaaffirmed and clarified the factual analysis constructed in JewelL' 64 By creating a coherent factual analysis
and applying it logically, the Court of Appeals provided guidance to
lower courts in resolving the jurisdictional issues that arise under the
Health Care Malpractice Claims Act and in dealing with the frustrations of plaintiffs and defendants as they attempt to litigate medically
related claims.' 6 5 Furthermore, in correcting the Court of Special Ap161. See supra notes 153-154 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the Act
as interpreted by the court).
162. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting the danger to a claimant's case of
failing to file a certificate of merit).
163. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (noting that the Act was created to
reduce frivolous claims and hasten claim resolution).
164. See Goicochea, 345 Md. at 729, 694 A.2d at 479 ("This case cannot be distinguished,
on any principled basis, from Jewell v. Malamet. .. ").
165. See id. at 728-29, 694 A.2d at 479 (describing how to conduct a proper factual analysis when confronted by a claim "[w]here a plaintiff alleges that he or she was injured by a
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peals's misapplication of the Jewell test, the Court of Appeals ensured
that future claimants who are unable to acquire a certificate of merit
will not be able to subvert the requirements of the Act by labeling
their claims as intentional torts. 166 Strong policy arguments were
available to the Court of Appeals in reaching this decision; yet, the
court did not voice these arguments explicitly.' 6 7 As a practical matter, court rulings will be better received if they are accompanied by a
thorough discussion of their underlying policies.' 68 In this case, the
court should have explicitly addressed the competing policy goals of
compensating legitimate tort claims and reducing the cost of medical
malpractice litigation.
With respect to the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act, the
future of claims arbitration in Maryland becomes dimmer with each
passing year. 1 69 In fact, the only provision in the Act with any substance is the certificate of merit requirement. 7 ° If reducing the cost
of medical malpractice litigation remains a serious goal of the General
Assembly, then perhaps the time has come to consider options other
1 71
than arbitration or litigation.
PETER STACKPOLE

health care provider during the rendering of medical treatment or services ... regardless
of whether the claim sounds in negligence or intentional tort").
166. See i&lat 729, 694 A.2d at 479 ("A plaintiff may not remove a medical malpractice
action from the ambit of the statute simply by adding the adjectives 'malicious' or
'willful."').
167. See supra notes 134, 153 and accompanying text (providing an analysis of the competing policy arguments inferred from and approved in Goicochea).
168. See REYNOLDS, supra note 157, at 60-61 (discussing the argument for reasoned elaboration in opinion writing, and noting that reasoned elaboration helps the court's audience
"see the goals identified by the court, its method of reaching those goals, and permits
criticism of opinions using the same bases").
169. See Health Claims Arbitration Office, Case Statistics Through December 31, 1997
(1998) (reporting that, out of 927 medical malpractice claims closed in 1996 and 1997,
only 29 were closed by an arbitration panel, while 808 waived arbitration under the Actthe remaining 80 claims were either settled or dismissed); Trimble, supra note 5, at 919
(describing an informal survey reporting that 84% of claimants' attorneys and 75% of defendants' attorneys would waive arbitration under the unilateral waiver in 80% of their
cases, and concluding that, given these numbers, "it is likely that.., the General Assembly
will have no choice but to . . . repeal the [Act]").

170. See Trimble, supra note 5, at 907 ("The single most effective mechanism for discouraging claimants may be the certificate of merit."); see also supra notes 129-132 and accompanying text (noting that the certificate of merit requirement discourages meritless claims).
171. See Weiler, supra note 156, at 948 ("[W]hen one compares the promise of medical
no-fault with the performance of malpractice litigation, the no-fault alternative has more
than enough merit to justify its availability as a legal option."). See generally Lynn A.
Kerbeshian, ADR: To Be or... ,70 N.D. L. REv. 381 (1994) (discussing alternative dispute
resolution generally, and providing an analysis of mediation, arbitration, and summaryjury
trials).
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A.

PROCEDURE

The Constitutionality of Ordinary First-Class Mail as a Method of
Initial and Original Service of Process

In Miserandino v. Resort Properties, Inc.,1 the Court of Appeals refused to give full faith and credit to a Virginiajudgment levied against
two Maryland residents because the method used to serve process was
constitutionally inadequate.2 The court observed that the use of ordinary first-class mail to serve the defendants with initial and original
notice of the action against them in Virginia violated due process.'
The decision challenged the Virginia legislature's amendment to its
long-arm statute, which struck the requirement that notice be sent by
"registered or certified mail" and required only that notice be
"mailed."4

Miserandinopresented a case of first impression for the Court of
Appeals, and the outcome may affect other causes of action in which
service by first-class mail has been allowed by statute. Refusing to draw
a bright-line rule applicable to service of process in all actions, the
court devised a three-part test to distinguish actions that allow service
1. 345 Md. 43, 691 A.2d 208, cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
2. Id. at 67-68, 691 A.2d at 220.
3. Id. "Initial service of process" means that the method of service is the first attempted by the plaintiff. "Original service of process" means that the process institutes the
judicial proceeding, as distinguished from mesne process which defines process during the
adjudication. BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 1205 (6th ed. 1990).
When actions were commenced by original writ, instead of, as at present, by
summons, the method of compelling the defendant to appear was by what was
termed "original process," being founded on the original writ, and so called also
to distinguish it from "mesne" or "intermediate" process, which was some writ or
process which issued during the progress of the suit. The word "process," however, as now commonly understood, refers to a summons, or, summons and complaint, and, less commonly, to a writ.
Id.
4. 1987 Va. Acts ch. 449, 459 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-329(c)
(Michie 1992)). Prior to 1987, service upon nonresidents was sufficient when the plaintiff
served the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Virginia, "provided that notice of such service, a copy of the process or notice, and a copy of the affidavits are forthwith sent by
registered or certified mail, with delivery receipt requested, by the Secretary to the defendant." Id.
(emphasis added). In 1987, Virginia's General Assembly amended the statute so that service would be sufficient upon the defendant, "provided that notice of such service, a copy
of the process or notice, and a copy of the affidavit are forthwith mailed, by the Secretary to
the person or persons to be served." § 8.01- 3 29(c) (emphasis added). The change implied
that service of process by ordinary first-class mail was permitted.
Registered and certified mail differ in the following ways: registered mail provides a
record of sending, a record of receipt, and indemnity for loss or damage. Certified mail
provides only a record of receipt. Ordinary first-class mail provides none of these protections to promote successful delivery. Note, Service of Process by Mail, 74 MICH. L. REv.381,
381 n.5 (1975) (citing 39 C.F.R. §§ 161.1, 168.1 (1975)).
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by ordinary first-class mail from actions that mandate a more rigorous
method of service.
1. The Case.-In January 1993, Resort Properties, Inc. (Resort
Properties) filed a "Warrant in Debt" in a Virginia district court
against Maryland residents Gerard and Karen Miserandino. 5 The dispute arose out of the Miserandinos' alleged default in a time-share
interest in property located in Warren County, Virginia. 6 Pursuant to
Virginia's long-arm statute, Resort Properties served process upon the
Secretary of the Commonwealth of Virginia who was then authorized
to serve the defendants.7 The Miserandinos failed to appear for the
hearing because they allegedly did not receive notice.' In February
1993, Resort Properties obtained a default judgment in the amount of
$4,211.82. 9
In June 1993, pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act,1" Resort Properties recorded the foreign judgment in
the Circuit Court for Carroll County, Maryland.1 1 The Miserandinos
moved to strike Resort Properties's registration of the Virginia judgment because they alleged that they had not received notice of the
Virginia action. 2 In September 1993, the circuit court held a hearing
on the Miserandinos' motion.'" The court initially granted the Miserandinos' motion to strike, but later reversed its own ruling and recorded the Virginia judgment.14 The Court of Special Appeals
affirmed, holding that procedural due process does not require actual
5. See Petitioners' Brief and Appendix at 4-5, Miserandino v. Resort Properties, Inc.,
345 Md. 43, 691 A.2d 208 (1997) (No. 93). "Warrant in Debt" was the title of the printed
form filed by Resort Properties to initiate the suit in the Warren County General District
Court to collect on the alleged debt. Id. at 5.
6. See Brief and Appendix of Respondent at 1, Miserandino v. Resort Properties, Inc.,
345 Md. 43, 691 A.2d 208 (1997) (No. 93).
7. See id.; see alsoVA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-329(c) (1992) (authorizing this procedure for
service of process).
8. Miserandino, 345 Md. at 47, 691 A.2d at 210.
9. Petitioners' Brief and Appendix at 6, Miserandino (No. 93).
10. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 11-801 to -807 (1995).
11. Miserandino, 345 Md. at 47, 691 A.2d at 209.
12. Id., 691 A.2d at 209-10.
13. Brief and Appendix of Respondent at 2, Miserandino (No. 93).
14. Miserandino, 345 Md. at 48-49, 691 A.2d at 210; see also Brief and Appendix of Respondent at 2-3, Miserandino (No. 93). In its original decision, the circuit court erroneously relied on Maryland's Uniform Foreign MoneyJudgments Recognition Act, MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-701 to -709 (1995). The court reversed its ruling upon Resort
Properties's motion contending that the decision should instead have been based on Maryland's Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. Brief and Appendix of Respondent at 2-3, Miserandino (No. 93).
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service of process." Consequently, service upon the Secretary of the
Commonwealth was valid despite the Miserandinos' argument that
they never received actual notice of the suit. The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari" on the question "whether initial and original service of process by first-class mail is constitutionally sufficient to confer
in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident individual in a long-arm
jurisdiction case. ",17
2. Legal Background.-The obligation to inform a litigant of impending actions is a fundamental requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment's procedural due process guarantee."8 At a minimum,
the procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause require that
"deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by
notice ...

. 19 Notice affords interested parties to the proceeding the

opportunity to be heard.20 Failure to notify a party of the action
against him denies him this fundamental right.
Personal service of process has always been regarded as the most
reliable guarantee that a defendant will receive notice of an action
against him. 2 Nevertheless, legislatures have adopted alternative
means of service that are more efficient and less expensive than actual
service, including serving a state official, posting notice, publishing
notice, mailing a waiver of service, mailing service by registered or
certified mail, mailing service by ordinary first-class mail, or a combination of these methods.2 2 Whatever method is chosen, the means of
service must comport with the guarantee of procedural due process.23
15. Petitioners' Brief and Appendix at 16, Miserandino (No. 93). The decision of the
Court of Special Appeals was unreported. Miserandino v. Resort Properties, Inc., No. 1352
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. filed Apr. 11, 1995).
16. Miserandino v. Resort Properties, Inc., 340 Md. 268, 666 A.2d 144 (1995).
17. Miserandino, 345 Md. at 52, 691 A.2d at 212 (emphasis omitted).
18. The Fourteenth Amendment states in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1; see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950).
19. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
20. Baker v. Baker, Eccles, & Co., 242 U.S. 394, 403 (1917); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 2 cmt. a (1982) ("The right to be heard before one's interests are
adjudicated is a fundamental principle of fairness. Giving notice to persons whose interests are to be adjudicated makes possible exercise of that right.").
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 2 cmt. a (noting that the common law
mode of direct manual delivery of a summons to the interested parties provided "substantial assurance of giving actual notice").
22. See Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Service of Process Under Due
Process Clause of Federal Constitution'sFourteenth Amendment-Supreme Court Cases, 100 L. Ed.
2d 1015, 1032-41 (1990).
23. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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The substitute method must approximate the likelihood of actual no24
tice guaranteed by the common law method of personal service.
The Supreme Court has ruled on the sufficiency of service of process in only a handful of cases, limiting its holdings to the narrow set
25
of facts on which these cases have been brought. In Hess v. Pawloski,
the Court held that a Massachusetts statute requiring nonresident motorists to stand trial in the state in which an automobile accident occurred, did not contravene the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
26
Amendment, provided that there was sufficient service of process.
The statute's requirements that a plaintiff leave a copy of the process
with the registrar, send a copy to the defendant via registered mail,
and attach the return receipt to the process complied with the Court's
standards of sufficient service. 27 In Wuchter v. Pizzutti,28 the Court

held that state laws explaining the method of serving process on a
nonresident must indicate a "reasonable probability that if the statutes
are complied with, the defendant will receive actual notice. '29 The
Court said that a statute that allowed service of process upon the Secretary of the State, without instructions that the Secretary of the State
serve the defendant, did not ensure, within a reasonable probability,
that the defendant would be notified.3" The Wuchter Court stated in
dicta that statutes of this kind impose on the plaintiff or the official
receiving service "the duty of communication by mail or otherwise
31
with the defendant."
The Supreme Court distilled the core principles of procedural
due process pertaining to notice in civil proceedings in Mullane v. Cen24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 2 cmt. a (explaining that the established standard requires that substitute service must be reasonably certain to convey actual
notice to the interested party).
25. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
26. Id. at 356-57. In Hess, the defendant was involved in an accident in Massachusetts.
Id. at 353. The defendant argued that because he was not personally served with process,
his constitutional rights to due process were violated. Id. at 353, 355. The Hess Court
declared that service of process by registered mail was sufficient where: (1) the defendant
had impliedly consented to the appointment of the registrar of his nonresident state as an
agent on whom process may be served, and (2) the defendant "actually receive[d] and

receipt[ed] for notice of the service and a copy of the process." Id. at 356.
27. Id. at 354.
28. 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
29. Id. at 24. Pizzutti, a resident of New Jersey, brought suit against Pennsylvania resi-

dent Wuchter when his horse-drawn wagon was struck by Wuchter's car on a New Jersey
roadway. Id. at 15. Service was made by leaving process with the Secretary of the State of

New Jersey. Id.
30. Id. at 24-25.
31. Id. at 20.
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tral HanoverBank & Trust Co. 32 The Court held that where the names
and mailing addresses of the parties to a proceeding were at hand,
notice by publication violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 The Court defined sufficient notice as "notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 4 In addition, the Court reasoned
that the method of notice "must be such as one desirous of actually
35
informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it."
The Court observed that "the mails" would have been a means more
likely to have apprised the defendants of the proceedings than publication. 6 On these facts, publication alone was unconstitutional, but
the status of service by "the mails" remained less certain.
The Court stated that use of "the mails" was "an efficient and inexpensive means of communication, "38 and intimated that ordinary
mail was a sufficient form of service under due process.3 9 The Court,
however, has not uniformly approved of mailed service. In Greene v.
Lindsey,4" the Court characterized "mail service" as "an inexpensive
and efficient mechanism ...to enhance the reliability of an otherwise
unreliable notice procedure,"4 1 but stated that "process served by mail
is far from the ideal means of providing the notice the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires."42 The Court implied
that mail service alone was an insufficient method of service under

32. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Central Hanover Bank, as trustee for several smaller trusts
whose beneficiaries were nonresidents of New York, published notice of a proceeding for
the settlement of the beneficiaries' accounts in a local New York newspaper as per the
requirements of section 100-c(12) of the New York Banking Law. Id. at 309.
33. Id. at 320.
34. Id. at 314.
35. Id. at 315.
36. Id. at 318.
37. Id. The Court reiterated this point in Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112
(1956), in which the Court stated that newspaper publication of proceedings to fix compensation in condemnation cases did not measure up to the quality of notice required by
due process when the name and address of the defendant were ascertainable. Id. at 116.
38. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319.
39. Id. at 318 ("Where the names and post-office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails to
apprise them of its pendency. . . . [WIe find no tenable ground for dispensing with a
serious effort to inform them personally of the accounting, at least by ordinary mail ... .").
40. 456 U.S. 444, 456 (1982). Greene invoked the language of Mullane, stating that
"[u]nder these conditions, notice by posting on the apartment door cannot be considered
a 'reliable means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are before
the courts.'" Id. at 453-54 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).
41. Id. at 455.
42. Id. at 455 n.9.
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due process, but nevertheless reasoned that mail service, combined
with other substitute methods such as posted service, would be constitutionally preferable.4 3
The Court has also stated that notice by publication to creditors
in probate actions was an insufficient method of giving notice to all
known or reasonably ascertainable creditors," and that notice by publication and posting was an insufficient method of service in a tax sale
4 5

proceeding.

The Supreme Court has not addressed the sufficiency of service
of process on nonresident defendants by ordinary first-class mail
alone.4 6 The Court's due process analyses of notice protocols in other
types of proceedings provide a framework for evaluating the constitutional sufficiency of ordinary first-class mail as a means of substituted
service. The Court's analyses emphasize that a court must consider
the totality of the circumstances before it can conclude that a particular method of service comports with the requirements of procedural
due process.4 7 On different facts a more or less stringent notice requirement may be present. One factual scenario may justify the use of
ordinary first-class mail to serve process, while other scenarios may
prohibit that use on the grounds of a denial of due process.
Other federal and state courts have rarely addressed the constitutionality of service of process by ordinary first-class mail.48 In Miles v.
Districtof Columbia,49 the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum43. Id.
44. SeeTulsa Profl Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 491 (1988) (remanding case
to determine whether interested party's identity was " ' reasonably ascertainable,'" for if it
was, then lack of actual notice would have violated due process).
45. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 (1983). The Court held
that posting a notice in the county courthouse of the sale of real property for nonpayment
of property taxes, coupled with the publication of the announcement, failed under the
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id In Schroederv.
City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), the Court held that the combination of newspaper
publication and posting within the vicinity of the property subject to the proceedings was
not a constitutionally valid means of notice when the name and address of the party sought
could easily have been ascertained. Id. at 211.
46. Miserandino, 345 Md. at 52, 691 A.2d at 212.
47. See, e.g., Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15 (1950) (stating that the constitutional requirements are satisfied if "with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case
these conditions are reasonably met").
48. Miserandino, 345 Md. at 52, 691 A.2d at 212.
49. 354 F. Supp. 577 (D.D.C. 1973), afffd, 510 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The District
of Columbia Board for the Condemnation of Insanitary Buildings sent notice by ordinary
first-class mail to a property owner regarding its decision to raze her buildings. Id. at 579.
In addition to the mailed notice, the Board published notice of its decision in a local
paper, which listed condemned properties by street address. Id. at 583. On this issue, the
court found that because the publication only listed the address of the properties, and in
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bia held that notice sent by ordinary first-class mail of the District's
decision to raze the plaintiff's buildings was unconstitutional.5" The
court found that under the circumstances where the District had had
numerous contacts with the plaintiff over a period of six years, and
where the plaintiff had spent substantial sums of money to improve
the condition of the building, "due process of the law requires no less
than registered or certified mail notice as the type reasonably
designed to inform the plaintiff.., and [to] afford her the opportunity to register her objections." 1
In State v. Lewis, 52 the Supreme Court of Kansas found that notice
of the revocation of a driver's license sent by ordinary first-class mail
was constitutionally sufficient.5" The Court of Appeals of Kansas
noted that where "fundamental rights are involved, substantial diligence is required [to provide notice]," but where "less significant
rights are involved ...less effort is required.., to provide notice that
is adequate for due process purposes."5 4
The Second Circuit held in Weigner v. City of New York5" that notice of a tax foreclosure action sent by ordinary first-class mail to a
nonresident pursuant to the City's Administrative Code is all that the
Constitution requires.5 6 The court recounted all of the advantages
that certified mail has over ordinary first-class mail, but concluded
that "means of notice beyond those reasonably calculated to reach interested parties are not required by due process."5 7 The court found
that under these circumstances, ordinary mail was reasonably calcuconsideration of the diminutive typeset, the published notice was not reasonably calculated
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action. Id. at 584-85. Miles differs from
Miserandinoin one significant aspect: The Board's notice in Miles did not comply with the
applicable statute, which required that notice to the owner of the condemned property be
sent by registered or certified mail. Id. at 585.
50. Id. at 585.
51. Id.
52. 953 P.2d 1016 (Kan. 1998).
53. Id. at 1026-27.
54. State v. Lewis, 935 P.2d 1072 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 953 P.2d
1016 (Kan. 1998).
55. 852 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1988).
56. Id. at 648. Ms. Weigner resided in Florida and had acquired 14 vacant parcels of
land in Queens, New York. Id. The City of New York instituted a tax foreclosure action
after Weigner had failed to pay property taxes for over four years. Id. at 651. Notice of the
action was sent to Weigner at her residence in Florida by ordinary first-class mail pursuant
to New York Administrative Code § 11417. Id. at 648.
57. Id. at 650-51. Several facts peculiar to this case influenced the court's holding.
First, publication of the foreclosure notice in three New York sources, and posting in the
Queens County Courthouse accompanied the mailed notice. Id. at 651. Additionally, the
court noted that Weigner's own failure to pay property tax should have alerted her to the
possibility of a foreclosure. Id.
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lated to reach the out-of-state defendant, and that certified mail would
have been in excess of what the Constitution required.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The constitutional adequacy of the
method used to notify the defendants in Miserandino posed a divisive
question for the Court of Appeals, reflected in the narrow four-tothree margin.5" Even though the method used by the plaintiff satisfied Virginia's statutory requirements for service of process on a nonresident defendant, the court held that the Virginia procedure
violated due process.5 9
The court stated that one of the factors to be considered when
determining what constituted due process was the nature of the action
being brought.6" The court recognized that some actions, such as
Maryland estate and tax sale proceedings and federal bankruptcy proceedings, allow service of process by first-class mail, but other actions,
such as proceedings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, do
not.6" The court noted that, under Maryland law, service by first-class
62
mail would not have been sufficient in this case.
The majority observed the precedent for using mail without a
signed return receipt, or waiver of service, to obtain personal jurisdiction in Federal Bankruptcy Rule 7004.63 The court distinguished the
rule in bankruptcy proceedings from state civil proceedings on two
grounds. First, the notice requirements pursuant to Federal Bankruptcy Rule 7004 satisfy procedural due process requirements, but
58. Miserandino,345 Md. at 46, 68, 691 A.2d at 209, 220. Before deciding the notice
issue, the Court of Appeals dispensed with the issue of whether the Virginia court could
assert personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Id. at 50, 691 A.2d at 211. The court said
that this was a case of specific jurisdiction because the cause of action arose out of the
defendants' contacts with Virginia, and that this was a sufficient basis for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that because the defendants
waived any attack they may have had against the assertion of personal jurisdiction under
the Virginia long-arm statute for the purposes of the circuit court hearing, it would not be
further considered by the court. Id. at 51, 691 A.2d at 212.
59. Id. at 67, 691 A.2d at 220.
60. Id. at 53, 691 A.2d at 213.
61. Id. at 63, 691 A.2d at 218. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, as amended in 1983
and 1993, provided no suggestion to the court that the use of ordinary first-class mail alone
was a sufficient method to serve process. Id. at 61, 691 A.2d at 216. A 1993 amendment to
Rule 4 allows the use of first-class mail, not to achieve service of process, but to allow the
recipient to waive his right to service, thereby permitting the action to go forward. FED. R.
Civ. P. 4(d).
62. Miserandino,345 Md. at 56, 691 A.2d at 214. The court observed that this fact was
of no consequence because the question was only whether the method of service under the
Virginia statute satisfies due process. Id. There is no requirement that Virginia's method
of service be as good as Maryland's chosen method in the hierarchy of service methods. Id.
63. Id. at 63, 691 A.2d at 218.
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they must be interpreted in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
55(c), which requires that a default judgment be set aside upon a
showing of a meritorious defense if the defendant failed to receive
actual notice.6 4 Second, the unique nature of bankruptcy proceedings warrants special requirements to justify a "more expeditious and
less costly means of service" than ordinary civil cases.65 Among the
unique features cited by the court were the increasingly large number
of bankruptcy cases filed each year, and the probability that the interests of many parties will be at stake. 6 6
Finally, the court determined that the only state interest applicable to this case that could justify the use of "the significantly less certain procedure of first-class mail" was that the defendants were not
residents of Virginia.67 This justification failed to persuade the court
that traditional methods of service were not required. The court
articulated a three-pronged test to establish guidelines for measuring
the constitutional sufficiency of a proposed method of substitute service.6" The test requires that the method adopted: (1) be "'a reliable
means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are
before the courts,"'6 9 (2) be a "'means . . . such as one desirous of
actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish
it,"' 7 and (3) be reasonable in comparison "'to the "feasible and customary" alternatives and supplements to the form of the notice chosen."'7 1 The court held that the method adopted by the Virginia
legislature fails this test, thus violating the defendants' due process
rights.

72

4. Analysis.-Miserandinopresents a clear question: Does service
of process by ordinary first-class mail on a nonresident defendant satisfy the due process requirements of notice? 73 The Court of Appeals
held that initial and original service of process by ordinary first-class
64. Id. at 64, 691 A.2d at 218.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 64-65, 691 A.2d at 218.
67. Id. at 65-66, 691 A.2d at 219.
68. Id. at 67, 691 A.2d at 219-20.
69. Id., 691 A.2d at 219 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 315 (1950)).
70. Id. (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315) (ellipsis in original).
71. Id., 691 A.2d at 220 (quoting Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 454 (1982) (quoting
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315)).
72. Id. The court stated "this test" in the penultimate paragraph of the opinion without expressly applying it to the facts in Miserandino. Id. See infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text for an explanation of why Virginia's statute failed the three-part test.
73. See Miserandino,345 Md. at 52, 691 A.2d at 212.
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mail is not constitutionally sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction
7
over a nonresident defendant in a long-arm jurisdiction case. 1
This result accords with an intuitive response to the question; the
added burden of serving process by certified mail seems slight compared to the greater risk that a defendant may suffer a default judgment because he failed to receive notice of the action. Several
obstacles, however, belie this cursory conclusion. First, it is the nature
of the action that determines whether service of process is permitted
by ordinary first-class mail.7 5 Some Fourth Circuit federal and state
proceedings permit service by ordinary first-class mail.7 6 Second, the
principles laid down by the Supreme Court on the sufficiency of substitute methods of service stop short of requiring that a defendant receive actual notice of process. 77 As long as the substitute method
satisfies constitutional standards, it is sufficient irrespective of whether
the defendant receives actual notice. Applying the Fourth Circuit's
test to the circumstances of Miserandino diffuses these counterarguments, and justifies the holding that the use of ordinary first-class mail
for the service of process on a nonresident defendant in a long-arm
jurisdiction case is unconstitutional.
a. Obstacles to Holding Notice by Ordinary First-Class Mail Unconstitutional.---Certainstate and federal proceedings allow service of
process by ordinary first-class mail. 71 One might argue that it is incongruous to say that notice by ordinary first-class mail is constitutional in
one proceeding, but unconstitutional in another. However, reliance
on the notice requirements for one class of proceedings ipso facto to
justify service by first-class mail in all proceedings is misguided because it fails to account for the "practicalities and peculiarities" of the
different proceedings. 79 For example, bankruptcy cases are substantially different from "the normal adversarial model of plaintiff versus
defendant," ° and can be distinguished from ordinary civil cases on
the ground that they require "more expeditious and less costly means
74. Id. at 67, 691 A.2d at 220.
75. Id. at 53, 691 A.2d at 213.
76. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
77. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Miserandino, 345 Md. at 63, 691 A.2d at 218 (noting that FED. BANKR. R.
7004 permits service by first-class mail); see also MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-103(a)
(1997) (stating that "first notice .. .is sufficient if deposited as first-class mail").
79. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (stating
that among the "general principles" of the "elementary and fundamental requirement of
due process" is "due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case").
80. Robert M. Lawless, Realigning the Theory and Practice of Notice in Bankruptcy Cases, 29
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1215, 1216 (1994).
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of service." 81 For instance, the great number of bankruptcy proceedings filed each year, and the number of persons likely affected by the
adjudication of each proceeding, are characteristics peculiar to bankruptcy proceedings. 82 Providing notice to each creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding likely "entails enormous expense and often cannot
be accomplished within the financial resources of the bankruptcy estate."8 3 Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Code, rules, and case law currendy "confuse[ ] issues of notice... fail [ing] to craft these laws into a
whole," and are thus an unlikely source for guidance.8 4 The nature of
bankruptcy proceedings justifies an expeditious and inexpensive
means of service likely to achieve actual notice in a large volume of
cases, and it warrants a relaxed standard of service. 85 As suggested by
this bankruptcy model, the inherent differences in proceedings account for the differences in the quality of notice that satisfies due
process.
In State v. Lewis,8 6 the Kansas Court of Appeals offered the most
compelling counterargument to Miserandino when it said:
The procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause
are designed to prevent erroneous deprivation of important
interests by the government. To achieve this end, however,
the Due Process Clause does not require perfect procedures.
"[T] he Due Process Clause has never been construed to
require that the procedures used to guard against an erroneous deprivation of a protectible 'property' or 'liberty' interest be so comprehensive as to preclude any possibility of
error. The Due Process Clause simply does not mandate that
all governmental decision-making comply with standards
87
that assure perfect, error-free determinations."
The Lewis court conceded that ordinary first-class mail is not one hundred percent effective, but that it cannot be unconstitutional simply
because it fails to give notice in every case. Ordinary first-class mail
does not fail in Miserandinobecause it is imperfect; certified mail may

81. Miserandino, 345 Md. at 64, 691 A.2d at 218.
82. Id.
83. Lawless, supra note 80, at 1218.
84. Id. at 1237.
85. Miserandino, 345 Md. at 64-65, 691 A.2d at 218.
86. 935 P.2d 1072 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 953 P.2d 1016 (Kan.
1998).
87. Id. at 1076 (alteration in original) (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13
(1979)).
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also fail to reach its recipient."8 Rather, ordinary first-class mail fails
because it does not meet the constitutional requirements of adequate
notice. The Court of Appeals packaged these requirements into a
test, hereafter referred to as the Miserandino test.
b. The Miserandino Test.--In reference to the constitutional
standards of adequate notice, the Supreme Court has said that it "has
not committed itself to any formula," nor has it "determin [ed] when
constructive notice may be utilized or what test it must meet.... But a
few general principles stand out in the books." 9 The Court of Appeals assembled these principles into a functional assay, the Miserandino test. The test requires that the method of service be (1) a
reliable means, (2) of the type that a person would use if she actually
desired to inform the defendant, and (3) reasonable "with reference
provided to the 'feasible and customary' alternatives and supplements
to the form of notice chosen."9" The court placed the test at the end
of the opinion and failed to apply it to the facts. This implied that the
application of the test was unwieldy, thus causing the court to shy away
from it. This left the test vulnerable to criticism by the dissent, which
found the test "at best vague and uncertain."91
Criticism of the test comes as no surprise. The first prong, reliability, is cumbersome in this context. A study of the reliability of ordinary first-class mail requires courts to draw conclusions from empirical
data of postal efficiency. The dissent argued that courts should defer
to legislatures in the absence of conclusive empirical data.9 2 The inability of the majority to find empirical data on the rate of success of
the United States Postal Service in delivering first-class mail supports
the dissent's conviction that the test is untenable."

88. See Note, supra note 4, at 387-90 (noting that refused, unclaimed, and unforwardable mail present problems for the person attempting service by certified mail). Refused
mail may indicate that the party to be served knew what the contents of the mailing were,
and thus received the notice he was due. Unclaimed mail poses a more serious threat that
the party to be served was unable to pick up the letter from the post office, as in the case of
the employee whose work hours conflict with the hours of operation of the post office.
89. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
90. Miserandino, 345 Md. at 67, 691 A.2d at 219-20 (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 75, 691 A.2d at 223 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 74, 691 A.2d at 223; see also Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Postman Never Rings
Twice: The Constitutionalityof Service of Process by PostingAfter Greene v. Lindsey, 33 AM. U. L.
REV. 601, 619-20 (1984). The counterargument made by the courts is that they are particularly well-qualified to address such fundamental matters as procedural due process, a matter relating to court operations and one in which the courts have expertise. Id. at 621
n.125.
93. Miserandino, 345 Md. at 62-63, 691 A.2d at 217. The court obtained performance
data on the average days of delivery for overnight, two-day, and three-day mail service;

19981

MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS

The test, however, is not wholly unworkable. The second and
third prongs of the test support its utility. Service of process on the
Secretary of the Commonwealth, followed by mailing the service to
the last known address of the defendant, as used in Miserandino, is not
a method a plaintiff actually desirous of informing the defendant
might reasonably adopt. This method does generate a record of dispatch, because the plaintiff delivers the service to an impartial state
official, whose function is to mail the notice to the defendant and to
file a certificate of compliance with the papers in the action.9 4 How-

ever, it creates no way of confirming receipt by the person to be
served. Service is deemed complete on the date that the certificate of
compliance is filed with the court, whether or not the defendant receives the service. 9 5
The second prong demands that the greater the significance of
the notice being sent, the more stringent the method of sending becomes for the sender who is actually desirous of informing his recipient. Ordinary first-class mail sufficiently effects routine transactions,
but more important transactions require the certainty of receipt offered by certified mail. An example illustrates the point. A person
sending a Christmas greeting may well desire that his addressee receive it, but probably is satisfied with using ordinary first-class mail.
Conversely, a conditional permanent resident filing a petition for permanent residency with the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) would more likely choose registered or certified mail, which
would enable him to document his compliance with INS procedures
by procuring receipts for delivery at his post office and receipt by the
INS. This choice reflects the greater significance of the interest at
stake with the petition for permanent residency compared to the less
important, albeit sincere, interest reflected by the Christmas greeting.
Similarly, adjudications that determine the disposition of important property interests mandate a method of service of process to the
parties whose interests are at stake by a means more certain than firstclass mail in order to satisfy the constitutional requirement that the
method chosen is one which a plaintiff actually desirous of informing
the defendant might reasonably adopt. The action originally filed by
Resort Properties in the Warrren County General District Court in
Virginia sought damages in excess of $4000.96

Therefore, the pro-

these data proved of little value in the assessment of how many pieces of mail are not
delivered. Id. at 63, 691 A.2d at 217.
94. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-329(c) (Michie 1992).
95. Id.
96. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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ceeding was one in which important property interests were at stake,
and the corresponding method that Resort Properties should have
adopted as a plaintiff actually desirous of informing its recipient was
something more than ordinary first-class mail.
The third prong of the test is most damaging to Resort Properties
on the facts of this case. Using the obvious, feasible, and customary
alternative to ordinary first-class mail service-i.e., certified mailwould have placed an insubstantial burden on the plaintiff or the Secretary of the Commonwealth. The current cost of sending a letter by
certified mail is nominal.9 7 The only additional burden is that the
sender must go to the post office to send the notice, rather than
merely affixing the appropriate postage and dropping it in a mailbox.
This is not an onerous burden.
c. Other Considerations.-UnderFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), a defendant who does not receive service of process may,
upon a showing of good cause, have a default judgment set aside.9 8
This rule ensures that a defendant who does not receive notice may
nonetheless be heard. The problem with allowing a method of service
that offers no assurances of receipt is that it increases the likelihood
that the defendant will have to go into court to have a default judgment set aside. In Virginia, the burden on the defendant is even
greater because it follows a more rigid common law rule, which permits the court to set aside a default judgment only when the defendant has acted without negligence regarding the receipt of process. 99
Choosing a method more certain to ensure actual receipt would keep
the responsibility of serving process on the plaintiff, thereby preserving the defendant's procedural due process rights by preventing him
from having to defend his rights in a collateral action.

97. U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, GET MORE FROM YOUR POST OMCE 2-5 (1997). At the time of
this writing, a fee of $1.35 is charged in addition to the regular postage for sending an
article via certified mail. Id. at 2. Return receipt requested at the time of mailing showing
the recipient's signature, the date, and the delivery address costs an additional $1.10. Id. at
3-4. Restricted delivery ensuring that the mail is delivered only to a specific addressee or
the addressee's authorized agent costs $2.75. Id. at 5. The total bill for certified mail and
return receipt with restricted delivery is $5.20 more than the postage for ordinary first-class
mail. Id.
98. FED. R.CIv. P. 55(c).
99. See Powell v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 194 S.E.2d 742, 744-45 (Va. 1973) (stating that "at
an earlier date in ourjurisprudence," defaultjudgments could be set aside in the event of a
mistake or accident, but that presently these grounds would not entitle a person to this
equitable relief because the "increase in litigation and the advanced complexities of a modern day business world... requir[e] that there be a high degree of finality to judgments").
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Furthermore, Virginia's legislature left no record of why it
changed the notice requirements for nonresident defendants in 1987,
eliminating the registered and certified requirements for service of
process by mail.100 Service by ordinary first-class mail is not among
the enumerated methods of substituted service available to a Virginian
initiating a suit against another Virginian.1"' This creates an inconsistency in which nonresidents are treated differently than residents. By
comparison, Maryland law requires the same service on residents and
nonresidents, except when service on nonresidents is made under a
method prescribed by a foreign jurisdiction if that method is reasonably calculated to give actual notice. 102 It is noteworthy that Maryland
asks no more of a Virginia resident suing a Maryland resident than the
Virginia resident receives from a Maryland resident suing him. Thus,
the Court of Appeals's holding in Miserandino is consistent with the
procedural requirements of Maryland law.1 0 '
5. Conclusion.--Actions at law fall within a spectrum of classes
along which the constitutionality of the methods of service of process
vary. Analyzing whether the method used satisfies procedural due
process for each type of action entails an evaluation of fairness that
often precludes the construction of generic black letter rules. The
competing interests of affording actual notice and permitting needed
adjudications to go forward without undue expense and complication
challenge the ideals of procedural due process. The Court of Appeals
has concluded that service of process by ordinary first-class mail on a
nonresident defendant is not a constitutionally acceptable method of
service. The Court of Appeals correctly reconciled inconsistency between the standard of service for in-state and out-of-state defendants,
holding that a civil suit against a nonresident was not the type of action that warranted use of a method of substitute service less certain to
provide actual notice.
THOMAS BEACH

100. Telephone interview with Robie Ingram, Attorney, Virginia Legislative Services
(Oct. 8, 1997).
101. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-296 (Michie 1992). The statute prescribes four modes of
service: (1) personal service, (2) service on a person at the abode of the person to be
served, (3) posting service at the abode of the party to be served, and (4) publication. Id.
102. Maryland Rule 2-121 (a) states in pertinent part: "Service of process may be made
within this State or outside this State when authorized by the law of this State .... Service
outside the State may also be made in the manner prescribed by the court or prescribed by
the foreign jurisdiction if reasonably calculated to give actual notice." MD. R. 2-121 (a).
103. But see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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Reconciling Maryland'sPleadingRequirements with Its Stringent
Standardsfor Recovering Punitive Damages

In Scott v. Jenkins,' the Court of Appeals reversed a Court of Special Appeals decision 2 and struck down a punitive-damage award that
was not expressly pleaded in the complaint. In so doing, the court
reaffirmed that modern pleadings still serve the crucial function of
providing notice to the defendant of the alleged tortious conduct and
of the relief sought. The court also reaffirmed that punitive damages
are an exceptional form of relief that mandate a higher standard of
conduct and proof.
This Note traces the history of punitive damages and pleading
requirements in Maryland and argues that Scott was a consistent application of both lines of precedent. Because punitive damages are appropriate only when the defendant acts with "actual malice,"3 the Scott
court's holding that a plaintiff seeking punitive damages must request
such damages specifically in the complaint 4 effectively reconciles
Maryland's procedural requirements of pleadings with its very exacting standards for recovering punitive damages.
1. The Case.--Terry Napoleon Jenkins claimed that he witnessed
an assault and battery that occurred on December 28, 1989.' When
Corporal Robert Scott and Officer C. Richardson sought to arrest a
person suspected of the crime, Jenkins tried to convince them that
they were arresting the wrong person.6 After the Prince George's
County police officers told Jenkins to leave the scene, Jenkins continued to insist that the detained suspect had not committed the crime.7
The dispute between Jenkins and the officers escalated, for reasons that are unclear.8 According to Scott, Jenkins became "irate"
when the police did not immediately release the suspect.9 Scott furl.345 Md. 21, 690 A.2d 1000 (1997).
2. Scott v. Jenkins, 107 Md. App. 440, 668 A.2d 958 (1995), rev'd, 345 Md. 21, 690 A.2d
1000 (1997).
3. Scott, 345 Md. at 37, 690 A.2d at 1008.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 25, 690 A.2d at 1001; Amended Complaint for Damages at 2, Jenkins v. Scott

(Md. Cir. Ct. Prince George's County 1994) (No. CAL 90-23661). The suspect was a juvenile who was accused of throwing snowballs at a woman. Id. Jenkins claimed that he observed the incident while he was outside of his home, washing the windows of his truck. Id.
6. Amended Complaint for Damages at 2, Jenkins (No. CAL 90-23661).
7. Id.
8. Scott, 345 Md. at 25, 690 A.2d at 1001-02 (noting that the underlying reasons for the
conflict between Scott and Jenkins are still "disputed by the parties").
9. Brief of the Appellant and Joint Record Extract at 1, Scott v. Jenkins, 107 Md. App.
440, 668 A.2d 958 (1995) (No. 1896).
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ther stated thatJenkins's anger led him to swing his fist at the officer,
resulting in Jenkins's arrest for assault.' °
Jenkins contended that the conflict occurred differently. According to Jenkins, Scott became "verbally abusive" when Jenkins would
not leave the scene of the incident." Jenkins claimed that Scott committed battery by "taking his finger and placing it in [Jenkins's] nostril."' 12 Jenkins further asserted that Scott then "hit [Jenkins] in the
left eye with his fist knocking [him] to the ground.""3
On December 28, 1990, Jenkins filed an amended complaint and
jury demand in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland.1 4 Jenkins's amended complaint alleged that Corporal Scott was
liable for false arrest,15 false imprisonment, 16 assault, 7 slander,1 8 and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.19 For each count, Jenkins
demanded judgment against Scott for $500,000 in damages, interest,
and "such other and further relief as the court may deem just and
proper." 20 The amended complaint did not specifically seek punitive
damages.2 1
Nonetheless, at the close of all evidence at trial, Jenkins re22
quested the submission of a punitive-damage instruction to the jury.
Scott objected to the punitive-damage submission and argued that
such an instruction should not be given to the jury because a request
23
for punitive damages was not pleaded in the amended complaint.
The trial judge overruled the objection, reasoning that because Jenkins had generally requested damages in the amount of $500,000 for
each count and had not alleged compensatory damages "that even
10. Id at 1-2.
11. Amended Complaint for Damages at 2, Jenkins (No. CAL 90-23661).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2-3.
14. Id. at 6. Jenkins filed his initial complaint and jury demand on October 11, 1990.
Brief of Appellant and Joint Record Extract at 2, Scott (No. 1896).
15. Amended Complaint for Damages at 2-3, Jenkins (No. CAL 90-23661).
16. Id. at 3-4.
17. Id. at 4.
18. Id. at 4-5.
19. Id. at 5.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Scott, 345 Md. at 26, 690 A.2d at 1002 ("Jenkins' Amended Complaint neither made
a specific claim for punitive damages, nor did it allege that Scott acted with actual
malice.").
22. Id.
23. Id. In making his objection at trial, Scott's counsel claimed that the jury instruction
took him by surprise and that the "first time" he had heard of punitive damages was when
the lawyers "were talking about jury instructions." Reporter's Official Transcript of Proceedings, Trial on the Merits, Volume II at 23-24, Jenkins v. Scott (Md. Cir. Ct. Prince
George's County 1994) (No. Civil Action Law 90-23661).
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closely approximated" that amount, it was improbable that Scott was
"taken by surprise" by the punitive-damage jury instruction.2 4
The jury was asked to decide whether Scott was liable to Jenkins
for battery 25 and false arrest. 26 The jury found Scott liable for both
torts and awarded Jenkins $150 in compensatory damages and $1000
in punitive damages. 27 The verdict sheet that the jury used did not
indicate whether the award of punitive damages was based on battery
or on false arrest.

28

Scott appealed the punitive-damage judgment to the Court of
Special Appeals, asking the court to decide the issue of whether the
trial court "err[ed] in instructing the jury on and entering punitive
damages when the relief had not been properly prayed" in the
amended complaint. 29 On appeal, Scott argued that the trial court's
decision was inconsistent with Maryland Rule 2-303(b), which states
that pleadings must "contain only such statements of fact as may be
necessary to show the pleader's entitlement to relief or ground of defense."3 ° Scott further argued that the trial court's decision was contradictory to Maryland Rule 2-305, which provides that pleadings must
"contain a clear statement of the facts necessary to constitute a cause
of action and a demand for judgment for relief sought."3 ' According
to Scott, Maryland courts had interpreted these rules as requiring a
pleading to include a claim for relief with sufficient specificity that it
would provide notice to the opposing party of the claim's nature.3 2
24. Reporter's Official Transcript of Proceedings, Trial on the Merits, Volume II at 24,
Jenkins (No. Civil Action Law 90-23661).
25. Scott, 345 Md. at 26 n.2, 690 A.2d at 1002 n.2 (containing a reprint of the trial
court's verdict sheet). The definition that the court used for the battery claim on the
verdict sheet was whether "Scott intentionally and unlawfully touch [ed] ... Jenkins in a
harmful or offensive manner." Id. In addition, during his verbal instructions to the jury
concerning battery, the judge indicated that a "police officer is not responsible if the police officer inflicts an injury on a person who is being lawfully arrested unless the officer
acts with malice toward that person." Reporter's Official Transcript of Proceedings, Trial
on the Merits, Volume II at 10,Jenkins (No. Civil Action Law 90-23661). Thejudge further
described "malice" as "exist[ing] when [an] officer intends to inflict an injury or [when an]
officer intends to act from improper motivations or with ill will." Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
26. Scott, 345 Md. at 26 n.2, 690 A.2d at 1002 n.2. The definition that the court used
for the false arrest claim was whether "Scott detain [ed] ...Jenkins for purpose of prosecution for misdemeanor battery without probable cause." Id.
27. Id. at 26, 690 A.2d at 1002.
28. Id.
29. Brief of the Appellant and Joint Record Extract at 2, Scott (No. 1896).
30. MD. R. 2-303(b).
31. MD. R. 2-305.
32. Brief of the Appellant andJoint Record Extract at 3-4, Scott (No. 1896). Scott relied
principally on Fletcher v. Havre de Grace Fireworks Co., 229 Md. 196, 177 A.2d 908, modified,
229 Md. 196, 183 A.2d 386 (1962), and Campbell v. Welsh, 54 Md. App. 614, 460 A.2d 76
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Scott argued that Jenkins's amended complaint violated these rules
because its general request for damages "gave no clue that anything
but compensatory damages were being requested."3
The Court of Special Appeals agreed with Scott in that Maryland
Rules 2-303(b) and 2-305 were dispositive of this issue.34 Moreover,
the court stated that, according to the Rules and relevant case law, it
was clear that the principal requirement of a complaint is to
"provid[e] notice to the other side. '35 The court stated that a party
who seeks punitive damages "must allege facts in his complaint which
show that the defendant acted with actual malice."3 6 In considering
what constitutes "actual malice," the court used the Owens-Illinois, Inc.
v. Zenobia definition that "actual malice" is "'conduct characterized
by evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud.' 38 The court found,
however, that while the amended complaint did not specifically mention the phrase "actual malice," it did allege facts sufficient to support
a punitive-damage claim because the amended complaint "alleged
that Scott placed his finger in Jenkins's nostril, that Scott was verbally
abusive to Jenkins, that Scott beatJenkins, and thatJenkins acted with
due care at all times and did nothing to provoke such abusive behavior." 39

Consequently, the court upheld the punitive-damage claim

against Scott and held that "when allegations sufficient to support a
punitive-damages claim are coupled with a general request for dam(1983). Brief of the Appellant and Joint Record Extract at 3-4, Scott (No. 1896). Fletcher
held that the Maryland Rules require the plaintiff "to state the subject matter of a claim in
the declaration with such reasonable accuracy as will show what is at issue between the
parties, so that... the defendant may be apprised of the nature of the complaint he is
required to answer and defend." 229 Md. at 200, 177 A.2d at 909-10. Campbell held that an
action against an estate "must give the personal representative reasonable notice of the
nature of the claim . . . (including] what relief is being sought." 54 Md. App. at 631, 460
A.2d at 86.
33. Brief of the Appellant and Joint Record Extract at 4-5, Scott (No. 1896).
34. See Scott, 107 Md. App. at 442, 668 A.2d at 959 ("Maryland Rules 2-303(b) and 2-305
are applicable to the disposition of this case sub judice.").
35. Id. at 443, 668 A.2d at 959 (citing Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 420, 24 A.2d 795,
800-01 (1942) (holding that the plaintiff's suit for injunctive relief against the defendant's
fence-building activities was sufficiently pleaded because the complaint alleged facts to "apprise the defendant of the nature of the claim brought against him"); Fischer v. Longest,
99 Md. App. 368, 380, 637 A.2d 517, 523 (1994) (holding that the appellant's malpractice
suit was not sufficiently pleaded because it did not provide notice to the appellees "of the
nature of the complaint [they were] required to answer and defend")).
36. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
38. Scott, 107 Md. App. at 443, 668 A.2d at 960 (quoting Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460, 601
A.2d at 652).
39. Id.
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ages, a defendant has adequate notice" that the plaintiff will seek punitive damages at trial.4"
In support of its decision that punitive-damage awards are permissible when the complaint includes sufficient facts to support a finding
for punitive damages and an unspecified damage request, the court
indicated that in this respect it viewed punitive and consequential
damages as comparable. 41 The court noted that when certain damages were the "natural, necessary, and logical consequence" of the defendant's actions, those damages "need not be specifically requested
in the complaint. ' 42 The court then found the defendant to be on
sufficient "notice" that such damages would be sought at trial.4 3 In
holding that punitive damages were like consequential damages in the
manner in which they can be pleaded-with allegations and a general
request for damages-the court further explained that it was adopting
a rule that was similar to that of many other jurisdictions.4 4
Scott appealed the Court of Special Appeals's decision to the
Court of Appeals, which granted certiorari to "consider the adequacy
of Jenkins' 'claim' for punitive damages."4 5

40. Id. at 444, 668 A.2d at 960.
41. Id. The court stated that "[t]he rationale for [the punitive-damage recovery] rule is
the same as the rationale for the consequential damages [recovery] rule." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id at 444-45, 668 A.2d at 960.
44. Id. at 444, 668 A.2d at 960. The court cited cases from Oklahoma, California, Georgia, Idaho, and NewJersey. See Alexander v.Jones, 29 F. Supp. 690, 693 (E.D. Okla. 1939)
(holding that an Oklahoma resident's demand for punitive damages from the defendant
corporations' alleged negligence did not amount to a separate cause of action because a
request for "punitive damages [is] incidental or collateral to [a] demand for actual damages"); Turner v. Whittel, 38 P.2d 835, 837 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934) (per curiam) (holding that allegations in a California plaintiff's complaint for assault and battery were
sufficient because punitive damages need not "be demanded by name if facts justifying
their recovery were pleaded, nor need they be segregated from the actual damages allowed
either in the findings or verdict" (citation omitted)); Hall v. Browning, 24 S.E.2d 392, 398
(Ga. 1943) (holding that a complaint alleging that a defendant shot a pistol into a Georgia
plaintiffs property was not subject to dismissal as claiming no recoverable damages because punitive damages need not be claimed by that name, and all that need be pleaded is
a stated amount and circumstances that may be considered as an aggravation); Harrington
v. Hadden, 202 P.2d 236, 237 (Idaho 1949) (holding that an Idaho complaint alleging
mutual combat was adequate because although special damages must be grounded upon
aggravations from other averments of the complaint, exemplary damages may be recovered under a claim for damages generally); Eatley v. Mayer, 154 A. 10, 11 (N.J. Cir. Ct.
1931) (refusing to strike from a complaint a New Jersey plaintiffs request for punitive
damages against his negligent dentist because "[i] t is a general rule of pleading that it is
not necessary to claim exemplary damages by name"), affd, 158 A. 411 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1932).
45. Scott, 345 Md. at 27, 690 A.2d at 1003.
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Legal Background.-

a. Punitive Damages.-In Davis v. Gordon,4 6 the Court of Appeals gave a clear indication that it considered punitive damages to be
exceptional relief that required an exceptional wrongdoing by the defendant.4 7 The plaintiff in Davis asked the court to affirm a punitivedamage award in a motor vehicle tort where the defendant was held
liable for hitting two pedestrians with his car, killing one of them, and
not stopping at the scene of the accident.4 8 The defendant's conduct
also violated certain driver safety statutes.4 9 In examining the trial
court's reasoning for permitting a jury instruction for punitive damages, the Court of Appeals concluded that the lower court must have
believed "that the negligence of [the] defendant was so gross and
wanton as to justify such an instruction."5 °
However, the Davis court overturned the punitive-damage award
because it found that the appellant lacked the requisite intent. 1 Citing nineteenth century precedent,5 2 the court held that in order for a
plaintiff to be entitled to punitive damages, "'there must be an element of fraud, or malice, or evil intent, or oppression entering into
and forming part of the wrongful act.'" 5 3 The court further explained
that punitive damages are permitted only in those cases where they
can be awarded "'as a punishment for the evil motive or intent with
which the act is done.' 54 Finding "no suspicion of a motive, and no
intention to do injury," the Davis court concluded that the punitivedamage award was improper and, consequently, overturned it.55
The court significantly modified the standard by which punitive
damages may be recovered in Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co.56 The
Smith case involved a motor vehicle tort where a minor was killed by a
truck driver because the truck driver failed to respond properly when
46. 183 Md. 129, 36 A.2d 699 (1944).
47. Id. at 133, 36 A.2d at 701.
48. Id. at 131-32, 36 A.2d at 700.
49. While the Davis court did not recount all of the driver safety statutes that the defendant violated, the court noted that the plaintiff based his argument for punitive damages solely on the finding that the defendant did not stop at the scene of the accident as
required by statute. Id. at 133, 36 A.2d at 701.
50. Id. at 132-33, 36 A.2d at 700-01.
51. Id. at 134, 36 A.2d 701.
52. The Court of Appeals cited Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Co. v. Hoeflich, 62 Md. 300 (1884). Davis, 183 Md. at 133, 36 A.2d at 701.
53. Davis, 183 Md. at 133, 36 A.2d at 701 (quoting Hoeflich, 62 Md. at 307).
54. Id. (quoting Hoefich, 62 Md. at 307) (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 134, 36 A.2d at 701.
56. 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972), overruled by Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325
Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
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his hood flew up while driving. The plaintiffs complaint alleged a
cause of action against the truck driver and his employer for "wrongful death due to negligent operation" and a cause of action against
the employer for "negligent entrustment."58 In considering the
threshold question of whether punitive damages could be awarded in
motor vehicle negligence claims, the court recounted the Davis
court's holding that punitive damages are recoverable' only in actions
that demonstrate a form of malicious intent.5 9 The court noted, however, that the case presented an opportunity for "further interpretation" of the issue.60
The Smith court reasoned that when an individual operates a motor vehicle with a "wanton or reckless disregard for human life" and
with knowledge of the risks associated with such conduct, that person's state of mind is the "legal equivalent" of the type of malice necessary to support an award of punitive damages. 6 ' The court defined
wanton, reckless disregard for human life as "'such conduct as would
carry an implication of malice or... from which one might determine
the existence of actual malice."' 6 2 Thus, the Smith court concluded
that a party may recover punitive damages in an automobile negligence case upon a showing of implied, rather than actual, malice.63
The court, therefore, extended punitive damages to negligence actions where the defendant's state of mind is not alleged to be entirely
willful or intentional.6 4
In creating a punitive-damage standard that identified conduct of
an "extraordinary [or outrageous] character" as the legal equivalent
of "actual malice," the court noted some concern that a more lenient
standard could result in misuse. 65 The court recognized the "danger
of formulating a test which may be so flexible that it can become virtually unlimited in its application."6 6 Therefore, the court insisted upon
57. Id. at 152, 169, 297 A.2d at 723, 732-34.
58. Id. at 152, 297 A.2d at 723.
59. Id. at 160, 297 A-2d at 728.
60. Id. at 162, 297 A.2d at 728.
61. Id. at 168, 297 A.2d at 731 (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. Id. at 167, 297 A.2d at 731 (quoting St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life
Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 239, 278 A.2d 12, 35 (1971)).
63. Id. at 173, 297 A.2d at 734.
64. Id. at 165-66, 297 A.2d at 730.
65. Id. at 166, 297 A.2d at 730-31 (alteration in original).
66. Id., 297 A.2d at 731. Indeed, in applying this modified punitive-damage standard
to the action against the truck driver, the court determined that the truck driver's alleged
conduct did not demonstrate a state of mind that could warrant punitive damages. Id. at
171, 297 A.2d at 733. The court noted that the driver's "failure to respond properly under
exigent circumstances underscores the very distinction [the court] make [s] between a situation reflecting 'mere' negligence, for which compensatory damages are available, and
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a demanding standard in pleading as well as proving "implied malice."6 7 The court noted favorably that the plaintiff's complaint described the allegations "in considerable detail" and that "[s]uch
particularity may well serve as a benchmark for pleading a case of exemplary damages .... No bald or conclusory allegations of 'wanton
or reckless disregard for human life' or language of similar import,
shall withstand attack on grounds of insufficiency."6 8
In H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman,69 the court considered extending Smith's "implied malice" standard to a negligence action arising out of a contractual relationship, but declined to do so.7 ° The
plaintiffs in Testerman, who were sole proprietors of a service station,
sued H & R Block in both tort and contract, claiming that H & R
Block had "negligently, wantonly, maliciously and intentionally" prepared their income tax returns incorrectly.7 1 After the trial court
ruled that the plaintiffs could not recover punitive damages because
H & R Block's actions amounted to "mere negligence," the Court of
Special Appeals reversed the decision. 72 Relying on Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., the intermediate appellate court determined that punitive damages were recoverable because H & R Block had prepared the
tax returns knowing that it had insufficient information and, consequently, acted in a way that "reckless[ly] disregard[ed] . . . the rights of
others."7' This state of mind was the "legal equivalent" of actual
malice.74
The Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Special Appeals's decision. 75 Noting the lower court's heavy reliance on Smith, the Testhat [conduct] which... may entitle an injured party to exemplary damages." Id.Yet, the
court distinguished the action against the truck driver from the action against his employer. Id. Whereas the truck driver's alleged negligence of driving with his hood up
occurred "under the pressures of a highway crisis," the employer's alleged negligence of
choosing not to properly prepare its trucks revealed an element of premeditation. Id at
172, 297 A.2d at 734. Therefore, the court sustained a count for punitive damages against
the truck driver's employer. Id.
67. Id. at 168, 297 A.2d at 732.
68. Id.
69. 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975), overruled by Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md.
420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
70. See id. at 46-47, 338 A.2d at 54 ("[Wle need only hold that the rule enunciated in
Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co.-that a 'wanton or reckless disregard for human life in the
operation of a motor vehicle' is the legal equivalent of such malice-cannot be extended
to this case." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
71. Id. at 37-38, 338 A.2d at 49 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Id. at 41, 338 A.2d at 51.
73. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 49, 338 A.2d at 55.
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terman court limited Smith by explaining that its holding was "confined
to a wanton or reckless disregard for human life, and to the operation
of a motor vehicle."76 For torts arising out of a contractual relationship,
"actual malice" was still required in order to recover punitive damages.7 7 Moreover, the court defined "actual malice" more stringently
as "the performance of an act without legal justification or excuse, but
with an evil or rancorous motive influenced by hate,7 the purpose being to deliberately and willfully injure the plaintiff." 1
In Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 79 the Court of Appeals refined its

Testerman decision. In Wedeman, the plaintiff, a car buyer, received a
punitive-damage award based on a finding that the car dealership had
fraudulently misrepresented the condition of her automobile before
she purchased it.08 Relying on Testerman, the Court of Special Appeals
reversed the judgment because it found that the tort in question,
fraud, arose out of a contractual relationship.8 1 As a result, the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the defendant acted with actual
malice.8 2
In reversing the lower court's decision, the Court of Appeals explained that it was correct that "actual malice" must be shown to recover punitive damages for a tort arising out of a contractual
relationship.8 3 However, it continued, punitive damages may be recovered based on findings of "implied malice," or conduct characterized by a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights of others, where
the tortious conduct precedes the formation of a contract.8 4 In this
case, the court found that the defendant's fraud had induced the
plaintiff to enter into the contract for purchasing the car.8 5 Therefore, the court permitted a punitive-damage award on a finding of
"implied malice" because the tortious act preexisted the forming of
86

the contract.

Taken together, Testerman and Wedeman created a standard based
on when the tortious conduct arose in relation to the formation of the
contract. If the conduct warranting punitive damages occurred prior
76. Id. at 47, 338 A.2d at 54.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 43, 338 A.2d at 52.
79. 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976), overruled by Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md.
420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
80. Id. at 525, 366 A.2d at 8-9.
81. Id. at 527-28, 366 A.2d at 10.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 528, 366 A.2d at 10.
84. Id. at 530-31, 366 A.2d at 11-12.
85. Id. at 529-30, 366 A.2d at 11.
86. Id.
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to the formation of the contract, then "implied malice" was required.
If the conduct occurred after the formation of the contract, however,
then "actual malice" was required.8 7
A plurality of the court reaffirmed the Testerman-Wedeman "arising
out of contract" distinction in Schaefer v. Miller.8 In a concurring
opinion, however, Judge Eldridge, joined by Judges Chasanow and
Cole, indicated that the Testerman-Wedeman standard should be rejected, in part, because the rule "has no relation whatever to the purposes of punitive damages."89 Judge Eldridge explained that punitive
damages served a dual purpose "'as punishment for outrageous conduct and to deter future transgressions."' 9 0 Rather than focusing on
the "heinousness of the defendant's conduct" in determining whether
punitive damages are warranted, Judge Eldridge's concurrence criticized the Testerman-Wedeman rule for placing its emphasis on "when
that conduct occurs relative to a contract between the parties" (i.e.,
whether the tort influenced the contract, or whether the contract
preexisted the tort).9
Relying heavily on Judge Eldridge's concurring opinion in Schaefer, the Court of Appeals overruled the Testerman-Wedeman standard in
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia.92 Zenobia involved a plaintiff who alleged
injuries caused by asbestos-containing products manufactured by the
defendant.9 3 The Court of Appeals opined that the Zenobia case "directly raise[d] the problem of what basic standard of wrongful conduct should be used for the allowance of punitive damages in
negligence actions generally, and in products liability actions based
on either negligence or on strict liability."9 4 In considering the
proper standard for punitive-damage awards, the court first held that
the Testerman-Wedeman approach was inappropriate because its inquiry
focused on the timing of the tortious act in relation to the formation
of a contract.9 5 Using the reasoning in Judge Eldridge's Schaefer concurrence, the court held that the proper inquiry into whether punitive
87. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 453, 601 A.2d 633, 649 (1992)
(describing the Testerman-Wedeman "arising out of contract" distinction and expressly overruling it).
88. 322 Md. 297, 587 A.2d 491 (1991) (plurality opinion).
89. Id. at 321, 587 A.2d at 503 (Eldridge, J., concurring in judgment).
90. Id. (quoting Nast v. Lockett, 312 Md. 343, 349, 539 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1988), overruled by Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992)).
91. Id.
92. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
93. Id. at 428, 601 A.2d at 636-37.
94. Id. at 451, 601 A.2d at 648.
95. Id. at 453, 601 A.2d at 649.
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damages were appropriate related exclusively to "the heinous nature
of the defendant's tortious conduct." 96
The court then held that in negligence actions, or products liability actions alleging either negligence or strict liability, the conduct
must evidence "actual malice., 9 7 In other words, the plaintiff must
prove that "the defendant's conduct was characterized by evil motive,
intent to injure, ill will, or fraud."9" In so holding, the Zenobia court
explicitly overruled Smith v. Gray ConcretePipe Co., which held that punitive damages could be imposed in certain negligence actions based
on "implied malice."9 9
The Zenobia court changed not only the standard of conduct required for obtaining punitive damages, but the standard of proof as
well.1 00 Noting that the policy behind punitive damages was "penal"
in nature, the court held that the standard for proving the intent necessary for an award of punitive damages should be higher than the
standard for compensatory damages.1 'O Therefore, the court declared that a plaintiff must prove "actual malice" by "clear and convincing evidence" rather than by a mere "preponderance of the
evidence."' 0 2 Yet, although it stated that the clear and convincing
standard for punitive damages applies to "any tort case,"' 0 3 the Zenobia
court refused to apply the underlying "actual malice" standard to in10 4
tentional tort cases.
The court's application of the "actual malice" standard to intentional torts came three years later in Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, FS.B. °5
In Ellerin, the court considered the appropriate standard for the availability of punitive damages in a tort action where the defendant allegedly committed fraud. 0 6 The Ellerin court made a distinction
between fraud where the defendant acted with "reckless indifference"
as to the truthfulness of the representation and fraud where the defendant had "actual knowledge of the falsity" at the time of the misrepresentation. 1 7 The court held that while in the former instance
the defendant did not have sufficient mens rea to justify an award of
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 454, 601 A.2d at 649.
Id. at 460, 601 A.2d at 652 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 459-60, 601 A.2d at 652.
Id. at 469, 601 A.2d at 657.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 460 n.21, 601 A.2d at 653 n.21.
337 Md. 216, 652 A.2d 1117 (1995).
Id. at 219, 652 A.2d at 1118.
Id. at 235, 652 A.2d at 1126.
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punitive damages, the latter circumstance demonstrated the existence
of "actual malice" and, consequently, could warrant a punitive-damage
award.' 08
In Montgomery Ward v. Wilson,10 9 the court expanded on Zenobia
and Ellerin and broadly held that "[w] ith respect to both intentional
and non-intentional torts,. . an award of punitive damages generally
must be based upon actual malice, in the sense of conscious and deliberate wrongdoing,
evil or wrongful motive, intent to injure, ill will, or
110
fraud."
Montgomery Ward involved an employee, arrested by the store for
credit card fraud, who filed an action for the intentional torts of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment."1 The trial court permitted an award of punitive damages for both torts, and the Court of
112
Special Appeals affirmed the judgment.
Reviewing the intermediate appellate court's decision, the Court
of Appeals dismissed the false imprisonment claim 1 3 and then considered whether punitive damages were appropriate for the malicious
prosecution claim.'1 4 The court conceded that punitive damages had
been recoverable in past malicious prosecution claims when "malice"
could be inferred because the defendant acted without probable
cause.'1 5 However, the court indicated that it had recently "modified
the standards for the allowability of punitive damages in tort cases." 1 6
The standard for both intentional and non-intentional torts was that a
punitive-damage award must be based on "actual malice" or "conscious and deliberate wrongdoing, evil or wrongful motive, intent to
injure, ill will, or fraud."" 7 Moreover, the court reaffirmed Zenobia's

108. Id. However, the Ellerin court recognized that it was making a subtle distinction
concerning the law of fraud as it related to punitive damages. Id. at 241, 652 A-2d at 1129.
Because the defendant had preserved at trial his objections to the punitive-damages award,
the court remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. Id
109. 339 Md. 701, 664 A.2d 916 (1995).
110. Id. at 733, 664 A.2d at 932.
111. Id. at 705-06, 664 A.2d at 918.
112. Id at 712, 664 A.2d at 921.
113. Id. at 727, 664 A.2d at 929. The Montgomery Ward court held that the instruction for
false imprisonment was improper because the plaintiff had alleged- only that the defendant
had wrongfully procured a warrant for her arrest, Id Because the arrest was made by an
officer with a valid warrant, the court explained that the plaintiff's false imprisonment
claim was actually a malicious prosecution claim. Id.
114. Id at 732, 664 A.2d at 931.
115. Id.
116. Id, at 733, 664 A.2d at 932.
117. Id,
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holding that such intent must be established by "clear and convincing
8
evidence" applied to all torts, intentional as well as non-intentional.1
b.

Pleading a Claim.-

(1) Alleging a Cause of Action. -Maryland Rule 2-305 requires
that "[a] pleading that sets forth a claim for relief.., shall contain a
clear statement of the facts necessary to constitute a cause of action
and a demand for judgment for relief sought." '19 Read Drug & Chemical Co. v. Colwill Construction Co.' 20 is a seminal case illustrating how
the Court of Appeals has interpreted the requirements imposed by
Maryland Rule 2-305.121 In Read Drug,the court considered whether a
complaint in a negligence action sufficiently included "'a clear statement of facts necessary to constitute a cause of action. '122 The case
involved two questions-whether the defendant, a construction company, had a duty to warn pedestrians about the dangers posed by
wooden planks left on the street, and whether the defendant's acts
proximately caused the plaintiffs injury. 123 The court found that the
plaintiff had pleaded her causes of action insufficiently because she
124
did not include facts that were dispositive as to the two issues.
In finding that the plaintiff had insufficiently pleaded the "facts"
that constituted her "cause of action" of negligence, the Read Drug
court made a crucial distinction between "simple factual situation [s]"
and "more complex factual situations." 125 The court indicated that
pleadings involving simpler factual situations can be more general in
118. Id.
119. MD.R. 2-305.
120. 250 Md. 406, 243 A.2d 548 (1968).
121. SeeJOHN A. LYNCHJR. & RICHARD W. BOURNE, MODERN MARYLAND CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 6.4(a), at 362 (1993). At the time Read Drugwas decided, Maryland Rule 2-305 was Maryland Rule 301(c). See MD. R. 2-305.
122. Read Drug, 250 Md. at 412, 243 A.2d at 552 (quoting former MD. R. 301(c)).
123. Id. at 416-17, 243 A.2d at 555.
124. Id. Specifically, the court found that:
There [were] no allegations in regard to the size of the board or the specific
nature of the danger allegedly involved. There [were] no allegations that danger
existed because the board projected from other boards, or because it was placed
on an angle, or because there was a difference in level between the ground and
the surface of the board, or because the board was of such a nature that it would
slip and slide when a person walked on it ....Nor [was] there any allegation that
the defendants placed the board in such a position as would cause it to slip or
wobble or otherwise cause a person walking on the board to lose her footing and
fall.
Id.
125. Id. at 413, 243 A.2d at 553.
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their allegations. 126 However, cases presenting more complicated situations must include facts sufficient to "'inform[ ] the court, whose
duty it is to declare the law arising upon these facts"' as well as "'to
apprise the opposite party of what is meant to be 1proved,
in order to
27
give him an opportunity to answer or traverse it.'

More recently, the Court of Appeals has reaffirmed that a complaint must include facts sufficient to fulfill all of the elements of the
cause of action. In Anderson v. Meadowcroft,1 28 the daughter of a decedent filed an action against an attorney who had both drafted the decedent's will and received a bequest from it.129 The court noted that

it did not need to consider the merits of the plaintiff's action for fraud
because she had not provided sufficient facts in her complaint to al130
lege "undue influence," an essential element of the cause of action.
Citing the Rule 2-305 requirement that a "pleading that sets forth a
claim for relief ...shall contain a clear statement of the facts necessary to constitute a cause of action," 131 the court further noted that
the presence of the word "coerce" in the daughter's complaint was
inadequate because it was a "conclusory allegation [that was], without
supporting facts, insufficient to state a cause of action. "132
(2) Alleging Damages.-While the Maryland Rules mandate
the pleading of facts sufficient to support a cause of action, common
law has defined the degree of specificity required in pleading damages. The landmark case of Ellicott v. Lamborne 3 established a distinction between those damages that are "the necessmy consequences of
the act complained of' and those that "do not necessarily result from
the main fact alleged." '3 4 Ellicott held that the latter classification of
126. Id. at 413-14, 243 A.2d at 553-54. The court noted in dicta that those "simple and
specialized situations" may be limited to cases like "motor vehicle and carrier passenger
cases." Id at 414, 243 A.2d at 554.
127. I& at 414, 243 A.2d at 554 (quoting Gent v. Cole, 38 Md. 110, 113 (1873)).
128. 339 Md. 218, 661 A.2d 726 (1995).
129. Id. at 221, 661 A.2d at 727.
130. Id. at 229, 661 A.2d at 731. The court stated that the daughter had not alleged in
her complaint any of the circumstances that the court has previously recognized as constituting "undue influence":
She neither alleged that the decedent's mental abilities had deteriorated such
that he would have been extraordinarily susceptible to his attorney's suggestions,
nor that [his attorney] used force or fear to coerce the decedent into changing
the will, nor that the decedent was especially dependent on [his attorney] to meet
his physical needs.
Id, at 230, 661 A.2d at 731-32.
131. See supra text accompanying note 119.
132. Anderson, 339 Md. at 230, 661 A.2d at 732.
133. 2 Md. 131 (1852).
134. Id at 136.
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damages, called "special damages," must be pleaded with specificity in
the plaintiffs complaint. 11 5 The Ellicott court established this requirement to "prevent a surprise upon the defendant" regarding the dam1
ages that were being requested.

36

In Weiller v. Weiss,' 3 7 the court reaffirmed Ellicott's distinction between special and general damages. Yet, the Weiller court held that in
causes of action alleging personal injury, the plaintiff could recover
damages that were a consequence of the original injury even though
those consequential damages were not specifically pleaded in the
complaint. 138 In other words, "consequential damages" were classified as "general damages" and were recoverable upon an unspecified
139
allegation of damages in the complaint.
Fifty years later, Nicholson v. Blanchette14 ° reaffirmed the Weiller
holding that a claim for general damages was adequate, for purposes
of pleading, for all damages that were consequential to the action.
The Nicholson court noted that in an automobile tort, a general allegation that a husband "suffered and continues to suffer damages because of the injuries caused his wife" was sufficient to allege that the
husband had suffered loss of consortium. 14' In so doing, the court
held that when certain damages are the natural and logical conse135. Id. The Ellicott court drew a distinction between damages resulting from the manufacturing of paper and those resulting from the preparation of paper. Id. at 135. While
the plaintiff, a paper mill owner, had pleaded damages that resulted from his inability to
manufacture paper, he had not pleaded damages resulting from his inability to prepare
the paper. Id. at 135-36. The Ellicott court held that the latter group of damages were
"special damages" because they did not "necessarily" result from the former group of damages. Id. at 136.
136. Id. at 136.
137. 124 Md. 461, 92 A. 1028 (1915).
138. Id. at 465, 92 A. at 1029. The Weiller court addressed a situation in which an automobile collided with a prized race horse, and the plaintiff filed a declaration alleging that
the horse was "seriously and permanently injured about her body and limbs." Id. at 464, 92
A. at 1028. At trial, the plaintiff produced evidence showing that "before the accident, the
mare was levelheaded, quite fearless of objects, a bold racer, and easy to handle; but that,
since, she was highly excitable and nervous, easily frightened, timid in her racing, and
valueless as a race horse because of that condition." Id., 92 A. at 1029.
While the Weiller court noted that the "declaration did not allege injury to the nervous
system," the court concluded nonetheless that "[t]he declaration apprised the defendant
that the injured animal was valuable because [the complaint indicated that it was] a racing
mare" and it was "common knowledge" that racing horses that had been hurt physically or
had been "badly frightened" have greatly diminished value. Id. at 465, 467, 92 A. at 102930.
139. See id. at 466, 92 A. at 1029 ("The rule adopted by this court.., is that, in suits for
personal injuries, it is not necessary to state specially any matters which are the legal and
natural consequences of the injury inflicted.").
140. 239 Md. 168, 210 A.2d 732, supplemented by 239 Md. 168, 213 A.2d 71 (1965).
141. Id. at 181, 210 A.2d at 739 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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quence of the alleged acts and injury, those damages need not be specifically requested in the complaint.1 42
3. The Court's Reasoning.-Judge Karwacki, writing for the court,
began the analysis in Scott v. Jenkins by examining the importance that
pleadings play in modern litigation.14 The court noted that while
"Maryland abandoned the formalities of common law pleading long
ago," pleadings still play a crucial role in litigation."4 The court was
particularly concerned with the manner in which the pleading pro1 45
vides "notice to the parties as to the nature of the claim or defense.
The court then reviewed previous holdings where it had found that
non-intentional and intentional torts were not pleaded properly because the pleadings did not include all of the elements of the
offense.

14 6

The court then traced its evolving jurisprudence concerning the
"necessary prerequisites" to a punitive-damage award and concluded
that "actual malice" must be demonstrated for both intentional and
non-intentional torts. 14 7 Moreover, the court reaffirmed the Zenobia
court's holding that "actual malice" must be demonstrated by conduct
"characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, ill will or fraud." '4 8 The
court also reaffirmed the Zenobia court's requirement of proving "actual malice" by "clear and convincing evidence" as opposed to the
more lenient standard of preponderance of evidence.14 9
The Court of Appeals suggested that it had cast aside the more
forgiving "implied malice" standard because it did not serve the underlying purposes behind punitive damages: "to punish and deter
particularly reprehensible conduct motivated by a conscious and evil
142. Id
143. Scott, 345 Md. at 27-28, 690 A.2d at 1003.
144. Id.
145. Id. (emphasis added) (citing LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 121, § 6.1, at 343). In
addition to notice, the court recognized that Maryland pleadings serve three other "distinct roles in our system ofjurisprudence." Specifically, the pleading "states the facts upon
which the claim or defense allegedly exists," it "defines the boundaries of litigation," and it
.provides for the speedy resolution of frivolous claims and defenses." Id. at 28, 690 A.2d at
1003. The court maintained, however, that of those four roles, the requirement of notice
was "paramount." Id.
146. Id. at 28-29, 690 A-2d at 1003. Specifically, the court cited Read Drug & Chemical Co.
v. Colwill Construction Co., 250 Md. 406, 243 A.2d 548 (1968), where the court struck down a
negligence award because the pleading party had not alleged with certainty facts sufficient
to support a negligence award. Scott, 345 Md. at 28, 690 A.2d at 1003.
147. Scott, 345 Md. at 28-29, 690 A.2d at 1003-04.
148. Id. at 31, 690 A-2d at 1005.
149. Id. at 29, 690 A.2d at 1004.
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motive. ' Implied malice may have "reached conduct that was perhaps reprehensible," but the court found that it also reached conduct
that was "otherwise free of the ill will appropriately targeted by a puni1'
tive damages award.'

51

In addition, the court noted that Montgomery Ward extended the
"actual malice" requirement to intentional as well as non-intentional
torts.1

52

In so doing, the court cited Heinze v. Murphy 5 1 for the propo-

sition that for the intentional tort of false imprisonment, a police officer "'who acts in good faith in making an arrest is absolved from
punitive or exemplary damages"' unless there are demonstrated "'circumstances upon which bad faith or malice may be attributed to him
in making the arrest.'

154

The Scott court continued, "'where damages

beyond compensation, to punish the party guilty of a wrongful act, are
asked, the evidence must show wanton or malicious
motive, and it
155
must be actual and not constructive or implied.'

Having described the punitive-damages precedent, Judge Karwacki then indicated that the nature of punitive damages required
that specific facts be alleged in the complaint in order to support the
award. 156 The Scott opinion interpreted Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co.
as imposing "a strict pleading requirement in punitive or exemplary
damages cases" because the Court of Appeals has not accepted "'bald
or conclusory allegations,"' instead requiring "'far greater
specificity."1

57

Moreover, the Court of Appeals in Scott criticized the Court of
Special Appeals for analogizing the punitive damages Jenkins was
awarded to consequential damages. 55' First, because punitive damages require a "higher standard of proof,

. . .

a more detailed factual

allegation is necessary to put the other party on notice that such damages are being sought."' 5 9 Second, the Scott court noted that punitive
damages do not "necessarily flow" from an injury in a way similar to
150. Id. at 32, 690 A.2d at 1005.
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 110-117 and accompanying text.
153. 180 Md. 423, 24 A.2d 917 (1942).
154. Scott, 345 Md. at 33, 690 A.2d at 1005 (quoting Heinze, 180 Md. at 430, 24 A.2d at
920).
155. Id., 690 A.2d at 1006 (quoting Heinze, 180 Md. at 434, 24 A.2d at 922-23)).
156. Id. at 34-35, 690 A.2d at 1006.
157. Id. at 34, 690 A.2d at 1006 (quoting Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149,
168, 297 A.2d 721, 732 (1972), overruledby Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601
A.2d 633 (1992)).
158. Id. at 35, 690 A.2d at 1006.
159. Id.
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consequential damages. 160 Whereas consequential damages are "relat[ed] to the loss suffered by the plaintiff," punitive damages "depict[ ] the degree of defendant's culpability and his ability to pay." 161
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals noted that the intermediate
' 162
appellate court's decision was "flawed."
Next, the court indicated that the varying purposes of punitive
damages suggest that they are "different in nature" and, consequently,
should be pleaded specifically in the complaint."' 3 Thus the court
held that:
[I]n order to properly plead a claim for punitive damages, a
plaintiff must make a specific demand for that relief in addition to a claim for damages generally, as well as allege, in
detail, facts that, if proven true, would support the conclusion that the act complained of was done with "actual malice." Nothing less will suffice.16 4
Applying this sweeping holding to the facts of the case, the court
noted that "[e]ven assuming that [Jenkins's] Amended Complaint
specifically and sufficiently alleged facts that would have supported
the conclusion that Scott acted with the requisite 'actual malice' to
support a punitive damages award," Jenkins's pleading would still be
inadequate because it "failed to make a specific claim for such damages" and because "[h]is prayer for damages and general relief [was]
simply insufficient to inform Scott of the extraordinary nature of the
65
additional relief sought against him."'
4. Analysis.-Scott v. Jenkins can be understood as a merging of
two different lines of Maryland jurisprudence: punitive damages and
pleading requirements. The decision is an appropriate application of
both precedents because past courts have established strict standards
for recovering punitive damages1 66 and for pleading causes of action.' 6 7 In holding that a complaint requesting punitive damages
must make a specific claim for such damages and include facts sufficient to allege that the defendant was motivated by "actual malice,"16
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 36, 690 A.2d at 1007.
Id.
Id. at 35, 690 A.2d at 1006.
Id. at 37, 690 A.2d at 1007.
Id., 690 A.2d at 1008.
Id. at 38, 690 A.2d at 1008.
See supra notes 97-118 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 124-132, 135-142 and accompanying text.
Scott, 345 Md. at 38, 690 A.2d at 1008.
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the Scott decision effectively completes the picture of what a plaintiff
hoping to recover punitive damages needs to allege and prove.
a. Punitive Damages Must Be Plead Specifically as Special Damages.-Maryland law has consistently required that all damages except
those that "necessarily result from the main fact alleged" be plead with
particularity in the complaint.16 9 While damages that were the "natural and logical" consequences of that main fact are classified as "general damages" and can be pleaded as an unspecified allegation of
damages, damages that are not the "natural and logical" consequence
of the main fact are considered to be "special damages" and are required to be pleaded specifically in the complaint.1 7 0 Under this approach, the Scott court was perfectly appropriate in classifying punitive
damages as special damages.
Since Zenobia, the court has steadily maintained that punitive
damages serve a categorically different purpose than other damages.
Unlike other types
of damages, punitive damages have a particularly
"penal nature. 1 71 The distinctly "penal nature" of punitive damages
can be seen in at least two respects. First, the requirement of malicious intent or "actual malice" is a distinct part of any cause of action
alleging punitive damages. Second, the heightened standard of proof
that a plaintiff must meet (i.e., "clear and convincing evidence") is
also particular to punitive damages. The existence of a higher standard of conduct and proof indicates that the court has, at least since
Zenobia, not considered punitive damages to flow naturally from other
types of damages.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals was justified in noting that the
Court of Special Appeals erred in analogizing punitive damages to
consequential damages. 1 72 The Court of Special Appeals had held improperly that "It]he rationale for [the recovery of punitive damages]
rule is the same as the rationale for the [recovery of] consequential
damages [because] when allegations sufficient to support a punitive
damages claim are coupled with a general requestfor damages, a defendant has adequate notice that the plaintiff may seek such [punitive]

169. See Ellicott v. Lamborne, 2 Md. 131, 136 (1852).
170. See Nicholson v. Blanchette, 239 Md. 168, 181, 210 A.2d 732, 739 (holding that a
husband could recover for loss of consortium in a case where he alleged only that he
"suffer[s] damages because of the injuries caused his wife" because loss of consortium was
a logical and natural consequence to the injuries alleged (internal quotation marks omitted)), supplemented &y 239 Md. 168, 213 A.2d 71 (1965).
171. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 469, 601 A.2d 633, 657 (1992).
172. Scott, 345 Md. at 35-36, 690 A.2d at 1007.

1998]

MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS

damages at trial." '7 3 Yet the cases upon which the Court of Special
Appeals relied in making the proposition are from jurisdictions that
have a more permissive view toward punitive damages.' 7 4 Thesejurisdictions require a lower standard of conduct for awarding punitive
damages; none require a finding of "actual malice" as defined by
Maryland. As a result, it would be much more likely that the defendant's notice of punitive damages could be inferred from a more general claim of damages.
Maryland law concerning punitive damages is unlike the law in
jurisdictions cited by the Court of Special Appeals and more like Virginia law, which was cited by the Court of Appeals.17 5 Like Maryland,
Virginia requires that punitive damages be predicated on the defendant's acting with a mens rea comparable to "actual malice." '7 6 The
Supreme Court of Virginia has held that punitive damages are unlike
compensatory damages in that they must be pleaded with a certain
degree of specificity.1 77 While Virginia's highest court has not provided an extensive explanation as to why punitive damages must be
plead specially, it is probable that Virginia's reasoning is comparable
to that of Maryland; because punitive damages result from a higher
allegation of conduct, a defendant does not have sufficient notice that
they are being requested unless they are pleaded specially.
Thus, while consequential damages can be foreseen by the defendant from the nature of the original injury, punitive damages cannot be foreseen because they serve a fundamentally different purpose.
As the Court of Appeals noted in Scott, punitive damages have "no
necessary relation to the loss suffered by the plaintiff, but rather depict[ ] the degree of the defendant's culpability. ' 17' Because punitive
damages do not inherently flow from any other form of recovery, the
Court of Appeals was consistent with precedent in implicitly classifying
them as more like "special damages."
b. PleadingFacts Sufficient to Allege That the Defendant's Motivation Was 'ActualMalice. '-Maryland's jurisprudence concerning plead173. Scott, 107 Md. App. at 444, 668 A.2d at 960 (emphasis added).
174. See supra note 44 (listing the states cited by the Court of Special Appeals, and
describing their holdings).
175. Scott, 345 Md. at 37, 690 A.2d at 1007 (citing Harrell v. Woodson, 353 S.E.2d 770,
773 (Va. 1987)).
176. See Hamilton Dev. Co. v. Broad Rock Club, Inc., 445 S.E.2d 140, 143 (Va. 1994).
177. SeeHarrel4 353 S.E.2d at 773 ("[W]e hold that punitive damages may only be recovered where the plaintiff has made an express claim for them in the prayer for relief...
sufficient to put the defendant on notice that an award of punitive damages is sought apart
from, and in addition to, the compensatory damages claimed.").
178. Scott, 345 Md. at 36, 690 A.2d at 1007.
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ings has also been unfailing in requiring that a pleading contain "'a
1 79
clear statement of facts necessary to constitute a cause of action."
The court has consistently interpreted Maryland Rule 2-305 as meaning that the facts pleaded must effectively satisfy every element of the
cause of action.18 ° In instances where the plaintiff has failed to plead
in the complaint facts proving a necessary element of the cause of
action, the Court of Appeals has not hesitated to uphold dismissals of
the plaintiffs action.1 8 '
Therefore, it is perfectly consistent with the court's interpretation
of Maryland Rule 2-305 and of its precedent concerning punitive damages to require a complaint alleging punitive damages to include facts
suggesting that the defendant was motivated by "actual malice." Previous courts have made clear that a determination of "actual malice" is a
separate inquiry into the mens rea of the defendant. 8 2 "Actual malice" is a determination that the defendant acted with an "evil motive"
or an "ill will" that is above and beyond the conduct that satisfies many
torts based on negligence. 183 Moreover, the "actual malice" inquiry
has been understood to be something beyond that which is required
to satisfy the intent requirement of many intentional torts. 184 Thus,
179. Read Drug & Chem. Co. v. Colwill Constr. Co., 250 Md. 406, 412, 243 A.2d 548, 552
(1968) (quoting Maryland Rule 301, now renamed Maryland Rule 2-305).
As scholars have noted, the language of Maryland Rule 2-305 differs significantly from
its parallel rule in the federal system, Federal Rule 8(a). LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 121,
§ 6.1, at 344. Whereas the Maryland Rules indicate that "facts" must be plead sufficient to
constitute a "cause of action," Rule 8(a) requires only a "short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The two rules
differ in that while the federal pleading rule functions almost exclusively to provide "notice" to the defendant of the general type of litigation involved, the Maryland pleading rule
imposes a greater burden on the plaintiff to define the issues with the pleadings. LYNCH &
BOURNE, supra note 121, § 6.1, at 343-45.
Because the federal rules allow for more generality in pleading the elements of a
claim, the disposition of Jenkins's case would have been very different had he been able to
plead it in federal court. Had Jenkins had a federal claim based on either diversity or
federal jurisdiction, his complaint would almost certainly have been sufficient in federal
court.
180. See supra notes 122-142 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Anderson v. Meadowcroft, 339 Md. 218, 229, 661 A.2d 726, 731 (1995)
(refusing to consider the merits of the plaintiff's case for fraud because her complaint did
not allege facts sufficient to show that the defendant acted with "undue influence"); Read
Drug, 250 Md. at 418, 243 A.2d at 556 (dismissing the plaintiffs action for negligence
because she did not include facts in her complaint that suggested that the defendant had a
duty to warn or that the defendant's conduct proximately caused her injury).
182. See supra notes 98, 105-110 and accompanying text.
183. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 462, 601 A.2d 633, 653 (1992).
184. See Ellerin v. Fairfax Sav., F.S.B., 337 Md. 216, 241, 652 A.2d 1117, 1129 (1995)
(upholding the trial court's determination that the defendant had the requisite intent for
fraud, but remanding the case for a new trial on whether the defendant demonstrated the
intent necessary to allow the plaintiff to recover punitive damages).
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the Scott court was correct in concluding thatJenkins's amended complaint did not allege that Scott had the requisite intent for "actual
malice" simply because it described facts that would make Scott liable
to Jenkins for battery and false imprisonment.1 8 5
The court has also consistently maintained that the level of specificity required in alleging the cause of action may depend on the complexity of the factual situation.' 8 6 In other words, the plaintiff
generally needs to include more facts in the complaint in circumstances where the cause of action is more complicated. In interpreting this standard, some scholars have suggested that "in all but the
simplest traffic accident cases ...the pleader should probably err on
the side of providing greater detail with respect to the crucial elements of the cause of action which establish liability of the
defendant."'

187

This approach supports the court's holding in Scott. A cause of
action alleging punitive damages is more complicated than an intentional tort claim for only compensatory damages because of the additional requirement of "actual malice." Because "actual malice" is a
separate element of a more intricate cause of action, the Court of Appeals was justified in requiring that Jenkins's amended complaint
pleaded sufficient facts to warrant a finding that Scott was motivated
by a malicious intent. In this respect, the Scott decision was well supported by precedent. With regard to pleadings, Maryland law has provided that a complaint must include sufficient detail of all of the facts
to support each requisite cause of action. 88 With regard to punitive
damages, post-Zenobia Maryland law has mandated that punitive damages are appropriate only when the defendant's conduct demonstrates a maliciousness amounting to "actual malice." 8 9 These two
lines of precedent support Scott's holding that an action requesting
punitive damages must plead facts alleging that the defendant's motivation was "actual malice."
c. Scott: Completing the Picture of the Requisites for Punitive
Damages.-In its synthesis of pleadings and punitive-damages law, the
Scott court finished painting what had previously been a work in progress concerning the requirements that a plaintiff must satisfy to re185. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (describing the facts in Jenkins's
Amended Complaint for Damages that would warrant a finding that Scott was liable for
battery and false imprisonment).
186. See, e.g., Read Drug, 250 Md. at 413, 243 A.2d at 553.
187. See LYNCH & BOURNE, supra note 121, § 6.4(a), at 362.
188. See MD. R. 2-305.
189. See supra notes 105-118 and accompanying text.
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ceive a punitive-damage award. After Scott, it is clear that to receive
punitive damages a plaintiff must: (1) plead punitive damages specifically in the complaint, (2) allege facts sufficient to prove every element of the cause of action including "actual malice," and (3) prove
that the defendant acted with "actual malice" by a standard of "clear
and convincing evidence." While the third requirement was previously established,190 the court in Scott provided the former two elements and effectively completed the picture of how a plaintiff can
obtain an award of punitive damages in tort claims.
As a result, it is easy to understand why the court's decision in
Scott was sufficiently uncontroversial to be filed without dissenting or
concurring opinions. Indeed, all the members of the court endorsed
the opinion except for Chief Judge Bell, who concurred in judgment
only.19 1 Although Chief Judge Bell did not write an opinion explaining his reasoning for not joining the court's opinion in Scott, one can
imagine that his lack of endorsement in Scott results from his disagreement with the court's conclusion that punitive damages should be
awarded only when a defendant's conduct demonstrates "actual malice" as evidenced by a finding of "clear and convincing evidence." Indeed, Judge Bell dissented from the court's opinion in Zenobia and
argued that such a standard of conduct and proof should not be necessary for a plaintiff to receive a punitive-damage award.19 2 Therefore,
one can see why Judge Bell would be unwilling to join Scott, a case that
codifies Zenobia and its progeny by applying their holdings back to the
pleadings stage.
5. Conclusion.-In Scott v. Jenkins, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed many of its previous holdings. The court maintained that punitive damages could only be granted by a showing of malicious intent
or "actual malice." Moreover, the court once again indicated that a
pleading must allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and
that damages that do not flow naturally from the alleged action, such
as punitive damages, must be plead specially. In this sense, there is
little decided in Scott that is new. However, by considering the procedural requirements of pleadings in a case involving the substantive
190. The court held in Zenobia that in negligence and strict liability actions, the defendant's conduct must be demonstrated by "actual malice." The Ellerin court extended the
"actual malice" requirement to intentional torts. The Zenobia court also held that the standard of proof required for recovering punitive damages was "clear and convincing evidence." Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 469, 601 A.2d 633, 657 (1992).
191. Scott, 345 Md. at 38, 690 A.2d at 1008.
192. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 481-82, 601 A.2d at 663 (Bell, J., dissenting) (explaining that
the Zenobia holding "simply goes too far").
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requirements of punitive damages, Scott provided explicit guidance
for the future as to what is required in pleading a claim involving punitive damages.
ROBERT

A.

GAUMONT
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TORTS

Restricting the Scope of Negligent Entrustment by Exempting Donors
and Sellers from Liability

In Broadwater v. Dorsey,' the Court of Appeals considered for the
first time whether the parents of an adult child who sell or give their
child an automobile can be subject to liability for harm suffered by a
third party through the child's negligent use of that automobile, when
the parents were aware of the child's previous reckless conduct.2 The
court concluded that "parents who sell or give an automobile to an
adult child are not responsible for damages when they lack the power
to control the child or the automobile"' and that "the chattel [must
be] under the control of the supplier at the time of the accident."4 In
so ruling, the court cited support from Maryland case law, cases from
other jurisdictions, other secondary authority, and the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts.5 A number of these authorities considered the
specific issue debated in Broadwater whether the entrustor's negligence should be measured at the time of the accident or at the time of
the entrustment. Contrary to the decision in this case, nearly all other
courts and commentators have concluded that liability for negligent
entrustment should hinge on the initial act of entrustment and not
the entrustor's control of the instrumentality at the time of the accident.6 Thus, Maryland stands virtually alone among its sister states in
severely restricting the scope of negligent entrustment by exempting
donors and sellers from liability.
1. The Case.-Ronald L. Broadwater, Jr. "was, to say the least,
not a highly motivated person."7 He was born in June 1965; "[a]fter
graduating high school.

..

,

he attended three different colleges for

varying periods but, despite five or six years of effort, had not graduated from any of them and had not even earned sufficient credits for
an A.A. degree."' He continued to live at home or with friends and
1. 344 Md. 548, 688 A.2d 436 (1997).
2. Id. at 550, 688 A.2d at 437.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 558, 688 A.2d at 441.
5. Id. at 554-62, 688 A.2d at 439-43.
6. See infra notes 90-107, 210-215 and accompanying text.
7. Broadwater v. Dorsey, 107 Md. App. 58, 62, 666 A.2d 1282, 1284 (1995), rev'd, 344
Md. 548, 688 A.2d 436 (1997).
8. Id Many of the facts regarding Ronald are uncertain. The intermediate appellate
court gave "scant attention" to the evidence supporting the defense because the jury had
implicitly rejected it at trial. Id. The intermediate court noted that "[t]his is particularly
important in this case [because] [m]ost of the evidence presented in their defense came
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"was almost totally supported by his parents."9 Although he worked
part-time for his father for a period of time, he never held a steady
10
job.
In 1980, at age 15, Ronald was involved in a motorcycle accident,
and his father was later sued for having negligently entrusted the motorcycle to his son."' By October 1989, Ronald had accumulated
seven citations for failing to obey traffic signals or speeding, resulting
in ten points on his driving record.1 2 In October 1990, Ronald was
involved in another accident in which he ran into a concrete bridge. 3
His mother paid a number of the fines for these violations, and she
retained an attorney to represent him on one or more of these
14
occasions.
In September 1991, Dr. and Mrs. Broadwater filed a petition with
the District Court for Baltimore County for an emergency evaluation
of Ronald because they believed he had a drug problem.1 5 In their
petition, they noted that Ronald had a history of drug abuse dating
back to 1980, and they implied that between 1989 and 1991 he had
been taking cocaine intravenously in both arms. 6 The court granted

from the testimony of Dr. and Mrs. Broadwater, who were called by the plaintiff and who
were very reluctant witnesses." Id. at 62 n.2, 666 A.2d at 1284 n.2. The court further noted
that Dr. Broadwater "seemed confused even as to when his son was born; they could not
agree on what year he graduated high school; and they both seemed to have no knowledge
of where he lived, what his telephone number was, how to reach him, or what he did." Id.
9. Id at 63, 666 A.2d at 1284. For a brief period, Ronald lived in an apartment paid
for by his parents while he was attending college. Id. at 62-63, 666 A.2d at 1284.
10. Id. at 63, 666 A.2d at 1284.
11. Id, 666 A.2d at 1285. "The case was apparently settled." Id.
12. Id.,
666 A.2d at 1284.
13. Id, 666 A.2d at 1285.
14. Id., 666 A.2d at 1284-85. As a result of these various accidents and traffic violations,
State Farm, the Broadwaters' insurance company, informed Dr. and Mrs. Broadwater that
it was unwilling to renew the insurance on their five other vehicles unless they excluded
Ronald from their policy. Id., 666 A.2d at 1285. The Broadwaters initially protested State
Farm's decision, but finally accepted the terms and signed an agreement in August 1991
that excluded Ronald from coverage. Id.
15. Id., 666 A.2d at 1285. It was also alleged that during the month of September,
Ronald's mother filed charges against her son for the "unauthorized taking" of her Mercedes and that one week later, she filed charges against him for the "theft" of a 1989 Ford
and a jet ski, as well as for assault and battery. Brief for Respondents at 5, Broadwater v.
Dorsey, 344 Md. 548, 688 A.2d 436 (1997) (No. 6). At trial, however, Mrs. Broadwater
testified that she could not recall whether these charges had been filed. Broadwater, 107
Md. App. at 64, 666 A.2d at 1285.
16. Broadwater, 107 Md. App. at 63, 666 A.2d at 1285.
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the petition, and Ronald was committed
for evaluation, remaining
17
hospitalized for four to six weeks.
In December 1991, Ronald's mother purchased a 1982 Mazda
RX7 sports car and gave the vehicle to her son about two months
later.' 8 Ronald subsequently retitled the vehicle in his own name. 19
Significantly, before Mrs. Broadwater gave him the car, Ronald had
received three additional speeding tickets. 2° The Broadwaters also
paid for Ronald's insurance with the Maryland Automobile Insurance
Fund, enabling him to carry the minimum required insurance
coverage.21
On October 2, 1992, eight months after having received the car
from his mother, Ronald drove his car across the center line of Falls
Road in Baltimore County and collided head-on into a car driven by
Matilda Dorsey, causing her serious injuries. 2 2 Dorsey and her husband brought suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, alleging
that Dr. and Mrs. Broadwater had
negligently entrusted the automobile to Ronald, Jr., their
adult son, by purchasing the vehicle and giving it to Ronald,
Jr., knowing at the time they gave the vehicle to Ronald, Jr. it
was likely, because of his driving record and drug abuse
problems, that he would drive the vehicle recklessly and pose
an unreasonable risk of physical harm to others.2 3
In response to this suit, the Broadwaters filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that they "had no power to control the
use of the vehicle at the time of the accident, and.., lacked sufficient
knowledge to put them on notice that their son posed an unreasonable risk of harm to others. ' 24 The circuit court denied their motion
and, following trial, entered judgment on ajury verdict in favor of the
17. I& at 64, 666 A.2d at 1285. The record is unclear as to the length of Ronald's
hospitalization. See Brief for Respondents at 5-6, Broadwater (No. 6); Brief of Appellants at
4, Broadwater v. Dorsey, 344 Md. 548, 688 A.2d 436 (1997) (No. 6).
18. Broadwater,107 Md. App. at 64, 666 A.2d at 1285.
19. Id. On February 2, 1993, four months after the accident in question and exactly
one year after having received the car from his mother, Ronald signed an "Agreement of
repayment," in which he promised to repay his parents for the car when he obtained his
college degree. Id. However, as of July 1994, no payments had been made on that promise. Id at 65, 666 A.2d at 1285.
20. Id. at 64, 666 A.2d at 1285.
21. Id.
22. Broadwater, 344 Md. at 550, 688 A.2d at 437.
23. Id, at 551, 688 A.2d at 437. The complaint also included a claim against Ronald,
alleging that he had "breached his duty to drive his vehicle in a safe, reasonable, and nonnegligent manner." Id. at 550, 688 A.2d at 437.
24. Id at 551, 688 A.2d at 437.
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plaintiffs.2" The Broadwaters appealed to the Court of Special Appeals,2 6 contending that the trial court had erred in finding that they
could be liable on a theory of negligent entrustment because "a sine
qua non for liability is the ability to prohibit the use of the chattel."27
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the jury verdict.2" The
court stated that because the tort is founded upon an entrustmentthe supply of a chattel by the defendant to another person-control
must be viewed in terms of whether the defendant had a choice to
supply the chattel or not. 29 The court concluded that this "negligence
must, of necessity, be viewed as of the time of the entrustment, not as
of the time the entrustee improperly uses the entrusted chattel."" °
As support for its position, the Court of Special Appeals stated:
A person who negligently places a chattel in the hands
of another under the circumstances stated in Restatement
§ 390 cannot escape liability by deliberately putting it beyond
his power to redress that negligence-by effectively relinquishing all practical ability thereafter to prohibit or limit
the use of the chattel by the entrustee. It would be wholly
inconsistent with the public policy underlying the tort to regard such an act as providing a greater advantage to the supplier than if he retained the power of control but declined to
exercise it.31

The court suggested that were it to hold otherwise, the effect would be
to provide relief for one who gives a chattel to another with dangerous
propensities and relinquishes control over it, while imposing liability
on one who retains some control over the chattel but neglects to exercise that control.32 The court concluded that "the continuing ability
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Broadwater, 107 Md. App. at 61, 67, 666 A.2d at 1284, 1287.
28. Id. at 61, 666 A.2d at 1284.
29. Id. at 67, 666 A.2d at 1287.
30. Id. The court relied heavily on the Court of Appeals's decision in Kahlenberg v.
Goldstein, 290 Md. 477, 431 A.2d 76 (1981), refusing to accept the Broadwaters' contention
that Kahlenbergwasdistinguishable because of the entrustee's status as a minor in that case.
Broadwater, 107 Md. App. at 68-69, 666 A.2d at 1287.
31. Broadwater, 107 Md. App. at 69, 666 A.2d at 1287-88.
32. Id. The court also addressed the knowledge requirement of the tort. The
Broadwaters contended that as long as the State was content to allow Ronald to drive, then
his parents should not be liable for providing him the means to do so. Id. at 70-71, 666
A.2d at 1288. They argued that they should be allowed to rely on the fact that the State
Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) had not suspended or revoked Ronald's license as
evidence that they did not have the requisite knowledge of Ronald's dangerous driving
habits. Id at 70, 666 A.2d at 1288. The court responded that "[t]he exercise or nonexercise of that authority has no direct bearing, however, on the civil liability of persons for
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to control the chattel is not required for a primafaciecase of negligent
entrustment; 3 control need only exist at the time of the
entrustment.

3

In his dissent, Judge Cathell disagreed with the majority on the
scope and application of the doctrine of negligent entrustment.3 4 He
suggested that the better position for the court to adopt would be a
more limited application of the doctrine that would, "in a sales context, require the transferor to retain the legal right to control the in35
strumentality or have a legal responsibility to control the buyer."
Judge Cathell reasoned that otherwise, liability for negligent entrustment would be too expansive and would subject all vendors to liability
long after the vendor had relinquished control over the chattel. 6
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider "whether the
parents of an adult child, who with knowledge of their child's incompetence, give or sell that child an automobile are to be considered
'suppliers' for purposes of § 390 of the Restatement," 37 and "whether
the supplier's control over the chattel should be measured at the time
of the 'entrustment' or at the time of the negligent act of the 'entrustee' resulting in injury."3 "
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Development of the Doctrine of Negligent Entrustment in Maryland.-The Court of Appeals adopted the doctrine of negligent en-,
trustment into the common law of Maryland in its 1934 decision in
Rounds v. Phillips.3 91 In Rounds, the plaintiff sued the father of a minor
child who, driving a car purchased by his parents, collided with a car
driven by Robert Lee Rounds. 4' Rounds died as a result of injuries he
received in the car crash.4" The plaintiff, Rounds's mother and administratrix of his estate, alleged that the defendant's son drove negligently and recklessly, causing the death of Rounds.4 2 The plaintiff
negligent entrustment" because the MVA "may not be aware of all of the circumstances
known to the [parent and] supplier" of the vehicle. Id. at 71, 666 A.2d at 1288-89.
33. Broadwater, 344 Md. at 555, 688 A.2d at 439 (citing Broadwater, 107 Md. App. at 67,
666 A.2d at 1287).
34. Broadwater, 107 Md. App. at 74-90, 666 A.2d at 1290-98 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 75, 666 A.2d at 1291.
36. Id. at 87, 666 A.2d at 1296-97. Judge Cathell declined to discuss the knowledge
requirement or acknowledge the limitations it already imposes on the doctrine.
37. Broadwater, 344 Md. at 554, 688 A.2d at 439.
38. Id. at 555, 688 A.2d at 439.
39. 166 Md. 151, 166, 170 A. 532, 538 (1934).
40. Id. at 158, 170 A. at 534.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 153, 170 A. at 532-33.
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argued that the defendant should be held liable for his son's conduct
because he gave his son the car knowing of his reckless propensities,
and took no action to prohibit his son from using the automobile.4"
The theory of liability advanced by the plaintiff did not rest on
vicarious liability or negligence imputed to the parents as owners of
the vehicle.4 4 Rather, the theory of liability advanced was based solely
on the primary negligence of the defendant father in giving the car to
his son and allowing him to continue driving it when he knew, at the
time of the gift, of the son's recklessness and incompetence as a
driver.4"
In an effort to determine whether the use of the car by the minor
son would likely create an unreasonable risk of danger to other persons, the court looked to section 260 of the tentative draft of the Restatement of the Law of Tonts,46 which states:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for use of another whom the supplier knows or from facts
known to him should know to be likely because of his youth,
inexperience or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to himself and others
whom the supplier should expect to share in, or be in the
vicinity of its use, is subject to liability for bodily harm caused
thereby to them.4 7
In considering this new theory of liability advanced by the plaintiff,
the court thoroughly examined pertinent case law in other jurisdictions "in order to demonstrate the authority upon which the quotation from the Restatement of the Law of Torts is founded."4" These cases
generally held that while automobiles are not dangerous instrumentalities per se, they have the ability to be dangerous when used by

43. Id. at 159-60, 170 A. at 535. The minor son had previously received a speeding
ticket and had been convicted of reckless driving and driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 153-54, 170 A. at 533. As a result, his driver's license was suspended for a period
of time. Id.
44. Id. at 160, 170 A. at 535.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 160-61, 170 A. at 535.
47. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 260 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1930).

Section

260 of the Restatement (Tentative Draft) later became section 390 of the Restatement of the
Law of Torts and the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
LAw OF TORTS § 390 (1964); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 390 (1934).

The lan-

guage of these two provisions is substantially the same. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
48. Rounds, 166 Md. at 166, 170 A. at 538.
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incompetent persons.49 Thus, an owner of an automobile has a duty
to withhold his consent and refrain from entrusting his car to another
whom he knows to be either inexperienced or incompetent to drive it
without bringing harm to others.5" The court concluded that the
principle expressed in the Restatement constituted "a fair and accurate
statement of the rule, deduced from opinions representing the great
weight of authority in this country."5 1
The court in Rounds defined the scope of liability to include not
only owners of automobiles or other vehicles, but also those with any
right to permit or prohibit the use of a vehicle.5 2 The defendant father in Rounds had argued that he should escape liability because the
car was titled in his wife's name at the time of the accident, rather
than in his own name.5" The court found this distinction insufficient
to relieve him from liability, reasoning that "the father, as the controlling head of the family, had the authority and power to permit the use
by the son of the mother's automobile, or to prohibit it."5 4 Because
his son was a minor, the father was deemed to have had the power to
control his son's activities, including his use of the car, even if he did
not have the power to control the car itself.5 The court therefore
concluded that it "[did] not think that the title to the automobile...
is conclusive, but that the principle applies not only to the owner of
an automobile, but to anyone who has the right to permit and the
power to prohibit the use thereof."5 6 The court did not specify when
the power to permit or prohibit must be exercised, but given that the

49. It-at 161-66, 170 A. at 535-37; see, e.g., Rocca v. Steinmetz, 214 P. 257, 260 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1923) (holding that consideration for the safety of others requires one to
withhold her consent and refrain from allowing another who is reckless or careless to use
an automobile); Tyree v. Tudor, 111 S.E. 714, 716 (N.C. 1922) (holding that a parent who
entrusted an automobile to his 16-year-old son, knowing his reckless character, could be
held liable); Elliot v. Harding, 140 N.E. 338, 339 (Ohio 1923) (holding that an automobile
may become a dangerous instrumentality when one entrusts its use to another who is unskilled or inexperienced); Raub v. Donn, 98 A. 861, 862 (Pa. 1916) (holding that one has a
duty to ensure that his automobile is not operated by a careless, reckless person); Allen v.
Bland, 168 S.W. 35, 36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914, writ ref'd) (holding that a parent who permitted his 11-year-old son to drive an automobile, knowing the boy was reckless, careless, and
inexperienced, could be held liable).
50. Rounds, 166 Md. at 166, 170 A. at 538.
51. Id. The court noted that "[o]f course, there are, and must be, limitations upon the
application of the rule," but went no further in illuminating what those limitations might
be. Id. at 166-67, 170 A. at 538.
52. Id. at 168, 170 A. at 538.
53. Id. at 167, 170 A. at 538.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 168, 170 A. at 538.
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son was still a minor, William Rounds, Sr., would have had continuing
control over his son and the car.57
For the next fifty years, Maryland appellate courts periodically revisited the doctrine of negligent entrustment with respect to
automobiles and other motor vehicles. However, these courts considered the doctrine in the context of a loan or bailment of a vehicle, as
opposed to a gift as in Rounds.58 Thus, ownership and continuing
control of the chattel itself was directly maintained and did not present an issue for decision in these cases.59
In 1981, almost fifty years after the Rounds decision, the Court of
Appeals was confronted with a negligent entrustment claim strikingly
57. A year later, the court again reviewed the Rounds case on appeal from a directed
verdict in favor of the defendants. Rounds v. Phillips, 168 Md. 120, 177 A. 174 (1935).
The issue on appeal was whether sufficient evidence existed to prove that the parents knew
of their son's recklessness when they entrusted him with the car. Id. at 121, 177 A. at 174.
Although the parents admitted that they knew that their son's license had been revoked,
they apparently made no effort to ascertain whether he could be safely entrusted with a
renewal of his driving privileges. Id. at 126, 177 A. at 176. The court stated that the renewal of his license, "is not a sufficient ground for relieving the defendants of their duty to
restrict their son in the use of the automobile." Id. The court asserted that the revocation
of his license should have prompted an investigation by the parents as to whether their son
was qualified to drive. Id/. Thus, the court found that the facts implied that the parents
should have known of the unreasonable risk involved in their son's use of the car and were
thus not entitled to a directed verdict in their favor. Id. at 126-27, 177 A. at 176-77.
58. Many of these cases involved the entrustment of a vehicle by an employer to an
employee, where the employer, as owner of the vehicle, was charged with negligently permitting an employee to use the vehicle. See, e.g., Morrell v. Williams, 279 Md. 497, 504, 366
A.2d 1040, 1043-44 (1976) (concluding that an employer could not be liable for negligent
entrustment because he was unaware that the employee did not have a valid driver's license or that the employee's use of the company truck would involve any unreasonable risk
of physical harm); Curley v. General Valet Serv., 270 Md. 248, 266, 311 A.2d 231, 240-41
(1973) (concluding that the employer entrusted the company van to its employee seven
days a week when the employer knew that the employee's habitual failure to heed traffic
signals rendered him an incompetent driver who posed an unreasonable risk of physical
harm to others); Snowhite v. State ex rel. Tennant, 243 Md. 291, 300, 221 A.2d 342, 347
(1966) (concluding that the employer was liable for allowing his employee to drive the
company gasoline tank truck and had either actual or constructive notice that the employee was unfit to drive); Houlihan v. McCall, 197 Md. 130, 140, 78 A.2d 661, 666 (1951)
(concluding that the employer could not be held liable because he had no actual or constructive knowledge of his employee's driving record); Morris v. Weddington, 74 Md. App.
650, 658-59, 539 A.2d 1145, 1149 (1988) (holding that the owners of a van were liable
because they failed to prohibit their adult son-in-law's use of their van when they knew or
should have known the full extent of his driving habits), rev'd on othergrounds, 320 Md. 674,
579 A.2d 762 (1990).
59. The bailor's or lessor's direct control of the chattel in bailment cases is similar to
the parent's indirect control over the chattel, through control of the user of the chattel, in
the parent/minor-child context. Because the bailor, like the parent of a minor child, has a
fight to control the chattel or its use, both at the time of the initial entrustment and the
time of the accident, the courts would not have had to determine the point in time that the
negligent act by the entrustor occurred.
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similar to the one in Rounds. In Kahlenberg v. Goldstein,6° Bernard
Goldstein had purchased an automobile for his son, Lawrence, as a
gift.6 1 Prior to the purchase of the car, Lawrence, a minor, 62 had received a number of moving violations and his driver's license had
been revoked. 61 Just days after receiving the car from his father, Lawrence was involved in a single-car accident that injured the plaintiff,
Lynn Kahlenberg, a passenger in the car.6 4
As a result of the accident, Kahlenberg brought suit "on the the65
ory that [Bernard] was negligent in supplying the vehicle to his son,"
and a jury ultimately found Bernard Goldstein liable for negligently
entrusting the car to Lawrence. 66 Bernard appealed, contending first,
that he had not supplied the car to Lawrence, and second, that he had
no power to permit or prohibit the vehicle's use by Lawrence.6 7 The
Court of Appeals accepted the plaintiff's theory, holding that liability
can be imposed "where a gift of an automobile is made to a member
of the donor's immediate family."6 8 In so ruling the court reasoned
that
the principal features of the tort lie in the knowledge of the
supplier concerning the dangerous propensities of the entrustee and in the foreseeability of harm. If one who gives an
automobile to a member of his immediate family has the requisite knowledge, and the other elements of the tort are satisfied, we can see no reason for denying liability exclusively on
the basis that title is transferred in addition to possession.6"
60. 290 Md. 477, 431 A.2d 76 (1981).
61. Id. at 485, 431 A.2d at 81. At trial, there was conflicting testimony as to whether
Lawrence had purchased the car with his own funds or whether Bernard had purchased
the car for Lawrence as a gift. Id. at 484, 431 A.2d at 81. The Court of Appeals found that
the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, indicated that Bernard
had purchased the car for Lawrence as a gift. Id. at 484-85, 431 A.2d at 81.
62. At the time of the accident, December 18, 1971, Lawrence was 20 years old. Id. at
479, 431 A.2d at 78. The age of majority was not lowered to 18 years until 1973. Id. at 479
n.1, 431 A.2d at 78 n.1.
63. Id. at 482, 431 A.2d at 80. In order for Lawrence to have his license reinstated,
Bernard endorsed his applications, certifying that he was fully aware of why Lawrence's
driving privileges were revoked. Id. Lawrence's license was reinstated in April 1970, and
he received an additional four violations between 1970 and 1971. Id. at 482-83, 431 A.2d at
80.
64. Id. at 479, 484, 431 A.2d at 78, 80-81.
65. Id. at 480, 431 A.2d at 78.
66. Id. at 480-81, 431 A.2d at 78. The Court of Special Appeals reversed on the ground
that the plaintiff had assumed the risk as a matter of law. Id.
67. Id. at 484-85, 431 A.2d at 81.
68. Id. at 489, 431 A.2d at 83.
69. Id. at 488, 431 A.2d at 83.
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Thus, the court made no distinction between liability premised on the
transfer of ownership of the car, as with a gift or a sale, and liability
premised on the transfer of possession. The court was careful to qualify its holding, noting that "[t] he holding in this case goes no further
than to recognize that the principle expressed in § 390 [of the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts] applies where a gift of an automobile
is made to a member of the donor's immediate family."7"
Addressing whether Bernard had the right to permit or prohibit
the use of the vehicle by Lawrence, the court found that
since a donor would ordinarily relinquish any right to permit
and power to prohibit the use of the chattel upon its delivery
to the donee .... the right to permit and the power to pro-

hibit the use of the chattel, after the transfer and at the time
of the injury,
would not ordinarily be a sine qua non of
71
liability.
The court further explained that "[t]he negligence of the supplier
72
consists of furnishing the chattel with the requisite knowledge."
Thus, the court found that at the time Bernard supplied the vehicle to
Lawrence, "he had the requisite knowledge of Lawrence's propensities . . . [and] the [p]laintiff was not required to go further and

demonstrate that Bernard retained, and should have exercised, a
power to prohibit any use by Lawrence of the completed gift."7 3
Ten years later, in Neale v. Wright,"4 the court considered whether
the joint ownership of an automobile, purchased together by a husband and wife, could form the basis for negligent entrustment by the
wife when the husband negligently used the vehicle, colliding with
and injuring the plaintiffs. 75 The wife had joined with her husband in
purchasing and obtaining registration for the vehicle even though she
was aware that he had been excluded from their insurance policy
under the named driver exclusion provision because of his driving
habits.

76

Looking to the precedent set forth in Rounds and Kahlenberg,the
Court of Appeals determined that in order for the wife to have sup-

plied the car to her husband, thereby subjecting herself to liability for
negligent entrustment, she must have had the power to permit or pro70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 489, 431 A.2d at 83.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 491, 431 A.2d at 84.
322 Md. 8,585 A.2d 196 (1991).
Id. at 10, 585 A.2d at 197.
Id. at 13-15, 585 A.2d at 198-99.
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hibit her husband from using the vehicle.7 7 Such power "could emanate from a superior right to control the operation of the car or from
a special relationship between the 'entrustor' and the driver, such as a
parent-child relationship. '78 The court concluded that because the
wife never had any superior rights to the car, she did not have the
power to permit or prohibit her husband from using it. 79 Consequently, the wife was not liable for negligent entrustment because she
could not have supplied the car to her husband.8"
The doctrine of negligent entrustment, as developed by Maryland
courts prior to Broadwater, stood for the proposition that one who
owned or had a superior right to control a vehicle and provided that
vehicle to another person, whether by way of a loan or a gift, could be
held liable for that person's negligent use of the vehicle if the owner
or controller of the vehicle knew of the other person's incompetence
or knew that the other person was likely to use the vehicle in such a
way as to harm a third person.8 1
b. The Doctrineof Negligent Entrustment in OtherJurisdictions.Courts in other jurisdictions that recognize the doctrine of negligent
entrustment have generally focused their analysis on whether an actual entrustment of the vehicle occurred and whether the entrustor
had knowledge of the entrustee's dangerous propensities. In most
cases where liability was not imposed, the court was unable to find that
an entrustment had occurred-either the alleged entrustor did not
actually purchase the vehicle or she never had a superior right to control the vehicle.8" Without such control or ownership, there can be
no entrustment.
For example, in Lopez v. Langer,83 the Supreme Court of Idaho
found that the father of a nineteen-year-old son had not entrusted the
vehicle to his son.8 4 Despite the fact that the car was titled in the
77. Id. at 19, 585 A.2d at 201.
78. Id. (citation omitted).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 39-80 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 138-187 and accompanying text. In some cases, courts have refused
to impose liability because the plaintiff was unable to satisfy the knowledge requirement of
the tort. See, e.g., Mullins v. Harrell, 490 So. 2d 1338, 1340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the defendant had no "basis or suspicion to foresee that [the entrustee] was unreliable, dishonest or incompetent in any way"); Mejia v. Erwin, 726 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the passage of 11 years between the time the defendant parent first obtained knowledge of his son's recklessness and the time of the accident was
sufficient to preclude liability for negligent entrustment).
83. 761 P.2d 1225 (Idaho 1988).
84. Id. at 1228.
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father's name at the time of the accident, the car had been purchased
with the son's own money and the father had never had any control
over the car.8 5 Because the father neither owned the car nor had control over it, there was no entrustment and, thus, the father could not
be liable for the son's negligent driving.86 In Peterson v. Halsted,8" the
Colorado Supreme Court refused to impose liability on the parents of
a twenty-six-year-old daughter because the parents were not suppliers
of the vehicle.8 8 The mere co-signing of a loan by the father, which
facilitated the daughter's purchase of the vehicle, was not sufficient to
89
constitute an entrustment.

Only a handful of cases have considered the narrow issue decided
in Broadwater whether control over the vehicle must exist at the time
of the entrustee's negligent act in order to impose liability on the entrustor. Of those that have specifically considered the issue, nearly all
have found that control at the time of the accident is not required-it
is the entrustment itself that constitutes the negligent act. For example, in Green v. Texas Electrical Wholesalers, Inc.,9 ° an employer permitted an employee to use a company vehicle to make a delivery, and the
employee, while using the vehicle outside the scope of his employment, collided with another car, causing injury to its passenger. 9 The
Texas Court of Appeals found that it was error to have instructed the
jury that the controlling event of the entrustment was the time of the
accident.9 2 The court concluded that "[t] he controlling event of the
case was the entrustment of the vehicle to [the employee] the day
before the accident, when he was instructed to carry out an assignment for his employer." 3
Similarly, in Huggins v. Ti-County Bonding Co.,94 the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals considered whether exclusionary language
in a homeowner's insurance policy foreclosed coverage for a negligent entrustment action brought against a father who loaned a car to
his eighteen-year-old son. In answering this question, the court found
that
85. Id. at 1226; see also infra note 175.
86. Lopez, 761 P.2d at 1229.
87. 829 P.2d 373 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
88. Id. at 377.
89. Id. at 377-78; see also Zedella v. Gibson, 650 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (Ill.
1995) (holding
that a father who co-signed a loan neither gave nor sold the car to his son and thus there
was no entrustment).

90. 651 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982, writ dism'd by agr.).
91. Id. at 5-6.
92. Id. at 7.

93. Id.
94. 337 S.E.2d 12 (W. Va. 1985).
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the critical element ...is the initial improper loaning of the

vehicle-improper in the sense that it is given to a person
who is known to be likely to cause an unreasonable risk of
harm to others....

Thus, the driver's negligent operation is

not the critical factor in a negligent entrustment action,
although it is necessary to complete the causal connection
between the original negligent act (the entrustment) and
the ultimate injury.95
In Vince v. Wilson," a passenger who was seriously injured in an
automobile accident brought suit against the driver's relative and
against the seller of the vehicle.9 7 The Vermont Supreme Court rejected the line of cases cited by the defendant that limited recovery to
situations in which the defendant is the owner or has the right to control the car entrusted.9" The court noted that such decisions have
been "severely criticized."99 The court further explained that "' [i] t is
the negligent entrusting which creates the unreasonable risk; and this
is none the less when the goods are conveyed."' 1 °° The court concluded that "[t]he key factor is that '[t]he negligent entrustment theory requires a showing that the entrustor knew or should have known
some reason why entrusting the item to another was foolish or
negligent. "'101

In Pugmire Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Sorrells,102 children brought a
wrongful death action for the death of their father against an automobile dealer whom they alleged sold a vehicle to a drunken driver who
later collided with the car driven by the father.1 3 The Georgia Court
of Appeals refused to impose liability on the auto dealer because the
plaintiffs failed to present evidence sufficient to show that the dealer
95. Id,at 17 (citations omitted).
96. 561 A.2d 103 (Vt. 1989).
97. Id. at 103.
98. Id. at 104-05.
99. Id. at 105 (citing PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 104, at 718 (5th ed.
1984)); see, e.g., C. Gibson Downing, Note, 43 Ky. L.J. 178, 183 (1954) ("[M]ere passing of
title does not change the character of the negligence of the defendant, and ... the law
should not operate to relieve him of his responsibility for the natural and probable conse-

quences of his own negligent act."); J.P. Leonard, Recent Decision, 32 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
237, 239 (1954) ("[L]iability in these cases arises not from ownership or agency but from
the combined negligence of the owner in entrusting the vehicle to the incompetent driver

and of the driver in carelessly operating the same.").
100. Vince, 561 A.2d at 105 (quoting PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs, supra

note 99, § 104, at 718).
101. Id. (quoting Mullins v. Harrell, 490 So. 2d 1338, 1340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
102. 236 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977).
103. Id. at 114.
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knew that the driver was drunk. 10 4 In an addendum to the majority
opinion,Judge Deen emphasized that negligent entrustment may be a
viable theory of recovery against a seller with actual knowledge of the
buyer's incompetence existing at the time of the sale.'
Moreover,
Judge Deen stated "there is no requirement that the defendant have
ownership at the time of the driver's negligence so long as he had
ownership or control at the time he himself was negligent in turning
the vehicle over to a driver actually known to be incompetent."'10 6
Judge Deen therefore concluded that as long as the seller has actual
knowledge of a buyer's incompetence at the time of the sale, the seller
may be liable for the buyer's subsequent negligent act that causes
harm.10 7 Thus, in other jurisdictions, donors and sellers alike are liable for negligent entrustment when the knowledge requirement is satisfied and a causal connection is established between the entrustor's
negligent act of supplying a vehicle and the entrustee's negligent
driving.
c. The Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts.-Courts
in Maryland and other jurisdictions have consistently looked to the
Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts, sections 390 and 308, for guidance on the principles that form the doctrine of negligent entrustment. 10 8 Section 390 of the Restatement provides that:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has
reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the
supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its
use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to
them.109

Comment a to section 390 explains that the rule "determines the liability of one who supplies a chattel for another to use," regardless of
whether it is used for the supplier's or user's interests.1 10 Comment a
further provides that "[t] he rule stated applies to anyone who supplies
104. Id. at 114-15.
105. Id at 116.
106. Id,
107. Id.; see alsoJohnson v. Casetta, 17 Cal. Rptr. 81, 82 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Mullins v.
Harrell, 490 So. 2d 1338, 1340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
108. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text; infra notes 139, 173, 192 and accompanying text.
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 390 (1964).
110. Id. § 390 cmt. a.
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a chattel for the use of another. It applies to sellers, lessors, donors or
lenders, and to all kinds of bailors." 111
Comment b to section 390 explains that the rule deals with supplying a chattel to a person incompetent to use it safely, and notes
that "the actor may not assume that human beings will conduct themselves properly if the facts which are known or should be known to
him should make him realize that they are unlikely to do so." 1 1 2 Four
of the illustrations following Comment b provide examples of agency,
bailment, and rental situations that constitute negligent entrustment,
while the remaining two illustrations provide examples of negligent
entrustment concerning donors and sellers.11 3 Illustration 6 provides
the most pertinent example of the negligent entrustment at issue in
Broadwater
A sells or gives an automobile to B, his adult son, knowing
that B is an epileptic, but that B nevertheless intends to drive
the car. While B is driving he suffers an epileptic seizure,
loses control of the car, and injures C. A is subject to liability
to C.

1 14

Section 390 makes no explicit distinction between those who retain
control and those who relinquish control of the chattel after entrustment to the user. 115
Section 308 of the Restatement is closely related to the principles of
law expressed in section 390. Comment b to section 390, in fact, notes
that the rule stated in section 390 is a "special application" of the rule
stated in section 308.116 Section 308 of the Restatement (Second) of the
Law of Torts provides that:
It is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to
engage in an activity which is under the control of the actor,
if the actor knows or should know that such person intends
or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself in the activity in such a manner
as to create an unreasonable risk of
1 17
harm to others.

Comment a to section 308 explains that "[t] he words 'under the control of the actor' . . . indicate that the third person is entitled to pos-

sess or use the thing ... only by the consent of the actor, and that the
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

I&
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.

§ 390 cmt. b.
§
§
§
§

390 cmt. b, illus. 6.
390.
390 cmt. b.
308.
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actor has reason to believe that by withholding consent he can prevent the third person from using the thing."" 8 The Restatement makes
no explicit mention in section 308 of a requirement that the chattel
be "under the control of the actor" at the time the chattel is misused
by the entrustee." 9
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Court of Appeals granted certiorari in Broadwaterto consider "whether the parents of an adult child
who sell or who make a gift of an automobile to their adult child, with
knowledge of the child's reckless conduct, may be held answerable in
damages to a third person subsequently injured by the son's negligent
operation of the automobile."12 0 In order to answer this question, the
court had to determine whether a parent must have control over
either the vehicle or the child at the time of the accident.1 21 The
court concluded that "parents who sell or give an automobile to an
adult child are not responsible for damages when they lack the power
to control the child or the automobile.' 2 2
In reaching its decision, the court examined the doctrine of negligent entrustment as stated in the Restatement (Second) of the Law of
Torts section 390 and adopted in Maryland. 23 The court first questioned whether the parents in this case should be considered "suppliers" for purposes of section 390 of the Restatement.12 4 The court noted
' 25
that "a 'supplier' . . . must have the right to control the chattel."'
Significantly, the court decided that as a prerequisite to imposing liability under the doctrine of negligent entrustment, the parents must
have had control over the vehicle at the time of the negligent act, not
126
merely at the time of the entrustment.
In discussing why control of the vehicle must be maintained at
the time of the accident, the court looked to sections 390 and 308 of
the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts, its own previous decisions in
27
Rounds, Kahlenberg, and Neale, and decisions in other jurisdictions.
The court acknowledged that it had adopted the doctrine of negligent
entrustment in Rounds, as set forth in section 390 of the Restatement,
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id § 308 cmt. a.
Id § 308.
344 Md. at 550, 688 A.2d at 437.
Id
Id
See id. at 554, 688 A.2d at 439.

124. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 390).

125. Id at 554-55, 688 A.2d at 439.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 557-62, 688 A.2d at 440-43.
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and noted that section 390 is a "special application" of section 308.128
As such, the court reasoned that the two sections are in pari materia
and should be read together. 129 The court further deduced that when
read together, "[section] 308's reference to a 'thing or . . . activity

which is under the control of the actor' limits § 390's broad reference
to 'one who supplies ...

a chattel for the use of another.""'13

Based

on this limitation, the court concluded that the doctrine is generally
limited to situations in which the supplier has a right to control the
13 1
chattel at the time of the accident.
The court noted that in Rounds it established that "the basis for
liability under the doctrine of negligent entrustment is the power to
permit and prohibit the use of the entrusted chattel. 13 2 The court
also cited Neale, in which it held that a co-owner of a vehicle "lacks the
right to control the use of the co-owned property" and thus is not
liable for damages caused by the other co-owner's negligent use of the
vehicle.

13 3

The respondents relied on Kahlenberg for the proposition that
"control at the time of the accident is not a prerequisite for liability
under the doctrine of negligent entrustment. "134 However, the Broadwater court distinguished Kahlenberg based on the fact that Kahlenberg
involved a minor child. 135 The court emphasized that "[t] he father in
Kahlenberg, like the father in Rounds, had the right to control his minor son's use of the car, even if he did not have the right to control
the car directly."'3 6 Accordingly, the court decided that it had "intended to limit the application of Kahlenbergto those cases involving a
parent/minor-child relationship." 3 7
The court cited additional support for its position from its "sister
states," which have "concluded that 'the paramount requirement for
liability... is whether or not the defendant had a right to control the
vehicle."" 3 The court noted that "[a]mong the states that have de128. Id. at 557, 688 A.2d at 440.
129. Id. at 558, 688 A.2d at 441.
130. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 308, 390 (1964)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 559, 688 A.2d at 441.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 560, 688 A.2d at 441.
135. Id., 688 A.2d at 442.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting Lopez v. Langer, 761 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Idaho 1988)); accord Alioto v.
Marnell, 520 N.E.2d 1284, 1286 (Mass. 1988) (finding that the plaintiff must show that the
defendant owned or controlled the vehicle and gave the driver permission to use it); Mills

v. Continental Parking Corp., 475 P.2d 673, 674 (Nev. 1970) (finding that the doctrine of
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cided cases involving a parent's sale or gift of an automobile to 13an9
adult child, nearly all reach the same conclusion as we do today."
The court found only one case that reached a contrary result. In
Golembe v. Blumberg, 4 ° "the appellate division of the Supreme Court
[of New York] held parents liable for having purchased a car for their
adult, epileptic son who then had an epileptic seizure while driving
the car, injuring the passengers." '4 ' The Broadwater court, however,
found Golembe unpersuasive, citing three subsequent cases' 4 2 that had
reached the opposite conclusion.1 4 3 Consequently, the Court of Appeals found that the authority of the Golembe holding had been completely undermined.1 4 4
Finally, the court turned to the facts of the instant case and reasoned that because a parent's legal responsibility ends when the child
reaches the age of majority, the legal right to control the actions of
negligent entrustment does not apply when the right to control the vehicle is absent); cf
Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352, 360 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (concluding that control by
the entrustor at the time the chattel is supplied is sufficient to impose liability).
139. Broadwater, 344 Md. at 561, 688 A.2d at 442; see Shipp v. Davis, 141 So. 366, 367
(Ala. Ct. App. 1932) (stating that one who is not the owner and is not in control of the
chattel is not liable for negligence with respect to such property); Peterson v. Halsted, 829
P.2d 373, 379 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (stating that "[c]ontinuing control, or its absence, is
a factor in determining the existence of a duty when time has elapsed between supplying a
vehicle to a user and the occurrence of an injury-causing accident"); Zedella v. Gibson, 650
N.E.2d 1000, 1004 (Ill. 1995) (finding that co-signing a loan to enable another to buy a car
did not constitute an entrustment); Tosh v. Scott, 472 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
(stating that "an essential element of a negligent entrustment cause of action is the defendant's ownership or right to control the vehicle"); Estes v. Gibson, 257 S.W.2d 604, 607-08
(Ky. 1953) (stating that the doctrine of negligent entrustment should not extend to a defendant who is not the owner of the vehicle nor to a person who had no control over the
vehicle); Fischer v. Lunt, 557 N.Y.S.2d 220, 221 (App. Div. 1990) (mem.) (finding that
because an adult son's use of a vehicle was not subject to his father's control, the father
could not be held liable for negligent entrustment); Rosenfeld v. Tisi, 542 N.Y.S.2d 762,
763 (App. Div. 1989) (mem.) (declining to find a negligent entrustment where the defendant mother neither owned the vehicle nor had any control over her daughter's driving);
Brown v. Harkleroad, 287 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955) (refusing to extend liability
for negligent entrustment in light of the "paucity" of authority).
140. 27 N.Y.S.2d 692 (App. Div. 1941) (mem.).
141. Broadwater, 344 Md. at 562, 688 A.2d at 442-43 (citing Golembe, 27 N.Y.S.2d at 692).
Given the factual similarities between Golembe and the Restatement's illustration 6, it is likely
that Golembe formed the basis for the Restatement illustration. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
142. 344 Md. at 562, 688 A.2d at 443 (citing Fischer,557 N.Y.S.2d at 221 (holding that a
father cannot be liable for negligent entrustment of a dangerous instrumentality to his
adult son); Rosenfeld, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 763 (holding that a mother who neither owned the
vehicle, nor had control over her daughter could not be liable for damages caused by the
daughter's negligent driving); Harkleroad,287 S.W.2d at 96 (refusing to impose liability due
to the scarcity of authority on the issue)); see infra notes 187-190 and accompanying text.
143. Broadwater, 344 Md. at 562, 688 A.2d at 443.
144. Id.
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the child ends as well. 14 5 Thus, the court ultimately found that because the Broadwaters had no legal right to control either their son or
the car at the time of the accident, they could not be held liable for
negligent entrustment.

146

4. Analysis.-In Broadwater v. Dorsey, the Court of Appeals held
that "the doctrine of negligent entrustment is generally limited to
those situations in which the chattel is under the control of the supplier at the time of the accident," and that "[o] rdinarily, without the
right to permit or prohibit use of the chattel at the time of the accident, an individual cannot be liable for negligent entrustment." 147
Such a temporal restriction is not supported by the precedent cited by
the Court of Appeals in Broadwater,or by case law from other jurisdictions. In effect, the court has exempted all donors and sellers from
liability for negligent entrustment in Maryland, a result that is contrary to the principles of law expressed in the Restatement (Second) of the
Law of Torts. Finally, the restriction is unwarranted because it further
limits a legal doctrine that is sufficiently confined by a demanding
"knowledge" requirement.
a. The Court's Reliance on Maryland Case Law.-The court
supported its holding in Broadwater by citing to several of its earlier
decisions, but failed to acknowledge their limited applicability in this
case. None of the prior Maryland cases specifically addressed whether
control by the entrustor at the time of entrustment would be sufficient
to trigger potential liability, or whether control continuing until the
moment of the accident would be required.1 4 The temporal requirement established by the court in Broadwater,mandating that the parents have the right to control the chattel at the time of the accident,
was not at issue in Rounds, nor did the Rounds court make any reference to when control must exist.1 49 Liability in Rounds was predicated
solely on the father's negligence in refusing to exercise parental au15 0
thority over his minor child, and thus the child's use of the vehicle.
Similarly, the court claimed support from Neale v. Wright.1 51 In
Neale, the court held that a co-owner of an automobile may not be
145. Id. at 562-63, 688 A.2d at 443.
146. Id. at 563, 688 A.2d at 443.
147. Id. at 558, 688 A.2d at 441.
148. See supra notes 39-81 and accompanying text.
149. See Broadwater,344 Md. at 558-59, 688 A.2d at 441.
150. Rounds v. Phillips, 166 Md. 151, 168, 170 A. 532, 538 (1934).
151. Broadwater,344 Md. at 559, 688 A.2d at 441 (citing Neale v. Wright, 322 Md. 8, 585
A.2d 196 (1991)).
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found liable for the other co-owner's negligent use of the automobile
when one co-owner lacks the exclusive right to control either the
other co-owner or the other co-owner's use of the automobile. 15 2 The
wife, as a co-owner of the car with her husband, never had exclusive
ownership of the car, nor did she ever have a superior right to control
the car.' 5 3 Without the existence of a superior right to control the
car, there can be no entrustment under any definition of the rule.
Thus, the Neale court could never have reached the issue of when control must be exercised.
Likewise in Snowhite v. State ex rel. Tennant,15 4 there was no need
to consider whether the negligence of the entrustor should be measured at the time of the entrustment or the time of the accident.
Snowhite, a bailment case, is factually distinguishable from Broadwater,
because in bailment cases, as with entrustments to minor children, the
power to permit and prohibit the use of the chattel exists naturally
15 5
both at the time of the entrustment and the time of the accident.
The court's reference to Snowhite thus provides no more support for
the Broadwaterdecision than does Rounds or Neale.
In an apparent effort to show steadfast adherence to Maryland
precedent, the court looked finally to Kahlenbergv. Goldstein,156 a case
strikingly similar to Rounds in that both involved a father's gift of a car
to his minor son.' 57 Yet, unlike its discussion of Rounds, the Broadwater
court found Kahlenberg "distinguishable . . . because Kahlenberg involved a minor child. 1 58 The significance given to this distinguishing

fact, though apparently of little significance when considering Rounds,
permitted the court to ignore its more recent statement in Kahlenberg
that
at the time [the father] supplied the chattel, he had the requisite knowledge of [his son's] propensities .... Under the

facts of this case the Plaintiff was not required to go further
and demonstrate that [the father] retained, and should have
152. Neale, 322 Md. at 19, 585 A.2d at 201.
153. Id.
154. 243 Md. 291, 221 A.2d 342 (1966).
155. See id. at 295-300, 221 A.2d at 344-47. In Snowhite, the defendant employer was held
liable for negligently entrusting a gasoline tank truck to his employee because the employer knew that the employee was a habitual drinker and frequently drank while driving
on the job. Id
156. 290 Md. 477, 431 A.2d 76 (1981).
157. See id.at 484, 431 A.2d at 81; Rounds v. Phillips, 166 Md. 151, 154-55, 170 A. 532,
533 (1934).
158. Broadwater, 344 Md. at 560, 688 A.2d at 442 (citing Kahlenberg, 290 Md. at 479 n.1,
431 A.2d at 78 n.1).
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exercised, a power to prohibit any use by [his son] of the
completed gift. 59
Though neither case clearly controls Broadwaterdue to Ronald's adult
status, the Court of Appeals chose not to rely on Kahlenberg,the most
recent, and arguably the most pertinent, Maryland decision on negligent entrustment. Instead, the court found clearer support from its
earlier, and equally distinguishable, decision in Rounds than the text
of that opinion justified.
Finally, unlike the Broadwater court, the Kahlenberg court recognized the importance of the demanding knowledge requirement as an
existing limitation on the doctrine of negligent entrustment.1 60 The
Kahlenberg court stated that
the principal features of the tort lie in the knowledge of the
supplier concerning the dangerous propensities of the entrustee and in the foreseeability of harm.... Liability is not
based upon continued ownership, but upon the negligent
entrustment when it operates16as
a concurrent cause with the
1
negligence of the entrustee.
Under the Restatement definition of negligent entrustment, a supplier
must be one who "knows or has reason to know" that misuse of the
chattel is "likely. '1 62 The term "likely" may be defined as "probable
and having [a] better chance of existing or occurring than not. 163
Knowledge, under the Restatement expression of negligent entrustment, therefore entails actual or constructive knowledge that an "unreasonable risk of physical harm" has a better chance of existing than
not. The Kahlenbergcourt found liability based upon this sort of initial
entrustment sufficiently limiting. 6 4 However, the Broadwater court
concluded that such a tort would "subject all vendors to liability long
after the vendor had relinquished control over the chattel. 1

65

Yet,

the court failed to acknowledge that only a very few vendors would
have the requisite knowledge to incur liability under Kahlenberg and
the Restatement.
Without controlling Maryland precedent, the Broadwater court
could have limited the doctrine of negligent entrustment by further
emphasizing the demanding knowledge requirement. The court also
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Kahlenberg, 290 Md. at 491, 431 A.2d at 84.
Id. at 488, 431 A.2d at 83.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF THE LAW OF TORTS

925 (6th ed. 1990).
290 Md. at 489, 431 A.2d at 83.
344 Md. at 556, 688 A.2d at 440.
BLACK'S LAW DIcriONARY

§ 390 (1964).
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could have simply considered Kahlenberg, noted that its pronouncements on the timing of a supplier's control were dicta, and explicitly
overruled Kahlenberg where inconsistent with Broadwater. Instead, it
distinguished the clearly unfavorable reasoning in Kahlenberg, and
stated that it found support from nearly every remaining source.
b.

The Court's Reliance on Decisions in OtherJurisdictions.-

(1) The Right to Control the Vehicle.-In an effort to bolster
support for its decision, the court relied on decisions in other jurisdictions, claiming that it "agree[d] with our sister states that have concluded that 'the paramount requirement for liability under a theory
of negligent entrustment is whether or not the defendant had a right
to control the vehicle."'" 6 6 While the cases it cited do, in fact, support
this proposition, by finding that control must exist at some point in
time before an entrustment can occur, they provide little support for
the court's ultimate conclusion that control must exist at the time of
the accident rather than merely at the time of the entrustment.16 7
For instance, the Court of Appeals relied on the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Colorado in Casebolt v. Cowan1 68 for support when,
in fact, Casebolt directly contradicts the holding in Broadwater.'6 9 In
Casebolt, one of the issues specifically before the court was "whether
the supplier must have the right and ability to exercise control at the
time of the negligent act of the entrustee resulting in injury or
17
t 0
whether control at the time the chattel is supplied is sufficient.
Citing Kahlenberg and three other cases for support,1 7 1 the Supreme
Court of Colorado stated that "[c] ases from other jurisdictions measure control at the time the chattel is supplied, the initial moment of
entrustment."1 7 2 Relying on sections 308 and 390 of the Restatement,
the Casebolt court overruled two earlier decisions by the intermediate
appellate court, "[t]o the extent that [they] require subsequent con166. Id. at 560, 688 A.2d at 442 (quoting Lopez v. Langer, 761 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Idaho

1988)).
167. See infra notes 168-175 and accompanying text.
168. 829 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
169. Caseboltspecifically "reject[ed] subsequent control as an essential element of negligent entrustment." Id at 360. In Casebolt, an employer was sued for negligent entrustment
when an employee borrowed the employer's vehicle and was later killed in a collision after
consuming alcoholic beverages. Id. at 353.
170. Id. at 359.
171. See id. (citing Green v. Texas Elec. Wholesalers, Inc., 651 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tex. App.
1982, writ dism'd by agr.); Vince v. Wilson, 561 A.2d 103, 105 (Vt. 1989); Huggins v. TriCounty Bonding Co., 337 S.E.2d 12, 17 (W. Va. 1985)).
172. Id.
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and concluded that "[w]e are persuaded by the approach of
other jurisdictions that we need look no further than the initial point
' 174
of entrustment to determine whether a supplier acted negligently."
Consequently, the Broadwatercourt's inclusion and citation to Casebolt
as support
appears to be a mischaracterization of the case's
5
trol,

holding.

17

The court claimed similar support for the proposition that the
defendant must have a right to control the vehicle when it quoted
from section 4:10 of The American Law of Torts, which states that
"' [t]he gist of the negligent entrustment is the right of control of the
entrustor over the vehicle or instrumentality entrusted.' 176 The court
misread the thrust of the text when it took this quote out of context.
The text continues by stating that:
As to donors of cars, the authorities are split. Some cases, of
dubious propriety at the very least, have denied liability of a
donor-such as the instance of the doting mother who gave

173. Id at 360.
174. Id; see also Peterson v. Halsted, 829 P.2d 373, 378 n.5 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (reiterating its holding in Casebolt that "the relevant time for assessing negligent entrustment is
the time at which the chattel is supplied to the entrustee").
175. The court cited three other cases in support of the proposition that the paramount
requirement for liability is a right to control the vehicle: Lopez v. Langer, 761 P.2d 1225,
1227 (Idaho 1988), Alioto v. Marnell 520 N.E.2d 1284, 1286 (Mass. 1988), and Mills v.
ContinentalParking Corp., 475 P.2d 673, 674 (Nev. 1970). In Lopez, the issue was whether a
father could grant his 19-year-old adult son permission to use a car when the car was
purchased with the son's money. 761 P.2d at 1226-27. Although the title was registered in
the father's name at the time of the accident, the court held that "[n]o meaningful permission can be given by one without the right to control, or in possession of, the vehicle." IM
at 1228-29. Because the car had been purchased with the son's money, the father, who was
not the owner or the possessor of the car, could not have entrusted the vehicle to his son.
Id. at 1229.
In Alioto, the issue was whether the father had granted permission to his 19-year-old
adult son to use the car after the son had been drinking alcohol, and whether the father
was, in fact, the true owner of the car. 520 N.E.2d at 1285-86. Because the plaintiff was
unable to provide sufficient evidence to show that the father had indeed given permission
to his son to drive the car, the court found that control, at any time, was lacking as a matter
of law. Id.at 1286.
In Mills, a bailment case, a parking lot attendant was sued for relinquishing control
over a car parked in its lot when the owner returned, clearly inebriated, and demanded the
keys. Mills, 475 P.2d at 674. The parking attendant returned the keys to the drunken
owner, who thereafter hit and killed a pedestrian. The defendant had no legal right to
refuse to return the car without risking a penalty for conversion. Id.
In none of these cases was an entrustment found to have occurred because none of
the defendants could claim control or ownership of the car sufficient to permit or prohibit
its use. Without an entrustment, these courts had no need to reach the temporal issue.
176. Broadwater,344 Md. at 561, 688 A.2d at 442 (quoting 1 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL.,
THE AMERICAN LAw OF TORTS § 4:10, at 594 (1983)).
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an automobile to her adult son knowing that he
was both an
77
alcoholic-an inebriate-and a drug addict.'
Rather than discussing any split of authority that may exist, or the
uncertain status of donor liability for negligent entrustment in other
jurisdictions, the court focused almost exclusively on those authorities
from which it could muster support for its decision, even when that
support was tenuous.
(2) Cases Refusing to Impose Liability.-In addition to cases requiring that an entrustment be predicated on the defendant's right to
control the chattel, the court proffered another line of cases that purportedly support its ultimate decision to limit liability. The court
claimed that "[a]mong the states that have decided cases involving a
parent's sale or gift of an automobile to an adult child, nearly all
reach the same conclusion as we do today." 1 78 However, rather than
focusing on the judgment and analysis that underlie these decisions,
the court focused solely on the outcome-the decision not to impose
liability.
For example, the court briefly discussed Peterson v. Halsted,'79 in
which the Colorado Supreme Court refused to impose liability on a
defendant for negligent entrustment.' 0 The Broadwatercourt held Peterson out as refusing to find liability because the parents had "no con177. 1 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 176, § 4:10, at 595-96 (footnotes omitted); see Estes v.
Gibson, 257 S.W.2d 604, 607-08 (Ky. 1953) (holding that a mother who gave an automobile
to her adult son knowing that he was an inebriate and a drug addict was not liable); see also
infra notes 196-209 and accompanying text.
178. Broadwater, 344 Md. at 561, 688 A.2d at 442; see Shipp v. Davis, 141 So. 366, 367
(Ala. Ct. App. 1932) (holding that a father who gave his son a car as a gift was not liable);
Peterson v. Halsted, 829 P.2d 373, 375 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (holding that a father who
co-signed a loan enabling his daughter to buy a car was not liable); Zedella v. Gibson, 650
N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (I1l. 1995) (holding that the co-signing of a loan did not constitute an
entrustment); Tosh v. Scott, 472 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that a father
who sold his son a car was not liable); Estes, 257 S.W.2d at 607-08 (holding that a mother
who gave her inebriate son a car was not liable); Fischer v. Lunt, 557 N.Y.S.2d 220, 221
(App. Div. 1990) (mem.) (holding that a father was not liable because he had no control
over the vehicle or his adult son); Rosenfeld v. Tisi, 542 N.Y.S.2d 762, 763 (App. Div. 1989)
(mem.) (holding that a mother was not liable because she neither owned nor had control
over either the car or her adult daughter); Brown v. Harkleroad, 287 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1955) (holding that a father who purchased a car for his 26-year-old son was not
liable).
179. 829 P.2d 373 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
180. Id at 375. The defendant, Donald Peterson, was the father of a 26-year-old daughter with a history of excessive alcohol consumption. Id. Peterson co-signed a loan for his
daughter in order to help her purchase a car. Id. at 376. The issue before the Peterson
court was "whether the indirect facilitation of the purchase of a vehicle.., as by Donald
Peterson's lending his credit to Tamara, is sufficient to make that person a supplier of a
chattel under section 390." Id. at 377.
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trol over the driving activities of their adult daughter."'8 1 However,
liability did not lie in Peterson because "[t]he Petersons did not give
their daughter the Bronco or provide her with funds to purchase
it.'

8 2

The Colorado Supreme Court found that the mere co-signing

of a loan did not render the father a "supplier" of the vehicle because
he never had control or possession of the car, and therefore, could
never have entrusted the vehicle to his daughter. 18 3 Moreover, in Peterson, the Colorado Supreme Court reiterated its holding in Casebolt
that "the relevant time for assessing negligent entrustment is the time
at which the chattel is supplied to the entrustee."'18 4 Despite the ultimate refusal to impose liability, the Colorado Supreme Court's conclusion with respect to when control over a vehicle is measured
directly contradicts the conclusion espoused in Broadwater.
The Broadwater court maintained that it found only one case,
Golembe v. Blumberg, in which parents were held liable1 8 5 for damages
resulting from their adult child's negligent use -of an automobile that
the parents had supplied.' 8 6 The court found Golembe "unpersuasive,"
stating merely that "[t]wo subsequent New York cases reach an opposite conclusion and undermine the authority of this holding."'8 7 The
court focused solely on the outcome of the cases, the refusal to im181. Broadwater,344 Md. at 561, 688 A.2d at 442.
182. Peterson, 829 P.2d at 377.
183. Id. at 377-78; see also Zedella v. Gibson, 650 N.E.2d 1000 (Il. 1995). In Zedella,
another case cited by Broadwaterthat is factually similar to Peterson,no liability was imposed
on the father of a 23-year-old son when the father merely "facilitated the purchase of a
vehicle by cosigning a purchase money loan." Id, at 1003-04. The court concluded that the
defendant father neither gave nor sold the car to his son and that the father's action "was
merely a link in the chain that facilitated [the son's] acquisition ... and use, of the vehicle,
but did not itself constitute an entrustment." Id. at 1004. Despite the Illinois court's refusal to find the father liable, the case is significantly distinct from Broadwaterand provides
little, if any, support for the Broadwaterholding that control of the vehicle or its use must
exist at the time of the accident.
184. Peterson, 829 P.2d at 378 n.5.
185. The court in Broadwater erroneously concluded that the parents in Goembe were
held liable, when in fact, based on the reported opinion, the court held that the complaint
stated a cause of action and it was error to have been dismissed. Broadwater, 344 Md. at
562, 688 A.2d at 442; Golembe v. Blumberg, 27 N.Y.S.2d 692,692 (App. Div. 1941) (mem.).
186. Broadwater, 344 Md. at 562, 688 A.2d at 442.
187. Id., 688 A.2d at 443. Neither Fischer v. Lunt, 557 N.Y.S.2d 220 (App. Div. 1990)
(mem.), nor Rosenfeld v. Tisi, 542 N.Y.S.2d 762 (App. Div. 1989) (mem.), the two NewYork
cases cited by Broadwater, specifically overruled or rejected the Golembe decision, nor did
either case make reference to Golembe. It is likely that neither court considered the cases
factually similar to Golembe or the rule of law applicable. Moreover, in neither case did the
parents at any time ever own or have control over the vehicle in question-in both cases,
the child had attained the age of majority and was the registered owner of the vehicle.
Fisher, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 220; Rosenfeld, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 763. As such, the parents never had
the power to permit or prohibit their children's use of the cars.
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pose liability, rather than on the rationale used to support them. The
court in Broadwatererroneously assumed that because of the New York
courts' refusal to impose liability in these two cases, these decisions
undermine the authority of Golembe. These decisions, however, were
premised on grounds wholly unrelated to the temporal issue in question here.
As further support of its position that the Golembe decision is "unpersuasive," the Broadwater court cited Brown v. Harkleroad, which it
'
claims "reject[ed] Golembe."188
After reviewing the handful of cases
that had addressed similar issues, including Golembe, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals concluded that in light of the "paucity of authorities
on this interesting question" and because "[t]he legislature has not
seen fit to impose any such liability[,] [w] e think it would be judicial
legislation if we undertook to go past that now recognized by existing
holdings."1 8' 9 The Harkleroadcourt thus refused to impose liability in
light of the few cases that had considered the issue at that time. 9 °
Significantly, the authority of the Harkleroad decision has been severely undermined by the most recent decision from that jurisdiction,
Nichols v. Atnip.19 1 In Nichols, the Tennessee Court of Appeals pointed
188. Broadwater, 344 Md. at 562, 688 A.2d at 443. In HarkleroadJ.E.Brown, father of 26year-old James Brown, accompanied his son to buy a car. The son, less than four months
later, collided with the Harkleroad car while driving drunk. 287 S.W.2d 92, 93-94 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1955). The Harkleroads brought suit alleging that the father was negligent in
purchasing the car for use by a known habitually reckless and drunken driver. Id. at 93.
Contrary to the Broadwatercourt's claim, however, Harkleroaddid not "reject" Golembe.
The Harkleroad court merely noted that it was difficult to reconcile the Golembe decision
with the later decision in Bugle v. McMahon, 37 N.Y.S.2d 540 (App. Div. 1942). See Harkleroad, 287 S.W.2d at 96. In Bugl, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint "fail [ed] to
allege any causal connection between the accident and any act or conduct of the appellant." 37 N.Y.S.2d at 541. The plaintiff was thereafter granted leave to serve a new complaint. Id. Because the dismissal in Bugle was due to deficient pleadings, the court never
reached the substantive issue regarding negligent entrustment. The Harkleroad court apparently misread the Bugle decision as a refusal to impose liability based on negligent entrustment rather than a mere dismissal for failure to properly plead causation. Harkleroad,
287 S.W.2d at 96. As a result, the Harkleroad court apparently considered the rule of law
applied in Bugle and in Golembe subject to some uncertainty. Id.
189. Harkleroad,287 S.W.2d at 96.
190. Prior to the Harkleroaddecision in 1955, only a few cases had addressed the issue of
whether parents of an adult child could be liable for negligent entrustment. See Shipp v.
Davis, 141 So. 366, 367 (Ala. Ct. App. 1932) (holding that a father who purchased a car for
his adult son, but never had possession or ownership of the car or exercised any control
over the car, could not be liable); Estes v. Gibson, 257 S.W.2d 604, 607-08 (Ky. 1953) (holding that the mother of a drug addict and inebriate was not liable for giving her son a car);
Bugle, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 541 (dismissing a negligent entrustment claim for failure to plead
causation); Golembe, 27 N.Y.S.2d at 692 (holding that the parents of an adult, epileptic child
who purchased a car for him could be liable for negligent entrustment).
191. 844 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
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out that "the Harkleroaddecision is contrary to [the] Restatement (Second) of [the Law ofi Torts § 390 (1964) and has been criticized by many
courts and legal scholars. 1 1 2 Thus, while Harkleroad may have "rejected Golembe," it appears that Nichols has rejected Harkleroad.
Along with Harkleroad, legal scholars have extensively criticized
both Shipp v. Davis9 ' and Estes v. Gibson,19 4 the two earliest cases that
refused to impose liability on defendant parents. 195 In Estes, a four-tothree majority ofjudges relied on Shipp v. Davis in refusing to impose
liability and held that the doctrine ought not to extend to those who
had no control over the vehicle when "the other party actually committing the injurious wrong was the owner."19' 6 In Estes, the mother of
an adult son, whom she knew to be an inebriate and drug addict, nevertheless bought her son a car and titled it in his name.197 Because
the record did not show what time period had intervened between the
son's receipt of the car and his negligent use of it, the court found
that the son could have been driving for a year or more without having an accident.' 9 8 The court stated that "[tlo impose legal liability
there must always be a reasonably close causal connection between an
act and the resulting injury."' 99 Here, however, the court found that
the causation was too tenuous and too remote, that there were "too
many probable and imponderable intervening events and conditions
between the gift of the car and its negligent operation by the owner20 0
driver" to impose liability.
Justice Duncan, joined by Justices Stewart and Milliken, wrote a
strong dissent asserting that one who transfers ownership and control
of a car is more negligent than one who merely lends his car to another
on one specific occasion, because in the former instance the entrustor
knowingly has given an incompetent driver the power to use the car at
192. Id. at 660 (citing PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 99, § 104, at
718; Talbott v. Csakany, 245 Cal. Rptr. 136, 139 (Ct. App. 1988); Kahlenberg v. Goldstein,
290 Md. 477, 431 A.2d 76, 83 (1981); Vince v. Wilson, 561 A.2d 103, 105 (Vt. 1989)).
193. 141 So. 366 (Ala. Ct. App. 1932).
194. 257 S.W.2d 604 (Ky. 1953).
195. "[A]ccording to Professor Prosser, [these cases] 'look definitely wrong."' Talbott,
245 Cal. Rptr. at 139 (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 99,
§ 104, at 718). Other cases that have noted such criticism include Nichols, 844 S.W.2d at
660, which stated that "the Harkleroad decision is contrary to [the] Restatement... and has
been criticized by many courts and legal scholars," and Vince, 561 A.2d at 105, which stated
that cases that "restrict the rule to situations where the defendant is the owner or has the
right to control the instrumentality have been severely criticized."
196. Estes, 257 S.W.2d at 607-08.
197. Id. at 604-05.
198. Id. at 607.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 608.
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all times, thus creating a long-term risk to third parties.2" 1 The dissent
further asserted that the majority had erroneously assumed that liability is dependent on some legal relationship such as agency or bailment.20 2 According to the dissent, "It]he authorities make it clear
that liability in such instances does not rest upon the fact of ownership
but upon the combined negligence of the owner in entrusting the
machine to an incompetent and reckless driver and of the driver in its
operation. ' Given the closeness of the vote in the opinions and the
nearly five decades of subsequent, contrary jurisprudence, the
strength of Estes as support for the Broadwaterdecision is questionable.
The Estes decision has also provoked considerable criticism from
the academic community.20 4 J.P. Leonard criticized the Estes decision
as not "sustained in principle for the authorities generally are in accord with the proposition that the owner's liability is not based upon
the fact of his ownership but upon his concurrent negligence in entrusting his car to an incompetent driver."2 5 Leonard added that the
decision in Estes to absolve the donor parent of liability was "unsupported by logic or reason." 20 6 Leonard asserted that it was "unreasonable to conclude that a mere transfer of title to a child, of whatever
age, should excuse a parent's negligence in placing an automobile in
the hands of one who is not only a user of intoxicating liquor to excess
20 7
but who is, in addition, a narcotic addict.
George Belsky has argued that the distinction made by the Estes
court between agency and bailment is "illogical, i.e. it is considered
negligent to give a limited chance to cause harm, as in bailment, but it
is not negligent to present an unlimited opportunity to cause harm, as
in the principal case. '20 8 He concluded that "the result achieved
20 9
seems to be: the greater wrong will incur the lesser liability."
(3) Cases Specifically Considering the Temporal Issue.-Like the
Colorado Supreme Court in Casebolt and Peterson, other jurisdictions
have expressly addressed the temporal aspect of an entrustor's negligence. Of the few that have specifically considered the issue, nearly
201. Id. (Duncan, J, dissenting).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See George M. Belsky, Comment, 33 B.U. L. REv. 538 (1953); Downing, supra note
99; Leonard, supra note 99.
205. Leonard, supra note 99, at 242.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Belsky, supra note 204, at 539.
209. Id.
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all have concluded that the negligent act is the entrustment itself; control at the time of the accident is not required. The Broadwater court
overlooked at least five jurisdictions in which courts have asserted that
the initial entrusting of the vehicle is the point in time when the negligent act occurs.
In Huggins v. Tri-County Bonding Co., the West Virginia Supreme
Court found improper the initial lending of the vehicle to one who is
known to be likely to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to another.2 1 ° In Green v. Texas Electrical Wholesalers, Inc., the Texas Court of
Appeals found that the lower court had erred in instructing the jury
that the controlling event of the entrustment was the time of the accident.2 ' A Florida court in Mullins v. Harrell asserted that "[s]ome
negligence in the initial entrusting process is necessary to make the
subsequent damage foreseeable."2 1 2
At least two jurisdictions have stated that even a seller can be liable for negligent entrustment based on the initial sale of the vehicle to
an incompetent driver.2 13 In Vince v. Wilson, the Vermont Supreme
Court found that a seller could be liable for negligent entrustment if
it could be shown that he knew or should have known at the time of
the sale some reason why entrusting the vehicle to the buyer was negligent.2 1 4 In Pug'mire Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Sorrells, the Georgia Court
of Appeals asserted that an auto dealer could be held liable if the
seller had actual knowledge of the buyer's incompetence at the time
of the sale.21 5 Thus, in these jurisdictions, courts have found that it is
negligent to entrust a vehicle to another when the entrustor knows, at
the time of the entrustment, that the entrustee is incompetent to
drive or likely to use the vehicle to create an unreasonable risk of
danger to others.
The Broadwateropinion falls short in providing independent reasoned analysis, and relies instead on cursory readings of cases from
other jurisdictions. The court made little effort to address the relevance of these decisions or their applicability to the instant case.
210. 337 S.E.2d 12, 17 (W. Va. 1985); see also supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
211. 651 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982, writ dism'd by agr.); see also supra notes 90-93
and accompanying text.
212. 490 So. 2d 1338, 1340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
213. In addition to Vermont and Georgia, California courts have also held that a seller
who meets all the elements of the tort may be liable for negligent entrustment. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Casetta, 17 Cal. Rptr. 81 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
214. 561 A.2d 103, 105 (Vt. 1989); see also supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
215. 236 S.E.2d 113, 116 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977); see also supra notes 102-107 and accompanying text. In this case, the court refused to impose liability because the plaintiffs were
unable to prove that the seller had actual knowledge that the buyer was drunk at the time
of the sale. Sorrells, 236 S.E.2d at 115.
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Though the cases cited may have refused to impose liability on parents of adult children or other donors of chattel, in many instances,
the rationale expressed for refusing to impose liability contradicts the
reasoning of Broadwater. None of the cases cited in Broadwater mandate control by the entrustor at the time of the accident, and of the
few cases that specifically address the temporal aspect of control,
nearly all support a contrary approach.
c. A Restatement of the Restatement (Second) of the Law of
Torts.-The principles of law expressed in the Restatement (Second) of
the Law of Torts also conflict with the notion that control must exist at
the time of the accident.2" 6 The Broadwater court first looked to the
Restatement for a definition of the term "supplier," explicitly seeking to
determine "whether the parents of an adult child, who... give or sell
that child an automobile are to be considered 'suppliers' for purposes
of § 390 of the Restatement."217
The Restatement does not specifically define the requirements for
one who "supplies." Under the plain meaning of the Restatement, the
Broadwaters could be considered to have supplied the car to their son
because they purchased the car and transferred title to him shortly
thereafter. According to comment a to section 390, "[t] he rule stated
applies to anyone who supplies a chattel for the use of another. It
applies to sellers, lessors, donors or lenders, and to all kinds of bailors
..
,"218 Moreover, illustration 6 provides an example of the doctrine's specific applicability to donors wherein a parent sells or gives
his adult son a car knowing the son is epileptic: the parent is subject
to liability when the son loses control of the car during a seizure and
injures a third party.2 19
Yet, the court failed to apply either the language in comment a or
the illustration, focusing instead on comment b,220 specifically, that
section 390 "is a 'special application' of § 308. ' ' 221 As such, the court
concluded, the two sections must be read together such that "§ 308's
216. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 390 (1964).

217. Broadwater, 344 Md. at 548, 688 A.2d at 439. It follows that one who does not qualify as a supplier cannot be held liable.
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 390 cmt. a.

219. Id § 390 illus. 6. This illustration was probably intended to mirror the Golembe case,
which the court in Broadwaterfound "unpersuasive." Broadwater, 344 Md. at 562, 688 A.2d
at 442-43; see Golembe v. Blumberg, 27 N.Y.S.2d 692 (App. Div. 1941) (mem.); see also supra
notes 114, 141, 185-187 and accompanying text.
220. Comment b to section 390 of the Restatement provides in pertinent part that "[t]he
rule stated in this Section is a special application of the rule stated in § 308, and has a close
analogy to the rule stated in § 307."
221. Broadwater, 344 Md. at 557, 688 A.2d at 440.

1018

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 57:642

reference to a 'thing or ... activity which is under the control of the
actor' limits § 390's broad reference to 'one who supplies ... a chattel
' 222
for the use of another.'
Although one who supplies a chattel to another must at some
point exercise control over the chattel, neither section 308 nor section
390 of the Restatement provides an explicit requirement for when that
control must be exercised. 223 The court took a giant leap when it
reasoned that the limiting phrase from section 308, "under the control of the actor," means, in effect, continuing control. Thus, using
the court's reasoning, in order to be a supplier one must have a continuing right to control the chattel.
As such, the court has read into the Restatement a definition of
supplier that excludes donors and sellers from liability, regardless of
whether they had knowledge of the donees' or buyers' dangerous
propensities at the time of the transfer. In so doing, the court has
contradicted the intent of the Restatement, which explicitly extends liability to both sellers and donors. 2 24 Once the applicability of the doctrine is restricted to only those with control over the chattel at the
time of the accident, donors and sellers simply drop out of the set of
potential defendants, because these groups generally relinquish all
control over the vehicle after the transfer. By refusing to find these
two classes of defendants potentially liable under the doctrine of negligent entrustment, the court effectively extinguished a plaintiff's
chances of recovery.

The court confined its discussion of the Restatement to the definition of supplier, electing to ignore altogether the doctrine's demanding knowledge requirement. This requirement, which imposes
liability only on those with either actual knowledge or a reason to
know that the entrustee is incompetent to use the chattel and is likely
to cause harm to others, 225 already sufficiently restricts the doctrine's
application. The rule imposes a foreseeability element under which
the entrustor of the chattel must not only know of the entrustee's dangerous propensities or reckless habits, a difficult hurdle in itself, but
the entrustor must also know that it is likely that the entrustee will use
the chattel in such a way as to harm others. 226 The court refused to
222. Id. at 558, 688 A.2d at 441.
223. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 308, 390.
224. Id. § 390 cmt. a.
225. Id. § 390; see supra notes 162-163 and accompanying text.
226. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 390. In a commercial sales
context, satisfying this demanding knowledge requirement would be quite difficult-the
plaintiff would be required to prove that the seller had actual or constructive knowledge
that the buyer was incompetent or had a poor driving record at the time of the sale and
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acknowledge this demanding requirement, and the restrictions
thereby imposed, in favor of a more rigid, almost categorical exclusion of donors and sellers.
5. Conclusion.-In Broadwater, the Court of Appeals required
that entrustors of property retain the power to permit or prohibit the
use of the chattel before liability under the doctrine of negligent entrustment can be found.2 2 7 Despite the Restatement's clear intention to
impose liability on all suppliers of chattel, including donors and sellers;2 28 despite the already demanding knowledge requirement of section 390 of the Restatement 229 despite severe criticism of similar
decisions by legal scholars;2 3 and despite contrary authority from
other jurisdictions,2 31 the Court of Appeals has restricted the doctrine
of negligent entrustment by requiring continuing control over the
chattel, thereby excluding virtually all donors and sellers from the
scope of the doctrine in Maryland. In so doing, the court provided
only blemished support for its conclusion and failed to acknowledge
that, of the jurisdictions that have considered whether an entrustor's
negligence should be measured at the time of the entrustment or at
the time of the accident, nearly all have reached a contrary result. As
a result, the court has made it difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiffs
to recover when they have been injured by the negligent giving or
selling of cars to incompetent drivers.
BETH

N. BEAM

B. Parent-ChildImmunity and Motor Vehicle Torts: Defending the
Minority View
In Renko v. McLean1 the Court of Appeals held: (1) the parentchild immunity doctrine prevents an adult child from suing a parent
for injuries that occurred during the child's minority; (2) there is no
exception to the parent-child immunity doctrine for motor vehicle
torts; and (3) the parent-child immunity doctrine, as applied, does not
violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Maryland
that it was foreseeable that the buyer would drive the vehicle off the lot and likely injure
others.
227. 344 Md. at 558, 688 A.2d at 441.
228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 390 & cmt. a.
229. Id § 390.
230. See supra notes 99, 193-209 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 90-107, 210-215 and accompanying text.
1. 346 Md. 464, 697 A.2d 468 (1997).
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or United States Constitutions. 2 For almost seventy years, Maryland,
with few exceptions, has adhered to the parent-child immunity doctrine.' The doctrine bars tort suits between parents and their minor
children.4 Although a majority of jurisdictions have either partially or
totally abrogated the doctrine, 5 the Renko decision is yet another reflection of Maryland's steadfast commitment to parent-child immunity.6 While other jurisdictions have created new exceptions to the
doctrine, particularly in the area of motor vehicle torts, 7 Renko foreshadows the dim prospects in Maryland of future exceptions to parent-child immunity.
1. The Case.--On December 8, 1992, Natasha Renko was seriously injured when her biological mother, Theresa Kaylor McLean,
negligently drove the vehicle they were both occupying into the rear
of another car.' At the time of the accident, Renko was seventeen
years old.9 Following her eighteenth birthday, Renko filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County seeking $100,000
in damages for the injuries she sustained in the accident."a The complaint named Theresa McLean and her husband Robert McLean,
Natasha's stepfather, as defendants." Both parents filed motions to
dismiss the action based on parent-child immunity. 1 2 At the hearing
on the motions, Renko argued that the parent-child immunity doctrine places an unreasonable restriction on an injured person's legal
access based on age and familial status, and that consequently, the
state should adopt a limited exception to the doctrine."3 The trial

2. Id. at 471, 697 A.2d at 471.
3. Id. at 468, 697 A.2d at 470.
4. Id. at 468-69, 697 A.2d at 470.
5. Id. at 474, 697 A.2d at 473.
6. Id. at 483, 697 A.2d at 478 (noting that "the doctrine well serves the citizens of this
State").
7. See infra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
8. Renko, 346 Md. at 467, 697 A.2d at 469.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id., 697 A.2d at 469-70.
12. Id. at 468, 697 A.2d at 470. Robert McLean would not have been entitled to parental immunity because while this action was pending, the Court of Appeals held that parentchild immunity does not bar suits between children and stepparents. Warren v. Warren,
336 Md. 618, 628, 650 A.2d 252, 257 (1994). However, Robert McLean subsequently filed
an independent motion for summary judgment based on a lack of agency between himself
and the driver, Theresa McLean. Remko, 346 Md. at 468, 697 A.2d at 470; see also Record
Extract at E.24-25, Renko v. McLean, 346 Md. 452, 697 A.2d 468 (1997) (No. 77) (stating
that the basis of Mr. McLean's motion for summary judgment was a lack of agency).
13. Record Extract at E.27, Renko (No. 77). Renko set forth two hypotheticals to
demonstrate the inherent unfairness of the doctrine: (1) a situation in which the state
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court, by granting the defendants' motions to dismiss, refused to create a new exception to the doctrine.' 4 Renko appealed the judgment
entered in favor of her mother, and the Court of Appeals granted
certiorari before consideration by the Court of Special Appeals.1 5
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Maryland's Adoption of Parent-Child Immunity.-The parent-child tort immunity doctrine is ajudicially created defense. 6 The7
doctrine originated in the Mississippi case of Hewellette v. George.'
Hewellette held that a minor could not sustain a civil action against a
parent for personal injuries resulting from the parent's actions.1 8 In
reaching this decision, the court relied heavily on a societal policy interest in promoting peace and harmony within families. 9 The court
reasoned that the state, through its criminal laws, would protect children from abuses and parental wrongdoing.2"
In 1930, the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted the parent-child
immunity doctrine in Schneider v. Schneider.2 ' The Schneider opinion
established a broad reciprocal immunity, which bars parents and chilpermits an 18-year-old to sue a parent while her 17-and-a-half-year-old sibling cannot; and
(2) a situation in which the state permits an unrelated minor, injured in a car accident, to
sue a driver, but the driver's child, who has sustained injuries in the same accident, is
barred from recovery. Id. at E.29-30.
14. Renko, 346 Md. at 468, 697 A.2d at 470.
15. Id. Renko did not appeal the judgment entered in favor of Robert McLean. Id. at
468 n.3, 697 A.2d at 470 n.3.
16. Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 566, 505 A.2d 826, 839 (1986).
17. 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891). In Hewellette, a minor daughter alleged that her mother
wrongfully committed her to an insane asylum, causing her to suffer personal and emotional injuries. Id. at 887.
18. Id. at 887. This opinion did not distinguish negligent acts from intentional torts,
nor did it cite any judicial precedent or authority for its holding. See Frye, 305 Md. at 545,
505 A.2d at 828 (commenting on the Hewellette court's creation of parent-child immunity).
19. Hewellette, 9 So. at 887. The Hewellette court stated:
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public
policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim
to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.
Id.
20. Id.
21. 160 Md. 18, 23, 152 A. 498, 500 (1930) (holding that a mother could not maintain
a tort action against her minor son). In Schneider,a mother sued her minor son for injuries
she sustained as a passenger in an automobile accident, that occurred while her son was
driving. Id. at 19-20, 152 A. at 498. By the time Maryland adopted parent-child immunity,
a majority of states had held that minors could not maintain tort actions against their
parents. Id. at 22, 152 A. at 499; see also Frye, 305 Md. at 545, 505 A.2d at 828 (stating that
for 40 years, the Hewellette decision was followed blindly by many courts throughout the
country).
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dren from asserting claims for civil redress against one another.2 2 The
court explained that an apparent conflict arises when a parent occupies the roles of both a minor's guardian and a plaintiff seeking recovery from that same minor. 2' The court reasoned that such adversarial
roles jeopardize the family relationship and that "[b]oth natural and
politic law, morality, and the precepts of revealed religion alike de24
mand the preservation of this relation in its full strength and purity.
Preservation of the family relationship became the justification for the
doctrine that would resound through the history of Maryland law.25
b. Maryland's Limited Exceptions to Parent-Child Immunity.Since its holding in Schneider, the Court of Appeals has created three
exceptions to the parent-child immunity doctrine. 26 The court established the first exception in Mahnke v. Moore.27 In Mahnke, a child
brought suit against her father's estate to recover for personal injuries
caused by her father's atrocious acts. 28 The Court of Appeals held
that, while parents are ordinarily immune from tort liability to their
minor children, "child [ren] shall have a right of action against a parent for injuries resulting from cruel and inhuman treatment or for
malicious and wanton wrongs. '29 The court explained that parentchild immunity is intended to protect the parent-child relationship by
22. See Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 622, 650 A.2d 252, 254 (1994) (noting that
Schneider established parent-child tort immunity in Maryland).
23. Schneider, 160 Md. at 22-23, 152 A. at 499-500. The court also compared an action
between a parent and child with the bar on suits between guardians and wards. Id., 152 A.
at 499. Because guardians are committed to the care and protection of the wards' interests, it is inconsistent to permit guardians to seek judgments against wards and their property. Id.
24. Id. at 23-24, 152 A. at 500 (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. See, e.g., Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 145-46, 571 A.2d 1219, 1222 (1990) ("The
rationale of the rule is that it is founded upon the relation in which the parent and the
unemancipated minor child stand to each other. The reciprocal dependence and entitlement of that relationship promotes a public policy which the rule reflects." (quoting Frye,
305 Md. at 548, 505 A.2d at 829)). The Frye court provided additional justification for the
doctrine:
It is clear that for over half a century this Court has recorded its belief in the
importance of keeping the family relationship free and unfettered. Our primary
concern with regard to matters involving the parent-child relationship was the
protection of family integrity and harmony and the protection of parental discretion in the discipline and care of the child.
Frye, 305 Md. at 551, 505 A.2d at 831.
26. See Warren, 336 Md. at 625, 650 A.2d at 255.
27. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
28. Id. at 63, 77 A.2d at 923. In Mahnke, a father shot the child's mother in the child's
presence, kept the mother's body with them for a week, and then committed suicide in the
child's presence. Id., 77 A.2d at 924.
29. Id. at 68, 77 A.2d at 926.
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barring suits arising out of traditional parental duties." The court
reasoned that because the parent's actions in Mahnke exhibited a complete abandonment of the parental relationship, the application of
parent-child immunity could not logically achieve its intended goals. 3 '
The court recognized the second exception in 1956 in Waltzinger
v. Birsner.32 In Waltzinger, an elderly woman sued her adult son to recover for injuries she sustained in her son's car when it unexpectedly
rolled down an incline.3 3 The Court of Appeals held that parent-child
34
immunity did not bar an action between a parent and an adult child.
The court created this exception because a bar on suits between parents and adult children does not serve the doctrine's goals of promoting peace and harmony in the home and maintaining parental
control over minor children.3 5
Finally, Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas6 held that parent-child immunity does not apply when a minor brings a tort action against a parent's business partner or partnership.3 7 In Hatzinicolas, a child was
injured by the rotating wheels of an automatic slicing machine on the
premises of her father's partnership business. 38 In deciding the case,
the Court of Appeals once again relied on the policy rationale behind
parent-child immunity.3 9 The court found that although a child's suit
against a parent's business partner may jeopardize the partnership relationship, parent-child immunity does not bar the suit because the
immunity is designed to protect solely the parent-child relationship. 0
c. Parent-Child Immunity as Applied in Maryland.-Although
Maryland recognizes a few exceptions to parent-child immunity,4 the
30. Id. ("Ordinarily, the parent is not liable for damages to the child for a failure to
perform a parental duty, or for excessive punishment of the child not maliciously inflicted,
or for negligent disrepair of the home.").
31. Id.
32. 212 Md. 107, 128 A.2d 617 (1957).
33. Id. at 110-12, 128 A.2d at 618-19.
34. Id at 126, 128 A.2d at 627.
35. Id.
36. 314 Md. 340, 550 A.2d 947 (1988).
37. Id. at 342, 550 A.2d at 948.
38. Id at 342-43, 550 A.2d at 948.
39. Id at 356, 550 A.2d at 955. "The parent-child immunity doctrine 'is founded upon
public policy, and is designed to preserve the peace and harmony of the home, as well as to
recognize the authority of the parent, under normal conditions, responsible for the maintenance of the home.'" Id. (quoting Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 550, 505 A.2d 826, 830
(1986)).
40. Id. at 358, 550 A.2d at 956.
41. See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions to the parentchild immunity doctrine that have been recognized in Maryland).
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courts have been more likely to reject than to accept new exceptions
to the rule. Challenges to the doctrine have most frequently arisen in
42
the context of automobile torts.
In 1971, the Court of Special Appeals, in Latz v. Latz, 43 declined
to make an exception to the parent-child immunity doctrine for an
automobile tort. In Latz, a father sued his minor daughter for the
death of his wife, the minor's mother.4 4 The death resulted from the
minor's negligent operation of an automobile in which the mother
was a passenger.4 5 The court held that the trial court did not err in
dismissing the father's complaint against his daughter on the ground
that parent-child immunity precluded suit.4 6 The fact that a minor
who was being sued by her father was protected by liability insurance
did not persuade the court to create an exception to the doctrine for
automobile torts.4 7 The court relied on the doctrine of stare decisis,
stating that, "for reasons of certainty and stability, changes in decisional doctrine are left to the Legislature."4
The Court of Special Appeals did not waver from this position
seven years later in Montz v. Mendaloff4 9 when a minor child sought an
exception to the parent-child immunity doctrine for injuries resulting
from her parents' alleged gross negligence. ° In Montz, the Court of
Special Appeals held that a minor could not sue her mother for inju42. See, e.g.,
Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 619, 650 A.2d 252, 252 (1994) (declining
to recognize an exception to parent-child immunity for motor vehicle torts); Smith v.
Gross, 319 Md. 138, 148-49, 571 A.2d 1219, 1224 (1990) (applying parent-child immunity
to a wrongful death suit following a fatal car crash); Fye, 305 Md. at 568, 505 A.2d at 839-40
(barring an action brought by a mother, as next friend to her infant son, against the infant's father, also her husband, following injuries the child sustained in a car accident);
Montz v. Mendaloff, 40 Md. App. 220, 221, 388 A.2d 568, 569 (1978) (precluding a minor
from suing her parents for injuries resulting from the grossly negligent operation of the
automobile in which the minor was a passenger); Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 732-33, 272
A.2d 435, 442 (1971) (granting a minor daughter immunity from suit brought by her father seeking damages for the death of her mother in a car accident caused by the daughter's negligence).
43. 10 Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435 (1971).
44. Id. at 725, 272 A.2d at 437.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 734, 272 A.2d at 443.
47. Id. at 729, 272 A.2d at 440. The father alleged that his minor daughter was protected by automobile liability insurance, and he reduced the amount of damages he was
seeking to the total amount of applicable insurance coverage available to the minor. Id. at
729 n.10, 272 A.2d at 440 n.10. See infra notes 123-159 and accompanying text for a more
detailed discussion of the role liability insurance has played in the abrogation of parentchild immunity.
48. Latz, 10 Md. App. at 733, 272 A.2d at 442.
49. 40 Md. App. 220, 388 A.2d 568 (1978).
50. Id. at 221, 388 A.2d at 569. In Montz, the daughter was almost 17 years old, unemployed, and living with her parents when the accident giving rise to the suit occurred. Id.
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ries she sustained as a result of the mother's grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 1 The court reasoned that in light of its
decision in Latz, the Maryland legislature had been aware of the exist52
ence of the parent-child immunity doctrine and had not changed it.
The issue of parent-child tort immunity in automobile accidents
reached the Court of Appeals in 1986 in Frye v. Frye. 3 In Frye, Barbara
Frye brought suit against her husband, George Frye, on behalf of their
minor son to recover for injuries he sustained as a result of George
Frye's negligent operation of an automobile.5 4 The court held that
parent-child immunity should not be abrogated despite the court's recent abrogation of interspousal immunity.55 The Court of Appeals
distinguished the interspousal relationship from the parent-child relationship by recognizing the significant changes that had evolved in
the marital relationship over time,5 6 and it reasoned that such significant changes in the parent-child relationship had not occurred.5 7
The court also reasoned that minors are protected by the legislature's
"enactment of a comprehensive scheme for civil and criminal enforcement of the obligations to support children, parents and spouses. "58
The daughter married and moved out of her parents' house before bringing the instant
lawsuit. Id.
51. Id. at 225, 388 A.2d at 571.
52. Id. at 224, 388 A.2d at 570. The court also compared the gross negligence alleged
in Montz with the Mahnke exception for atrocious, willful acts. Id. at 225, 388 A.2d at 571.
The court found that the mother's behavior in Montz did not rise to the level of abandoning or forfeiting her parental authority and privileges as the father had in Mahnke. Id.;
see also supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (discussing Mahnke).
53. 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986).
54. Id. at 544, 505 A.2d at 827. She also named George Frye's automobile insurer as a
defendant for denying coverage to her minor son under the uninsured motorist provision
of the policy. Id
55. Id at 557, 505 A.2d at 834. In Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983),
interspousal immunity was abrogated for tortious actions between spouses. Id. at 273, 462
A.2d at 521.
56. Frye, 305 Md. at 557, 505 A.2d at 834. At common law, a suit could not lie between
a husband and wife because the wife had no legal existence apart from her husband. Id at
553, 505 A.2d at 832. The court abrogated interspousal immunity because it was a vestige
of the past and unsound in light of the circumstances of modern society. Id. at 557, 505
A.2d at 834.
57. Id. at 557-58, 505 A.2d at 834.
58. Id at 560, 505 A.2d at 836. In Frye, the court further explained that parent-child
suits disrupt family harmony because of a child's natural dependence upon his or her
family. Id. at 549, 505 A.2d at 830. The court reasoned:
A minor is "dependent upon a parent to provide for him the judgment and care
which he, and any property of his, may need during his immaturity. In a suit
against him, he would ordinarily depend upon his parents to procure him an
One of his parents would ordinarily be
attorney, for he cannot appoint one ....
appointed guardian ad litem, he being incapable of defending except by
guardian."
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Frye also held that a minor child, injured by a parent's negligent
operation of an automobile, cannot circumvent parent-child immunity by claiming to be an uninsured motorist for insurance purposes.59
Barbara Frye argued that because parent-child immunity precluded a
suit by her son against his father, the father was rendered an uninsured motorist. Therefore, the son should have a claim under the
uninsured motorist provision of the motor vehicle policy. 60 The court
did not accept this argument, however, and reasoned that parentchild immunity had "closed the front door to redress by the son from
the father" and that a "back door" exception allowing the minor to
maintain the action would not be recognized.6 1
In Frye, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the modern
trend among other jurisdictions had moved toward abrogation of the
parent-child immunity doctrine for motor vehicle torts.6 2 The court
identified two primary reasons for abrogation common among other
states:
1) The operation of an automobile is outside the area of
parental control, authority and discretion. With respect to
motor torts, the doctrine does not achieve the purpose of
promoting family harmony or parental autonomy.
2) Automobile liability insurance, now widely prevalent,
negates the family tranquility argument. Insurance tempers
the possibility
of family discord and depletion of family
63
resources.

Without specifically addressing the first justification, the court sternly
rejected abrogation based on the widespread existence of liability insurance. 64 The court reasoned that compulsory motor vehicle liability
insurance, mandated by the legislature, reflects the General Assembly's public policy.6" The court further explained that the exclusion
of motor torts from parent-child immunity would inevitably have some
impact on the state's insurance scheme and that a decision to alter
that scheme ought to come from the legislature rather than the
66

courts.

Id. (quoting Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 23, 152 A. 498, 500 (1930)).
59. Id. at 568, 505 A.2d at 839-40.
60. Id., 505 A.2d at 839.
61. Id,, 505 A.2d at 840.
62. Id. at 562, 505 A.2d at 836-37.
63. Id. at 562-63, 505 A.2d at 837.
64. Id. at 566-67, 505 A.2d at 838-39.
65. Id. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839.
66. Id.

19981

MARYLAND

COURT OF APPEALS

1027

In Smith v. Gross,6 7 a mother brought a wrongful death action on
behalf of her deceased son against the child's biological father following a fatal car crash. 6" The mother argued that parental immunity was
inapplicable because the child had never lived with the father and
there was no father-child relationship to preserve.6 9 The Court of Appeals held that parent-child immunity bars wrongful death and survival actions brought on behalf of a deceased minor against a surviving
parent, even if the child had not been living with that parent prior to
the child's death.7 ° Once again, the court deferred to the legislature,
stating:
If the legislature intended that the judicially created parentchild immunity rule be excepted from the legislatively created survival and wrongful death actions, it has had ample
opportunity to say so. But it has allowed the rule to stand
inviolate as we have adopted and applied it, without change
or modification.7"
The court also reasoned that the "rights, privileges, obligations, and
duties arising from the father-child relationship were not wiped out
merely because the child lived with the mother."72 Additionally, the
court explained that the primary requisite of the parent-child relationship was not whether the parent and the child lived together, but
whether the defendant was, in fact, the child's father.73
Most recently, the Court of Appeals reiterated its refusal to abrogate the parent-child immunity doctrine for motor vehicle torts in
Waren v. Wa"ren.74 The court reiterated its position on parental immunity, stating "[f] amily life and values have not significantly changed
since we last addressed this issue ....

and we believe that it is still in

the best interest of both children and parents to retain parent-child
immunity." 75 The court once again noted that although other jurisdictions had abrogated the doctrine, in Maryland, an exception for
67. 319 Md. 138, 571 A.2d 1219 (1990).
68. Id at 141, 571 A.2d at 1220.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

147, 571 A.2d at
148-49, 571 A.2d
149, 571 A.2d at
148, 571 A.2d at
147-48, 571 A.2d

1223.
at 1224.
1224.
1223.
at 1223.

74. 336 Md. 618, 650 A.2d 252 (1994). In Warren, a mother and father brought suit on
behalf of their son against the child's stepmother following a car accident, caused by the
stepmother, that injured the minor. Id. at 620, 650 A.2d at 253. In addition to discussing
the application of parent-child immunity to motor vehicle torts, the court held that the
doctrine does not protect stepparents, regardless of whether they are standing in the place
of a parent. Id. at 628, 650 A.2d at 257.
75. Id. at 626, 650 A.2d at 256.
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motor vehicle torts would have to come from the legislature in accord76
ance with its statutory insurance scheme.
The push for abrogation of parent-child immunity for motor torts
is characterized by the argument that because automobile liability insurance mitigates the potential for family discord, the purpose for barring parent-child suits becomes obsolete.7 7 The Court of Appeals has
repeatedly rejected this argument. 78 In Frye, the court explained that
an exception to the immunity based on liability insurance
will cause the cost of liability insurance to increase drastically, that it will lead to collusion and fraud, that, in the presence of insurance, a suit between family members is not truly
adversary, that the insurer may not receive the necessary cooperation from a family defendant in providing adequate information for the insured's defense, that a defendant may be
too helpful to the plaintiff family member and may prejudice
the jury by his statements, and that the presence of insurance
will unduly
influence a jury to award an unjustifiable large
79
recovery.
Thus, the Court of Appeals opposes abrogation of parent-child immunity based on the presence of liability insurance. 8 °
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Renko v. McLean, the Court of Appeals held that a minor, injured in a motor vehicle accident resulting
from her mother's negligence, may not sue her natural mother to recover for those injuries once she has reached the age of majority.8 " It
also held that the existence of mandatory motor vehicle liability insurance does not justify the creation of an exception to parent-child immunity for motor vehicle torts.8 2 Furthermore, the court held that
parent-child immunity, as applied, did not violate either the Maryland
Declaration of Rights or the United States Constitution. 3
76. Id. at 627-28, 650 A.2d at 256-57.
77. See Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 563, 505 A.2d 826, 837 (1986) (citing the availability
of liability insurance as a major consideration in the abrogation of parent-child immunity
in other jurisdictions).
78. See Warren, 336 Md. at 627-28, 650 A.2d at 256-57; Frye, 305 Md. at 567, 505 A.2d at
839; Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 729, 272 A.2d 434, 441 (1971).
79. Frye, 305 Md. at 566, 505 A.2d at 838.
80. Warren, 336 Md. at 626, 650 A.2d at 256 (relying on Frye for its rejection of abrogation of parent-child immunity based on compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance).
81. Renko, 346 Md. at 473, 697 A.2d at 472-73.
82. Id. at 473-81, 697 A.2d at 473-76 (discussing the arguments for and against abrogating the doctrine in light of mandatory automobile insurance).
83. Id. at 481-84, 697 A.2d at 476-78.
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The court first addressed the issue of whether persons who have
reached the age of majority may sue their parents for events that occurred during that person's minority.8 4 Renko argued that because
adults are permitted to sue their parents for acts that occur after they
have reached the age of majority, the court should logically allow
adult children to sue their parents for wrongful acts that occur during
minority.8 5 The court distinguished Renko from WaltzingeW6 by observing that although Renko had reached the age of majority, she sought
recovery for events that had occurred during her minority.8 7 The
Court of Appeals affirmed that parent-child immunity applies not only
to suits initiated during the child's minority, but it bars actions arising
from any events that occurred during the child's minority. 88 The
court reasoned that to hold otherwise would undermine its commitment to the doctrine by allowing minors to wait until they have
reached the age of majority before commencing a suit that otherwise
would have been barred. 89 This position is consistent with the policy
behind parent-child immunity because the "looming specter of a lawsuit is as surely detrimental to family peace and harmony and parental
authority as is the actual suit itself."9 °
Next, the court addressed the justifications for applying the parent-child immunity doctrine in light of compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance.9 1 Judge Karwacki, writing for the court,
acknowledged that an overwhelming majority of states have totally or
partially abrogated parent-child immunity for motor vehicle torts, but
he objected to the reasoning employed by these jurisdictions.9" These
jurisdictions reason that the threat a lawsuit between parents and their
children poses to family harmony is nullified when the parents' liabil84. Id at 471-73, 697 A.2d at 471-73.
85. Id at 472-73, 697 A.2d at 472.
86. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of Waltzinger.
87. Renko, 346 Md. at 473, 697 A.2d at 472-73.
88. See generally id. at 471-73, 697 A.2d at 471-73 (comparing previously created exceptions to parent-child immunity with the exception for emancipated children proposed by
Renko).
89. Id. at 473, 697 A.2d at 472.
90. Id.
91. Id., 697 A.2d at 473.
92. Id. at 478, 697 A.2d at 475. Jurisdictions abrogating parent-child immunity for motor vehicle torts have reasoned that liability insurance negates the disruption of family
peace and harmony that is sought to be avoided by the doctrine. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 672 (Del. 1976) ("Liability insurance impersonalizes the suit and negates the possible disruption of family harmony by easing the financial repercussions of the
accident."); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (Mass. 1975) ("Where insurance
" (internal quotation marks
exists, the domestic tranquillity argument is hollow ....
omitted)).
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ity is covered by insurance.93 The Court of Appeals found that this
reasoning gives rise to an even greater problem because it diminishes
the adversarial nature of a lawsuit.9 4 Thus, the liability insurance becomes the sole reason for the existence of the suit and forces the insurer "to defend a suit that its insured has every incentive to lose."9 5
The court also explained that the dependence of a lawsuit upon the
existence of liability insurance is inconsistent with Maryland law, because evidence of liability insurance is irrelevant to the issue of a de96

fendant's liability.

Finally, the court reasoned that the insurance-based argument
fails in the case of judgments that exceed the amount of applicable
insurance coverage. 9 7 When this happens, "the rancor and discord
the insurance is said to obviate" would only resurface as the parent
98
and child become adversaries in subsequent collection proceedings.
Lastly, the court addressed whether parent-child immunity violates either the Maryland Declaration of Rights9 9 or the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. a0 On the issue of due
process, the court reasoned that it is well settled both under Maryland
and federal law that there is no constitutionally protected property
right in a particular cause of action.10 1 In addition, the court rejected
Renko's equal protection argument because her age and familial status did not place her in a "suspect class."10' 2 Finally, the court rea93. Renko, 346 Md. at 474-78, 697 A.2d at 473-75 (citing case law from other jurisdictions abrogating parent-child immunity for motor tort cases).
94. Id. at 478, 697 A.2d at 475; see also text accompanying note 79 (warning of the
potential for fraud and collusion when a parent-child suit is predicated on the existence of
liability insurance).
95. Renko, 346 Md. at 478, 697 A.2d at 475.
96. Id.; see also Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 564, 505 A.2d 826, 837-38 (1986) (stating that
the existence of liability insurance does not affect the question whether a father is precluded from bringing a tort action against his minor child).
97. Renko, 346 Md. at 479, 697 A.2d at 475-76.
98. Id., 697 A.2d at 476.
99. Id. at 481, 697 A.2d at 476. The Maryland Declaration of Rights states in pertinent
part: "That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties
or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life,
liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land." MD.
CONST. DECL. OF RTs., art. XXIV.

100. Renko, 346 Md. at 481, 697 A.2d at 476. The United States Constitution states in
pertinent part: "No State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
101. Renko, 346 Md. at 481, 697 A.2d at 477.
102. Id. at 482, 697 A.2d at 477; see also Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam) ("[A] suspect class is one saddled with such disabilities,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
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soned that the doctrine survives a rational basis standard of review
because it serves the state's interest in "insulating families from the
'
vagaries and rancorous effects of tort litigation. 10
3
4. Analysis.-In Renko v. McLean, the Court of Appeals refused
to create a new exception to the doctrine of parent-child immunity.
Renko's push to abrogate the doctrine was defeated by a holding that
has bolstered the vitality of parent-child immunity in Maryland. This
decision is not surprising given the Court of Appeals's reluctance to
10 4
recognize new exceptions to the parent-child immunity doctrine.
Despite the trend among other jurisdictions to abrogate the doctrine
for motor torts, the court stands by its goal of preserving peace and
harmony within families by barring parent-child tort suits. This position is firmly grounded in Maryland precedent and supported by logical and convincing policy arguments.
a. Approval of the Rationale for Parent-Child Immunity.-In
Renko, the court relied on the policy arguments in favor of parentchild immunity that have been discussed throughout the history of the
doctrine.' 0 5 Parent-child immunity is intended to promote family harmony,1 0 6 preserve parental discipline and control,10 7 protect families
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.").
103. Renko, 346 Md. at 483, 697 A.2d at 478.
104. See, e.g.,
Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 619, 650 A.2d 252, 252 (1994) (refusing to
abrogate parent-child immunity for motor vehicle torts); Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 14849, 571 A.2d 1219, 1224 (1990) (holding that parent-child immunity bars tort suits between
parents and their children, even if the parent and child do not reside together); Frye v.
Frye, 305 Md. 542, 568, 505 A.2d 826, 916 (1986) (refusing to abrogate parent-child immunity in light of the abrogation of interspousal immunity); Montz v. Mendaloff, 40 Md. App.
220, 225, 388 A.2d 568, 573 (1978) (upholding parent-child immunity as a defense to gross
negligence in motor vehicle torts); Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 732-33, 272 A.2d 435, 442
(1971) (declining to recognize a motor vehicle tort exception to parent-child immunity).
105. See generally Renko, 346 Md. at 468-70, 697 A.2d at 470-71. For a detailed discussion
on the development of parent-child immunity in Maryland and policy arguments supporting the doctrine, see Fye v.Fye, 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986).
106. See Renko, 346 Md. at 469, 697 A.2d at 470 ("[Tjhe parent-child immunity doctrine
grew out of an abiding belief that it served the compelling public interest in preserving,
under normal circumstances, the internal harmony and integrity of the family unit and
parental authority in the parent-child relationship." (citing Warren, 336 Md. at 622, 650
A.2d at 254; Gross, 319 Md. at 14546, 571 A.2d at 1222; Frye, 305 Md. at 548, 505 A.2d at
829-30; Yost v. Yost, 172 Md. 128, 134, 190 A. 753, 756 (1937); Schneider v. Schneider, 160
Md. 18, 21-22, 152 A. 498, 499-500 (1930))).
107. See sources cited supra note 106. The Warren court explicitly withdrew the judicial
process from parent-child conflict.
"The level of parental guidance necessary to rear responsible, productive members of society simply cannot be attained in a situation where parents must constantly weigh the benefit of helping a child to understand an important lesson
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from depleting their resources on litigation,' s and curb fraud and
collusion among families.1" 9 The conservative agenda behind this
doctrine is undoubtedly the promotion of traditional relationships between parents and their children and the encouragement of dispute
resolution within the family.110
Maryland's strict adherence to these policy motives places it in
the minority."' In Renko, the Court of Appeals noted that mostjuris1 12
dictions have either totally or partially abrogated the doctrine.
Only eight states, including Maryland, do not make an exception to
the doctrine for motor vehicle torts."' Every other state has either
never adopted the doctrine, completely abrogated it, abrogated it in
4
motor tort cases, or created other exceptions to the doctrine."
Jurisdictions that have abrogated parent-child immunity have exhibited dissatisfaction with the policy arguments set forth by Maryland
courts. Other courts reason that the injury giving rise to a lawsuit,
rather than the lawsuit itself, is responsible for disruption of family
harmony." 5 Some jurisdictions have assuaged the concern that families will collude to defraud liability insurers by reasoning that the possibility of collusion exists in any lawsuit and that the determination of
against the looming specter of being hauled into court by an opportunistic attorney for the child".... We are not willing to open the door to rebellious children
and frustrated parents and allow the courts to become the arbitrator of parentchild disputes and the overseer of parental decisions.
Warren, 336 Md. at 626, 650 A.2d at 255-56 (quoting Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906,
913 (Miss. 1992) (Lee, J., dissenting)).
108. See Renko, 346 Md. at 480, 697 A.2d at 476 (arguing that suits for pain, suffering,
and other noneconomic damages may "saddle a family with a judgment that they can illafford to pay because . . .it exceeds [their] available [liability] insurance").
109. See Warren, 336 Md. at 624, 650 A.2d at 255 (citing policy justifications for parentchild immunity). But see Samuel Mark Pipino, In Whose Best Interest? Exploring the Continuing Viability of the ParentalImmunity Doctrine, 53 OHio ST. L.J. 1111, 1114 (1992) (questioning the validity of the fraud and collusion argument in support of parent-child immunity).
110. See supra note 107; see also David A. Leib, Note, Maryland Refuses to Abrogate Parental
Tort Immunity, 55 MD. L. REv. 832, 842 (1996) (stating that Maryland has become one of
the nation's most conservative states on the issue of parent-child immunity).
111. Renko, 346 Md. at 474, 697 A.2d at 473.
112. Id. In Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 561-62, 505 A.2d 826, 836-37 (1986), and Warren,
336 Md. at 621 n.1, 627 n.2, 650 A.2d at 253 n.1, 256 n.2, the Court of Appeals also recognized the widespread abrogation of parent-child immunity.
113. Renko, 346 Md. at 474 & n.12, 697 A.2d at 473 & n.12. Those states are Alabama,
Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, and Nebraska. Id.
114. Id. at 474, 697 A.2d at 473; see also Warren, 336 Md. at 627 n.2, 650 A.2d at 256 n.2
(citing authorities from 43 jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, permitting
parent-child suits for motor vehicle torts).
115. See Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907, 913 (Mass. 1975) ("When the wrong has
been committed, the harm to the basic fabric of the family has already been done and the
source of rancor and discord already introduced into family relations.").
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fact and a proper verdict are issues to be decided by ajury.1 1 6 Some
states have adopted a "reasonable parent" standard that permits children to sue their parents in tort, but limits recovery to damages resulting from conduct that fails to meet the standard of care reasonably
expected of parents. 1 7 For automobile torts, courts may reason that
abrogation is appropriate because the operation of an automobile is
118
outside the traditional area of parental control.
Despite the "chorus of criticism surrounding the doctrine," 11 9
Renko expresses the Court of Appeals's devotion to stare decisis on the
issue of parent-child immunity. 2 ° The court opined that since the
doctrine was first adopted in 1930, the parent-child relationship had
changed little, if at all."' This opinion demonstrates that, in Maryland, the doctrine's purpose of preserving peace and harmony among
families will trump the justifications for abrogation offered by the majority of other jurisdictions.
b. Abrogation of Parent-ChildImmunity for Motor Vehicle Torts.The most common exception to the parent-child immunity doctrine
prohibits its application to motor vehicle tort suits. 2 2 Many jurisdictions conclude that the widespread presence of automobile liability

116. See Renko, 346 Md. at 477, 697 A.2d at 474 ("[T]he possibility of collusion exists to a
certain extent in any case. Every day we depend on juries and trial judges to sift evidence
in order to determine the facts and arrive at proper verdicts." (quoting Glaskox v. Glaskox,
614 So. 2d 906, 912 (Miss. 1992)). But see infra notes 141-143 and accompanying text (explaining the effects collusion may have on a jury verdict).
117. See Leib, supra note 110, at 844 (discussing the reasonable and prudent parent
standard).
118. See Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 562, 505 A.2d 826, 837 (1994) (identifying reasons
why other states have excluded motor torts from parent-child immunity).
119. Renko, 346 Md. at 470, 697 A.2d at 471; see also Martin J. Rooney & Colleen M.
Rooney, Parental Tort Immunity: Spare the Liability, Spoil the Parent, 25 NEw ENG. L. Rmv.
1161, 1184 (1991) (arguing that in the absence of legislative action, courts should modify
parent-child immunity to address the needs of the injured child); Sandra L. Haley, The
Parental Tort Immunity Doctrine: Is It a Defensible Defense, 30 U. RICH. L. Rxv. 575, 603-04
(1996) (questioning the relevance of the rationales behind the continued existence of
parent-child immunity); Leib, supra note 110, at 845-46 (arguing that Maryland should
adopt the reasonable parent standard); Janet K Mansfield, Note, Parent-ChildImmunity, 50
Mn. L. REv. 1325, 1333-34 (1991) (criticizing the Court of Appeals in Smith v. Gross, 319
Md. 138, 571 A.2d 1219 (1990), for failing to create an exception to parent-child immunity
for wrongful death).
120. See Renko, 346 Md. at 484, 697 A.2d at 478 ("Maryland law has long recognized, save
for extraordinary circumstances, that the parent-child immunity doctrine is a reasonable
and well-founded limitation upon a child's access to our courts, serving to protect one of
the most fundamental and sacred units in our society.").
121. Id. at 470, 697 A.2d at 471.
122. Haley, supra note 119, at 581.
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insurance justifies partial abrogation of the doctrine. 12 1 Courts following the majority view have concluded that a parent-child suit does not
threaten the doctrine's concern for domestic tranquility when the parent is covered by liability insurance.12 4 The litigation becomes an action between the child and the parent's insurer rather than an action
between parent and child. 125 According to this argument, the presence of automobile liability insurance negates the concern for family
tranquility by eliminating the adversarial roles a parent and child
12 6
would normally assume in the absence of liability insurance.
Maryland courts strictly oppose abrogation of parent-child immunity based on the presence of liability insurance, but this disagreement reaches beyond whether the rationales behind the doctrine are
being served. The Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals
have both rejected the insurance argument because insurance is not
relevant to the issue of liability. 12 7 In an ordinary tort case, Maryland
law prohibits evidence indicating the presence of liability insurance
from being presented to the jury.1 2 ' Evidence of a defendant's insur123. See Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 672 (Del. 1976) ("'[W]hen insurance is
involved, the action between parent and child is not truly adversary .... '" (quoting Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (Mass. 1975)); Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d at 913 ("[I]t
would be incongruous to permit recovery against a parent and the parent's insurance company by the unrelated child but to deny recovery to the parent's child when culpability is
admitted or established."); Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906, 911 (Miss. 1992) (reasoning
that "domestic peace and harmony may be more threatened by denying the cause of action
than by permitting one, especially where there is insurance").
124. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d at 914.
125. Id
126. Cf Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 562-63, 505 A.2d 826, 837 (1986) (citing cases in
other jurisdictions that adopt this argument).
127. See Renko, 346 Md. at 478, 697 A.2d at 475 (discussing the lack of relevance of
insurance to liability); Frye, 305 Md. at 564, 505 A.2d at 837 (stating that policies or contracts held by parents indemnifying them against loss from judgments are not relevant to
the determination of the parents' liability (citing Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 24,
152 A.2d 498, 500 (1930)); Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 729, 272 A.2d 435, 440 (1971)
(stating that the fact that a defendant has a particular type of insurance does not change
the rule on parental immunity). Maryland is among a majority of jurisdictions following
the rule that insurance is irrelevant to the determination of liability. Renko, 346 Md. at 478,
697 A.2d at 475.
128. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Atwood, 319 Md. 247, 258, 572 A.2d 154, 159 (1990) (discussing the admissibility of liability insurance evidence at the trial of a tort case). There are,
however, a few exceptions to this rule. Evidence of liability insurance may be admitted in
motor vehicle torts if relevant to the cause of the accident, if reference to insurance is
made by the defendant or his witness, or if relevant to show proof of agency, ownership, or
control. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Miller, 315 Md. 182, 191 n.8, 553 A.2d 1268, 1272 n.8 (1989);
Jones v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., 252 Md. 475, 494, 250 A.2d 653, 664-65 (1969). Similarly,
the Federal Rules of Evidence limit the introduction of insurance coverage.
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible
upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.
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ance is inadmissible to show fault or lack thereof' 2 9 and may be highly
prejudicial.1 3 ° Establishing the availability of a certain sum of coverage may distort a jury verdict"' or sway a jury to award damages without fault.' 32 "It is a common experience in many courts that a jury's
1 33
generosity is proportional to the amount of available insurance."
In Renko, the court relied on these principles when it explained
that, in a normal case, liability insurance is not relevant until an in1 34
sured's liability has been fixed in an appropriate legal proceeding.
Yet, in jurisdictions abrogating parent-child immunity for motor vehicle torts, the entire existence of the case is predicated on the presence
of liability insurance. 3 5 Liability insurance does not create liability;
13 6
insurance only recompenses liability when liability -otherwise exists.
In the same respect, liability insurance cannot create a cause of action
where one did not otherwise exist.
Abrogation of parent-child immunity based on the existence of
liability insurance forces the insurer to defend a suit that its insured
has every incentive to lose. 13 7 Our legal system is designed to be an
adversarial process; 38 yet, in parent-child suits, parents are more
likely to admit to liability, whether or not they believe that admission,
if their insurance will fund their child's judgment. 1 39 This is where
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability
when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness.
FED. R. EVID. 411.
129. See Miller, 315 Md. at 191, 553 A.2d at 1272 (explaining the limited purposes for
which liability insurance may be introduced in tort suits).
130. Atwood, 319 Md. at 258, 572 A.2d at 159. The Court of Appeals explained:
The rule against admitting evidence regarding insurance is for the protection of both parties. If the amount of insurance coverage is high, reference to it
may prejudice the defendant because the jury may consider the fact that the defendant will not be personally liable for any damages, and therefore be overly
generous in an award to the plaintiff. Conversely, if the limits of coverage are
low, or if coverage is nonexistent, the award may be smaller than justified because
the jury may limit the award to what it believes the defendant can personally
afford regardless of the actual damages proved.
Morris v. Weddington, 320 Md. 674, 681, 579 A.2d 762, 765 (1990).
131. Miller, 315 Md. at 191-92, 553 A.2d at 1272.
132. Jones, 252 Md. at 494-95, 250 A.2d at 665.
133. Renko, 346 Md. at 479, 697 A.2d at 475.
134. Id. at 478, 697 A.2d at 475.
135. Id.
136. Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 730, 272 A.2d 435, 440 (1971) (quoting PROSSER ON
TORTS § 116 (3d ed. 1964)).
137. Renko, 346 Md. at 478, 697 A.2d at 475.
138. Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906, 915 (Miss. 1992) (Lee, J., dissenting).
139. Renko 346 Md. at 478 n.14, 697 A.2d at 475 n.14.

1036

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 57:642

the concern for fraud and collusion arises.' 4 ° In collusive suits, insurers will inevitably be forced to defend the insured parent without
knowledge of the facts giving rise to the child's claim and with little
hope of cooperation from the insured parent to avoid liability. 4 ' Jurors are expected to determine liability and award verdicts based on
facts and evidence. 4 2 However, if facts relevant to the defendant's
liability are suppressed or fabricated by an agreement of the supposed
adversaries, the jury's verdict will be distorted in favor of the facts that
the colluding plaintiff and defendant have chosen to set forth. 4 3
Partial abrogation based on liability insurance will force insurance companies to expend their own resources to guard against collusive suits. 1 4 4 Proponents of abrogation have argued that cooperation

clauses, which are frequently found in insurance contracts, provide
insurers with an avenue to disclaim coverage in the event that an insured parent is colluding to defraud the insurer. 45 Disclaimer under
a cooperation clause is not, however, a simple remedy. In Maryland,
an insurer may not disclaim coverage under a cooperation clause unless the insured's lack of cooperation has actually prejudiced the insurer. 14 6 Insurance companies frequently face excessive litigation in
order to establish the validity of such a disclaimer.' 47 Between the
payment of judgments against parents and increased litigation ex140. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
141. See Glaskox, 614 So. 2d at 915 (Lee, J., dissenting) (warning that abrogation of parent-child immunity will negate the antagonistic nature of the adversarial process).

142. Id.
143. Id. Some jurisdictions that have abrogated the immunity acknowledge the possibility of parent-child collusion, but reason that the benefit of injured parties' receiving compensation outweighs the detriments of a limited number of collusive suits. See Sorensen v.
Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (Mass. 1975) ("When insurance is involved, the action between parent and child is not truly adversary; both parties seek recovery from the insurance carrier to create a fund for the child's medical care and support without depleting
the family's other assets.").
144. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d at 915 (Lee, J. dissenting) (discussing the adverse consequences
abrogation of parent-child immunity in motor vehicle torts will have on the insurance
industry).
145. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d at 915.
146. Roussos v. Allstate Ins. Co., 104 Md. App. 80, 86-87, 655 A.2d 40, 42-43 (1995)
(deciding that an insured's failure to cooperate with an insurer's contractual right to control the defense infringed on the insurer's right to protect its financial interests, constituting actual prejudice).
147. See, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 791 F. Supp.
1079, 1080-81 (D. Md. 1992) (mem.) (suing for indemnification of defense costs incurred
by one insurer against another insurer who disclaimed coverage based on the insured's
failure to provide timely notice of the suit); Sherwood Brands, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. &
Indem. Co., 347 Md. 32, 50, 698 A.2d 1078, 1087 (1997) (rejecting the insurer's disclaimer
of coverage for defense costs incurred by the insured prior to notifying the insurer of the
suit); Roussos, 104 Md. App. at 91, 655 A.2d at 45 (affirming the trial court's grant of sum-
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penses, the additional costs insurers incur undoubtedly will be passed
on to policy holders.1 48
In response to the abrogation of parent-child immunity in other
jurisdictions, some insurance companies have begun inserting "household exclusion" clauses into their automobile liability insurance contracts. 1 4 9 These clauses exclude coverage for family members living in
the insured's household so that if a child is injured in a car accident
due to her parent's negligence, the parent's insurer will not cover the
costs of the injury to the child. 5 ° Consequently, household exclusions protect insurers from fraudulent or collusive parent-child suits
by eliminating the monetary incentive for such a suit. Some jurisdictions have held household exclusions to be invalid and against public
policy,' while other jurisdictions have enforced the exclusions.1 52 In
the past, Maryland courts have rejected household exclusions in mo3
5
tor vehicle insurance policies.1

mary judgment in favor of an insurer who brought a declaratory action against its insured
to establish disclaimer of coverage under a cooperation clause).
148. See Glaskox, 614 So. 2d at 915 (Lee, J., dissenting) (arguing that liability insurance
rates will be driven up by abrogation of parent-child immunity based on the existence of
liability insurance).
149. CompareHaley, supra note 119, at 582 (citing case law holding household exclusion
clauses both valid and invalid) with Glaskox, 614 So. 2d at 915 (Lee,J., dissenting) (arguing,
in 1992, that the widespread abrogation of parent-child immunity would cause insurers to
exclude family members from liability coverage).
150. Haley, supra note 119, at 582.
151. See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 1985) (holding a household family exclusion in an automobile insurance policy contrary to public policy and
therefore invalid).
152. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boles, 481 N.E.2d 1096, 1101 (Ind. 1985) (holding that a
household exclusion was not contrary to Indiana public policy); Walker v. American Family
Mut. Ins. Co., 340 N.W.2d 599, 600 (Iowa 1983) (affirming the trial court's refusal to invalidate on public policy grounds an insurance contract clause that excluded from coverage
bodily injury to any member of the insured's household).
153. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 307 Md. 631,
644, 516 A.2d 586, 592 (1986) (holding a household exclusion clause in an automobile
insurance contract invalid to the extent of minimum statutory liability coverage, but valid
as to the coverage beyond that minimum); Jennings v. Government Employees Ins. Co.,
302 Md. 352, 362, 488 A.2d 166, 171 (1985) (holding invalid a household exclusion clause
in an automobile liability insurance policy). These clauses were found to be in conflict
with the General Assembly's mandate on automobile liability insurance and the exclusions
that the legislature intended to permit. Id. at 359, 488 A.2d at 169-70. Recently, however,
Maryland's insurance code has been revised to allow a limited household exclusion from
mandatory uninsured motorist coverage. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 19-509(f) (1) (1997). The
statute states in relevant part:
(f) Exclusions.-An insurer may exclude from the uninsured motorist coverage required by this section benefits for:
(1) the named insured or a family member of the named insured who
resides in the named insured's household for an injury that occurs when the
named insured or family member is occupying or is struck as a pedestrian by an
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals has concluded:
"'The exclusion of motor torts from the parent-child immunity rule
would inevitably have some impact on the insurance scheme and the
social policy it furthers.' 1 54 In both Warren and Frye, the court reasoned that because the legislature created compulsory motor vehicle
insurance as part of its elaborate insurance scheme, any exception to
155
parent-child immunity should be left to the General Assembly.
Renko concurred with Warren and Frye, citing the legislature's silence
156
on the issue of parent-child immunity.
In addition to evidentiary and legislative problems, the insurancebased argument in favor of abrogation suffers from another flaw. In
Renko, the Court of Appeals noted that this argument fails to assess the
consequences of an award that exceeds the amount of available coverage. 157 In this situation, a judgment in excess of the parents' insurance coverage may require subsequent collection proceedings against
the parents, causing further disruption of family harmony.1 58 Even if
recovery were limited to the amount of available insurance, Renko's
argument "that her recovery should be no different than that of any
person negligently injured" would be weakened because damage
awards among similarly injured plaintiffs would vary greatly depend1 59
ing upon the amount of available liability insurance.
5. Conclusion.-Renko v. McLean is the latest decision in a series
of cases demonstrating the vitality of the parent-child immunity doctrine in Maryland law.16 ° In Renko, the court was unwavering in its
deference to the doctrine's rationale of promoting peace and haruninsured motor vehicle that is owned by the named insured or an immediate
family member of the named insured who resides in the named insured's
household.
Id. It is unlikely that insurers will embrace this exclusion as a mechanism for avoiding
collusive parent-child suits because the permissible exclusion applies only to extremely limited circumstances, and parent-child immunity already protects insurers from the potential
for fraudulent or collusive suits.
154. Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 626-27, 650 A.2d 252, 256 (1994) (quoting Frye v.
Frye, 305 Md. 542, 567, 505 A.2d 826, 839 (1986)).
155. See id. at 627-28, 650 A.2d at 256-57; Frye, 305 Md. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839.
We are not unmindful of the direction being taken by other jurisdictions in this
area, especially where the parties are insured.... We decline, however, to follow
those jurisdictions, leaving it to the Maryland legislature to make this change if it
perceives it to be in the best interest of the people of this State.
Montz v. Mendaloff, 40 Md. App. 220, 224, 388 A.2d 568, 571 (1978) (citations omitted).
156. Renko, 346 Md. at 470, 697 A.2d at 471.
157. Id. at 479-80, 697 A.2d at 475-76.
158. Id.
159. Id at 480, 697 A.2d at 476.
160. See generally supra notes 43-76 and accompanying text.
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mony within families and preserving parental authority over children.1 6 ' The court's reluctance to allow new exceptions to the
doctrine is well grounded in legal precedent, policy arguments, and
logic. Because the Court of Appeals has rejected even the most widely
accepted arguments in favor of abrogation,1 6 2 proponents will have to
direct their arguments to the General Assembly in order to change
the doctrine of parent-child immunity in Maryland.
CATHY

C.

A. HINGER

Clarifying the Elements of Malicious Use of Process and Abuse of
Process Claims

In One Thousand Fleet Ltd. Partnershipv. Gueniero,1 the Court of
Appeals held that a community organization's lawsuit challenging Baltimore City's decision to grant a zoning modification and issue a
building permit was neither a malicious use of process nor an abuse of
process even though the lawsuit had a detrimental effect on the developer who intended to renovate the site.2 In reaching its decision, the
Court of Appeals clarified the elements of both torts.' While forgoing
a detailed discussion of some of these elements,4 the court addressed
a question of first impression regarding the termination issue of malicious use of process and reinforced the damages element of abuse of
process.5 In addressing these issues, the Court of Appeals made the
already stringent malicious use of process and abuse of process standards even more difficult for plaintiffs to meet.
1. The Case.-During the summer of 1992, One Thousand Fleet
Limited Partnership (Fleet), a real estate development business, began negotiations to purchase an abandoned warehouse that it

161. See supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
1. 346 Md. 29, 694 A.2d 952 (1997).
2. Id. at 43, 48, 694 A.2d at 958-59, 961.
3. See id at 37-38, 694 A.2d at 956 (explaining that an action for malicious use of
process has five elements and that an action for abuse of process has three elements); see
also infra notes 118-122 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of malicious use

of process); infra notes 130-133 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of abuse
of process).
4. For example, the court chose not to discuss the "prior proceeding" and "probable
cause" elements of malicious use of process, nor did it discuss the "ulterior motive" ele-

ment of abuse of process. See infra notes 153-164, 170-172 and accompanying text.
5. Guerriero, 346 Md. at 41-48, 694 A.2d at 958-61.
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planned to convert to an apartment building. 6 Initially, the Little Italy
Community Organization (the Community Organization) supported
the conversion of the warehouse to apartments.7
After reaching an agreement of sale with the warehouse owners
in April 1993, Fleet requested that the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore rezone the property from heavy industrial to residential use.8
Fleet also requested conditional use authority9 from the City's Board
of Municipal and Zoning Appeals so that the building could be utilized as apartments."0 The City granted both of Fleet's requests.1 1
Following the zoning change and receipt of the conditional use
authority, Fleet sought and obtained commitments for federal, state,
and local funding for the conversion of the warehouse to apartments.1 2 To obtain the state and local funds, Fleet promised that ten
of the fifty-six apartments in the building would be rented to people
of "moderate income."'" About the time that Fleet secured these
funds, the Community Organization withdrew its support for the
project."
6. Id. at 32, 694 A.2d at 953. The abandoned warehouse at issue in this case was the
Bagby Furniture building, located at 509-521 South Exeter Street in Baltimore City. Id.
Fleet planned to renovate it into a 56-unit apartment complex. Id.
7. Id. In a March 15, 1993 letter to Fleet's predecessor, the Community Organization
stated that "'[t] he community overwhelmingly approved the conversion of the building
into 56 apartment units."' Id. at 32-33, 694 A.2d at 953-54.
8. Id. at 33, 694 A.2d at 954. The rezoning was necessary to convert the abandoned
warehouse into apartments. Id.
9. In Baltimore City, an empty building-no matter its size-is considered a one-family dwelling, and the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals must authorize as a "conditional use" any conversion of the building for use by more than one family. One Thousand
Fleet, Appeal No. 385-93X, Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals, Baltimore City, Md.
(Nov. 30, 1993) (referencing BALTIMORE CITY, MD., NEW COMPREHENSIVE ZONING ORDINANCE No. 1051 (Apr. 20, 1971)).
10. Guerriero, 346 Md. at 33, 694 A.2d at 954.
11. Id. Fleet received the zoning change from the Mayor and City Council on July 2,
1993, and the conditional use authority from the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals
on November 30, 1993. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 33-34, 694 A.2d at 954.
14. Id. at 34, 694 A.2d at 954. According to Fleet's complaint, the Community Organization's support for the project dissipated when Fleet agreed to reserve 10 apartments for
moderate income residents. Id. Fleet alleged that John Guerriero, a Little Italy property
owner, stated during a meeting regarding the public financing that the project troubled
him because "'itwould attract residents of African-American descent' to the neighborhood." Id. In addition, Fleet alleged that Guerriero offered to fund a lawsuit to stop the
project, provided his name would not be associated with the suit. Id.
Guerriero eventually had his lawyer send a letter to the Manekin Corporation, the
realtor handling the sale of the warehouse, offering to purchase the building for $300,000
cash. Id.
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After Fleet completed its purchase of the warehouse, the Community Organization and Richard Ingrao, a Little Italy property owner
and then president of the Community Organization, filed four actions
against the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals and the Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore.1 5 In the lawsuits, the Community Organization and Ingrao challenged the Board's approval of the conditional use authority and the City's rezoning of the building and
subsequent issuance of a building permit.' 6 Fleet filed a motion to
intervene, which the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted. 7 On
June 8, 1995, the circuit court decided that the Community Organization and Ingrao lacked standing to assert their claims and consequently dismissed all of the lawsuits.'" The Community Organization
and Ingrao appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. 9 On December
5, 1995, the Court of Special Appeals dismissed the case for lack of
prosecution.

20

On April 24, 1995, Fleet filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City against the Community Organization, Ingrao, and
John Guerriero, alleging abuse of process stemming from the four
lawsuits filed by the Community Organization and Ingrao against the
Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals as well as the Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore. 2 1 On June 26, 1995, Fleet amended its complaint to add a malicious use of process claim.22
15. Id
16. Id. Fleet was not a defendant in any of the four lawsuits. Id, at 35, 694 A.2d at 954.
17. Id.
18. Id, 694 A.2d at 955.
19. Id.
20. Id
21. Id. Fleet alleged in its abuse of process complaint that the Community Organization and Ingrao filed their suits "at the direction of Guerriero and with his financial backing." Id, Moreover, Fleet asserted that they filed their suits "not for the purposes set forth
therein but to (i) interfere with Plaintiff's business affairs, (ii) cause a failure of the financing for the Project, (iii) depress the purchase price of the Property and (iv) facilitate the
purchase of the Property by Guerriero at a price below market value." Plaintiff's Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 7, One Thousand Fleet Ltd. Partnership v. Guerriero,
No. 95114001/CL195817 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City Apr. 24, 1995).
The Community Organization, Ingrao, and Guerriero subsequently filed a two-count
counterclaim. Guerriero, 346 Md. at 35, 694 A.2d at 955. In the first count, the Community
Organization, Ingrao, and Guerriero alleged that the City wrongly issued a building permit
because the conditional use authority on which they based the permit was invalid. Id. In
the second count, the Community Organization, Ingrao, and Guerriero claimed that
Fleet's allegations of racism in a letter sent to ajudge shortly after the filing of its abuse of
process complaint constituted defamation. Id
22. Guerniero, 346 Md. at 35, 694 A-2d at 955. In the amended complaint, Fleet alleged
that the suits by the Community Organization and Ingrao were filed without probable
cause; that each suit terminated in its favor; that the suits were filed with malice "in that
each was intended to interfere with Plaintiffs [sic] financing of the Property and the Pro-
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The circuit court granted the motion of the Community Organization, Ingrao, and Guerriero to dismiss, and Fleet appealed to
the Court of Special Appeals. 23 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari before consideration of the case by the Court of Special
Appeals.2 4
2. Legal Background.-Marylandcourts have had many opportunities during the last century to examine the torts of malicious use of
process and abuse of process. 25 Despite extensive consideration of
certain elements of these torts-for example, the "probable cause,"
"malice," and "damages" elements of malicious use of process2 6 and
the "improper use" element of abuse of process 27-Maryland courts
have left some unanswered questions regarding the requirements of
these claims. Two such questions, which the Court of Appeals addressed in One Thousand Fleet Ltd. Partnershipv. Guerriero, concerned
what constitutes termination of the prior proceeding in a malicious
use of process claim and whether damages are required to establish
abuse of process.28
a. Malicious Use of Process.--In Owens v. Graetzel,29 the Court
of Appeals set forth the five elements of the tort of malicious use of
process: (1) the institution of prior civil proceedings; (2) the lack of
probable cause for the proceedings; (3) the presence of malice in the
proceedings; (4) the termination of the original proceedings in the
ject, reduce the value [of] the property and facilitate Guerriero's purchase of the Property
at a reduce [sic] price"; and that Fleet sustained actual damages because it had not been
able to finalize its financing and had incurred increased costs and lost rental revenue due
to the delay. Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint at 8-9, One Thousand Fleet Ltd. Partnership v. Guerriero, No. 95114001/CL195817 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore CityJune 26, 1995).
23. Guerriero, 346 Md. at 35-36, 694 A.2d at 955. The Community Organization, Ingrao,
and Guerriero moved to dismiss the abuse of process claim because Fleet failed to allege
the requisite misuse of process after its issuance and damages. Defendants' Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 5-9, One Thousand Fleet Ltd.
Partnership v. Guerriero, No. 95114001/CL195817 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore City Sept. 7, 1995).
They moved to dismiss the malicious use of process claim because Fleet failed to show that
it sustained damages as a result of a prior civil proceeding filed by the defendants without
probable cause and with malice. Id. at 9-13.
The trial court granted the motions of the Community Organization, Ingrao, and
Guerriero for the reasons that they set forth in their motion and because the underlying
lawsuit that gave rise to the malicious use of process claim was on appeal. Guerriero, 346
Md. at 35-36, 694 A.2d at 955.
24. Guerriero, 346 Md. at 36, 694 A.2d at 955.
25. See infra notes 30-83 and 86-112 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 32-56 and 73-83 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 124-126 and 134-136 and accompanying text.
29. 149 Md. 689, 132 A. 265 (1926).
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defendant's favor; and (5) the infliction of damages upon the defendant by arrest, seizure of property, or other special injury. 30 Because
the first element-the requirement of a prior proceeding-has generally been addressed by the courts as a part of the other four elements,3" this discussion will focus on the last four elements.
(1) Probable Cause.-In Owens v. Graetzel,3 2 the Court of Appeals disposed of a malicious use of process cause of action by addressing only the "probable cause" element of the tort.3 3 In Owens, a
mortgagor filed a complaint against a mortgagee alleging malicious
use of process.34 The court was able to dispose of the case by examining only whether there was probable cause for the prior proceedings.35 Noting that the mortgagor did not win the foreclosure
proceeding initiated by the mortgagee until after an appeal, the Court
of Appeals concluded that there was probable cause for the prior action, stating that "the effect of the chancellor's decree, despite its reversal on appeal by this Court, was a conclusive adjudication that the
appellee had probable cause in beginning his foreclosure action."36
After explaining how a trial judge's decision evidenced probable
cause in Owens, the Court of Appeals discussed how an attorney's actions established probable cause in North Point Construction Co. v. Sag30. Id. at 695-96, 132 A. at 267-68. The Court of Appeals defined special injury for
purposes of malicious use of process as one "which would not necessarily result in all suits
prosecuted to recover for a like cause of action." Id., 132 A. at 267.
The Court of Appeals altered the elements it enumerated in Owens in the subsequent
case of Shamberger v. Desse4 236 Md. 318, 320, 204 A.2d 68, 69 (1964). See infra notes 73-76
and accompanying text for a discussion of Shamberger. The Shambergercourt explained that
the elements necessary to prove malicious use of process were "(a) the institution or continuation of a proceeding by the present defendant against the plaintiff; (b) the termination of such proceeding in the present plaintiffs favor; (c) absence of probable cause or
malice in instituting the proceeding; and (d) that damages were sustained by the plaintiff."
Id. (emphasis added); accord Delisi v. Garnett, 257 Md. 4, 7, 261 A.2d 784, 786 (1970)
(explaining that "there must be a showing of malice or want of probable cause" to sustain
an action for malicious use of process).
31. See, e.g., Walker v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 237 Md. 80, 88-89, 205 A.2d 302, 30708 (1964); Owens, 149 Md. at 696, 132 A. at 268.
32. 149 Md. 689, 132 A. 265 (1926).
33. Id. at 696-98, 132 A. at 267-68.
34. Id. at 692, 132 A. at 266. The mortgagee instituted a foreclosure proceeding
against the mortgagor because of his belief that the mortgagor's failure to make an advance interest payment was a default. Id. The court ruled in the mortgagor's favor, and
the mortgagor subsequently initiated a malicious use of process claim against the mortgagee. Id. Although this suit by a mortgagor against her mortgagee would today be called an
action for malicious use of process, the Court of Appeals in Owens referred to it as an
action for "malicious prosecution." See id.
35. Id. at 696-98, 132 A. at 268.
36. Id. at 698, 132 A. at 268.
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ner.17 In Sagner,a construction company filed an action for malicious
use of process against three individuals who had petitioned the court
to appoint a receiver for the company, claiming that the company
owed them money.3" In deciding the malicious use of process suit,
the Sagner court focused solely on the element of probable cause.3 "
According to the court, because the three creditors were represented
by an attorney in the prior proceeding, there was a presumption of
probable cause.4" The court reasoned that "in a civil action, it is
enough that an attorney at law who acts in good faith in presenting
and prosecuting a claim for his client, had reasonable ground to believe that his client had a good case."'"
The Court of Appeals had yet another opportunity to address the
probable cause element of malicious use of process in Walker v. American Security & Trust Co.4" In Walker, the court concluded that there
was probable cause for a conservator trust company to initiate a
habeas corpus action in order to regain custody of its ward after she
had been taken from her apartment by her son.4 3 The court explained that the son had removed his mother from the lawful custody
of the conservator trust company without her consent or approval.4 4
37. 185 Md. 200, 208-09, 44 A.2d 441, 445-46 (1945).
38. Id. at 205-06, 44 A.2d at 444. The three individuals became upset when negotiations with the construction company led not to the payment of the company's debts to
them, but to the payment of its debt to a fourth creditor. Id. at 206, 44 A.2d at 444. Their
eventual suit against North Point Construction Company resulted in a settlement in which
the company agreed to pay them only a portion of the amounts that they claimed were
owed. Id. Throughout the lawsuit, officials from the construction company claimed either
that the amounts sought by the three creditors were incorrect or that the company was not
liable. Id.
39. Id. at 208-09, 44 A.2d at 445-46. Although the court failed to enumerate each element of malicious use of process individually, it briefly discussed damages, suggesting that
"[t]he mere expense and annoyance of defending a civil action is not a sufficient special
damage or injury to sustain an action for malicious prosecution." Id. at 207, 44 A.2d at 445.
However, the court said little more than this about damages. See id. The court did not
focus at all on the requirements of malice and the termination of the prior proceedings
during its disposition of the case. See id. at 207-09, 44 A.2d at 444-46.
40. Id. at 208, 44 A.2d at 445.
41. Id. The Court of Appeals suggested that the construction company could have
rebutted this presumption only by proving the existence of a conspiracy between the creditors and their legal counsel to institute receivership proceedings despite knowledge that
there was no reasonable grounds for doing so. Id.; accord Herring v. Citizens Bank & Trust
Co., 21 Md. App. 517, 544, 321 A.2d 182, 197 (1974) (noting that a "[b]ank was further
protected from a finding that there was a want of probable cause by its reliance upon the
advice of its attorney").
42. 237 Md. 80, 89, 205 A.2d 302, 308 (1964).
43. Id. at 83-84, 89, 205 A.2d at 304-05, 308. Without permission from her conservator,
a son took his mother from an apartment near Washington to a Baltimore medical specialist and then to her home in Talbot County. Id. at 83, 205 A.2d at 304.
44. Id. at 89, 205 A.2d at 308.
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According to the court, the presence of probable cause precluded the
malicious use of process action.4 5
As a result of Owens, Sagner, and Walker, it is relatively clear that a
plaintiff asserting a malicious use of process claim will have difficulty
establishing a lack of probable cause for the prior proceeding. If the
other party received a favorable ruling at the trial or appellate level in
the prior proceeding, if the other party was represented by an attorney acting in good faith, or if the other party instituted the prior proceeding in response to an unlawful act against him, there will have
been probable cause, and the malicious use of process action will
46
fail.
4 the Court of
(2) Malice.-In Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co.,
Appeals addressed the "malice" element of malicious use of process.4 8
In Siegman, a husband and wife filed a malicious use of process claim
against the bank in which they had a joint checking account.4 9 Their
claim was based on the bank's attempt to satisfy Mrs. Siegman's individual debt out of the couple's joint account.5" In holding that the
bank's efforts did not constitute a malicious use of process, the Court
of Appeals noted that there can be no malice "where an act, though
wrongful, is committed in the honest assertion of a supposed right
51
and without any evil intention."

After suggesting in Siegman that a wrongful act would not necessarily reveal malice, the Court of Appeals indicated in Wesko v. G.E.M.,
Inc.52 that malice could not always be inferred from a lack of probable
cause: "While malice can be inferred from want of probable cause, it
is no more than a permissible inference . . .subject to negation by
45. Id.
46. See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text. But seeWesko v. G.E.M., Inc., 272 Md.
192, 194, 321 A.2d 529, 530 (1974) (concluding that a store lacked probable cause for
having a customer's wages attached even though the store was represented by an attorney).
47. 267 Md. 309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972).
48. Id. at 314, 297 A.2d at 760-61.
49. Id. at 311, 297 A.2d at 759.
50. Id at 313, 297 A.2d at 760. According to Maryland law, a bank cannot charge a
joint account for the debt of only one of the joint account depositors. Id.
51. Id. at 314, 297 A.2d at 761. The court also addressed the element of probable
cause. Id. at 317, 297 A.2d at 762. It stated that "[t]he fact that an attorney acting in good
faith in presenting and prosecuting a claim for his client had reasonable grounds to believe his client had a valid claim is sufficient to show probable cause on the part of the
client." Id (citing North Point Constr. Co. v. Sagner, 185 Md. 200, 208, 44 A.2d 441, 445
(1945)).
52. 272 Md. 192, 321 A.2d 529 (1974).
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proof that there was no actual malice on the defendant's part. '5 3 In
Wesko, the court held that although a store lacked probable cause for
having the wages of a customer attached when that customer had already satisfied the debt in question, 4 the fact that the store took such
action as a result of a clerical error eliminated the possibility of an
improper motive.5 5
Based on the rulings of Siegman and Wesko, it appears that the
presence of malice is as difficult for a malicious use of process plaintiff
to establish as the lack of probable cause. Just because the prior proceeding was initiated wrongfully or without probable cause, there is
not necessarily a presumption of malice.5 6
(3) Termination of the Proceedings.-The fourth element of a
malicious use of process claim requires that the prior proceedings
must have terminated in the defendant's favor. In Walker v. American
Security & Trust Co.,5" the Court of Appeals considered whether the
prior proceedings had terminated in favor of the defendant. 59 The
court recognized that the plaintiff in the underlying habeas corpus
proceeding ultimately dismissed its case.6 ° Explaining, however, that
the dismissal occurred only after the plaintiff obtained what it sought
to achieve by means of the habeas corpus proceeding-judicial per53. Id. at 197, 321 A.2d at 532 (citation omitted); accord Palmer Ford, Inc. v. Wood, 298
Md. 484, 508, 471 A.2d 297, 309 (1984) ("We have said that the existence of malice flowing
from the want of probable cause is a permissible inference and not a presumption.");
Hooke v. Equitable Credit Corp., 42 Md. App. 610, 616, 402 A.2d 110, 114 (1979) ("The
element of malice . . . may be inferred from the element of a want of probable cause.").
54. Wesko, 272 Md. at 194, 321 A.2d at 530.
55. Id. at 199, 321 A.2d at 533. But cf Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 303 Md. 397, 408,
494 A.2d 200, 205 (1985) (suggesting that the existence of malice can be inferred from the
lack of probable cause). In Keys, Chrysler Credit Corporation requested that Anna Keys's
wages be attached even though the debt that the attachment was to satisfy had been paid
four years earlier. Id. at 401, 494 A.2d at 202. The attorney who requested the writ of
attachment on behalf of Chrysler Credit Corporation was the same lawyer who signed the
"Order of Satisfaction" given to Anna Keys when she paid her debt in full. Id. The trial
judge decided to take Keys's malicious use of process claim from the jury, believing that
only the three following elements constituting malicious use of process had been satisfied:
that a prior civil proceeding had been instituted by the defendant, that the proceeding was
instituted without probable cause, and that the proceeding terminated in the plaintiff's
favor. Id. at 407, 494 A.2d at 205. In its review of the lower court's decision, the Court of
Appeals stressed that "[f]rom the lack of probable cause, the jury could have inferred the
existence of malice." Id. at 408, 494 A.2d at 205.
56. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
58. 237 Md. 80, 205 A.2d 302 (1964).
59. Id. at 89, 205 A.2d at 308.
60. Id.

1998]

MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS

1047

mission to continue supervision of a ward under its care-the court
held that termination was not in the defendant's favor.6 1
62
It was even more clear in Herring v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co.
that the prior proceeding had not terminated in favor of the party
now asserting a malicious use of process claim.63 In Herring,the party
bringing the malicious use of process action had been ordered in the
prior proceeding to pay a judgment of $52,387, plus interest.6 4 The
court stated, "The element of the tort of malicious use of process requiring that the prior proceedings terminate in favor of the defendant
65
therein was, therefore, not even arguably satisfied.
In Berman v. Karvounis,66 the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether to affirm the dismissal of a malicious use of process
claim because several counts in the underlying proceeding remained
open and unadjudicated.6 7 The court first reiterated that malicious
use of process required a termination of the prior proceeding in favor
of the plaintiff.6" It then explained that an adjudication of less than
all of the counts of a complaint is not a termination of the action
because such adjudication is subject to revision until entry of judgment on all counts.6 9
Although Maryland courts have had opportunities to consider
whether the losing party in a prior proceeding could argue that termination was in his favor,7 ° or whether dismissal of only some counts of a
claim constituted termination of a prior proceeding, 7 1 other questions
regarding the termination element of malicious use of process have
eluded them. One such question is whether the prior proceeding is
terminated if there is a pending appeal.7 2
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
21 Md. App. 517, 321 A.2d 182 (1974).
Id. at 547, 321 A.2d at 198-99.
Id., 321 A.2d at 198.
Id.
308 Md. 259, 518 A.2d 726 (1987).
Id. at 267, 518 A.2d at 730.
Id. at 266-67, 518 A.2d at 729-30.
Id. at 267, 518 A.2d at 730. According to the Court of Appeals, the only time that

this would not be true is when the court entered final judgment on some of the counts of a

complaint "upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon
an express direction for the entry ofjudgment." Id. There was no such determination or
direction in the proceeding giving rise to Berman. See id,
70. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.

71. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
72. See Guerriero,346 Md. at 41, 694 A.2d at 958 ("The question of whether a proceeding has been 'terminated' for purposes of a malicious use of process action when the judgment 'terminating' the proceeding was pending on appeal at the time the plaintiff
initiated the malicious use of process action is a question of first impression in this State.").
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(4) Damages.-The Court of Appeals first addressed the issue of damages in the context of malicious use of process in Shamberger
v. Dessel.73 In Shamberger, an individual instituted a caveat proceeding
prior to the probate of a will-an action that, until it was dismissed
with prejudice, prevented the appellant in the malicious use of process action from possessing certain real property.7 ' The court held
that the appellant had not suffered a special injury, an essential element of malicious prosecution. 75 The court reasoned that the appellant's inability to use the real estate during the caveat proceeding was
an injury that would result from "all caveats to wills involving devises
of real property," and, therefore, not a special injury.7 6
Walker v. American Security & Trust Co. 7 7 also indicated how difficult it is for a plaintiff to satisfy the damages requirement of malicious
use of process. 71 In deciding whether a conservator trust company's
habeas corpus action against its ward's son was a malicious use of process, the Court of Appeals stated that "[m]ere annoyance and the expense of defending a civil action are not enough" to satisfy the
damages requirement of malicious use of process.79
In Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp.,8 0 the Court of Appeals once again
addressed the damages element of malicious use of process.8 ' The
court held that the attachment of an individual's wages for a debt that
had been paid four years earlier constituted sufficient damages to sustain an action for malicious use of process.8 2 The court explained,
"'[T] he action will lie wherever the defendant.. . has been deprived
'
of his liberty, or of the possession, use or enjoyment of property. "'83

73. 236 Md. 318, 321, 204 A.2d 68, 69-70 (1964); see also supra note 30.
74. Shamberger, 236 Md. at 319-20, 204 A.2d at 69.
75. Id. at 321, 204 A.2d at 70.
76. Id.; accord Herring v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 21 Md. App. 517, 548, 321 A.2d
182, 199 (1974) (rejecting the debtors' special injury argument by saying that "[a]ny damage .. .to their credit ratings and business reputations by virtue of the filing of the confessed judgments was only that damage typically sustained by anyone placed in similar
straits").
77. 237 Md. 80, 205 A.2d 302 (1964).
78. See id. at 89-90, 205 A.2d at 302.
79. Id. at 90, 205 A.2d at 308; accordHooke v. Equitable Credit Corp., 42 Md. App. 610,
613-14, 402 A.2d 110, 113 (1979) (dismissing a contention that attorneys' fees and other
expenses incurred in defending against a civil action constituted special damages).
80. 303 Md. 397, 494 A.2d 200 (1985).
81. Id. at 409,-10, 494 A.2d at 206-07.
82. Id. at 407-10, 494 A.2d at 205-07.
83. Id. at 410, 494 A.2d at 207-08 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Owens v. Graetzel, 149
Md. 689, 695, 132 A. 265, 267 (1926)).
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b. Abuse of Process.-Inaddition to claims of malicious use of
process, Maryland courts have also been faced with several abuse of
process cases. In Maryland, there are three elements essential to sustaining a claim of abuse of process:
(1) that the defendant made an illegal, improper, perverted
use of the process, a use neither warranted nor authorized by
the process ....

and (2) that the defendant had an ulterior

motive or purpose in exercising such illegal, perverted, or
improper use of process, and (3)
that damage resulted to the
84
plaintiff from the irregularity.
The Court of Appeals distinguished abuse of process from malicious
use of process in Walker v. American Security & Trust Co., explaining
that the former concerns misuse of process once a valid proceeding
has begun, whereas the latter contemplates that the prior proceeding
was invalid and initiated without probable cause.85
(1) Improper Use of Process.-In Bartlett v. Christhilf,s6 a receiver sued his co-receiver for abuse of process, based on the co-receiver's lawsuit against him for unlawfully withholding assets,
obstructing collection of the assets, acting in contempt of the authority of the court that had appointed him receiver, and embezzling
money from the trust.8' The court emphasized that abuse of process
is "the malicious misuse or misapplication of that process to accomplish some purpose not warranted or commanded by the writ."' 8 The
court further said that "[a] 11 the cases upon this subject depend either
upon the arrest of the person or the seizure of his property. "89 After
determining that the receiver had not misused the court's order
against his co-receiver, and that the alleged injuries to the co-receiver's business and reputation were insufficient to meet the abuse of
84. Herring v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 21 Md. App. 517, 534, 321 A.2d 182, 192
(1974) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Berman v. Karvounis, 308 Md. 259, 262,
518 A.2d 726, 727 (1987) (enumerating these three elements).
85. 237 Md. 80, 87, 205 A.2d 302, 307 (1964). In Berman, the Court of Appeals emphasized that it was irrelevant in an abuse of process action whether the prior proceedings
terminated in favor of the plaintiff. 308 Md. at 262, 518 A.2d at 727. In Berman, the trial
judge had dismissed an abuse of process claim, saying that several counts of the underlying
proceedings were still alive and awaiting disposition. Id.
86. 69 Md. 219, 14 A. 518 (1888).
87. Id. at 222-23, 14 A. at 518. The plaintiff in the abuse of process action alleged that
his co-receiver brought suit against him "'for the purpose of having [him] declared in
contempt of court and removed from his office of receiver, and to disgrace him.'" Id. at
228, 14 A. at 520. He further alleged that his feelings, reputation, and business had suffered as a result of the action against him. Id., 14 A. at 520-21.
88. Id. at 229, 14 A. at 521.
89. Id. at 231, 14 A. at 522.
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process damages standard, the Court of Appeals held that no abuse of
process had occurred.9"
In Walker v. American Security & Trust Co., the Court of Appeals
once again focused on the improper use of process, holding that
there was no abuse of process in a habeas corpus action brought by a
conservator trust company to regain control of its ward.9" The Walker
court stated that "abuse of process is concerned with the improper use
of criminal or civil process in a manner not contemplated by law after
92
it has been issued."
In assessing the abuse of process claim, the court focused on the
propriety of the writ.9 3 The court found a writ of habeas corpus to be
a proper and normal means of regaining custody of a ward, notwithstanding the fact that the ward was with her son voluntarily. 94 Therefore, the court held that the son's action for abuse of process failed.9 5
Based on Walker, it appears that there is no improper use of process if
the plaintiff uses process only to gain the remedy normally awarded in
the particular cause of action.
(2) Ulterior Motive.-In Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp.,96 the
Court of Appeals focused on the ulterior motive element of abuse of
process. 97 The court indicated that, in addition to the improper use
or perversion of process after its issuance, the tort of abuse of process
requires an ulterior motive on the part of the individual who initiated
the proceedings in question.9 8 The Court of Appeals said that the jury
in Keys could reasonably infer an ulterior motive on the part of
Chrysler Credit Corporation in that it attached the wages of Anna
Keys for the purpose of satisfying a debt that had already been paid in
full.99
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 230-31, 14 A. at 521-22.
237 Md. 80, 88, 205 A.2d 302, 307 (1964).
Id. at 87, 205 A.2d at 306.
See id., 205 A.2d at 307.
Id at 87-88, 205 A.2d at 307.
Id. at 88, 205 A.2d at 307.
See supra notes 55, 80-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of this

case.

97. 303 Md. 397, 411-12, 494 A.2d 200, 207 (1985).
98. Id. at 411, 494 A.2d at 207.
99. Id. However, the court said that the presence of an ulterior motive in issuing process did not guarantee that process was used in a manner not intended by law after issuance. Id. at 411-12, 494 A.2d at 207. The court treated the issues of ulterior motive and
misuse of process after issuance as two separate questions. See id. After determining
whether Chrysler Credit Corporation initiated the attachment proceedings with an ulterior
motive, the court decided whether Chrysler utilized the process to achieve an unusual
result outside the normal scope of an attachment proceeding. Id.
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The Court of Special Appeals considered the issue of ulterior motive in Herringv. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. The Herringcourt stated it
could not determine whether a bank instituted confessed judgment
proceedings against a debtor for the allegedly ulterior motive of collecting $5000 in attorney's fees.' 0 0 However, the court held that because the bank's confessed judgment proceedings resulted in the
collection of a debt-exactly the purpose that one would expect such
proceedings to serve-there was no abuse of process in Herring.10 1
(3) Damages.-In Bartlett v. Christhilft0 2 the Court of Appeals
indicated that only two forms of injury would satisfy the abuse of process damages standard. 0 3 It stated that "[a]ll the cases upon this subject depend either upon the arrest of the person or the seizure of his
property."1 °4 After concluding that the plaintiff had suffered only injuries to business and reputation, the court held that no abuse of pro10 5

cess had occurred.

In Herringv. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., the Court of Special Appeals considered whether injuries to the plaintiffs' credit ratings and
personal and business reputations, resulting from a bank's confessed
judgment proceedings against them, satisfied the damages requirement of abuse of process.10 6 The court held that such damages were
insufficient because "the injuries contemplated by this particular tort
(and an indispensable element of it) are limited to an improper arrest
of the person or an improper seizure of property. "107
Despite the clarity with which the Bartlett and Herringcourts addressed the damages element of abuse of process, 0 8 many cases left a
great deal of uncertainty as to whether a showing of damages was even
100. 21 Md. App. 517, 531, 321 A.2d 182, 190 (1974). The court speculated that, if the
bank initially desired to collect these attorneys' fees, "the actual institution of such [confessed judgment] proceedings would appear to have been resorted to only when all hope
of achieving that ulterior purpose was despaired of." Id
101. Id, at 532, 321 A.2d at 191. The Court of Special Appeals could not place a great
deal of weight on the plaintiffs' claim that the bank used process not only to assure debt
collection, but to obtain "'undue and excessive'" attorneys' fees, because such fees were
never obtained. Id. at 533, 321 A.2d at 191. The court stated that, "if the act of the prosecutor is in itself regular, the motive, ulterior or otherwise, is immaterial." Id, at 534, 321
A.2d at 192 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. See supra note 87 for a discussion of the facts of this case.
103. 69 Md. 219, 231, 14 A. 518, 522 (1888).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 21 Md. App. at 525, 536-37, 321 A.2d at 187, 193.
107. Id. at 536, 321 A.2d at 193.
108. See supra notes 102-107 and accompanying text.
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necessary. In Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp.," °9 the Court of Appeals mentioned only that a showing of "improper use of the process" and "ulterior motive" were required,1 1 and in Walker v. American Security &
Trust Co., 1 11 the court never indicated that damages were an element
112
of abuse of process despite doing so for malicious use of process.
Just as the effect of a pending appeal of the underlying proceeding
would be the major question facing the Guerrierocourt in its malicious
use of process analysis, 1 3 the question whether abuse of process contained a damages element would be a focal point for the Guerriero
court in its discussion of this second tort.' 1 4
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Guerriero, after determining the
legal significance of the injuries suffered by a developer and the pendency of an appeal of the underlying proceeding, the Court of Appeals held that a lawsuit challenging the developer's acquisition of
building permits and a zoning modification was neither a malicious
use of process nor an abuse of process. 1 5 The court began its analysis
by identifying the standards for malicious use of process and abuse of
process,1 16 explicitly distinguishing the two causes of action.1 1 7
The Guerriero court recognized five elements necessary to maintain an action for malicious use of process: (1) that the defendant in
the malicious use of process action must have instituted a prior civil
proceeding;" 8 (2) that the defendant must have instituted this proceeding without probable cause; 9 (3) that the defendant must have

109. See supra notes 96-99 for a discussion of this case.
110. See Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 303 Md. 397, 411, 494 A.2d 200, 207 (1985).
111. See supra notes 42-45 and 91-95 for a discussion of this case.
112. See Walker v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 237 Md. 80, 87-88, 205 A.2d 302, 306-07
(1964).
113. See infra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
115. 346 Md. at 43, 48, 694 A.2d at 958-59, 961.
116. See id. at 36-40, 694 A.2d at 955-57.
117. See id. at 38, 694 A.2d at 956 ("The two torts at issue ... are separate and distinct.").
The court continued:
"An action for abuse of process.., is concerned with the improper use of criminal or civil process in a manner not contemplated by law after it has been issued,
without the necessity of showing lack of probable cause or termination of the
proceeding in favor of the plaintiff, while actions for malicious prosecution or
malicious use of process are concerned with maliciously causing criminal or civil
process to issue for its ostensible purpose, but without probable cause."
Id. at 39, 694 A.2d at 956-57 (quoting Walker, 237 Md. at 87, 205 A.2d at 306-07).
118. Id at 37, 694 A.2d at 956.
119. Id. The Court of Appeals noted that "[p ] robable cause for purposes of malicious
use of process means 'a reasonable ground for belief in the existence of such state of facts
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initiated the proceeding with malice; 2 ' (4) that in the prior civil proceeding, the court must have ruled in favor of the party now bringing
an action for malicious use of process; t2 1 and (5) that the plaintiff in
the malicious use of process action must demonstrate damages by
arrest or imprisonment, by seizure of property, or by other special
injury.

122

Applying these five elements of malicious use of process to the
case before it, the Court of Appeals concluded that Fleet could not
prevail on its malicious use of process claim.' 2 Fleet began its malicious use of process action while the underlying proceedings were
pending on appeal and, therefore, before the underlying suit against
it had terminated.12 4 Thus the court held that Fleet failed to satisfy
the "termination of proceedings" element. Addressing the effect on a
malicious use of process claim of a pending appeal of the underlying
proceeding-a question of first impression in Maryland12 5-the court
stated: "'It would be a waste ofjudicial resources to allow the plaintiff
in the malicious prosecution action to prosecute his claim only to
have it rendered meaningless if later the appeal of the underlying ac126
tion is decided against him.'
The court held that Fleet also failed to satisfy the damages element of the tort because the injuries that it claimed to have endured
were no different than those that any real estate developer would suffer during a challenge to the zoning of its property. 127 The Court of
Appeals stated: "To qualify as a 'special injury,' the damages must be
different than those that ordinarily result from all suits for like causes
of action."12 8 The court elected not to consider the "prior proceedas would warrant institution of the suit or proceeding complained of.'" Id. (quoting North
Point Constr. Co. v. Sagner, 185 Md. 200, 208-09, 44 A.2d 441, 445 (1945)).
120. 1d The court recognized that malice can be inferred from a lack of probable
cause. Id
121. Id The Court of Appeals elected not to consider whether the plaintiff in the malicious use of process action can be an intervening party as well as an original party in the
underlying lawsuit. See id
122. Id. The Court of Appeals defined special injury as damages that would not normally result from other suits prosecuted for similar causes of action. Id.
123. Id. at 40-45, 694 A.2d at 957-59.
124. Id. at 41-43, 694 A.2d at 958-59. Although Fleet filed its amended complaint after
the circuit court had dismissed the lawsuit by the Community Organization and Ingrao, the
Court of Special Appeals had not yet acted on the Community Organization and Ingrao's
appeal of the decision. Id. at 43, 694 A.2d at 958.
125. Id at 41, 694 A.2d at 958.
126. Id. at 43, 694 A.2d at 958 (quoting Moran v. Klatzke, 682 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1984)).
127. Id at 44-45, 694 A.2d at 959.
128. Id at 44, 694 A.2d at 959.

1054

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 57:642

ing," "probable cause," and "malice" elements of malicious use of process in holding that Fleet's cause of action failed due to insufficient
1 29
damages and lack of final disposition of the prior proceeding.
In considering the claim of abuse of process, the court recognized three elements a plaintiff must establish to prevail.13 ° First, the
defendant must have "willfully used process after it issued in a manner
not contemplated by law."131 Second, the defendant must have "acted
to satisfy an ulterior motive. ' 3 2 Finally, the plaintiff must have suffered damages as a result of the defendant's "perverted use of
process."'

33

Because Fleet failed to establish the elements necessary for abuse
of process, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's dismissal
of Fleet's claim. 13 ' The court did not consider whether "Fleet properly alleged abuse of process after the lawsuits were filed because ...
Fleet did not allege legally cognizable damages."'3 5 Noting that Fleet
alleged neither arrest nor seizure of property, the court indicated that
Fleet's increased financing and construction costs as well as its lost
rental revenue were insufficient to satisfy the abuse of process damages element.1 36 Without sufficient damages, there could be no abuse
of process,1 37 just as actions for malicious use of process must fail ab1 38
sent a showing of damages.
4. Analysis.-In addressing the termination issue of malicious
use of process and the damages element of abuse of process, the
Court of Appeals in One Thousand Fleet Ltd. Partnershipv. Guerrieroanswered some unresolved questions about the two torts. In the case of
the termination element of malicious use of process, the court also
created new legal doctrine. In doing so, however, the Court of Appeals did not in any way depart from the stringent standards that pre-

129. See id. at 40-45, 694 A.2d at 957-59.
130. See id. at 38, 694 A.2d at 956.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 48, 694 A.2d at 961.
Id. at 45, 694 A.2d at 960.
Id. at 45-46, 694 A.2d at 960. According to the court, the damages element of abuse

of process will not be satisfied even if there exists a special injury that would satisfy the

malicious use of process damages element because "'[a]ll the [abuse of process cases]
depend either upon the arrest of the person or the seizure of his property."' Id. (quoting

Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 231, 14 A. 518, 522 (1888)).
137. Id. at 48, 694 A.2d at 961.
138. Id. at 43-44, 694 A.2d at 959.
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vious malicious use of process and abuse of process plaintiffs have had
difficulty meeting.
a. Malicious Use of Process.-In Guerriero, the Court of Appeals applied the same five-part standard that it had used many times
before."a 9 Because it found that the plaintiff failed to establish all five
elements necessary to a claim of malicious use of process, 140 the Court
of Appeals was correct in its disposition of this portion of the case.
Fleet's action for malicious use of process failed, in part, because
it did not suffer the requisite damages for a malicious use of process
claim.'
Fleet only suffered an inability to obtain final financing for
the conversion of the warehouse to apartments, delays that increased
the cost of construction, and a loss of rental revenue.' 42 Based on the
ruling of the Court of Appeals three decades earlier in Shamberger v.
Dessel,'4 3 which was endorsed by the decision of the Court of Special
Appeals in Herring v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 144 such damages are
predictable and, therefore, insufficient to establish a claim for malicious use of process. Shamberger recognized that special damages necessary for a malicious use of process claim cannot be satisfied by
ordinary damages that any defendant involved in a similar lawsuit
would experience. 145 Most developers whose projects are the subject
of lawsuits are likely to experience construction delays, lost rental income during the period of delay, and-depending on the fluctuations
of interest rates and prices during the delay-less attractive financing
139. See id. at 37, 694 A.2d at 956; see also supra notes 32-83 and accompanying text.
140. See Guerriero, 346 Md. at 41-45, 694 A.2d at 958-59. The Court of Appeals said that
the absence of even one of the five elements would prevent Fleet from succeeding in its
cause of action. Id. This interpretation of the rule is consistent with prior Maryland decisions. See, e.g., Owens v. Graetzel, 149 Md. 689, 695, 132 A. 265, 267 (1926) (discussing the
five elements of malicious use of process and explaining that all five must co-exist); Hooke
v. Equitable Credit Corp., 42 Md. App. 610, 613, 402 A.2d 110, 113 (1979) (noting that the
failure to plead even one of the five elements will defeat a malicious use of process claim);
Herring v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 21 Md. App. 517, 539, 321 A.2d 182, 194 (1974)
(stating that the absence of any one of the five elements of malicious use of process will be
fatal to the suit).
141. See Guerriero,346 Md. at 43-45, 694 A.2d at 959.
142. Id. at 44, 694 A.2d at 959.
143. See supra notes 30 and 73-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of Shamberger.
144. See supra note 76 for a discussion of Herring.
145. See Shamberger v. Dessel, 236 Md. 318, 321, 204 A.2d 68, 70 (1964) (stating that the
filing of a caveat to a will did not meet the malicious use of process damages standard
because a delay in possession of property is not a special injury "which would not ordinarily
result in all caveats to wills involving devises of real property"); see also Herring v. Citizens
Bank & Trust Co., 21 Md. App. 517, 548, 321 A.2d 182, 199 (1974) (explaining that the
damages requirement for the malicious use of process claim was not met because the damage suffered "was only that damage typically sustained by anyone placed in similar straits.").
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and construction costs. In adhering to the precedent set by these
cases, the Guerrierocourt confirmed what many previous malicious use
of process plaintiffs must have realized: While recognizing malicious
use of process causes of action in order to discourage frivolous and
unjustifiably harmful litigation, Maryland courts will apply a sufficiently stringent damages standard in such cases so that they cannot
be used to discourage other parties from asserting apparently valid,
even if ultimately unsuccessful, legal claims.
The Court of Appeals could have held that Fleet's malicious use
of process claim failed simply by determining that Fleet did not satisfy
the damages element.14 6 In Guerriero, however, the Court of Appeals
elected not to dispose of Fleet's claim based solely on the damages
issue and, prior to its discussion of damages, answered "a question of
first impression in this State.'

47

Specifically, the court determined

whether the termination element of a malicious use of process claim
would be satisfied if the prior judgment was pending on appeal.148 In
answering this question, the Court of Appeals likely made the decision
of individuals contemplating the initiation of a malicious use of process cause of action even more difficult.
In making its determination, the Court of Appeals examined the
law of other jurisdictions and reflected on the public policy reasons
for following the law of these other states.' 4 9 Ultimately, the court
crafted a compelling argument that the prior action by the Community Organization and Ingrao, which was awaiting disposition by the
Court of Special Appeals when Fleet initiated its claim, had not been
terminated. 150 Suggesting that it should always be the goal of a court
to discourage "'repetitive and unnecessary litigation,"' the Court of
Appeals stated that "' [i] t would be a waste of judicial resources to allow the plaintiff in the malicious prosecution action to prosecute his
146. In many previous cases, the court ended its discussion of malicious use of process
upon determining that the plaintiff failed to establish one of the required elements. See,
e.g., Berman v. Karvounis, 308 Md. 259, 266-68, 518 A.2d 726, 729-30 (1987) (determining
that, after only an analysis of the termination element, there was no malicious use of process); Shamberger,236 Md. at 321, 204 A.2d at 70 (considering whether the filing of a caveat
to a will resulted in a special injury, but not whether the filing occurred without probable
cause and with malice); Owens v. Graetzel, 149 Md. 689, 698, 132 A. 265, 268 (1926) (deciding that it was unnecessary to consider elements such as malice, because it had been
determined that there was probable cause).
147. Guerriero, 346 Md. at 41, 694 A.2d at 958.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 42-43, 694 A.2d at 958-59. The Court of Appeals considered cases from Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, and Michigan. Id. These cases held that an
action giving rise to a claim for malicious use of process does not terminate until final
resolution on appeal. Id.
150. Id. at 41-43, 694 A.2d at 958-59.
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claim only to have it rendered meaningless if later the appeal of the
underlying action is decided against him."'" 5 1 The Court of Appeals
essentially mandated that an individual thinking about initiating a malicious use of process lawsuit may have to wait for years until all adverse decisions against the other party are upheld on appeal.
Fleet's failure to satisfy the "termination of proceedings" element
of malicious use of process due to a pending appeal would not have
prevented it from re-filing the action following the appeal; therefore,
the Court of Appeals needed to consider another element of malicious use of process in order to prevent subsequent litigation. 15 2 Because it chose to examine the damages element, the court missed an
opportunity to resolve some issues regarding the first two elements of
the tort-the institution by the defendant of a prior civil proceeding
against the present plaintiff (who was merely an intervening party in
the underlying proceeding giving rise to this case), and the institution
of that proceeding without probable cause.15 3 In Gueriero, the prior
proceeding was a zoning challenge by the Community Organization
and Ingrao against the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals as
well as the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. 5 John Guerriero
was not a plaintiff in the prior proceeding, and Fleet was an intervening party, not a named defendant.1 5 5 The court mentioned that Guerriero, Ingrao, and the Community Organization had raised the issue
of Fleet's absence from the underlying lawsuit.1 56 The court also mentioned that Fleet responded by suggesting that it was essentially a
named defendant because "it was clearly the target of each action. "157
An analysis of whether Fleet had standing to maintain its action would
likely have provided as much guidance to future Maryland courts
faced with the issue of an intervening party in a malicious use of process case as the court's discussion of the novel issue of termination,
and it might have resolved some doubts in the minds of future malicious use of process plaintiffs. That is, a decision that an intervening
party could assert a malicious use of process claim would have elimi151. Id (quoting Moran v. Klatzke, 682 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)).
152. Id. at 43, 694 A.2d at 959.
153. Id. at 37, 694 A.2d at 956.
154. Id. at 33, 694 A.2d at 954; see also supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
155. See Guerriero,346 Md. at 33, 694 A.2d at 954.
156. Id. at 41, 694 A.2d at 957. Without addressing the merits of the arguments, the
Court of Appeals mentioned Guerriero, Ingrao, and the Community Organization's contention that Fleet lacked standing due to its absence in the prior proceeding and Fleet's
contention that it had the right to intervene because its interests were at stake in the zoning challenge. Id.
157. Id.
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nated some anxiety on the part of individuals who are effectively the
targets of litigation but, as in Guerriero, not the parties initially named
in the prior proceeding.
The Court of Appeals also decided not to discuss the "probable
cause" element of malicious use of process, leaving future courts with
the task of resolving some contradictory statements from previous
cases.1 58 In both North Point Construction Co. v. Sagnei' 59 and Siegman v.
Equitable Trust Co., 1 6 0 the court suggested that probable cause exists
whenever an attorney acting in good faith files a claim on behalf of a
client,16 ' but in Wesko v. G.E.M., InC., 1 62 the fact that an attorney was
representing a store in an attachment proceeding against a customer
did not mean that there was probable cause. 1 63 In the underlying proceeding giving rise to Fleet's malicious use of process claim, the Com16 4
munity Organization and Ingrao were represented by an attorney,
as are most parties to litigation. If it had elected to consider the
"probable cause" element of malicious use of process instead of damages, the court could have determined whether an attorney's representation of the Community Organization and Ingrao in the zoning
challenge gave rise to a nearly irrebuttable presumption of probable
cause or whether such representation was just one factor in establishing probable cause. If the former, then it will be less likely that a
plaintiff can succeed in a malicious use of process claim because parties infrequently initiate civil litigation without the representation of
an attorney.
158. See id at 40-45, 694 A.2d at 957-59.
159. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sagner.
160. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of Siegman.
161. See Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 317, 297 A.2d 758, 762 (1972);
North Point Constr. Co. v. Sagner, 185 Md. 200, 208, 44 A.2d 441, 445 (1945); see also supra
notes 41 and 51 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wesko.
163. Wesko v. G.E.M., Inc., 272 Md. 192, 200, 321 A.2d 529, 534 (1974); see also supra
notes 53-54 and accompanying text. In Sagner,the Court of Appeals indicated that the only
way to overcome the presumption of probable cause based on an attorney's presence in a
case would be to prove the existence of a conspiracy between the attorney and the client to
initiate proceedings for which there were no reasonable grounds. See North Point Constr.
Co. v. Sagner, 185 Md. 200, 208, 44 A.2d 441, 445 (1945); see also supra note 41. Such a
conspiracy, however, would constitute malice. The Siegman court noted: "'[M]alice may
be characterized as the performance of an unlawful act, intentionally or wantonly, without
legal justification or excuse but with an evil or rancorous motive influenced by hate.'"
Siegman, 267 Md. at 314, 297 A.2d at 760 (quoting Drug Fair v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 352,
283 A.2d 392, 398 (1971)). The plaintiff in Wesko overcame the presumption of probable
cause based on a lawyer's presence without a showing of malice. Wesko, 272 Md. at 199, 321
A.2d at 533; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
164. Guerriero, 346 Md. at 35, 694 A.2d at 954.
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b. Abuse of Process.-In finding insufficient Fleet's allegation
that the Community Organization, Ingrao, and Guerriero engaged in
an abuse of process, the Court of Appeals applied the three-part standard of the Herringand Berman cases.1 65 Although many courts have
disposed of abuse of process cases by focusing on the first elementi.e., that the defendant willfully used process after it issued in a manner not contemplated by law 1 6 6-fewer courts have placed much emphasis on either the second element-i.e., that the defendant acted to
satisfy an ulterior motive"6-0r the third element-i.e., that the
plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the defendant's misuse of process.16 8 The Guerriero court focused mainly on damages during its
abuse of process analysis," and in doing so, it presented a damages
standard for abuse of process even more stringent than the one facing
malicious use of process plaintiffs.
In determining whether Fleet had been the victim of an abuse of
process, the Guerriero court chose not to focus on the ulterior motive
element of the tort.1 7 ° Although the court recognized an ulterior motive as an element of the tort, it did not address whether Ingrao, the
Community Organization, or Guerriero possessed an ulterior motive
in initiating the four lawsuits. 7 The court did mention, however,
Fleet's contention that the ulterior motive element was satisfied based
on John Guerriero's desire to purchase the warehouse at a reduced
price.' 7 2 Thus, the court suggested that the ulterior motive require165. Id. at 38, 694 A.2d at 956 (explaining that a plaintiff must prove three elements in
order to sustain an action for abuse of process); see supra notes 130-133 and accompanying
text (applying a three-part abuse of process test).
166. See, e.g., Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 303 Md. 397, 412, 494 A.2d 200, 207 (1985)
(explaining that there must be evidence of an improper use of process after it has issued);
Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 229, 14 A. 518, 521 (1888) (stating that an abuse of
process is a misuse or misapplication of process to accomplish something not warranted by
the writ); Herring v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 21 Md. App. 517, 535, 321 A.2d 182, 192
(1974) (explaining that a party claiming abuse of process must show that he was compelled
to do something that the process would not normally have compelled him to do).
167. See, e.g., Berman v. Karvounis, 308 Md. 259, 262, 518 A.2d 726, 727 (1987) (stating
that the plaintiff in an abuse of process case must prove an ulterior purpose); Keys, 303 Md.
at 411, 494 A.2d at 207 (suggesting that ajury in an abuse of process action needed to infer
an ulterior motive on the part of the defendant).
168. See, e.g., Berman, 308 Md. at 262, 518 A.2d at 727 (stating merely that the plaintiff in
an abuse of process case must prove damages); Bartlet 69 Md. at 231, 14 A. at 522 (indicating that an abuse of process action depends upon arrest or seizure of property).
169. Guerriero, 346 Md. at 45-48, 694 A.2d at 959-61.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 38, 694 A.2d at 956.
172. Id. at 45, 694 A.2d at 959. In Herring v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., the Court of
Special Appeals failed to indicate what constituted an ulterior motive, speculating only that
the defendant in the abuse of process suit initiated the underlying action "when all hope of
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ment may be easy to meet (i.e., with any evidence of questionable
goals on the part of the plaintiff in the underlying proceeding) and
not a significant obstacle for an abuse of process plaintiff.
On the other hand, the court's discussion of the damages element 173 did establish a difficult standard for a plaintiff in an abuse of
process action to meet. The court ultimately held that Fleet had not
proven legally cognizable damages. 174 It refuted Fleet's claim that it
had met the damages requirement by establishing loss of money, a
delay of its project, and increased construction, legal, and financing
costs. 17 5 The court recalled a statement made by Judge McSherry in

Bartlett v. Christhilf 176 "All the cases upon this subject [abuse of process] depend either upon the arrest of the person or the seizure of his
property; and we have been referred to none where this action 1 was
77
sustained for an injury to the plaintiff's business or good name.
Because Fleet had not suffered an arrest or seizure of its prop1 78
erty,
the Court of Appeals correctly held that Fleet had failed to
state a cause of action for abuse of process. In reaching this holding,
the court explicitly and unequivocally reinforced the requirements for
meeting the damages element of an abuse of process claim. Given the
omission of these details from many previous cases,' 79 such a reminder was long overdue. However, the court established a definitive
abuse of process damages standard that will be extremely difficult for
plaintiffs to meet. Plaintiffs in malicious use of process cases have had
enough difficulty meeting a damages standard that includes a "special
injury" element,' which is not even present in the arrest or seizure of
achieving [its] ulterior purpose was despaired of." 21 Md. App. 517, 531, 321 A.2d 182,
190 (1974). In Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp., the Court of Appeals stated that ulterior motive
could be inferred from the attachment of an individual's wages if the debt in question had
already been paid. 303 Md. 397, 411, 494 A.2d 200, 207 (1985).
173. See Guerriero,346 Md. at 45-48, 694 A.2d at 960-61.
174. See id. at 48, 694 A.2d at 961.
175. See id. at 47, 694 A.2d at 960.
176. Id. at 45-46, 694 A.2d at 960 (citing Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 231, 14 A. 518,
522 (1888)). In Herringv. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 21 Md. App. 517, 321 A.2d 182 (1974),
the Court of Special Appeals noted that damages were an element of abuse of process and
that they were evidenced only by an arrest of a person or seizure of property. Id. at 534,
536, 321 A.2d at 192-93.
177. Bartlett, 69 Md. at 231, 14 A. at 522.
178. See Guerriero,346 Md. at 32-35, 694 A.2d at 953-55.
179. See, e.g., Keys v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 303 Md. 397, 412, 494 A.2d 200, 207 (1985)
(dismissing an abuse of process claim merely because there was no misuse or perversion of
the process after its issuance); Walker v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 237 Md. 80, 88, 205
A.2d 302, 307 (1964) (concluding that there was no abuse of process simply because a
habeas corpus proceeding was a proper means for a conservator trust company to regain
control of its ward).
180. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
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property standard that the Guer-iero court articulated for abuse of process. l"' Essentially, unless a plaintiff who has been the victim of an
improper use of process by someone with even the worst possible motive can also establish that he was arrested or suffered a seizure of
property, his action for abuse of process will fail.
5. Conclusion.-In correctly deciding that a zoning challenge by
a community organization and one of the area's residents was not a
malicious use of process or abuse of process, i" 2 the Court of Appeals
addressed a question of first impression and held that a proceeding
pending appeal will not satisfy the termination element of malicious
use of process.18 ' Furthermore, the court reiterated that any injury
short of arrest or seizure of property will not meet the damages requirement of abuse of process.1 8 4 In so holding, although it elected
not to illuminate further the details of the "prior proceeding" and
"probable cause" elements of malicious use of process and the "ulterior motive" element of abuse of process,18 5 the Court of Appeals shed
some much needed light on the "termination of proceedings" element of malicious use of process18 6 and reinforced the damages element of abuse of process.1 8 7 Unfortunately for future malicious use of
process and abuse of process plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals adhered
to stringent damages standards that have proven difficult to meet, and
in the case of malicious use of process, the court likely made the initiation of such an action even more burdensome with its requirement
that a plaintiff wait until after the defendant exhausts all appeals in
the underlying proceeding.
CHRISTOPHER W.

D.

PATE

Customer Use of Non-Public Restrooms: Clarifying the Jury's Role in
Applying Maryland's Tort Immunity Statute

In Houston v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,1 the Court of Appeals construed,
for the first time, Maryland's statute granting immunity to retail establishments from liability arising from a customer's use of a non-public
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
1.

See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
Gueriero, 346 Md. at 40-48, 694 A.2d at 957-61.
Id at 43, 694 A.2d at 958-59.
Id. at 48, 694 A.2d at 961.
See supra notes 153-164, 170-172 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 147-151 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 173-181 and accompanying text.
346 Md. 503, 697 A.2d 851 (1997).
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restroom. 2 The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the restroom was "public," and therefore,
the statute did not shield the store from liability.' In so finding, the
court reversed the Court of Special Appeals,4 which held, as a matter
of law, that the facility in question was "not a public restroom,"5 and
that, therefore, the statute granting immunity to the retail establishments governed the case. 6 In its opinion, the Court of Appeals, in
determining the nature of a restroom for purposes of the statute, examined the legislative history of section 5-378 and considered the legislature's intent in enacting the law.7 In addition, the court clarified
the proper legal analysis for cases involving customers injured while
attempting to use a toilet in a retail establishment. 8 Finally, the court
defined the purview of the jury in determining the nature of the restroom at issue.9 By confirming the jury's power to determine threshold factual questions, Houston places a practical limitation on the
application of the immunity statute. Further, viewing the statute in
the context of the law in other jurisdictions and examining the motivations behind its enactment suggest the law is special interest
legislation.

2. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-378 (1995). This section was renumbered in
1997, and is now section 5-635. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-378 (1997) (noting
transfer of immunity provisions under that section to section 5-635). However, for simplicity, this Note will refer to the statute as section 5-378, as this was the number of the section
when the Court of Appeals decided the principal case. The statute reads:
[Immunity] -Customer use of employee toilet facility in retail establishment.
(a) Definition.-In this section "customer" means an individual who is lawfully on the premises of a retail establishment.
(b) In generaL-A retail establishment and any employee of a retail establishment are not civilly liable for any act or omission in allowing a customer, including a customer as defined in § 24-209 of the Health-General Article, to use a toilet
facility that is not a public toilet facility, if the act or omission:
(1) Is not willful or grossly negligent;
(2) Occurs in an area of the retail establishment that is not accessible to
the public; and
(3) Results in an injury to or death of the customer or any individual
other than an employee accompanying the customer.
(c) Employee toilet not public restroom.-Notwithstanding any provision of this
section, an employee toilet facility is not to be considered a public restroom.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.

§

5-378.

3. Houston, 346 Md. at 523-24, 697 A.2d at 860-61.
4. Houston v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 109 Md. App. 177, 674 A.2d 87 (1996), rev'd, 346
Md. 503, 697 A.2d 851 (1997).
5. Id. at 198, 674 A.2d at 97 (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. Id. at 198-200, 674 A.2d at 97-98.
7. Houston, 346 Md. at 511-21, 697 A.2d at 855-59.
8. Id. at 522, 697 A.2d at 860.
9. Id. at 522-24, 697 A.2d at 860-61.
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1. The Case.-While shopping at a Safeway store in Lanham,
Maryland, on September 16, 1992, Carrie Houston asked a store employee whether there was a restroom available for her use.10 She was
told to go to the back of the store and proceed through a set of
double doors into a storage or warehouse area.1 1 While searching for
the restroom in this area, Ms. Houston slipped on a piece of twine and
fell to the floor, suffering an injury that required the amputation of
12
one of her toes.
Ms. Houston filed a negligence suit against Safeway, alleging that
the store had "breached the applicable standard of care by failing to
maintain its premises in a safe condition."1 3 Safeway claimed that it
was immune from civil liability pursuant to section 5-378 of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article.14
The case was bifurcated, and a jury trial was held on the issue of
liability in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County." At the beginning of the proceedings, a bench conference was held to determine the issues appropriate for expert testimony.' 6 At this
conference, the trial judge stated that the question whether the restroom was public was a matter for the jury "without the aid of opinions
17
by 'experts.'
At trial, both parties presented evidence on the question whether
the restroom used by Ms. Houston in the Safeway store should be considered "public."1 " It was shown that the double doors, through which
Ms. Houston was instructed to go, each bore a sign reading "No Admittance."19 There were no restrooms in the retail area of the store.20
The first-floor facility, to which Ms. Houston was directed, was the
only facility equipped for use by handicapped persons, although there
were two other facilities on the second floor located near the employee lounge. 2 ' Customers in need of a restroom were never directed to the second-floor facilities, but "were directed exclusively to
10. Id. at 506, 697 A.2d at 852.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. See supra note 2 for a description of the statutory provisions.
15. Houston, 346 Md. at 507, 697 A.2d at 853.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. (stating that a "great deal of conflicting evidence was presented at trial on the
question of whether the restroom at issue should be considered a 'public' restroom").
19. Houston, 109 Md. App. at 181, 674 A.2d at 89.
20. Houston, 346 Md. at 508, 697 A.2d at 853.
21. Id.
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the first-floor restroom." 22 Furthermore, Ms. Houston presented evidence that the double doors, through which she had to pass in order
to reach the first-floor restroom, were sometimes kept open, prevent2
ing customers from reading the "No Admittance" signs. 1
The parties also presented evidence on the issue of whether cus24
tomers were required to get permission before using the restroom.
Safeway maintained that all customers seeking to use the restroom
must ask for permission because the first-floor facility is always locked,
and the key is kept at the front of the store. 25 Houston contended,
however, that customers familiar with the store can proceed directly to
the first-floor facility without asking for permission first. 26 She also
stated that during the more than twenty years she had used the restroom as a customer, it was rarely locked, but if it was locked, the key
27
was always hanging on a nail next to the facility and readily available.
At trial, the parties also addressed the issue of who used the facility, and how often.2" There was no evidence presented that a customer was ever denied access to the first-floor restroom.29 Safeway
testified that approximately four customers per shift were directed to
the first-floor restroom.3 ° Using these figures, Houston argued that as
many as three thousand customers used Safeway's first-floor restroom
each year. 3 ' Although Safeway employees are permitted to use the
first-floor restroom, the "employees used this facility on a less frequent
32
basis than customers."
After the plaintiffs case-in-chief, and again at the close of all evidence, Safeway moved for judgment, relying on the immunity granted
by section 5-378." 3 The trial court reserved ruling on both motions
and submitted the case to the jury.3 4
The jury, using a special verdict form prepared by Safeway, returned the following findings: "(1) that the restroom was not an employee toilet facility, (2) that the restroom was a public toilet facility,

22. Id.
23. Id. at 508-09, 697 A.2d at 853.
24. Id. at 508-10, 697 A.2d at 853-54.
25. Id. at 509, 697 A.2d at 854.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 509-10, 697 A.2d at 854.
28. Id. at 510, 697 A.2d at 854.
29. Id.
30. Id. Safeway's corporaie designee also testified that "four or five" customers per day
were directed to the first floor restroom. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. See supra note 2 for the language of the statute.
34. Houston, 346 Md. at 510, 697 A.2d at 854.
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(3) that Safeway was negligent, and (4) that Petitioner was not con5

tributorily negligent.

3

36
Safeway then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
After a hearing, the trial court found, as a matter of law, that the restroom at issue was not public and that under section 5-378 Safeway was

immune from liability. 37 The court did not discuss any other require-

ments of the statute.38
Ms. Houston appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's ruling. 3 The Court of Special Appeals held
that the restroom was not public, and thus, the action was governed by
section 5-378, which granted immunity to Safeway.4 ° Judge Cathell,
writing for the court, began his examination of the issue by reviewing
the legislative history of the statute.4 1 After examining the evolution
of the statute,4 2 the court concluded that the General Assembly intended retail establishments to have immunity from liability for customers' permissive43 use of their "private and/or employee"
facilities.' The court felt that the appropriate distinction under section 5-378 was "between public and private facilities."4 5 Thus, Judge
Cathell turned the analysis to "what exactly differentiates a public facility from a private one,"46 and conducted an exhaustive examination
of the definition of the word "public."4 7 The court held that:
35. Id. at 510-11, 697 A.2d at 854.
36. Id. at 511, 697 A.2d at 854.
37. Id.
38. Id. Specifically, the trial court did not discuss subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) of
section 5-378, which require that there be no "willful" or "grossly negligent" conduct and
that the injury occur in an area not "accessible" to the general public. Id. See supra note 2
for the full text of the statute.
39. Houston, 109 Md. App. at 200-01, 674 A.2d at 97-98.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 184-89, 674 A.2d at 90-93.
42. Id.; see also infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of
the statute).
43. See infta note 68 and accompanying text (distinguishing section 24-209, which
grants immunity when retail businesses are required to provide access to customers with
specified physical disorders, from section 5-378, which grants immunity to all retailers that
allow customers to use their employee restrooms).
44. Houston, 109 Md. App. at 190-91, 674 A.2d at 93.
45. Id. at 191, 674 A.2d at 93. It is important to note that the parties had distinguished
only between "public" and "employee" facilities. Id. For Judge Cathell, this was a crucial
difference. Because, as Judge Cathell put it, "while an employee rest room will always be a
private, i.e., nonpublic, rest room, it cannot be said that a private rest room will always be
an employee rest room." Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 191-97, 674 A.2d at 93-96.
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[A] public rest room is one that is (1) generally unlocked
and devoid of other barriers to its entry, (2) available for the
unrestricted use of the general public, (3) situated in an area
of the retail establishment to which the general public is invited to participate in the primary activities of the establishment, (4) duly identifiable as a public rest room by way of
signs, such as "Rest Rooms," "Mens," "Ladies," in open view
in the retail area of the store, and (5) for which no permission need be obtained before use.4 8
The court then applied the facts of the case to this definition and
found that the restroom at issue could not reasonably be characterized as "public. '4 ' Further, the court held that "occasional use by customers" did not render an otherwise private restroom public. 50 Thus,
the court affirmed the trial court's ruling that section 5-378 granted
Safeway immunity from Ms. Houston's suit.5"
Ms. Houston appealed to the Court of Appeals, which granted
certiorari to review the judgment of the intermediate appellate
court.

52

2. Legal Background.-Marylandfirst enacted a statute addressing customer access to non-public restrooms and a retail establishment's immunity from suit for providing such access in 1987. 53 Prior
to that, Maryland followed the common law principles of premises
liability.
a. The Common Law.-Under the common law principles of
negligence based on premises liability, courts first classify the injured
plaintiff as a trespasser, a licensee, or an invitee, and then courts determine the level of care the defendant owed to the plaintiff based on
that classification. 4 Determining the classification of the plaintiff is
normally a question of fact left to the jury.5 5 In Maryland, customers
48. Id. at 197, 674 A.2d at 96 (footnote omitted).
49. Id. at 198-99, 674 A.2d at 97.
50. Id. at 200, 674 A.2d at 98.
51. Id. at 200-01, 674 A.2d at 98.
52. Houston, 346 Md. at 511, 697 A.2d at 855.
53. See id.; Houston, 109 Md. App. at 185, 674 A.2d at 90 (tracing the legislative history
of the statute).
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 329-332 (1965). For an extensive review of
the law and comparison of liability based on plaintiff classification, see Norman S. Marsh,
The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 69 LAw Q. REv. 182
(1953).
55. See, e.g.,
Coken v. Peterson, 92 N.E.2d 352, 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1950) (holding that
the issue of whether the plaintiff was an invitee or trespasser after passing through a swinging door in the mistaken belief that it led to the wash room, was a question for the jury).
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in retail establishments are considered business invitees. 56 Based on
this classification, store owners owe their customers "a duty of ordi57
nary care to maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition."
However, this duty only extends to parts of the store where customers
are invited.5"
Thus, the common law only barred recovery to customers, categorized as "invitees," when they exceeded the scope of their invitation by
going to a place not covered by the invitation.5 9 Under these principles, a retail establishment could protect itself from liability by denying customers access to private restrooms.6 ° Thus, the law prior to
1987 provided a disincentive for retailers to allow customers access to
their private facilities. The retailers' potential liability for negligence
resulted in some customers, who suffered from certain medical conditions, being subject to "great embarrassment and inconvenience when
they were denied access to restrooms in stores. '' 61
b. The Origins of the Immunity Statute.-The legislature passed
section 24-209 of the Health-General Article in 1987.62 That statute
was designed to provide customers with access to restrooms when nec56. Giant Food, Inc. v. Mitchell, 334 Md. 633, 636, 640 A.2d 1134, 1135 (1994); Pellicot
v. Keene, 181 Md. 135, 137, 28 A.2d 826, 827 (1942); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 332 cmt. e (discussing the two classes of business visitors).
57. Giant Food, 334 Md. at 636, 640 A.2d at 1135.
58. See Pellicot, 181 Md. at 139, 28 A.2d at 828 (holding that store owners' duty of care
does not extend to areas behind the store's counters).
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 cmt. I (discussing "scope of invitation"
as it applies to tort liability based on land conditions and use).
60. Houston, 109 Md. App. at 185, 674 A.2d at 90.
61. Houston, 346 Md. at 511, 697 A.2d at 855.
62. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 24-209 (1987). As originally enacted, the statute
read:
Use of retail establishment's employee restrooms by certain customers.
(a) "Customer" defined.-In this section "customer" means an individual who:
(1) Suffers from Crohn's disease, ulcerative colitis or any other inflammatory bowel disease, or any other medical condition that requires immediate
access to a toilet facility; or
(2) Utilizes an ostomy device.
(b) In generaL-At the request of a customer, and where a public restroom is
not readily available, each retail establishment with 20 or more employees that
has a toilet facility for its employees shall allow the customer to use the facility.
(c) Employee toilet not public restroom.-Notwithstanding any provision of this
section, an employee toilet facility is not to be considered a public restroom.
(d) Civil liability of retail establishment or employee.-A retail establishment and
any employee of a retail establishment are not civilly liable for any act or omission
in allowing a customer to use a toilet facility that is not a public toilet facility, if:
(1) The act or omission is not willful or one of gross negligence;
(2) The act or omission occurs in an area of the retail establishment that
is not accessible to the public; and
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essary for medical reasons while limiting a retailer's liability if those
customers were injured as a result of the retailer's ordinary negligence.6" The original statute was restricted to businesses with twenty
or more employees.6 4
In 1989, these tort immunity provisions were expanded with the
passage of section 24-210.61 Section 24-210 gave immunity to "retail
establishments of any size" that allowed "any customer to use an employee toilet facility."66 The limited immunity provisions of section
24-209 (d) were removed and transferred to section 24-210.67 Thereafter, the essential difference between section 24-209 and section 24-210
was that section 24-209 "required" retailers to provide access to customers with specified medical conditions, while section 24-210
(3) The act or omission results in an injury to or death of the customer
or anyone other than an employee accompanying the customer.
Id. Section 24-209 was originally enacted as section 11-209 of Health Environmental Article; however, the legislature later transferred Title 11 to the Health-General Article. See
1987 Md. Laws 306.
63. See supra note 62 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 24-209(d) (1) (1987),
which excluded "willful" and "gross" negligence from the immunity provision).
64. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 24-209(b).
65. 1989 Md. Laws 387. Thus, after 1989, section 24-210 read:
Same-Civil liability of retail establishment or employee.
(a) "Customer" defined.-In this section, "customer" means an individual who
is lawfully on the premises of a retail establishment.
(b) In general.-A retail establishment and any employee of a retail establishment are not civilly liable for any act or omission in allowing a customer, including a customer as defined in § 24-209 of this subtitle, to use a toilet facility that is
not a public toilet facility, if:
(1) The act or omission is not willful or one of gross negligence;
(2) The act or omission occurs in an area of the retail establishment
that is not accessible to the public; and
(3) The act or omission results in an injury to or death of the customer
or anyone other than an employee accompanying the customer..
(c) Employee toilet not public restroom.-Notwithstanding any provision of this
section, an employee toilet facility is not to be considered a public restroom.
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 24-210 (1990).
66. See Houston, 109 Md. App. at 187, 674 A.2d at 91 (quoting MD. SENATE JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS COMM., Bill Analysis, H.B. 162, Reg. Sess. (1989)).
67. Thus, after 1989, section 24-209 read:
(a) "Customer" defined.-In this section, "customer" means an individual who:
(1) Suffers from Crohn's disease, ulcerative colitis or any other inflammatory bowel disease, or any other medical condition that requires immediate
access to a toilet facility; or
(2) Utilizes an ostomy device.
(b) In general.-At the request of a customer, and where a public restroom is
not readily available, each retail establishment with 20 or more employees that
has a toilet facility for its employees shall allow the customer to use the facility.
(c) Employee toilet not public restroom.-Notwithstanding any provision of this
section, an employee toilet facility is not to be considered a public restroom.
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 24-209 (1990).
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granted immunity for "allowing" any customers to use non-public
68
restrooms.
In 1990, Maryland's immunity provisions were consolidated.6 9
Section 24-210 was re-enacted, without substantive changes, as section
70
5-378 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
Recently, in 1997, the provisions under section 5-378 were renumbered and transferred to section 5-635 of the same Article.71
c. Judgment Notwithstandingthe Verdict.--Maryland Rule 2-532
governs the operation of motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict (j.n.o.v.).7 2 Subsection (a) of the rule provides that "[i]n a
jury trial, a party may move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
only if that party made a motion for judgment at the close of all the
evidence and only on the grounds advanced in support of the earlier
motion."7 3 The moving party is "entitled to a . . . JNOV when the
evidence at the close of the case, taken in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, does not legally support the nonmoving party's
claim or defense. ' 74 However, if there exists any legally competent
evidence, however slight, from which the jury could have found as
75
they did, aj.n.o.v. would be improper.
When considering a motion for j.n.o.v., the trial court must assume the truth of all credible evidence, as well as all "reasonable inferences" drawn from such evidence, and then view the evidence and the
inferences in the "light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." 76 Subsection (e) of Rule 2-532, governing the disposition of
j.n.o.v. motions, states that in circumstances where the jury has returned a verdict, "the court may deny the motion, or it may grant the
motion, set aside anyjudgment entered on the verdict, and direct the
68. See Houston, 346 Md. at 515, 697 A.2d at 856 (discussing the difference between the
two statutes).

69. See id.; 1990 Md. Laws 546.
70. However, the title of the statute was changed from "Same-Civil liability of retail
establishment or employee" to "[Immunity]-Customer use of employee toilet facility in
retail establishment." Houston, 346 Md. at 515 n.4, 697 A.2d at 857 n.4; see also supra note 2
(quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-378 in full).
71. See supra note 2.
72. MD. R. 2-532.
73. MD. R. 2-532(a); see Annapolis Mall, Ltd. v. Yogurt Tree, Inc., 299 Md. 244, 256, 473
A.2d. 32, 38 (1984) (holding that "the grounds which may be advanced for a judgment
n.o.v: are limited to those advanced in support of the motion for directed verdict").
74. Bartholomee v. Casey, 103 Md. App. 34, 51, 651 A.2d 908, 916 (1994).
75. See Impala Platinum Ltd. v. Impala Sales, Inc., 283 Md. 296, 328, 389 A.2d 887, 906
(1978).
76. Id.
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entry of a newjudgment. '' 77 Alternatively, "[i] f a verdict has not been
returned, the court may grant the motion and direct the entry ofjudgment or order a new trial., 71 In addition, if the party's motion for
j.n.o.v. is granted, "the court . . . shall decide whether to grant that
party's motion for new trial, if any, should the judgment thereafter be
reversed on appeal.

79

Upon appeal, if the appellate court finds that the trial court erred
in granting the j.n.o.v., subsection (f) (1) provides three possible remedies: the appellate court may enterjudgment on the original verdict,
remand the case for a new trial if the trial court granted a conditional
motion for a new trial, or order a new trial.8 0 If, however, the motion
forj.n.o.v. is denied by the trial court and the appellate court reverses,
it may "enter judgment as if the motion had been granted or ... itself
order a new trial."8 " When reviewing such a denial, the court must
"assume the truth of all credible evidence and all inferences of fact
reasonably deducible from it tending to sustain the decision of the
trial court in favor of the nonmoving party."8 2
3.

The Court'sReasoning.-In Houston, the Court of Appeals held

that there was sufficient evidence for the jury's finding that the restroom was "public," and that, therefore, section 5-378 did not shield
Safeway from liability.8 " Writing for the majority, Judge Chasanow
considered the legislature's intent in passing section 5-378 and concluded that a "totality of the surrounding circumstances" test should
be applied to determine whether the restroom is "public."8 4
The court began its analysis by reviewing the history of the immunity statute. The court stated that "[p] rior to 1987, Maryland retailers
were not required to allow their customers access to any restroom on
the premises that was maintained solely for use by employees and not
for use by the public. 8 5 The court said that this policy resulted in
stores' denial of restroom access to some customers who suffered from
medical conditions such as inflammatory bowel disease.8 6 Consequently, the court noted, the General Assembly passed section 24-209
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

MD. R. 2-532(e).
Id.
Id.
MD. R. 2-532(f)(1).
MD. R. 2-532(0(2).
Mallard v. Earl, 106
Houston, 346 Md. at
Id. at 518, 697 A.2d
Id. at 511, 697 A.2d

86. Id.

Md. App. 449, 455-56, 665 A.2d 287, 290 (1995).
523-24, 697 A.2d at 860-61.
at 858.
at 855.
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of the Health-General Article to help these customers gain access to
restrooms, while at the same time limiting store liability should the
customer be injured.8 7 The statute mandated access to non-public
restrooms for customers with special medical conditions if the store
employed twenty or more people.8 8 In 1989, the limited immunity
provisions of section 24-209 were expanded with passage of section
24-210, which granted immunity regardless of the customer's medical
condition or the size of the establishment.8 9 The court noted that the
essential difference between section 24-209 and 24-210 was that in the
former, persons suffering from specified medical conditions were entitled to use non-public facilities, while under the latter, access to such
facilities for any customer was at the discretion of the store.90 The
court observed that this was the state of the law until 1990, when all of
Maryland's immunity provisions were consolidated, and section
24-210 was transferred to section 5-378 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article while section 24-209 remained unchanged. 9
The court then turned its focus to the intermediate court's reasoning.9 2 The Court of Appeals noted that the intermediate court did
not base its decision on either the reasoning of the trial court or on
any arguments presented by the parties.9 3 Instead, the Court of Special Appeals considered the wording of section 24-209 and section
5-378, noting as significant that section 24-209 expressly limited its
provisions to "employee" restrooms while section 5-378 applied to all
non-public restrooms.9 4 The Court of Appeals concluded that the intermediate court seemed to be "imply[ing] that the legislature retained the distinction between public and employee toilets in the 1989
reenactment of § 24-209, but that the legislature changed the distinctions to public versus private toilets when it enacted § 24-210."" 5 The
Court of Appeals, however, found no evidence to suggest that the legislature intended the terms "not a public toilet facility" and "employee
toilet facility" to be interpreted differently.9 6 Thus, the court held
that for the purposes of these two statutes, the terms "private rest87. Id. at 511-12, 697 A.2d at 855.
88. Id. at 513, 697 A.2d at 855.
89. Id., 697 A.2d at 856.
90. Id. at 515, 697 A.2d at 856.
91. Id., 697 A.2d at 856-57.
92. Id. at 511-15, 697 A.2d at 855-57.
93. See id. at 515, 697 A.2d at 857.
94. See id. at 516, 697 A.2d at 857 (reviewing the intermediate court's treatment of the
difference between "non-public" and "employee").
95. Id.
96. Id.
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room," "non-public restroom," and "employee restroom" could be
97
used interchangeably.
The court went on to review the intermediate court's formulation
of a five-factor definition for "public restroom." 8 However, the court
concluded that there was no reason to believe that the legislature intended such a specific definition for the purposes of section 5-378." 9
Instead, the court held that "[a] court should be able to consider the
totality of the surrounding circumstances in any individual case to determine whether a particular restroom is public."' 0 If the toilet is
found to be a public facility, then the immunity provisions of section
5-378 and section 24-209 do not apply.1 0 1 However, if the toilet is
found to be private, non-public, or an employee facility, then! the immunity provisions of the statutes apply, assuming that the other re10 2
quirements of the statutes are satisfied.
In dicta, the court, in order to aid future litigants and retail establishments, addressed the "accessibility" requirement of section
5-378(b) (2), which states that the statute applies to areas within a retail establishment that are not accessible to the public. 10 3 The court
agreed with the lower court's conclusion that "'the fact that the store,
with some regularity, directed patrons to that rest room does not
render the facility accessible within the meaning of the statute.' 1 0

4

In

other words, retailers would not lose immunity protections under section 5-378 simply because they regularly allowed customers to use a
particular restroom. Rather, the court noted that the term "not accessible," as used in the statute, refers to areas such as stock rooms where
shipments of new merchandise are received.' 0 5 The court noted that
such areas "may not be maintained in as safe a condition as the retail
floor," and therefore it is possible that a customer might be injured
while in a stock room.10 6 The court stated that the provisions of sec97. Id. at 516-17, 697 A.2d at 857.
98. Id. at 517-18, 697 A.2d at 857-58.
99. Id. at 518, 697 A.2d at 858.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 522, 697 A.2d at 860.
102. Id. at 518, 697 A.2d at 858. Specifically, section 5-378(b) requires that the act or
omission not be "willful or grossly negligent" and that the injury occur in a non-accessible
area of the store. See supra note 2 (reproducing the text of section 5-378 in full); supra note
38 and accompanying text. The same requirements apply to section 24-209. See supra note
62.
103. Houston, 346 Md. at 519-20, 697 A.2d at 858-59.
104. Id. at 519, 697 A.2d at 858 (quoting Houston, 109 Md. App. at 198-99, 674 A.2d at 97
(footnote omitted)).
105. Id. at 519-20, 697 A.2d at 859.
106. Id. at 520, 697 A.2d at 859.
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tion 5-378 were meant to protect a retailer in such a case. 10 7 However,
the court explained that section 5-378 would not shield an establishment from liability if a customer were injured in an accessible area,
such as the retail floor. 10 8 In such a case, the customer would be considered an invitee and the store owner would have a duty to maintain
the area in a reasonably safe condition.
Finally, the court addressed the procedural grounds for reversing
the trial court's ruling. 10 9 The court held that because there were material facts in dispute as to whether the restroom was public, it was
improper for the trial court to grant the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict." 0 The court cited six separate
facts in dispute that it found to be material:
(1) that the "no admittance" sign on the double doors was
clearly visible to customers versus that the sign is not visible
when the double doors are blocked open, as is sometimes
done; (2) that persons who knew the location of the toilet
were required to ask permission before using it versus that
Petitioner's daughter may have used the toilet in the past
without asking for permission; (3) that the door to the firstfloor toilet was always kept locked versus that it was not
locked on the day that Petitioner was injured; (4) that if the
door to the first-floor restroom was kept locked the key was
kept in the front of the store versus that Petitioner's daughter always found the key hanging right next to the door; (5)
that very few people were ever directed to the first-floor restroom versus that as many as 3,000 people annually were so
directed; and (6) that employees commonly used the firstfloor restroom versus that they rarely used it.''
Considering the dispute over material facts, the court held that it "was
appropriate for the trial judge to decline to rule on Safeway's motions
for judgment and let the jury resolve the factual issue."" 2 Moreover,
the lower court should have been bound by the jury's finding that the
restroom was a public facility, because there was sufficient evidence to
sustain such a finding.1

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

521, 697 A.2d at
523, 697 A.2d at
522-23, 697 A.2d
523, 697 A.2d at

3

859-60.
860.
at 860.
860.
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Judge Raker dissented, stating that the lower court's ruling
should be affirmed. 1 14 In reaching this conclusion, Judge Raker mentioned two factors: (1) that the restroom was located approximately
ninety feet inside the stock area, and (2) that the stock area and restroom were behind doors marked "No Admittance."" 5 Based on these
two factors, Judge Raker opined that it was appropriate for the trial
court to find that the restroom in question was not a public facility as
a matter of law." 6 Moreover, Judge Raker stated that she did not
agree with the majority's conclusion that the facts in dispute were material-specifically, whether customers knew the location of the restroom or had to ask permission, the existence and location of a key, or
the amount of use." 7 In Judge Raker's opinion these facts did not
affect the status of the restroom as being either public or nonpublic."
4. Analysis.-In Houston v. Safeway, the Court of Appeals wisely
left to the jury the threshold factual determination of whether a particular restroom is "public," and therefore beyond the scope of Maryland's statute granting immunity to retail stores that permit customers
to use their non-public restrooms. In reversing the lower courts, the
court applied the correct standard for reviewing a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and it found that the existence of disputed material facts precluded a finding as a matter of law that the facility in
question was non-public." 9 The court resisted the temptation to
adopt a narrow, judicially defined test for determining when toilets
are "public," and instead developed a "totality of the circumstances'"
test, which leaves the power to consider all factors relevant to a particular situation to the fact finder. With this decision, the Court of Appeals clarified the application of Maryland's unique immunity statute.
However, in order to fully grasp the significance of this immunity statute, it must be viewed in the broader context of what other jurisdictions are doing, as well as the policy considerations that suggested the
necessity of the statute originally.
a. Procedural Grounds for Reversal.--The Court of Appeals's
decision to overturn the ruling of the Court of Special Appeals was
based on solid procedural grounds, and the court correctly applied
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 524, 697 A.2d at 861 (Raker, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 525, 697 A.2d at 861.
Id.
Houston, 346 Md. at 522-23, 697 A.2d at 860.
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the proper standard of appellate review. At trial Safeway moved for
judgment both at the end of the plaintiffs case-in-chief and after the
close of all evidence.1 20 When Safeway again renewed its motion for
judgment after the jury's verdict, the renewed motion became a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.), pursuant to
Rule 2-532(b). 2 '
In the Court of Special Appeals opinion, Judge Cathell claimed
that there was "absolutely no evidence" that the first-floor restroom in
the Safeway store was public.' 22 In its appeal to the Court of Appeals,
Safeway argued that "uncontroverted evidence" showed that the restroom was a private facility. 123 However, as the Court of Appeals correctly noted, there were material facts in dispute in this case. 12 4 There
was conflicting evidence presented on several issues, including the following: the visibility of the "No Admittance" sign, whether the restroom was kept locked, the location of the key to the restroom, and the
amount of use by patrons versus employees. 125 Considering the existence of material facts in dispute and the procedural rules regarding
j.n.o.v., it was improper for the trial court to grant Safeway's motion
for j.n.o.v., and for the Court of Special Appeals to affirm the trial
court. 1 26 Thus, the Court of Appeals's decision to reverse the judg-

ment and reinstate the jury's verdict was procedurally sound.
b. The Test: Which Toilets Are Public?-In overruling the
Court of Special Appeals, the Houston court developed a broad "totality of the surrounding circumstances" test to determine whether a
restroom is "public."' 2 7 This is in sharp contrast to the intermediate
court's very particularized five-factor definition of "public."' 2 8 While
each approach has its merits, the Court of Appeals's "totality of the
surrounding circumstances" test offers the best method of establishing
whether the restroom at issue is public.

120. See supra text accompanying note 33.
121. See Mo. R. 2-532(b). Subsection (b) of Rule 2-532 states in part: "If the court
reserves ruling on a motion for judgment made at the close of all the evidence, that motion becomes a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict if the verdict is against
the moving party or if no verdict is returned." Id.
122. Houston, 109 Md. App. at 194, 674 A.2d at 95.
123. Brief of Appellee at 22, Houston v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 346 Md. 503, 697 A.2d 851
(1997) (No. 64).
124. Houston, 346 Md. at 524, 697 A.2d at 861.
125. Id.; see supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 72-82.
127. See supra text accompanying note 100.
128. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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(1) The Five-FactorDefinition.-After an exhaustive survey of
the term "public" as used and defined in numerous contexts, 1 2 9 Judge
Cathell settled on a "concise"1"' definition that clearly sets out the
parameters of what constitutes a public restroom. 31 His very limited
list of characteristics would permit only restrooms that are unlocked,
open to the public without having to ask permission, located on the
sales floor, and equipped with a posted sign indicating that there is a
32
restroom.1
Judge Cathell's exact definition of a public restroom would certainly make it simpler to determine whether the immunity statute, section 5-378, applies to a particular case. Fact finders or defendant
retailers would only need to hold the list out in front of them and
check off whether the factors were present to determine whether the
retailer was immune from suit. Should any one factor be lackinge.g., a sign missing from the restroom door-the restroom facility
could be declared non-public, and the statute would grant immunity
133
to the retail establishment.
The practical result of this approach would be predictability. Any
retail establishment endeavoring to ensure that the protections of section 5-378 extended to its restroom facility would be on notice as to
exactly which characteristics would render a restroom "public." With
an almost formulaic certainty, retailers would be able to predict
whether they were vulnerable to suit for any particular restroom on
their premises.
However, it is the very predictable nature of Judge Cathell's fivefactor definition that is its major limitation. This approach, while
clear, is extremely rigid. It allows only for the factors viewed as important and relevant by the Court of Special Appeals to be considered in
making the determination of whether the restroom is public. Thus, it
effectively removes the fact finder's discretion to examine each particular case individually and render a finding as to the threshold question based on that unique situation, replacing individualized
judgment and discretion with a checklist of factors.
(2) The "Totality of the Surrounding Circumstances" Test.-The
Court of Appeals's approach to whether a facility is "public" is much
broader than that of the intermediate appellate court. It allows the
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See Houston, 109 Md. App. at 191-97, 674 A.2d at 93-96.
Id. at 197, 674 A.2d at 96.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 48.
See supra note 2 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-378(b) (1995)).
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trier of fact to go beyond the concise list of factors identified by Judge
Cathell and apply its own judgment to the particular situation."' It
allows for flexibility and openness in determining what considerations
should enter into the examination of the facts.
Certainly, fact finders may conclude that the same factors as
those highlighted by Judge Cathell should predominate; however,
with the "totality of the surrounding circumstances" test they are not
bound by or limited to those criteria. For example, the issue of
"use"-by whom is the facility used on a regular or, exclusive basismay be considered highly relevant under some circumstances. However, as this factor is absent from Judge Cathell's list, the fact finder
would be -barred from weighing such a consideration in making its
determination.
Possibly the most common criticism of any "broad" legal test is
that it is vague and can be unpredictable, often producing varied results.1" 5 The "totality of the surrounding circumstances" test applied
to the threshold question of whether a restroom is public could result
in conflicting findings. In one case, a jury might determine that a
particular facility is public; however, in another, factually similar case,
a jury might find that same restroom to be non-public. Thus, this
approach does not offer a retail establishment a clear guide to
whether its particular facility is a public restroom. The totality of the
surrounding circumstances test will make it more difficult for retailers
to ascertain whether they are immune under the statute, thus denying
them the opportunity to predict with complete accuracy their future
liability.1 36 However, providing such assurances is not the purpose of
the tort law system. This point was eloquently stated by Oliver Wendell Holmes in his classic compilation of lectures, The Common Law.
He wrote:
The business of the law of torts is to fix the dividing lines
between those cases in which a man is liable for harm which
he has done, and those in which he is not. But it cannot
enable him to predict with certainty whether a given act
under given circumstances will make him liable, because an
act will rarely have that effect unless followed by damage,
134. See Houston, 346 Md. at 518, 697 A.2d at 858.
135. This is especially the case with tort cases that go to the jury, as the main concern is
that juries are inherently biased toward the plaintiff, and can often render unpredictable
verdicts. See EIuK MOLLER, RAND INSTITUTE, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985, at
13-14 (1995).
136. "When the material facts of the case, and the inferences to be drawn from those
facts, are undisputed, the nature of the toilet facility can be determined as a matter of law."
Houston, 346 Md. at 522, 697 A.2d at 860.
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and for the most part, if not always, the consequences of an
act are not known, but only guessed at as more or less probable. All the rules that the law can lay down beforehand are
rules for determining the conduct which will be followed by
liability if it is followed by harm,-that is, the conduct which
a man pursues at his peril. The only guide for the future to
be drawn from a decision against a defendant in an action of
tort is that similar acts, under circumstances which cannot be
distinguished except by the result from those of the defendant, are done at the peril of the actor; that if he escapes liability, it is simply because by good fortune
no harm comes of
13 7
his conduct in the particular event.
Thus, while the provisions of section 5-378 grant statutory immunity to
retailers under specific circumstances, the law does not, nor should it,
serve as a "crystal ball" from which defendant-retailers can foretell future liability. Therefore, on balance, the Court of Appeals's approach, which considers the totality of the circumstances in any case
and is more compatible with the overall aims of tort law, is preferable
to the legal test developed by the lower court.
c. Viewing Maryland's Unique Immunity Statute in Context.The provisions of section 5-378 are unique to Maryland.13 1 While
other states grant various types of tort immunity, such as governmental immunity and employer immunity from tort liability in some situations covered under workers' compensation laws, 1 3 9 no other state has
granted immunity to retail establishments for situations in which customers use their non-public restroom facilities. The law in other
states primarily follows the common law premises liability framework,
similar to Maryland law prior to the enactment of the immunity
statutes.

137.

140

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 79 (1881).
138. See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 16, Houston v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 346 Md. 503, 697
A.2d 851 (1997) (No. 64). Several Westlaw searches turned up no other states with similar
immunity statutes. Search of WESTLAW, St-ann-all Database (Apr. 23, 1998) ((customer
/p immunity /p restroom) or (store /p immunity & toilet /p customer /p use)). However, several states do have statutes regulating public restrooms. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 1686 (West 1992) (requiring that certain establishments provide toilet facilities for customer use); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-2,264 (1996) (requiring that food establishments provide conveniently located toilet facilities); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.34
(Anderson 1997) (requiring that certain establishments provide free restroom facilities).
139. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.10 (West Supp. 1998) (liability under workers' compensation provisions); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1407 (West Supp. 1997) (granting
governmental immunity from tort liability).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
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The fact that Maryland is the only state with an immunity statute
like sections 5-378 and 24-209 naturally leads to the question: Why
did Maryland see the need for such a unique statute? At first glance,
one wonders if the answer to this question lies in the possibility that
Maryland suffered from an explosion of litigation holding retailers liable for customer injuries in restrooms, and the statutes were enacted
as a response to that problem. However, there does not seem to be
any evidence of such an explosion. 14 1 If the laws were not passed in
What was the
response to a litigation crisis, the question still remains:
14 2
motivation behind enacting the immunity statutes?
(1) Retailer Immunity as a Public Interest Law.--The Court of
Appeals gives one possible answer to this question in Houston. It
noted that before the enactment of the statutes granting immunity,
retailers were not required to grant customers access to private
restrooms, and "many citizens who required immediate access to a
restroom because of [medical] problems" were forced to "suffer great
embarrassment and inconvenience."' 14 Thus, the Court of Appeals's
statement seems to suggest that the immunity provisions were enacted
as a type of "Good Samaritan"1'4 4 law designed to benefit the public.
141. In fact, Maryland case law does not report any cases, other than the principal case,
involving customers injured while attempting to use retail establishment restrooms.
Although it is possible that such cases may be litigated in the lower courts with some frequency, it is worth observing that neither the Court of Appeals nor the Court of Special
Appeals noted any increase of litigation in this area. There are, however, several interesting cases in otherjurisdictions involving customers injured while attempting to use retailer
toilet facilities. See, e.g., Dickau v. Rafala, 104 A.2d 214, 215 (Conn. 1954) (involving a
customer who was injured by falling down stairs while looking for the restroom); Hon v.
Percy A. Brown & Co., 110 A.2d 375, 376 (Pa. 1955) (involving a shopper injured by a
swinging door in a grocery store on her way to the restroom); Bauhof v. Adair, 56 A.2d 370,
371 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1948) (involving a plaintiff who was injured when entering a dark room
while attempting to locate the ladies' restroom); Strawhacker v. Stephen F. 'Whitman &
Son, Inc., 23 A.2d 349, 350 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1941) (involving a customer who was injured in
a restaurant lavatory while attempting to hang her coat). No other states have immunity
statutes like Maryland's. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
142. This question is aimed at discovering the "motivation" behind the passage of the
law, as opposed to the legislative "intent." For a brief discussion comparing "motive" and
"intent" in statutory interpretation, see Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 272-73 (1982). Courts typically
look to the intent of the legislative body, but not at its motive in enacting the legislation.
Id.
143. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also SENATE ECON. & ENVTL. AFFAIRs
COMM., SUMMARY OF COMMITrEE REPORT, S.B. 413 (Md. 1987).
144. The term is used here in its non-legal sense, meaning simply one who helps another. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICrIONARY 567 (2d ed. 1982). It does not refer to the
"Good Samaritan doctrine" in tort law, which holds that a volunteer rescuer cannot be
charged with contributory negligence as a matter of law for risking her own life while
attempting to rescue another. See BLACK'S LAW DICrONARY 694 (6th ed. 1990). It is worth
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The idea being, once retailers were guaranteed immunity, they would
permit more customers to use their restrooms.14 5 Such a law could be
viewed as serving the public interest, because it would give customers
greater access to restrooms.
This public interest explanation provides a convincing reason for
the enactment of section 24-209, which mandates access for customers
with specific medical conditions. It does not, however, aid in understanding the necessity for expanding the statutory immunity protections to all customers permitted to use private restrooms, as was done
in 1989 with the enactment of section 24-210, which later became section 5-378.146 Thus, while public interest could have been the motivation behind section 24-209, it does not provide an answer for why
Maryland felt the need to expand retailer immunity under section
5-378.
(2) The Immunity Statutes as Special Interest Legislation.--One
possible explanation for the expansion of the immunity provisions is
that the law was special interest legislation passed simply to benefit
retailers who wished to avoid liability and thus control potential economic losses. Special interest groups often play a large role in influencing the passage of many laws. 147 In the case of section 24-210,
which later became section 5-378, the legislative record reveals that
two special interest groups, the Maryland Retailers Association and
the Mid-Atlantic Food Dealers, testified before the House Judiciary
Committee in support of the bill.' 4 ' There were no opponents. 49 In
fact, the bill's sponsor, Delegate Elliot, was an independent druggist.1 50 Thus, it seems likely that the expanded immunity statute was a
noting that the Maryland Retailers Association, an interest group that testified in support
of the statute, refers to the law in its newsletter as granting its members "'good samaritan'
immunity." Court Weakens RetailersProtections,MD. RETAILERS Assoc. NEWSLETrER, Fall 1997,
at 3.
145. By providing such an "incentive" to retailers, it is questionable whether retailers
under this scheme can truly be considered Good Samaritans, because they are not performing a "selfless" act. See AMEP.CAN HERITAGE DICTIoNARY, supra note 144, at 567 (defining "Good Samaritan" as a "compassionate person who unselfishly helps others").
146. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
147. For an extensive case study examining the effect of special interest groups on the
passage of one particular law, and the effect that this can have on the judicial process, see
Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and theJudicialFunction: The Dilemma of
Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1 (1984).
148. Retail Establishments-Toilet Facilities-Immunity from Civil Liability: Hearing
on H.B. 110 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 395th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1989) (record of speakers and appearances).
149. Id.
150. Telephone Interview with Tom Saguella, President, Maryland Retailers Association
(Jan. 20, 1998).
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piece of special interest legislation. However, it is still possible that a
law designed to benefit a special interest can have the corollary effect
of benefitting the general public. Here, for example, the immunity
statutes may have increased the number of retailers who permit customers access to restrooms, when they might otherwise not have, thus
benefitting consumers. At the same time retailers would avoid any
risk of liability. Considering the special interest aspect of section
5-378, it was wise for the Court of Appeals to examine the statute's
application and scope critically.
5. Conclusion.-In Houston, the Court of Appeals held that a limited definition of what constitutes a "public" restroom was not intended by the General Assembly; rather, the proper analysis leaves the
question to be determined by the jury through the application of a
"totality of the surrounding circumstances" standard. In so doing, the
court refused to predetermine which facilities are granted immunity
under section 5-378 by formulating a narrow definition, but instead
left the issue to the jury. In that way, Houston represents a confirmation of the jury's ability to determine complex factual questions, without rigidly prescribed judicial constraints. Further, the court's
treatment of the statute was appropriate considering the uniqueness
of the statute and the special interest motivations behind its enactment. The Court of Appeals reaffirmed Maryland's recognition of the
basic common law principles of tort liability by resisting the temptation to extend the scope of a special interest immunity statute.
SHILPA M. PATEL

E. Denouncing the Existence of a Universal Action at Law to Redress
Breaches of Fiduciaiy Duty
In Kann v. Kann,' the Court of Appeals held that there is no independent, ubiquitous cause of action at law to redress every breach
of fiduciary duty.2 In so holding, the court upheld equity's historically
ingrained dominion over trusts,3 and it necessarily confined the jury
trial right in actions brought by a beneficiary against a trustee to scant
exceptions. The court correctly applied Maryland law, but it was unpersuaded by arguments that the inadequacy of existing equitable
remedies warrants the creation of an action at law to redress a
trustee's breach of fiduciary duty. As a consequence, the court
1. 344 Md. 689, 690 A.2d 509 (1997).
2. Id at 693, 690 A.2d at 511.
3. 1&
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avoided discussing the discernible breaches of fiduciary duty by the
trustee in the instant case.
1. The Case.-Frances 0. Kann died testate in 1974.' She predeceased her husband, Louis M. Kann, Jr., and the couple's two children, Donald R. Kann and Lois K. Fekete. 5 Under her will, Frances
allocated a portion of her estate to her widowed husband and placed
the remainder in trust (the Frances Trust), naming Louis as life income beneficiary and sole trustee-no successor trustee was named.6
The Frances Trust was unorthodox for want of any provision allowing
Louis to invade the trust principal on his own behalf.7 The remainder
of the trust, consisting of the principal in its entirety along with any
undistributed income, was to be divided equally between Donald and
Lois, free of trust.8

Louis remarried twice after Frances's death.9 Louis's marriage in
1979 to his third wife, Regina H. Kann, lasted fourteen years, until his
death on December 18, 1992.10 Like Frances's will, Louis's will stipulated that his entire residuary estate be held in trust." Under Louis's
trust (the Louis Trust), Regina would receive the income from the
trust assets for the duration of her life.' 2 Louis's will further provided
that Regina's accustomed standard of living was of paramount concern, and therefore, whenever necessary to maintain that standard,
the trust principal was to be invaded."3 Following Regina's death,
one-half of the remainder of the Louis Trust assets would be distributed to Lois and the other half would be divided equally between
Donald's two sons, Aaron and Burton.' 4 Donald was designated as the
sole trustee of the Louis Trust and personal representative of Louis's
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Kann v. Kann, No. 621, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 31, 1996) (per
curiam), affd, 344 Md. 689, 690 A.2d 509 (1997); Brief of Appellant at 3, Kann v. Kann,
344 Md. 689, 690 A.2d 509 (1997) (No. 22). At its inception, the Frances Trust contained
$106,958.09 in stocks and bonds; when Louis died in 1992, the trust assets were valued at
approximately $128,056. Id.
7. Motion to Dismiss and Brief of Appellee Donald R. Kann at 17, Kann v. Kann, 344
Md. 689, 690 A.2d 509 (1997) (No. 22).
8. Kann, 344 Md. at 693, 690 A.2d at 511.
9. Id. In 1976, Louis entered into a marriage that lasted only one year. Id.
10. Id. From 1974 until his death in 1992, Louis retained his position as trustee of the
Frances Trust. Brief of Appellant at 3, Kann (No. 22).
11. Kann, 344 Md. at 693, 690 A.2d at 511.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Donald was not named as a beneficiary under Louis's will. Brief of Appellant at
3, Kann (No. 22).
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estate. 15 In his capacity as trustee of the Louis Trust, invasion of the
trust principal for Regina's benefit was within Donald's sole
discretion.16
Shortly after Louis's death, Donald procured legal assistance
from Venable, Baetjer and Howard (Venable) and, specifically, the
head of Venable's estates and trusts practice group, Alexander I.
Lewis, III.7 The attorneys then delegated to Donald, as personal representative of the estate, the responsibility of compiling the estate's
assets and liabilities."i In late 1992 or early 1993, while reviewing
Louis's bank records, Donald discovered evidence that Louis may
have improperly transferred $10,412.71 in funds from the Frances
Trust to a checking account held jointly by Regina and Louis.' 9 In the
meantime, because Louis's death had left the position of trustee of
the Frances Trust vacant, Donald petitioned for appointment as successor trustee on March 31, 1993; the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
granted the petition. 20 By this time, Donald had doubts regarding his
father's execution of the Frances Trust, but he had yet to scrutinize
Louis's finances to expose the extent of his father's transgressions.2
Over the ten-month period subsequent to his initial discovery of
the apparently misappropriated assets, Donald, acting on the advice of
counsel, continued to investigate his father's conduct while Louis was
trustee of the Frances Trust.2 2 Donald concluded that Louis had mis15. Kann, 344 Md. at 693-94, 690 A.2d at 511.
16. Id. at 693, 690 A.2d at 511; Kann, No. 621, slip op. at 1-2.
17. Kann, 344 Md. at 694, 690 A.2d at 511.
18. Motion to Dismiss and Brief of Appellee Donald R. Kann at 18, Kann (No. 22).
19. Kann, 344 Md. at 694 & n.1, 690 A.2d at 511 & n.1. Donald's suspicion was triggered by an uncharacteristically large deposit made in August 1992. Id,
20. Id. at 694, 690 A.2d at 511-12.
21. Id. There was some conflict between the parties regarding Donald's motives in
applying to become successor trustee of the Frances Trust. The Court of Appeals's opinion is silent on this issue. See id. On appeal, Donald's counsel argued that:
Donald seemed the most logical choice to succeed Louis as trustee, because Donald already served as a fiduciary of Louis's estate and because the only other likely
candidate-Donald's sister and co-beneficiary, Lois-lived out of state.
...Notably, Donald assumed that role long before he or his lawyers had
reached any conclusion about whether his father had actually misappropriated
funds from the Frances Kann Trust.
Brief of Respondents, Venable, Baeter and Howard and Alexander I. Lewis, III, at 6, Kann
v. Kann, 344 Md. 689, 690 A.2d 509 (1997) (No. 22) (citations omitted).
Regina contended that Donald "created a conflict of interest by petitioning the Circuit
Court to become successor trustee of Frances's trust after he already knew that he would be
claiming that [Louis] had improperly taken money from [Frances's] trust." Brief of Appellant at 13, Kann (No. 22).
22. Kann, 344 Md. at 694, 690 A.2d at 511. Donald and his wife, Joanna B. Kann, spent
approximately 1200 hours researching Louis's finances to calculate the amount thought to
have been misappropriated from the Frances Trust. Brief of Appellant at 4, Kann (No.
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appropriated over $118,000 during his eighteen-year tenure as trustee
of the Frances Trust. 23 According to Donald's estimation, if given the
opportunity to accrue, these funds would have increased to
$195,300.24 Donald, once again acting on the advice of counsel, diverted $195,300 from Louis's estate to a segregated, interest-bearing
account in the name of the Frances Trust while he awaited a final
2
resolution of the matter. 1

On December 21, 1993, Donald, by filing a supplemental inventory with the Orphan's Court for Baltimore City, formally alleged that
Louis had misappropriated funds with a present value of $196,197.31
from the Frances Trust. 26 On January 12, 1995, the Orphan's Court
approved the adjusted inventory and the First and Final Administration of Louis's estate. 27 After consulting with Venable, Donald consciously withheld from Regina all information pertaining to his
discovery of Louis's defalcations, including information regarding the
recently concluded Orphan's Court proceedings, Donald's appointment as successor trustee of the Frances Trust, the investigation of
Louis's financial affairs, and the transfer of misappropriated assets
28
from the Louis Trust back to the Frances Trust.

After the funds in question were transferred, and the twenty-day
period to file exceptions to the accounting approved by the Orphan's
Court had elapsed, Donald forwarded to Regina a detailed memoran22). Donald endeavored to "meticulously reconstruct[ ] Louis' financial affairs" in an effort to uncover a "legitimate explanation for the [$10,412.71] transaction." Motion to Dismiss and Brief of Appellee Donald i. Kann at 19, Kann (No. 22). On the contrary, Donald
discovered other instances in which Louis evidently inappropriately procured Frances
Trust principal. For example, in order to purchase a condominium, Louis secured over
$35,000 by liquidating stock previously held by the Frances Trust. Kann, 344 Md. at 694,
690 A.2d at 511.
23. Kann, 344 Md. at 694, 690 A.2d at 512.
24. Id.
25. Id. The Court of Appeals maintained that, as personal representative of Louis's
estate, trustee of Louis's trust, and substitute trustee of the Frances Trust, Donald had
conflicts that mandated holding "the segregated assets in abeyance, for possible return to
the Louis Trust unless and until the equity court approved a completed transfer to the
Frances Trust." Id. at 714 n.8, 690 A.2d at 521 n.8. Regina, however, intimated that Donald never really intended to await a court's disposition, and that, at the time of the transfer,
he had already assumed the assets belonged to the Frances Trust. See Brief of Appellant at
14-15, Kann (No. 22).
26. Kann, 344 Md. at 694-95, 690 A.2d at 512; Brief of Appellant at 5, Kann (No. 22).
Donald amended the original inventory to reflect a $196,197.31 withdrawal of funds that
he claimed did not rightfully belong to Louis. Id.
27. Kann, 344 Md. at 695, 690 A.2d at 512.
28. Brief of Appellant at 4-5, Kann (No. 22). "As an heir and a beneficiary of the Louis
trust, but not a legatee, Regina was [not] an 'interested person' in the probate estate of
Louis." Kann, 344 Md. at 695 n.2, 690 A.2d at 512 n.2. She was thus not notified of the
Orphan's Court proceeding. Id. at 695, 690 A.2d at 512.
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dum enumerating Louis's alleged misappropriations from the Frances
Trust.2" Donald's hopes of amicably settling this matter were
squelched when Regina responded to the memorandum by demanding payment of $500,000.3o In April 1994, Donald-through his counsel and in his capacities as personal representative of Louis's estate,
trustee of the Louis Trust, and substitute trustee of the Frances
Trust-responded by filing a complaint for declaratory judgment in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.3 1 Regina answered the complaint, filed a counterclaim, and requested a jury trial.3 2
Regina alleged in her counterclaim that Donald contravened his
fiduciary duties as personal representative of Louis's estate and as
trustee of the Louis Trust.3 3 She claimed that Donald improperly
aided the Frances Trust, in which he had a beneficial interest, at the
expense of the Louis Trust, that he wrongly shared information between the two trusts, and that he failed to inform her of the misappropriations in a timely fashion. 4 Regina's counterclaim also alleged
that Donald created a conflict of interest by petitioning to succeed
Louis as trustee of the Frances Trust. Regina further asserted that
Donald failed to raise procedural defenses, including lack of timeliness, and unspecified substantive defenses to the claim against Louis's
probate estate that was made by the Frances Trust.3 5 The counterclaim joined Venable and Lewis, individually, as counter-defendants. 6
Regina charged the attorneys with professional negligence, Donald
with fraud and malfeasance, and Venable, Lewis, and Donald, jointly

29. Kann, 344 Md. at 695, 690 A.2d at 512; Brief of Appellant at 5, Kann (No. 22); see
alsoJoint Record Extract at E61-178, Kann v. Kann, 344 Md. 689, 690 A.2d 509 (1997) (No.
22) (containing the memorandum and all of its attachments).
30. Motion to Dismiss and Brief of Appellee Donald R. Kann at 21, Kann (No. 22).
31. Kann, 344 Md. at 695, 690 A.2d at 512. Lois as well as Donald's sons, Aaron and
Burton, joined with Donald in filing the complaint. Id. The complaint, filed under the
Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 3-401
to -415 (1995), aimed to clarify the parties' rights and responsibilities with respect to the
segregated assets. Kann, 344 Md. at 695, 701, 690 A.2d at 512, 515.
32. Kann, 344 Md. at 695, 690 A.2d at 512. Both Regina's answer and her counterclaim
included prayers for a jury trial. Id.
33. Id. Regina amended the counterclaim twice, first to add a count for conversion
against both Donald and his attorneys and next to make obvious that she sought to hold
Donald personally liable. I. at 695-96, 690 A.2d at 512-13.
34. Id. at 695-96, 690 A.2d at 512.
35. Id. at 696, 690 A.2d at 512.
36. Id. Regina asserted that the attorney respondents were negligent and acted in cohort with Donald in his breaches of trust by either directly performing or erroneously
advising Donald to perform the allegedly improper acts. Id
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and severally, with breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, and conversion.3 7 She demanded $42 million in punitive damages.3 a
The trial court dismissed Regina's counterclaim in its entirety for
failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted, and afterward, the court tried the declaratory judgment action at a bench
trial. 39 In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Judge Robert I.H.
Hammerman found that Donald had acted properly when he transferred the money and that Donald had not breached his fiduciary
duty as trustee of the Louis Trust.4 ° Regina appealed the judgment in
Donald's favor to the Court of Special Appeals.4 1
In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed
the lower court's ruling.4 2 That court began its journey into the "morass created by the alleged defalcation and breaches of fiduciary duty
. .. at a fork in the road of pleadings between law and equity."4
Mindful of Maryland's rule that the remedies available to a beneficiary
for a trustee's breach of duty are generally equitable, the court observed that Regina failed to allege a recognized exception to the prevailing rule.44 Even assuming that recourse in a court of law were
available to Regina, the court determined that her allegations were
deficient.45 Regardless, the court concluded that Maryland does not
recognize the tort of breach of fiduciary duty.46 Furthermore, the
Court of Special Appeals found that the attorney defendants owed no
duty to Regina and that the trial court's determination that Donald
37. Brief of Respondents Venable, Baetjer and Howard and Alexander I. Lewis, III, at
11, Kann (No. 22).
38. Kann, 344 Md. at 696-97, 690 A.2d at 513. Regina also requested damages for
"stress, mental anguish and exacerbation of various physical ailments and conditions directly resulting from Donald's actions." Brief of Appellant at 17-18, Kann (No. 22).
39. Kann, 344 Md. at 697, 690 A.2d at 513.
40. Id. Judge Hammerman was "thoroughly impressed" with Donald's "honorable" actions throughout this ordeal and found that Donald, although he "might wind up with
more money" as a result of the proceedings, was in no way "motivated in whole or in part
by his self interest." Joint Record Extract at E269-70, Kann (No. 22) (oral opinion of the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Jan. 20, 1995).
41. Kann, 344 Md. at 697, 690 A.2d at 513.
42. Kann, No. 621, slip op. at 26. The Court of Special Appeals commented that, during the declaratory judgment proceeding, Donald presented substantial evidence to show
that Louis misappropriated assets from the Frances Trust, whereas "Regina was unable to
explain what had happened to the missing money." Id. at 3-4.
43. Id. at 5.
44. Id. at 6-15.
45. Id. Regina had failed to allege any cognizable damages and failed to prove that
Donald did anything more than extract misappropriated assets-assets that Regina had no
legal right to possess. Id at 16-17.
46. Id. at 15 n.5, 16.
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acted properly was not reversible as a clearly erroneous finding.4 7 Regina then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which granted certiorari
in order to resolve whether the issues raised in Regina's counterclaim
were legally sufficient and whether she was entitled to a trial by jury.48
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Right to Trial by Jury.-Maryland's first Constitution,
adopted in 1776, did not specifically consider ajury trial right in the
context of civil litigation.49 Instead, the Constitution of 1851 was the
earliest of Maryland's constitutions to recognize the preservation of
the right to a jury trial in civil actions.5" Article X, section 4 of the
Constitution of 1851 "inviolably preserved" the right to ajury trial as
that right existed at common law in 1776."' Hence, determining entitlement to ajury trial "requires an historical inquiry on a case by case
basis as to when the right to ajury trial existed in 1776. "52 This historical analysis and a Maryland litigant's right to ajury trial, when no federal law is involved, are governed by Article 23 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights rather than by the Seventh and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 5 1 Maryland's guarantee of a right to trial by jury is not absolute, however, and the parties
47. Id. at 20-26.
48. Kann, 344 Md. at 697, 690 A.2d at 513.
49. Luppino v. Gray, 336 Md. 194, 200 & n.6, 647 A.2d 429, 432 & n.6 (1994).
50. Id at 200, 647 A.2d at 432. Article X, section 4 of the Constitution of 1851 provided that "[t]he trial by jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings, in the several courts of
law in this State, where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of five dollars, shall be
inviolably preserved." MD. CONST. of 1851, art. X, § 4; see also Mn. R. 2-325(a) ("Any party
may elect a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury .. ").
51. See C. Christopher Brown, The Law/Equity Dichotomy in Maryland, 39 MD. L. REv.
427, 457 (1980) (discussing the right to trial by jury in Maryland).
52. Id.
53. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875); Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 346, 335
A.2d 670, 675 (1975). Though not bound by federal law on the issue of the right to jury
trial, the Court of Appeals has cited with approval cases such as Daiy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,
369 U.S. 469 (1962), and Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). See Higgins
v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 551, 530 A.2d 724, 733 (1987) (citing those Supreme Court cases).
Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is substantially the same as Article X,
section 4 of the Constitution of 1851, except that the Article 23 amount in controversy
requirement is $5000. Compare MD. CONST. art. 23 with MD.CONST. of 1851, art. X, § 4.
The Court of Appeals has long recognized that "this provision preserves 'unimpaired the
ultimate historical right as it existed at the time of our separation from the mother country
....'Higgins, 310 Md. at 542, 530 A.2d at 729 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Knee v. City
Pass. Ry. Co., 87 Md. 623, 627, 40 A. 890, 892 (1898) (discussing Article XV, section 6 of
the Constitution of 1867, which was another precursor to Article 23 of the current Declaration of Rights)).
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may waive that right either expressly or by failing to request ajury trial
in a timely fashion. 4
When conducting a historical analysis to evaluate if a jury trial
right applies to a specific action, the court will ascertain whether the
action would have been heard in a court of law or a court of equity at
the time Maryland's Constitution was first adopted. 55 Equity courts
historically did not recognize a jury trial right.5 6 In addition to equity's inability to conduct a jury trial, only a court of law may impose
punitive damages on a defendant.57 Once a court of equity has assumed jurisdiction, though, that court may grant complete relief, including damages,58 in strict adherence to the principle that "equity
59
suffers no right to be without a remedy.
" [S]ince they were first enforced," trusts have been subject to the
courts' equitable jurisdiction.6" In fact, the autonomy that equity ex-

54. See MD. R. 2-325(b) ("The failure of a party to file the demand within 15 days after
service of the last pleading filed by any party directed to the issue constitutes a waiver of
trial by jury.").
55. See Pennsylvania v. Warren, 204 Md. 467, 473-74, 105 A.2d 488, 490-91 (1954);
Hashem v. Taheri, 82 Md. App. 269, 272-73, 571 A.2d 837, 839-40 (1990). "It was as if one
entered Maryland's courts of general jurisdiction through two doors, one marked 'law,' the
other 'equity,' and once inside, the jury trial question was resolved on the basis of which
door one had used for entry." Richard W. Bourne & John A. Lynch, Jr., Merger of Law and
Equity Under the Revised Maryland Rules: Does It Threaten Trial by Jury?, 14 U. BALT.L. REv. 1,
44-45 (1984) (footnote omitted).
56. See Warren, 204 Md. at 473, 105 A.2d at 491 ("Finding that the proceedings should
be in equity, it is not necessary that we pass upon the right to ajury trial ....); Hashem, 82
Md. App. at 273, 571 A.2d at 839 ("Equitable claims will be decided by the court without a
jury.").
57. Superior Constr. Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. 1, 20, 104 A.2d 581, 585 (1954) ("[A] court
of equity is a court of conscience which will not enforce penalties or forfeitures, or go
beyond compensation .... [Elquity will permit only what is just and right with no element
of vengeance.").
58. See Phil J. Corp. v. Markle, 249 Md. 718, 725, 241 A.2d 718, 722 (1968); Brown,
supra note 51, at 435-36, 443-44. Thus, after a court of equity obtains jurisdiction, it may
grant traditionally legal forms of relief even if all equitable issues were previously discarded
and no possibility for equitable relief remains. McKeever v. Washington Heights Realty
Corp., 183 Md. 216, 224, 37 A.2d 305, 310 (1944). Although an equity court is prevented
from granting punitive damages, it can award compensatory damages in certain circumstances and can also award relief to a defendant. See Hardisty v. Kay, 268 Md. 202, 212, 299
A.2d 771, 776 (1973) (stating that an equity court may award money damages); Vulcan
Waterproofers, Inc. v. Maryland Home Improvement Comm'n, 253 Md. 204, 211-12, 252
A.2d 62, 66 (1969) (asserting that equity may grant a defendant relief even though the
defendant did not request it).
59. Wells v. Price, 183 Md. 443, 452, 37 A.2d 888, 893 (1944).
60. 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 197, at 188 (4th ed. 1988).
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erts over trusts is so intrinsic to Maryland practice6 1 that the Maryland
courts have been reluctant to recognize more than limited exceptions
to the general rule.62 The anomalies are confined to situations in
which a trustee is bound to immediately and unconditionally distribute money or chattels to the beneficiary 63 or circumstances in
which the trustee has entered into improper investments.6 4 Notwithstanding the foregoing exceptions, claims brought by the beneficiary
of a trust against the trustee have not entitled the beneficiary to ajury
65
trial.
Despite equity's jurisdiction over trusts, the right to a jury trial
will be granted if a legitimate legal claim is posed, irrespective of the
means used to raise that legal claim.66 Accordingly, counterclaims
have enjoyed the same assurances to trial by jury as primary claims.6 7
In Higgins v. Barnes,68 for example, the defendant was accorded ajury
trial on the legal claims presented by her counterclaim despite the
fact that the counterclaim was introduced in an equitable action.6 9 In
that case, the defendant answered the plaintiffs complaint, which
sought specific performance, and filed a counterclaim praying damages."0 None of the issues in Higgins was resolved by ajury.7 a In order
to give credence to the jury trial guarantee, the Higgins court held that
the damages claim should have been submitted to the jury first.72
Later, the trial judge could have resolved any remaining equitable

61. See Nelson v. Howard, 5 Md. 327, 331 (1854) (declaring that a beneficiary may not
sue the trustee at law); Green v. Johnson, 3 G. & J. 389 (Md. 1831) (commenting that a
court of law will not decide actions concerning trusts).
62. See Kahle v. John McDonough Builders, Inc., 85 Md. App. 141, 151-52, 582 A.2d
557, 562 (1990).
63. Id. at 152, 582 A.2d at 562 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 197, 198
(1959)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 151, 582 A.2d at 562. There are numerous cases brought by a beneficiary
against a trustee that proceeded in equity without a jury. See, e.g., Maryland Nat'l Bank v.
Cummins, 322 Md. 570, 588 A.2d 1205 (1991); Mangels v. Tippett, 167 Md. 290, 173 A. 191
(1934) (case name in the Atlantic Reporter is Mangels v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.).
66. Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 551-52, 530 A.2d 724, 733-34 (1987).
67. I. at 551, 530 A.2d at 733.
68. 310 Md. 532, 530 A.2d 724 (1987).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 535, 530 A.2d at 725. Essentially, the plaintiff in Higgins claimed that the
defendant breached the contract. Id. The defendant averred damages resulting from the
plaintiff's alleged failure to perform in conformity with the contract's specifications. Id
The contract dispute concerned the plaintiff's promise to construct a building and the
defendant's promise to secure his debt to the plaintiff. Id.
71. Id. at 534, 530 A.2d at 725.
72. Id. at 552, 530 A.2d at 734.
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claims. 73 Thus, where one case raises both legal and equitable issues,
a court's resolution of the equitable claims will rarely defeat the right
to a jury's judgment on the legal issues. 4
According to the Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act,
the fact that a declaratory judgment is sought does not affect the right
to trial by jury.75 In delineating a claimant's right to trial by jury in a
particular declaratory judgment action, the "circuit court must look to
the underlying circumstances to ascertain whether, prior to the [Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act], legal relief would have sufficed or, alternatively, whether special factors would warrant the
intervention of equity. '76 Thus, a court hearing a claim for declaratory relief must once again engage in a historical analysis in order to
determine a litigant's right to be heard by a jury.
For both typical legal actions and declaratory judgment claims,
the law is replete with authority establishing that if a right to trial by
jury accompanies an action under the common law as it existed when
Maryland's Constitution was first enacted, that right continues to apply to comparable actions today. 77 However, because the administration of trusts is intrinsically equitable in nature and because a court of
equity had (and continues to have) no power to defer factual issues to
a jury for determination, an action that focuses on the administration
of a trust will seldom be resolved by a jury.78
b.

Breach of FiduciaryDuty.-

(1) Duty of Loyalty.--"Fiduciary" is a comprehensive term
used to describe a person who must exercise duties of good faith, confidence, and trust towards another. 79 Executors and administrators,
receivers, pledgees, guardians, agents, corporate directors and officers, partners, joint adventurers, attorneys, and trustees are all fiduciaries. o " [T] he fiduciary element ... is peculiarly intense in the case
73. Id.
74. Id. at 551, 530 A.2d at 733.
75. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 3-404 (1995); see also Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959) (noting that the right to jury trial is specifically preserved under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act). Prior to Maryland's procedural
merger of law and equity in 1984, a declaratory judgment claim could be instituted in
either a court of law or equity. Himes v. Day, 254 Md. 197, 206, 254 A.2d 181, 186 (1969).
76. Bourne & Lynch, supra note 55, at 50.
77. See supra notes 55, 66-76 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
79. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 626 (6th ed. 1990).

80. Madden v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 27 Md. App. 17, 29, 339 A.2d 340,
348 (1975) (listing types of fiduciary relationships); Roger A. Clapp, A Fiduciay'sDuty of
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of a trust."8 Though there are other obligations the trustee has to the
beneficiary,8 2 the duty of loyalty is the most sacred and heavily
guarded:8" it requires the trustee's unfailing devotion to the interests
of the beneficiary.8 4
Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo eloquently described the duty of loy85
alty in this oft-quoted passage from Meinhard v. Salmon:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound
by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than
the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard
of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is
unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has
been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating
erosion" of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of
conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by
any judgment of this court.8 6
Maryland similarly acknowledges the sanctity of the trustee's relationship to the beneficiary and has proscribed situations that result in
a division of the trustee's loyalties. In the 1934 case of Mangels v. TipLoyalty, 3 MD. L. REv. 221, 221 (1939) (same); Austin Wakeman Scott, The Trustee's Duty of
Loyalty, 49 HARv. L. REv. 521, 521 (1936) (same).
81. Scott, supra note 80, at 521.
82. Along with the duty of loyalty, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts lists the following as
fiduciary duties: the duty to furnish information (section 173), the duty to exercise reasonable care and skill to preserve trust property (section 176), the duty to defend actions
(section 178), and the duty to keep trust property separate (section 179). RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 173, 176, 178, 179 (1959).
83. Clapp, supra note 80, at 221. The duty of loyalty is "[t]he most fundamental duty
owed by the trustee to the beneficiaries." Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement
Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 317 Md. 72, 110, 562 A.2d 720, 738 (1989) (alteration in original) (quoting 2A AUSTIN W. SCOTT, ScoTr ON TRUSTS § 170 (William F. Fratcher ed., 4th
ed. 1987)).
84. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts defines the duty of loyalty as follows:
(1) The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust
solely in the interest of the beneficiary.
(2) The trustee in dealing with the beneficiary on the trustee's own account
is under a duty to the beneficiary to deal fairly with him and to communicate to
him all material facts in connection with the transaction which the trustee knows
or should know.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170.
85. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
86. Id. at 546 (citation omitted). This excerpt has been cited with approval by Maryland courts. See Herring v. Offutt, 266 Md. 593, 597, 295 A.2d 876, 879 (1972).
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pett,17 the court held that a fiduciary will breach the duty of loyalty
simply by creating circumstances in which the trustee's personal interests may conflict with those of the beneficiary, regardless of whether
the trustee's actions were proper or the beneficiary experienced a
loss.88

On December 24, 1931, Bernard M. Mangels died testate. 89 Richard B. Tippett was named co-trustee of Mangels's testamentary trust
(the Mangels Trust).9" The assets of that trust included Mangels's
one-half interest in the Mangels-Herold Company, consisting of 1250
shares of stock valued at $100,000 at the time of Mangels's death.9
Through his position as trustee, Tippett obtained the voting rights for
the 1250 shares, and at a regular meeting of directors, Tippett was
elected secretary of the Mangels-Herold Company at a salary of $50
per week.9 2 Mangels's widow, Gertrude, and children were not informed of Tippett's position, although they were the beneficiaries of
the Mangels Trust.9 3 After making several fruitless inquiries of Tippett into the status of the finances of the Mangels Trust, the beneficiaries filed a petition for removal of Tippett as trustee and for an
accounting of the trust assets.9 4 They alleged, inter alia, that Tippett
was withholding information, that the income beneficiary had received less than her share of the profits for 1932, that the estate was
paying half of Tippett's salary through its one-half ownership interest
in the company, that the trust estate was not being administered to
the advantage of the beneficiaries, and that Gertrude and Tippett
could not comport congenially.95
The court held that Tippett could not be removed from his position as trustee simply because the beneficiaries and trustee could not
interact amiably, though the relationship between beneficiary and
trustee is one factor for the court to consider in determining whether

87. 167 Md. 290, 173 A. 191 (1934).
88. Id. at 300, 173 A. at 195.
89. Id. at 291, 173 A. at 192.
90. Id. at 294, 173 A. at 193. The Safe-Deposit and Trust Company was the other
trustee named along with Tippett. Id,
91. Id.
92. Id. at 294-95, 173 A. at 193. At the meeting, Tippett and the other half-owner of
the company, John H. Herold, voted. Id, at 294, 173 A. at 193. After voting on the new
directors of the company, at which time Tippett was named one of three directors, Tippett
motioned to elect Herold president and treasurer, and Herold motioned to elect Tippett
secretary. Id.
93. I& at 296, 173 A. at 194.
94. Id. at 296-97, 173 A. at 194.
95. Id. at 297-98, 173 A. at 194.
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to exercise its discretion to remove a trustee.9 6 Although the court
refused to remove Tippett, it went on to declare "that a trustee

. .

is

not permitted to place himself in such position that the interest of the
beneficiary and his own personal interest do or may conflict."9 "
If the foregoing rule were not applied rigidly, the court reasoned,
many frauds and inequities would go undetected.9" Therefore, the
only way for courts to "inculcate and enjoin a strict observance of the
divine precept: 'Lead us not into temptation"' 9 is for them to remove
the temptation altogether. 10 0 Though Tippett was not shown to have
acted with bad motive or evil intention,' 01 the court could not allow
him to retain his salary when that salary undeniably depleted the assets of the Mangels Trust. 0 2
The rule proffered in Mangels has been extended to cover various
situations where there is, or may be, an element of self-dealing. 10 3
The trustee, for instance, may not individually purchase property held
by the trust unless the beneficiaries consent.1 0 4 A trustee is also prohibited from selling personal property to the trust, from using trust
property for his own purposes, and from purchasing from a third
party an interest adverse to that of the beneficiary.10 5 A trustee will
breach the duty of loyalty by competing in any way with the interests
of the beneficiary.'0 6
The Court of Appeals has recognized a general presumption
against the validity of any transaction in which the fiduciary's interests
may be advanced at the expense of the beneficiary.'
Transactions in
96. Id at 298-300, 173 A. at 194-95.
97. Id. at 300, 173 A. at 195.
98. Id. at 304, 173 A. at 197.
99. Id. at 302, 173 A. at 196 (quoting Hoffman Steam Coal Co. v. Cumberland Coal &
Iron Co., 16 Md. 456 (1860)).
100. Id, at 303, 173 A. at 197.
101. Id. at 305, 173 A. at 197. The rule that a trustee may not attain any position in
which there may be a conflict with the beneficiary's interests is applied as strictly as possible, and the motives of the trustee are therefore irrelevant. Id. at 303, 173 A. at 197; Clapp,
supra note 80, at 222.
102. Mangels, 167 Md. at 305-06, 173 A. at 197-98. Because the Mangels Trust held half
of the shares in the Mangels-Herold Company, when Tippett drew a salary from the company, it depleted the company's profits and thus the distribution to Gertrude, the income
beneficiary of the trust. Id at 305, 173 A. at 197.
103. See Madden v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 27 Md. App. 17, 33, 339 A.2d
340, 350 (1975) ("'When a person.., is a party to or otherwise profits from a transaction
with a trust or other estate of which he is a fiduciary ... he is self dealing.'").
104. See Smith v. Townshend, 27 Md. 368, 388 (1867); Clapp, supra note 80, at 222-27.
105. Clapp, supra note 80, at 227-29.
106. Id. at 231-32.
107. See Hughes v. McDaniel, 202 Md. 626, 632, 98 A.2d 1, 4 (1953) ("[A] trustee is
prohibited from placing himself in any position where his self-interest will or may conflict
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which a trustee's "self-interest will or may conflict with his duties,"1 1 8
are not fraudulent per se, 10 9 but are voidable when the consent of the
beneficiary has not been obtained beforehand." ' The courts have
invoked this rule because loyalties are at least drawn into question
when the fiduciary is sitting on both sides of a bargain."' Where a
transaction is fair, however, the rule does not apply if the trustee is
protecting the beneficiary's interests, if the beneficiary has consented,
if the beneficiary has slept on her rights, or if a statute, the instrument
2
that created the trust, or a court has authorized the transaction."1
In Cosden v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co.," 3 the Court of Appeals employed the self-dealing doctrine, but determined that the
trust company had not breached its fiduciary duty to the beneficiary
when it sold trust property. 1 4 The principal contention in Cosden was
that trust assets were sold at an inadequate price because the trust
company held a twenty-percent interest in the purchaser-corporation
through other trusts and fiduciary accounts. H5 The presumption of
invalidity that attaches to transactions in which the trustee might
profit was not controlling because the trustee itself neither benefited
from the transaction nor entered into the sale for its own advancement."1 6 Thus, when a common fiduciary deals among two different
trusts but has no personal interest in the outcome, the transaction will
17
be sustained if it was fair and made in good faith."
Although some transactions involving two trusts with a common
trustee may be valid, the trustee nevertheless owes the beneficiary of
each trust the duty to defend against any claim that may result in a loss
to the trust estate." 8 Maryland adheres to the Restatement (Second) of

with his duties as trustee, or from using the advantage of his position to gain any benefit
for himself at the expense of the beneficiary of the trust.").
108. Id.
109. See Harlan v. Lee, 174 Md. 579, 592, 199 A. 862, 869 (1938).
110. Madden v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 27 Md. App. 17, 33, 339 A.2d 340,
350 (1975) (citing McDaniel v. Hughes, 206 Md. 206, 111 A.2d 204 (1955); Shockett v.
Tublin, 170 Md. 117, 183 A. 521 (1936); Mangels v. Tippett, 167 Md. 290, 173 A. 191
(1934)).
111. Harlan,174 Md. at 592, 199 A. at 869 ("[C]onfidence in the loyalty and impartiality
of a fiduciary is not maintained by one who is at once the seller and the buyer of the
subject of sale.").
112. Id. at 592-93, 199 A. at 869.
113. 41 Md. App. 519, 398 A.2d 460 (1979).
114. Id. at 545, 398 A.2d at 475.
115. Id at 531, 536, 398 A.2d at 467, 470.
116. Id at 536, 398 A.2d at 470.
117. I. at 536-37, 398 A.2d at 470.

118.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS

§ 178 (1959).
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Trusts,1 19 which contains a duty to defend provision. 120 Encompassed
in the trustee's duty to defend the trust against claims is the trustee's
duty to appeal. If the trustee, acting on behalf of the trust, is sued and
loses, the trustee must appeal the adverse decision to a higher court if
it is unreasonable not to appeal. 12 1 The trustee can settle a claim
"even though it appears to be a claim which is not enforceable, if the
cost and risk incurred in defending the claim would be such that it is
not unreasonable not to contest the claim. '"122
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the duty of loyalty demands a presumption of invalidity for any situation in which there is a
possibility that the trustee's interests will interfere with the beneficiary's interests. The trustee may not take a personal stake in a transaction unless the beneficiary, the court, or the testator has affirmatively
sanctioned the trustee's actions.' 23 In cases where the trustee's interests may conflict and authorization was not previously obtained, the
actual gain or loss to the beneficiary is irrelevant, as are the fiduciary's
motives or good faith intentions, because the mere manifestation of
such a conflict will serve to invalidate actions perpetrated while the
1 24
trustee's loyalties were divided.
(2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty as an Independent Cause of Action.-Although the Court of Appeals never formally recognized or
disclaimed breach of fiduciary duty as a tort before Kann, it has commented on the existence of the tort on several occasions. For example, Adams v. Coates'25 involved the right to punitive damages in a
traditionally equitable action-an accounting between partners. 2 6
While the court refused to award punitive damages, 2 7 it did assume,
"solely for the purpose of discussion," that the tort of breach of fiduci119. See, e.g., Gianakos v. Magiros, 238 Md. 178, 185-86, 208 A.2d 718, 722-23 (1965)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 2 cmt. b, 26, 170); Kahle v. John McDonough
Builders, Inc., 85 Md. App. 141, 152, 582 A.2d 557, 562 (1990) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 197, 198).
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 178. The Restatement defines the duty to defend by declaring that "[tihe trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to defend actions
which may result in a loss to the trust estate, unless under all the circumstances it is reasonable not to make such defense." Id

121. Id. § 178 cmt. a.
122. Id. § 178 cmt. c.
123. See McDaniel v. Hughes, 206 Md. 206, 221-22, 111 A.2d 204, 211 (1955).
124. Mangels v. Tippett, 167 Md. 290, 301-02, 305, 173 A. 191, 196-97 (1934).
125. 331 Md. 1, 626 A.2d 36 (1993). Judge Rodowsky authored both Kann and Adams.
Kann, 344 Md. at 693, 690 A.2d at 511; Adams, 331 Md. at 2, 626 A.2d at 36.
126. Adams, 331 Md. at 9-10, 626 A.2d at 40.
127. Id. at 15. 626 A.2d at 43.
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ary duty existed in Maryland. 128 The court further assumed that,
"under proper proof, the tort can be the springboard for punitive
damages."

' 29

In Alleco, Inc. v. Harry &Jeanette Weinberg Foundation, Inc.,' 3 ° the
Court of Appeals took the Adams discussion one step further: it assumed the existence of the tort of breach of fiduciary duty and went
on to describe the elements of that theoretical tort.' 3 1 Using section
874 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as its guide,1 3 2 the Alleco court
listed "(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) a breach of
duty owed by the fiduciary to the beneficiary, and (3) harm resulting
from the breach" as elements of the hypothetical tort of breach of
fiduciary duty.133 These requirements, the court opined, are in conformity with those identified by other jurisdictions that have already
recognized the possibility of tort liability for breaches of fiduciary
duty.'
Nevertheless, because the plaintiffs in Alleco had failed at all
levels of the litigation to prove the requisite harm resulting from the
breach, the court held that they did not adequately state a cause of
action. 135
Similarly relying on section 874 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and armed with the Adams and Alleco opinions, the Court of Special
Appeals, in Hartlove v. Maryland Schoolfor the Blind,136 endorsed breach
of fiduciary duty as an independent cause of action in tort.' 37 The
Court of Special Appeals decided Hartlove after it1 38
ruled on Kann but
prior to the Court of Appeals's opinion in Kann.
Henry F. Hartlove was the personal representative of the estate of
Claude Faye Bass, and the Maryland School for the Blind (the School)
was the residuary legatee under Bass's will. 139 In its suit against Hart-

128. Id. at 12, 626 A.2d at 41.
129. Id.
130. 340 Md. 176, 665 A.2d 1038 (1995).
131. Id. at 192, 665 A.2d at 1046.
132. Id. at 191-92, 665 A.2d at 1045-46; see infra notes 188-193 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court of Appeals's treatment of section 874 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts in Kann).
133. Alleco, 340 Md. at 192, 665 A.2d at 1046.
134. Id. (citing Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 321-23 (Colo. 1993); Davis v.
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 852 P.2d 640, 649 (Mont. 1993)).
135. Id. at 184, 193, 665 A.2d at 1042-43, 1047.
136. 111 Md. App. 310, 681 A.2d 584 (1996), vacated per curiam, 344 Md. 720, 690 A.2d

526 (1997).
137. Id. at 331, 681 A.2d at 593. The Hartlovedecision is in stark contrast to the intermediate appellate court's Kann opinion, in which it vehemently stated that such a tort does
not exist. Kann, No. 621, slip op. at 16.
138. Kann, 344 Md. at 708, 690 A.2d at 518.
139. Hartlove, 111 Md. App. at 316, 681 A.2d at 586.
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love, the School alleged that Hartlove had misappropriated funds and
mismanaged the estate's assets.14 ° Specifically, the School alleged that
several bank accounts, with assets totaling approximately $176,000,
held jointly by Hartlove and Bass before she died, were Bass's sole
property. 14 Therefore, the School claimed that the funds in those
accounts should have passed through the probate estate to the residuary legatee and not to Hartlove personally through a right of
survivorship.

142

The School sought both equitable and legal forms of relief, including compensatory and punitive damages, a constructive trust, an
accounting, injunctions, and the removal of Hartlove from his position as personal representative of the Bass estate. 143 The circuit court
submitted two conversion counts, an unjust enrichment count, and
charges of breach of fiduciary duty to the jury for consideration. 144
The jury found in favor of the School on the breach of fiduciary duty
count and awarded $25,000 in compensatory damages, but returned a
verdict for Hartlove on the other three counts.14 5 Both parties
appealed.1 46
On review, the Court of Special Appeals described the standard
of care owed by a fiduciary as:
1. The exercise of the care, skill and diligence of a reasonably prudent person dealing with his or her own property;
2. The exercise of good faith and loyalty to all the
beneficiaries;
140. Id. When Hartlove filed the first of two information reports with the Register of
Wills, he failed to include the assets contained in several of Bass's bank accounts. I&. at
320-21 & n.5, 681 A.2d at 588-89 & n.5; see Mo. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 7-224 (1997)
(describing an information report as a written report, made under oath, that lists the decedent's assets). He later listed these accounts on a supplemental information report. Hartlove, 111 Md. App. at 321, 681 A.2d at 589. The School contended that Hartlove originally
omitted the accounts from the report "because he thought 'that [he] could get away with
taking [one of the accounts].'" Id- (first alteration in original).
141. Hartlove, 111 Md. App. at 317-25, 681 A.2d at 587-90.
142. Id.
143. Id, at 317, 681 A.2d at 587.
144. Id. at 325, 681 A.2d at 591.
145. Id, The $25,000 compensatory damages award bears no relation to the $176,000
sought Furthermore, the trial judge stated after the trial that "he would have found no
breach of fiduciary duty" had he been sitting alone as the trier of fact in a court of equity.
Id. at 324, 681 A.2d at 591.
146. Id. at 316-17, 681 A.2d at 586-87. Hartlove "contend[ed] that, because there [was]
no independent cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on that claim." Id. at 326, 681 A.2d at 591. Hartlove "emphasize[d] that
he [did] not contend that a fiduciary may never be accountable for misdeeds. Rather, he
contend[ed] that the specific claim against the fiduciary must [have been] based on a
Irecognized' cause of action, such as fraud." Id at 327, 681 A.2d at 591.
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3. The lack of self-dealing;
4. The exercise of reasonable watchfulness over investments; and
5. The maintenance of full, accurate and precise
147
records.

Given the stringent standard demanded of fiduciaries, the intermediate appellate court reasoned that fiduciaries should be accountable
under an independent tort action for their breaches of duty.14 8 The
court then proceeded to provide a substantial number of cases from
other jurisdictions that recognize the tort of breach of fiduciary
duty.14 9 Nonetheless, the Court of Special Appeals never reached a
decision regarding whether a jury trial right would attend the new
action.

150

The Hartlove court also asserted that the adequacy of existing
remedies was not a compelling justification for failing to recognize a
new tort. 5 ' The fact that the School prevailed only on the breach of
fiduciary duty count illustrated that the other remedies available were
insufficient. The Hartlove dissent, however, stated "that our adversarial system contemplates that on occasion litigants lose," whereas the
majority's view would not prevent the court from creating new causes
of action whenever a litigant cannot prevail using an established legal
doctrine. 5 2 The dissent also advanced judicial economy concerns,
noting that an independent tort for breach of fiduciary duty could
well "open a broad range of applicability."' 5 3 Because the final word
147. Id. at 330-31, 681 A.2d at 593 (quoting ALLANJ. GIBBER, GIBBER ON ESTATE ADMINIS-

TRATION § 3-1, at 3-1 (3d ed. 1991)).
148. Id. at 331, 681 A.2d at 593.
149. Id. Only one case cited by the Court of Special Appeals in Hartlove, InterFirstBank
Dallas,N.A. v. Risser, 739 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. App. 1987, no writ), involved an action brought
by a beneficiary against a trustee. The other cases referred to by the Hartlove court merely
cite to section 874 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and do not expound on the extent of
the legal remedies available to a beneficiary. See Long v. Lampton, 922 S.W.2d 692 (Ark.
1996); Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mann, 177 Cal. Rptr. 495 (Ct. App. 1981); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) (en banc); Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487
(Del. 1982); King Mountain Condominium Ass'n v. Gundlach, 425 So. 2d 569 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982); Widett & Widett v. Snyder, 467 N.E.2d 1312 (Mass. 1984); Davis v. Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 852 P.2d 640 (Mont. 1993); Mandelblatt v. Devon
Stores, Inc., 521 N.Y.S.2d 672 (App. Div. 1987); Loehrke v. Wanta Builders, Inc., 445
N.W.2d 717 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
150. Hartlove, 111 Md. App. at 333-34, 339, 681 A.2d at 594-95, 598 (declining to reach
the issue because Hartlove failed to properly preserve the argument that the circuit court
erred in submitting the breach of fiduciary duty claim to the jury).
151. Id. at 332-33 & n.13, 681 A.2d at 594 & n.13.
152. Id. at 358, 681 A.2d at 607 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 355-56, 681 A.2d at 605-06; see supra text accompanying note 80 (listing types
of fiduciaries).
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on the acceptance of a new tort rests with either the General Assembly
or the Court of Appeals,1" 4 after Hartlove, the circumstances were ripe
for Maryland's high court to conclusively establish whether an autonomous action based on breach of fiduciary duty would stand as the law
of this state.' 5 5
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Kann v. Kann, the Court of Appeals held that mere allegations of a breach of fiduciary duty do not
alone engender a generic cause of action at law, triable of right by a
jury and imputable to all denominations of fiduciaries.' 5 6 The court,
insisting that "'[t]rusts are, and have been since they were first enforced, within the peculiar province of courts of equity,"' 57 repudiated a beneficiary's ability to maintain an action at law for the
trustee's breach of trust.'
Additionally, the court refused to "preside
over the death of equity"1'59 by advocating a manifest departure from
traditional Maryland law through the creation of a new tort without a
showing that existing equitable remedies for breach of a trustee's duties are inadequate.' 6 °
Before commencing its inquiry into Regina Kann's right to maintain an action at law and the concomitant right to a jury trial,' 6 ' the
Court of Appeals condensed the issues presented on appeal.' 6 2 The
circuit court had fully adjudicated in a bench trial whether Donald
Kann breached his fiduciary duties, converted funds from the Louis
Trust, committed malfeasance, or defrauded Regina.' 6 3 Therefore,
the Court of Appeals could not vacate the trial court's decision unless
154. Alleco, Inc. v. Harry &Jeanette Weinberg Found., Inc., 99 Md. App. 696, 701, 639
A.2d 173, 175 (1994), affd, 340 Md. 176, 665 A.2d 1038 (1995).
155. Given that the Kann court "disapproved" of Hartlove's creation of an omnibus action at law to redress breaches of fiduciary duty, Kann, 344 Md. at 713, 690 A.2d at 521, the
Court of Special Appeals, reconsidering Hartlove on remand, reversed its earlier decision
endorsing a separate tort action for breach of fiduciary duty and found that a personal
representative, like a trustee, cannot be held accountable for breaches of fiduciary duty
under an independent cause of action at law. Hartlove v. Maryland Sch. for the Blind, No.
1706, slip op. at 7, 15 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 6, 1997) (per curiam).
156. Kann, 344 Md. at 693, 690 A.2d at 511.
157. Id at 703, 690 A.2d at 516 (quoting Sco'Ir & FRATCHER, supra note 60, § 197, at
188).
158. Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 14-101 (1991) ("A court having equity
jurisdiction has general superintending power with respect to trusts.").
159. Kann, 344 Md. at 713, 690 A.2d at 521.
160. Id. at 712-13, 690 A.2d at 520-21.
161. In Maryland, equity recognizes no right to trial by jury. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
162. Kann, 344 Md. at 699, 690 A.2d at 514.
163. Id. at 698, 690 A.2d at 513-14.
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any one of Regina's claims should have been tried to a jury.1 64 If a
bench trial had been appropriate, the only remaining issue would
concern whether the circuit court declined erroneously to hold that
165
the claim against the Louis Trust was time barred.
After encapsulating the issues, the court delved into a historical
analysis of the law-equity dichotomy, 166 commenting that
"'[d] etermining which actions belong[ ] to law and which to equity
for the purpose of delimiting the jury trial right continues to be one
of the most perplexing questions of trial administration."'167 First, the

Court of Appeals explained that Article 23 of the Declaration of
Rights preserves the right to ajury trial of issues in a civil proceeding
where the amount in controversy exceeds the $5000 threshold. 6
Although the trial court's ruling on Donald's declaratory judgment claim was not being reviewed, the Court of Appeals next probed
the jury trial right in declaratory judgment actions because the court
felt it demonstrative of Regina's right to a jury trial on her counterclaim.16 9 The court stated that in declaratory judgment actions in
Maryland, trial courts must look to the substance of a claim to determine if an accompanying jury trial right exists.1 7 ° In the instant case,
the underlying substantive claims surrounded the administration of a
trust-claims that historically sounded in equity.1 7 1 There was consequently no attendant right to ajury trial on Donald's declaratory judg172
ment claim alone.

The court then addressed Regina's principal argument-that she
3-and
advanced issues in her counterclaim triable by right to ajury T7
resolved that her counterclaim, like the declaratory judgment action,
164. Id. at 699, 690 A.2d at 514. Regina's counterclaim failed for lack of proof, but the
circuit court determined that Donald had not breached his duties. Id. at 698, 690 A.2d at
514.
165. Id. at 699, 690 A.2d at 514 (citing MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 8-103 (Supp.
1996)).
166. Id at 699-702, 690 A.2d at 514-15.
167. Id. at 699, 690 A.2d at 514 (alterations in original) (quoting 9 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2302, at 18 (2d ed.
1995)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 700-01, 690 A.2d at 514-15. Regina did not contend that she was entitled to a
jury trial-absent her counterclaim-on the declaratory judgment action alone. Id. at 700,
690 A.2d at 514.
170. Id at 700, 690 A.2d at 514-15.
171. Id. at 701, 690 A.2d at 515.
172. Id. at 700-01, 690 A.2d at 514-15.
173. Id. at 702, 690 A.2d at 515. Had the trial of this matter involved both legal and
equitable issues, the common issues would have been submitted to a jury. See Higgins v.
Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 551, 530 A.2d 724, 733 (1987).

1998]

MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS

1101

was grounded solely in equity. 7 4 Because all of Regina's assertions
were those of a beneficiary against a trustee for breach of the trustee's
fiduciary duties,1 75 the court reasoned that the remedies available to
her were exclusively equitable.1 76 The court confirmed that "equity
has original and complete jurisdiction over trusts and will enforce the
rights of a'beneficiary because they arise out of a trust."177 The Court
of Appeals observed that it has only recognized an exception to this
rule when the trustee is obligated to immediately and unconditionally
pay money or transfer chattel to the beneficiary. 17' Although Regina
was entitled to "the net income of the Residuary Trust, in monthly or
quarterly installments as nearly equal as may be practical,"1 79 the court
noted that she was not entitled to receipt of any income unconditionally or immediately'S°-that is, distribution of the income was within
Donald's sole discretion.'' Accordingly, the court held that Regina's
claims did not fall within an exception to the rule that actions brought
by beneficiaries against the trustee are within equity's exclusive
jurisdiction.'8 2
Likewise, the court concluded that the joinder of Venable and
Lewis in Regina's counterclaim failed to convert the action from an
equitable to a legal claim.'
If Regina had brought suit against the
attorney respondents alone, asserting similar allegations, she would
have had no jury trial right.1 4 Unless a beneficiary is "entitled to pos-

session of the trust property when bringing [a] possessory action [ ],
[she] 'cannot maintain an action at law against a third person who
commits a tort or other wrong with respect to the trust property."" 8
174. Kann, 344 Md. at 702, 690 A.2d at 515.
175. Id. at 702-03, 690 A.2d at 515-16. Regina was an income beneficiary of the Louis
Trust and could not be considered a legatee under Louis's will. Id. at 702, 690 A.2d at 515-

16; see MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-101(k) (1991) (stating that the trustee, not the
trust beneficiary, receives the legacy under a will).

176. Kann, 344 Md. at 703, 690 A.2d at 516.
177. Id. at 703-04, 690 A.2d at 516 (quoting GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT

& GEORGE TAYLOR

BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 870, at 136 (rev. 2d ed. repl. vol. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
178. Id. at 703, 690 A-2d at 516; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 197, 198 (1959).
The Court of Special Appeals made "[ylet another exception . . . when the trustee has
made improper investments. In such a case, the action is one at law, triable byjury." Kahle

v. John McDonough Builders, Inc., 85 Md. App. 141, 152, 582 A.2d 557, 562 (1990).
179. Joint Record Extract at E18, Kann (No. 22) (Last Will and Testament of Louis M.
Kann, Jr.).
180. Kann, 344 Md. at 703, 690 A.2d at 516.
181. Kann, No. 621, slip op. at 1-2.
182. Kann, 344 Md. at 703, 690 A.2d at 516.
183. Id at 705, 690 A.2d at 517.
184. Id.
185. Id. (quoting ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note 60, § 281, at 21).
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Although all of Regina's claims sounded in equity and were devoid of any jury trial right under conventional Maryland jurisprudence, she advocated Maryland's adoption of breach of fiduciary duty
as an independent action at law, triable by right to a jury and but18 6
tressed by the ability to sustain punitive damages in suitable cases.
The Court of Appeals remarked that it had countenanced comparable
contentions in the past, but always assumed, "solely for the purpose of
discussion," the existence of such an action without passing on its actual legal presence."8 7
Regina's proposition that Maryland should embrace a universal
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty relied on the Restatement
(Second) of Torts."' s The Kann court, however, was not ready to concede that the Restatement recognized a jury trial right in every breach
of fiduciary duty action. 8 9 The court reasoned that the Restatement
meant to refer state courts to local rules of procedure and the nature
of the underlying situation to determine if a beneficiary is entitled to
redress through a jury trial.190

Regina also relied on Hartlovebecause it purported to uphold the
legitimacy of a generic cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.19 1
In that case, however, the Court of Special Appeals never reached the
issue of whether such an action was necessarily coupled with a right to
trial by jury. 2 The Court of Appeals resolved that both Regina and
19 3
the Hartlove court "read too much into § 874 of the Restatement."
The court also noted that other jurisdictions do not appear to have
19 4
loosened the grip that equity has over trusts.
Besides displacing the court's inherent domain when it sits in equity by transferring to a jury its right to determine questions of fact,
Regina also attempted to amplify a beneficiary's remedies to include
186. Id. at 706, 690 A.2d at 517.
187. Id.
188. Id. "One standing in a fiduciary relation with another is subject to liability to the
other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the relation." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1977) (entitled "Violation of Fiduciary Duty").
189. Kann, 344 Md. at 707, 690 A.2d at 518.
190. Id. Comment b to section 874 states: "The local rules of procedure, the type of
relation between the parties and the intricacy of the transaction involved, determine
whether the beneficiary is entitled to redress at law or in equity. The remedy of a beneficiary against a defaulting or negligent trustee is ordinarily in equity . . ." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. b.
191. Kann, 344 Md. at 708, 690 A.2d at 518.
192. Id. at 709, 690 A.2d at 519.
193. Id. at 710, 690 A.2d at 519.
194. Id.
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punitive damages as well as reparations for emotional distress.1 95 The
court dismissed each of these suggestions as deviations from the essential character of trusts and the traditional province of equity to preside
over such instruments.1" 6 The Court of Appeals perceived it inconceivable that, by recognizing a universal cause of action in tort for
breach of fiduciary duty, a trustee may be held liable for the beneficiary's emotional distress damages resulting from the breach despite the
fact that the trustee committed the breach mistakenly or non-negligently.1 9v The court maintained that punitive damages are completely
unrecoverable in equity. 9 ' Rather, a trial court may sanction the
trustee by reducing the trustee's commissions in cases of "serious, but
not necessarily criminal, breaches of trust." 199
The court contended that both Regina and the Court of Special
Appeals in Hartlove attempted to alter entrenched aspects of Maryland
law without examining what relationships will be controlled by this
"new tort" and how it will be applied to those relationships.2 0 0 The
Court of Appeals has been willing to recognize new torts when there
was no available legal remedy20 1 or when existing remedies were inadequate,2 °2 but it found neither of these exigencies in the instant
case. 2 0 3 In order to guard Learned Hand's maxim that "[t]he law
ought not make trusteeship so hazardous that responsible individuals

195. Id. at 711, 690 A.2d at 520; see supra note 38 and accompanying text (reporting
Regina's demands for relief). The equitable remedies generally available to a trust beneficiary are:
(a) to compel the trustee to perform his duties as trustee;
(b) to enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust;
(c) to compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust;
(d) to appoint a receiver to take possession of the trust property and administer the trust;
(e) to remove the trustee.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 199 (1959).
196. Kann, 344 Md. at 711-12, 690 A.2d at 520.
197. Id. at 711, 690 A.2d at 520.
198. Id. at 712, 690 A.2d at 520.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. (citing Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981)
(abusive discharge); Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, 236 A.2d
269 (1967) (negligent failure to settle); Carrv. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d 841 (1962)
(invasion of privacy)).
202. Id. (citing Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976)
(strict liability in tort)).
203. Id. at 712-13, 690 A.2d at 520.
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and corporations will shy away from it,"2° 4 the Kann court disapproved

Hartlove to the extent that it conflicted with the ruling in Kann20 5 and
held:
[T] hat there is no universal or omnibus tort for the redress
of breach of fiduciary duty by any and all fiduciaries. This
does not mean that there is no claim or cause of action available for breach of fiduciary duty. Our holding means that
identifying a breach of fiduciary duty will be the beginning
of the analysis, and not its conclusion. Counsel are required
to identify the particular fiduciary relationship involved,
identify how it was breached, consider the remedies available, and select those remedies appropriate to the client's
problem. Whether the cause or causes of action ,selected
carry the right to ajury trial will have to be determined by an
historical analysis. Counsel do not have available for
use in
206
any and all cases a unisex action, triable to a jury.
Though the court adjudged that she was not entitled to a jury
trial, Regina alternatively claimed that Donald breached his fiduciary
duty in failing to timely oppose the transfer of the segregated funds
on the grounds that the transfer was time-barred by section 8-103(a)
of the Estates and Trusts Article. 20 7 However, the court held that the
time limitations of section 8-103(a) are not unyielding and a personal
representative may unintentionally waive or be estopped from asserting a defense under this statute. 20 8 Donald either waived the ability to
raise this defense or was estopped from raising it because, in his capacity as personal representative of Louis's estate, he allowed the trustee
of the Frances Trust (himself) to investigate Louis Kann's misappropriations (or investigated them while acting as personal representative

204. Id. at 710, 690 A.2d at 519 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting InterFirst Bank Dallas, N.A. v. Risser, 739 S.W.2d 882, 914 (Tex. App. 1987,
no writ) (quoting Dabney v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 196 F.2d 668, 675 (2d Cir. 1952))).
205. Id. at 713, 690 A.2d at 521.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 713-14, 690 A.2d at 521. The statute states:
[A]lI claims against an estate of a decedent ... are forever barred against the
estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and legatees, unless presented
within the earlier of the following dates:
(1) 6 months after the date of the decedent's death; or
(2) Two months after the personal representative mails or otherwise delivers
to the creditor a copy of a notice ... notifying the creditor that his claim will be
barred unless he presents the claim within 2 months from the mailing or other
delivery of the notice.
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 8-103(a) (Supp. 1996).
208. Kann. 344 Md. at 714-15, 690 A.2d at 521-22.
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of Louis's estate).2°9 Because Donald, in his capacity as personal representative of Louis's estate, was aware of his own ongoing investigation, he was estopped from later asserting the section 8-103(a) bar or
deemed to have waived the protection of this provision.2 10 Finding no
error on the part of the trial court, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
circuit court's ruling on Donald's declaratory judgment action.2 1 1
4. Analysis.-In Kann v. Kann, the Court of Appeals decreed
that Maryland does not recognize a universal tort to redress every
breach of fiduciary duty. 212 First, the court denounced any deviation
from the longstanding maxim that equity has exclusive jurisdiction
with respect to the administration of trusts. 21 3 The court then condemned a generic cause of action at law by stating that adequate equitable remedies will not be superseded by discarding equity's
entrenched dominion over trusts.21 4 In so holding, the court failed to
realize the inadequacy of the existing equitable remedies available to
a beneficiary when the trustee breaches his fiduciary duties. The
court also disregarded Donald Kann's glaring breaches of duty, acknowledgment of which would have allowed the court to reach a just
and equitable resolution without undermining equity's jurisdiction
over trusts.
a. Conflicting Interests.-Regina's principal argument before
the Court of Appeals was that her counterclaim raised issues entiding
her to ajury trial. 2 1' The court, therefore, never reached the question
of whether Donald actually breached his fiduciary duties.2 1 6 Had the
court considered Donald's actions as trustee of the Louis Trust, it
should have overruled as clearly erroneous the trial court's ruling that
Donald fulfilled his duties to Regina. Such a judgment would not
compel the creation of a new tort for breach of fiduciary duty, and the
Court of Appeals could have restricted the trial court, on remand, to
administering only established equitable remedies for Donald's
breaches of his fiduciary duties.
209. Id. at 715, 690 A.2d at 522. The court assumed that Donald, the personal representative of Louis's trust, and Donald, the trustee of Frances Trust, were two different people
in order to illustrate this argument. Id.
210. let at 715-16, 690 A-2d at 522.
211. Id. at 716, 690 A.2d at 522.
212. Id. at 693, 690 A.2d at 511.
213. Id. at 710, 690 A.2d at 519.
214. Id. at 712-13, 690 A.2d at 520-21.
215. let at 697-98, 690 A-2d at 513.
216, let The issue of whether Donald had breached his fiduciary duties, however, was
before the Court of Special Appeals. Kann, No. 621, slip op. at 5.
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By late 1992 or early 1993, Donald had discovered instances of
apparently improper transfers from the Frances Trust to a joint bank
account held by Louis and Regina. 21 7 When he discovered that his
father may have removed funds from the Frances Trust, a trust in
which he had a one-half interest, Donald's loyalties were divided-he
knew that the trust he was appointed to oversee may have embezzled
funds earmarked for him. Although Donald's loyalties became divided the instant he realized the potential of a defalcation, this discovery and Donald's failure to resign from his position as trustee may not
have constituted a breach of his fiduciary duties in and of themselves.
When Louis decided to make Donald the trustee of his testamentary
trust in 1992, Louis, as the trustee of the Frances Trust for nearly six21 8
teen years, was aware that Donald was a beneficiary of that trust.
Any conflict of interest that might have resulted by virtue of Donald's
position as trustee of the Louis Trust and beneficiary of the Frances
Trust was within Louis's comprehension when he created his trust and
therefore did not amount to a breach of Donald's fiduciary duties to
Regina.

2 19

Donald did, however, breach his duties to Regina by neglecting to
inform her immediately of his discovery and his subsequent removal
from the Louis Trust of all of the funds he deemed misappropriated.2 2 ° In so doing, Donald withheld information that doubtless
would seriously impact Regina's interests and then used that information for his personal benefit-the more money Donald believed Louis
wrongly removed from the Frances Trust, the more Donald, as a beneficiary of the Frances Trust, stood to gain. In his capacity as trustee of
the Louis Trust, Donald owed Regina an unwavering duty of loyalty,
but instead of acting solely for Regina's benefit, Donald pursued his
own interests at the expense of the trust estate.
Before segregating the assets, had Donald applied to the court
for guidance, resigned from his position as trustee of the Louis Trust,
or informed Regina promptly of his discovery, allowing her the opportunity to seek his removal, he could have exculpated himself from

217. Kann, 344 Md. at 694, 690 A.2d at 511.
218. See Motion to Dismiss and Brief of Appellee Donald R. Kann at 42, Kann (No. 22).
219. See Goldman v. Rubin, 292 Md. 693, 706, 441 A.2d 713, 720 (1982) (noting that a
presumption of invalidity as a result of a fiduciary's self-dealing does not attach when the
instrument that created the trust contemplates a conflict of interest).
220. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(2) (1959) ("The trustee in dealing
with the beneficiary on the trustee's own account is under a duty to the beneficiary ... to
communicate to him all material facts in connection with the transaction . . ").
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wrongdoing.2
To the contrary, while continuing to act as trustee for
both of his parents' trusts, Donald investigated his father's finances
for nearly ten months without consulting Regina.2 2 2 He then filed a
supplemental inventory in order to extract from the Louis Trust those
223
funds he believed were misappropriated from the Frances Trust.
Donald waited until Regina could no longer oppose the supplemental
inventory and the segregation of nearly $200,000 before informing
her of what had transpired. 224 All of these actions demonstrate Donald's improper motivation: He did not want Regina to know of the
2 25
transfer because he knew that she would ardently oppose it.
Whether Donald's actions were deemed proper, however, is irrelevant,2 2 6 and the simple fact that he stood to benefit from any funds
transferred to the Frances Trust from the Louis Trust was enough to
make the transfer voidable. 227 Donald's circumstances were such that
it was impossible for him to deal fairly with both trusts, and he
breached his duties both by failing to allow Regina or the court the
opportunity to oversee the segregation and by profiting from the
transfer.
Throughout the litigation that followed Donald's segregation of
the misappropriated funds, he continued to breach his duties to Regina. In faithfully pursuing the interests of the beneficiary, the trustee
must defend against any claim that may occasion a loss to the trust
estate. 228 Donald not only failed to defend the Louis Trust, but he
also represented an interest adverse to Regina's. In this regard, the
intermediate appellate court's opinion is telling because it proclaims
that, "[a]t the declaratory judgment proceeding . . . , Donald
presented significant evidence demonstrating how and when Louis
improperly withdrew money from the Frances Trust. Alternatively,
Regina was unable to explain what had happened to the missing

221. See id. § 170(2) & cmt. r. Comment r states: "If the circumstances are such that the
interests of the beneficiaries of [two trusts with a common trustee] are so conflicting that
the trustee cannot deal fairly with respect to both trusts, he cannot properly act without
applying to the court for instructions." Id. § 170 cmt. r.
222. Kann, 344 Md. at 694, 690 A.2d at 511.
223. Id. at 694-95, 690 A.2d at 512.
224. Id at 695, 690 A.2d at 512.
225. But see id. at 695 & n.2, 690 A.2d at 512 & n.2 (indicating that Regina was not
entitled to notice of the Orphan's Court proceedings).
226. Compare supra notes 40, 47 and accompanying text, stating that Donald's actions
were deemed proper at trial, with supra note 88 and accompanying text, noting that a
determination of the propriety of a trustee's actions is irrelevant where the trustee's personal interests may conflict with those of the beneficiary.
227. See supra notes 107-117 and accompanying text.
228. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 178 (1959).
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money."22' 9 The Court of Special Appeals erroneously placed the burden of defending the trust estate on the beneficiary when in actuality
the trustee was obligated to defend against any adverse claims.2"' As
trustee for both trusts, Donald had a duty to defend the Louis Trust
and the Frances Trust, despite the fact that the two trusts were adverse
parties in this litigation. Donald breached his duty to defend by sitting at both the plaintiffs' and defendant's tables at trial while exclusively representing the interests of the Frances Trust (and his own
beneficial interest in that trust) in a manner adverse to Regina's
interests.
Donald, however, would not have breached his duties if it were
reasonable for him to segregate the funds and settle the Frances
Trust's claim against the Louis Trust. 231 The trustee is required to
defend against adverse claims and cannot settle any claims "unless
under all the circumstances it is reasonable not to make such defense. '' 23 2 In the instant case, the reasonableness of contesting the
claim is best demonstrated by assuming that the two trusts were administered by different trustees and that the trustee of the Louis Trust
had no interest in the assets of the Frances Trust. If that were the
case, the trustee of the Louis Trust would unquestionably have disputed the removal of nearly $200,000 from the corpus of the trust.
Even if some amount of money was clearly misappropriated, it was still
unreasonable not to challenge the calculation of interest and income
that had accrued as well as the computation of the amount of the
defalcation. Had the trustee of the Louis Trust been anyone other
than a beneficiary of the Frances Trust, that trustee would have defended the Louis Trust estate. Therefore, Donald's duty to defend
the Louis Trust against a loss was not affected by his ability to settle,
because it would have been unreasonable for him to do so.
Although the propriety of Donald's actions was not an issue
presented to the Court of Appeals for consideration, by adjudging
Donald in breach of his duties to Regina, the court could have
reached the result that justice required without disturbing equity's
longstanding jurisdiction over trusts. The trial court's determination
that Donald had not breached his fiduciary duties was clearly erroneous and inconsistent with Maryland precedent, given Donald's benefi229. Kann, No. 621, slip op. at 3-4.
230. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 178.
231. Id.
232. Id. § 178 & cmt. c; cf Joint Record Extract at E266, Kann (No. 22) (oral opinion of
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Jan. 20, 1995) (stating that fiduciaries are not required to "blindly defend" against all claims).
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cial interest in the Frances Trust and his hostile actions towards the
beneficiary of the Louis Trust. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
should have found Donald in breach of trust, removed him from his
position as trustee of the Louis Trust, deemed the segregation of purportedly misappropriated assets a nullity, and remanded the case to
the trial court for a determination of the appropriate equitable remedies. To this end, the Court of Appeals could have required that the
assets in question be kept separate (or under the court's supervision)
until such time as an impartial appointee determined the amount of
funds misappropriated from the Frances Trust.233 Regina, consequently, would have been provided with a trustee who advocated her
interests; at the same time, Louis's misappropriations would not have
escaped correction.
b. A New Tort for Breach of Fiduciary Duty.-In Kann, the
Court of Appeals's refusal to recognize a ubiquitous tort to redress all
breaches of fiduciary duty was consistent with Maryland law,23 the Restatement (Second) of Trusts,2" 5 treatises,23 6 and the majority of other jurisdictions.23 7 Trusts have long been regarded as exclusively equitable
instruments, and the promulgation of an action at law with ajury trial
233. The trial court, sitting in equity, may award any relief necessary to correct the
wrongs committed. McKeever v. Washington Heights Realty Corp., 183 Md. 216, 224, 37
A.2d 305, 310 (1944). Therefore, this form of relief would be well within the equity court's
power.
234. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
235. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 197, 198.
236. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 177, § 870, at 136; ScoTr & FRATCHER, supra note
60, § 197, at 188.
237. Other jurisdictions have recognized breach of fiduciary duty as a tort. See supra
note 149 and accompanying text. However, few courts have explicitly supported a beneficiary's ability to bring an action at law against the trustee of a testamentary trust for breach
of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Cartee v. Lesley, 350 S.E.2d 388, 389-90 (S.C. 1986) (treating
breach of fiduciary duty as a tort). The majority ofjurisdictions follow the traditional view
that trusts are creatures of equity and actions for breach of trust are not triable of right to a
jury. SeeExparteHolt, 599 So. 2d 12, 15 (Ala. 1992) (holding that an action concerning a
trustee's breach of fiduciary duty sounds in equity and is not attended by ajury trial right);
Carstens v. Central Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 461 N.W.2d 331, 333 (Iowa 1990) ("Generally,
the remedies of a beneficiary against the trustee are exclusively equitable." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197)); Magill v. Dutchess Bank & Trust Co., 541 N.Y.S.2d 437,
438 (App. Div. 1989) (stating that a beneficiary ordinarily has no right to a jury trial in an
action against the trustee because such an action is governed by equity). These jurisdictions, devoted to the general rule that trusts are equitable instruments, only recognize a
jury trial right pursuant to the exceptions enumerated in the Restatement. See Kaitz v. District Court, Second Judicial Dist., 650 P.2d 553, 555 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (noting that a
beneficiary may maintain an action at law if the trustee is obligated to immediately and
unconditionally transfer chattels to the beneficiary); Uselman v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130,
137 (Minn. 1990) (en banc) (stating that an exception may exist if the trustee is under a
duty to unconditionally and immediately pay money to the beneficiary).
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right for breach of fiduciary duty would necessarily displace equity's
autonomous authority over trusts.238 Because the court never denounced the availability of ajury trial in all actions for breach of fiduciary duty, however, actions for breach of fiduciary duty in which there
inheres a historical right to a trial by jury will retain that right.23 9 The
court, therefore, did not actually limit the right to a jury trial, but
merely refused to extend the jury trial right to all actions for breach of
240
fiduciary duty.
By confining actions concerning the administration of trusts to
the equity courts, the Court of Appeals not only declined to extend
the right to a jury trial beyond the exceptions to the rule that equity
has exclusive jurisdiction over trusts, but also eliminated the possibility of imposing punitive damages on a trustee. 24 1 The penalties a
trustee faces for breaching his fiduciary duties are limited to the following: compelling the trustee to perform his duties, removing him
from his position as trustee, forcing him to redress the trust estate for
his breach of duty, or reducing or eliminating his commission.2 4 2 AcRegardless of the power that equity has historically exercised over trusts, some courts
have strayed from the prevailing rule. See Fortune v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 371 S.E.2d
483, 485 (N.C. 1988) (treating breaches of fiduciary duty as torts because the court could
"see no reason why a beneficiary may not sue... for damages if the... trustee has mismanaged the property he holds in a fiduciary capacity"); Cartee, 350 S.E.2d at 390 (recognizing
the right of a beneficiary to bring an action at law for the trustee's breach of fiduciary
duty); InterFirst Bank Dallas, N.A. v. Risser, 739 S.W.2d 882, 907 (Tex. App. 1987, no writ)
(regarding breach of fiduciary duty as a tort). These jurisdictions have allowed a jury to
intervene when a beneficiary sues the trustee and have also sustained the possibility of
attaching punitive damages where the trustee acted in bad faith toward the rights of the
beneficiaries. See Cartee, 350 S.E.2d at 390 ("Punitive damages may be imposed upon a
trustee where there is evidence his management of the estate was in bad faith or conscious
indifference to the rights of the beneficiaries."); InterFirstBank, 739 S.W.2d at 907 ("[A]n
intentional breach of a fiduciary duty is a tort justifying the award of exemplary damages."). In InterFirstBank Dallas, N.A. v. Risser, for example, the beneficiary claimed that
the trustee was guilty of self-dealing and had therefore sold trust assets for too low a price.
Id. at 887-88. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the jury's compensatory award and
remitted the jury's exemplary damages award. Id. at 909. The InterFirstBank court stated
that the fundamental duties of a trustee include loyalty to the beneficiary and the use of
the care, skill, and prudence that an ordinary person would exercise in conducting his or
her own affairs. Id. at 888. A trustee's transgression of these duties, the court reasoned,
warrants the imposition of compensatory and, in certain instances, punitive damages. Id.
at 888-89, 907.
238. This is because equity does not recognize the right to ajury trial. See supra note 56
and accompanying text.
239. Kann, 344 Md. at 713, 690 A.2d at 521.
240. Id.
241. See Superior Constr. Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. 1, 20, 26, 104 A.2d 581, 585, 588 (1954)
(reversing an equity court's decree awarding punitive damages because equity's purpose in
awarding relief is to compensate for the wrong committed).
242. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 199.
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cordingly, if the trustee's breach of duty is discovered and adjudicated
unlawful, at worst he may be denied compensation, told never to do
that again, or be forced to put the cookies back in the cookie jar.
These penalties provide little incentive for the trustee to remain
steadfast when faced with the opportunity to profit from a transaction
that may constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. The Kann court observed that trusteeship should not be so hazardous as to make honest
corporations and individuals hesitant about assuming the role of
trustee. 24 3 The court, however, failed to observe that the penalties for
breaches of fiduciary duty by a trustee may be so lenient that profiting
at the expense of the trust estate is not effectively deterred. Therefore, in its zeal to protect honest trustees, the court protected some
dishonest trustees as well.
Because the standard of care required of a trustee is considera2
44
ble,
the penalties for transgressing the duty owed should reflect the
moment of the relationship. 24 5 Nonetheless, a court of equity cannot
go beyond compensation in awarding relief. 24 6 In an equitable action
by a beneficiary against a trustee, a punitive-damages award is apparently the only relief entirely unavailable to the beneficiary.2 47 In order to hold the trustee accountable for intentional breaches of his
fiduciary duty, exemplary damages should be accessible.2 48 Because
only a court of law may impose punitive damages,2 49 the Court of Appeals should have ventured to declare the existence of an action at law
to redress breaches of fiduciary duty by a trustee. It is untenable that
Maryland has endorsed an exception for situations in which the
243. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
245. Both Regina and the Hartlove court proffered similar arguments by stating that fiduciaries should be held accountable for their breaches of duty under an independent
action targeted at quelling such nefarious conduct. Hartlove v. Maryland Sch. for the
Blind, 111 Md. App. 310, 331, 681 A.2d 584, 593 (1996), vacated per curiam, 344 Md. 720,
690 A.2d 526 (1997); Brief of Appellant at 9-10, Kann (No. 22). Regina further argued that
the law as it stands creates an inverse relationship between the duty owed and the liability
for breaching that duty. Id.
246. See Elmo, 204 Md. at 20, 26, 104 A.2d at 585, 588.
247. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (stating that only a court of law may
award punitive damages, but also stating that a court of equity may grant complete relief).
248. The Court of Appeals expressed concern regarding the imposition of punitive
damages on a trustee for a non-negligent or mistaken breach of fiduciary duty. Kann, 344
Md. at 711, 690 A.2d at 520. The court's fears are not warranted, however, because punitive damages are only recoverable when the wrongful act is accompanied by "an element of
fraud, or malice, or evil intent, or oppression." Philadelphia, Wilm., & Balt. R.R. Co. v.
Hoeflich, 62 Md. 300, 307 (1884); accord Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 462,
601 A.2d 633, 653 (1992) (referring to the standard for recovering punitive damages as
actual malice").
249. Elmo, 204 Md. at 20, 26, 104 A.2d at 585, 588.
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trustee merely mismanages the trust assets,2 50 but the court now refuses to afford the beneficiary an action at law when the trustee has
forsaken his duties altogether.
Moreover, a beneficiary's ability to bring an action for damages at
law would not be a "wholesale ' 251 departure from Maryland law because
the court could simply announce another exception (or expand existing exceptions) to the rule that equity presides over the administration of trusts.2 5 2 The court could limit the availability of such an
action to beneficiaries of testamentary trusts and need not declare a
universal tort maintainable against all fiduciaries. 25 ' Neither would
the pronouncement of a legal remedy for a trustee's breach of fiduciary duty entirely displace equity's ability to preside over actions concerning trusts. When faced with a prayer for punitive damages in an
action by a beneficiary against the trustee for breach of the trustee's
duties, the trial court could submit the issue of punitive damages to
the jury while reserving its opinion on any remaining equitable issues
until after the jury renders a verdict. 254 This approach would not displace the equity courts' power with respect to the administration of
trusts but would provide the relief necessary to forestall breaches of
duty.
5. Conclusion.-Although the issue of whether Donald Kann
breached his fiduciary duties to Regina Kann was not reviewed by the
Court of Appeals, had the court endeavored to examine Donald's actions, it should have determined that he did in fact transgress his duties. Because Donald "might wind up with more money"2 55 as a result
of this ordeal, the propriety of his actions should have been inquired
250. Kahle v. John McDonough Builders, Inc., 85 Md. App. 141, 152, 582 A.2d 557, 562
(1990).
251. Kann, 344 Md. at 713, 690 A.2d at 520 (emphasis added).
252. Kahle, 85 Md. App. at 152, 582 A.2d at 562 (noting the availability of an action at
law when the trustee has made improper investments); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§§ 197, 198 (1959) (allowing an action at law when the trustee is required to unconditionally remit money or chattels to the beneficiary).

253. But see Kann, 344 Md. at 713, 690 A.2d at 521 (stating that the court will not adopt a
cause of action at law for all breaches of fiduciary duty by every type of fiduciary). By
simply creating or expanding the list of exceptions, the Court of Appeals could heed the
Hartlove dissent's warning that recognition of an independent tort for breach of fiduciary
duty would have sweeping implications. Hartlove v. Maryland Sch. for the Blind, 111 Md.

App. 310, 355-56, 681 A.2d 584, 605-06 (1996) (Cathell, J., dissenting), vacated, 344 Md.
720, 690 A.2d 526 (1997).
254. See Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 551-52, 530 A.2d 724, 733-34 (1987) (holding
that a right of trial by jury must be preserved as to legal issues where both legal and equitable issues are presented in a single case).
255. Joint Record Extract at E270, Kann (No. 22) (oral opinion of the Circuit Court for

Baltimore City, Jan. 20, 1995).
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into by the trial court. Not only did he have an interest in the funds
removed from the corpus of the Louis Trust, but Donald also failed to
faithfully defend that trust against adverse claims-though they were
claims he himself was making. Donald breached his duties to Regina
by profiting from the transfer of assets he believed were misappropriated and by disregarding his duty to defend the Louis Trust. Therefore, the Court of Appeals could have sidestepped discussing the
creation of a new tort by adjudging Donald in breach of trust and
labeling the trial court's opinion to the contrary clearly erroneous.
In refusing to sanction a generic tort and a jury trial right for
breach of fiduciary duty, the Court of Appeals rigidly conformed to
the traditional rule as well as established Maryland law. In clinging to
the rule that trusts are within equity's exclusive province, however, the
court failed to perceive the insufficiency of existing equitable remedies. A court of equity should not constrain itself to traditional forms
of relief if they are inadequate. 5 6 Nonetheless, the only relief currently unavailable to a beneficiary in any action against the trustee is
punitive damages. Because a punitive-damages award may only be imposed by a court of law, the Court of Appeals should have advocated a
beneficiary's ability to combat breaches of fiduciary duty by a trustee
through an action at law.
BRIAN

C.

ROSENBERG

256. See Wells v. Price, 183 Md. 443, 452, 37 A.2d 888, 893 (1944) ("[E]quity suffers no
right to be without a remedy." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Recent Decisions
The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit
I.
A.

BANKRUPTCY

Rendering Section 707(b) the Equivalent of a Good Faith Requirement
for Chapter 7 Debtors

In the case of In re Kestell,1 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit upheld the denial of a Chapter 7 debtor's discharge in bankruptcy under sections 105(a) and 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. 2 In so holding, the Fourth Circuit rendered section
707(b), which allows a court to dismiss a Chapter 7 debtor's bankruptcy petition if the court finds that granting relief would be a "substantial abuse" of the bankruptcy process,3 the equivalent of a good
faith requirement for debtors seeking a Chapter 7 discharge. By eliminating any consideration of the debtor's future income in making its
determination, the Fourth Circuit moved further away from the future
income test promulgated by the Ninth Circuit in In re Kelly.4 The
court also demonstrated a clear intent to employ section 707(b) to
realize a primary goal of the Bankruptcy Code, namely, "to prevent
the use of the bankruptcy process to achieve illicit objectives."5
1. The Case.-In 1993, Janet Atkinson received a divorce from
her husband of twenty-seven years, Robert Kestell.6 As a result of the
divorce judgment, Kestell was obligated to pay Atkinson alimony,
child support, a lump sum award, attorney's fees, and a share of prof1. 99 F.3d 146 (4th Cir. 1996).
2. Id. at 149.
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994). This section states:
After a notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion . . . but not at the
request or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it
finds that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of
this chapter. There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor.
Id.
4. 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988).
5. Kestell, 99 F.3d at 149.
6. Id. at 147.
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its from a rental property.7 Just thirteen days after the divorce judgment, Kestell, who earned $193,000 in 1993, filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy.'
One month subsequent to his filing for bankruptcy, Kestell attended a creditors' meeting where he stated that he intended to reaffirm all of his debts except a small credit card debt and the
dischargeable portion of the debt that he owed to Atkinson. 9 Also at
this meeting, Kestell remarked that he did not want his ex-wife "to
have anything," and he swore under oath that, to the best of his
knowledge, he had accurately listed all of his assets and debts.1" In
reality, however, Kestell not only failed to list on the bankruptcy
schedules his anticipated receipt of a $13,000 income tax reimbursement from his employer, but he also neglected to amend the schedule
when he received the money. 1 Kestell also failed to report sick leave
benefits that he received from his employer in March 1994.2
After a one-day trial, the bankruptcy court ruled that the benefits
and the reimbursement qualified as property of the estate.1 3 Moreover, the court found that Kestell should have amended the bankruptcy schedules to reflect these payments and turned the proceeds
over to the bankruptcy trustee. 14 The court also determined that Kestell's actions evidenced an intent to defraud a creditor, namely Atkinson.1 5 As a result of these findings, the bankruptcy court found
fraudulent concealment in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2) (B) 1 6
7. Id,
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id
11. Id
12. Id Kestell received the sick leave benefits, which he had initially anticipated receiving only upon resignation or retirement, in March 1994 as a result of a modification in
company policy. After attempting to return the check so that he could receive his benefits
at a later date, Kestell cashed the check and deposited the money in a checking account in
Jamaica. Id
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id
16. This section provides:
(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate charged with custody of property under this title, has transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or has permitted to be
transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed(B) property of the estate, after the date of the filing of the petition;...
11 U.S.C. § 7 27(a) (2) (B) (1994).
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and denied Kestell's petition for a bankruptcy discharge.1 7 On appeal, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland affirmed the lower court's decision, and Kestell subsequently appealed
18
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Legislative History of 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).-In 1984, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984,'9 which added section 707(b) to the Bankruptcy Code. z° Section 707(b) allows a court to dismiss a case filed under Chapter 7 of
the Bankruptcy Code if the "granting of relief would be a substantial
abuse of the provisions of [Chapter 7]. "21 Section 707(b) was one of
several consumer credit amendments that Congress added to the
Bankruptcy Code in an effort to lessen the increasing number of
22
Chapter 7 petitions filed by debtors who did not truly need relief.

Prior to the enactment of section 707(b), the only obstacles to relief
under Chapter 7 for debtors were the exceptions to discharge found
in section 523(a), 2 3 grounds for dismissal in 707(a), 24 and objections
17. Keste4 99 F.3d at 147.
18. Id.
19. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
20. In re Green, 934 F.2d 568, 570 (4th Cir. 1991).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).
22. See Green, 934 F.2d at 570.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1994 & Supp. I 1996). Section 523 provides exceptions to
discharge for debts that fall into 18 enumerated categories. Id. § 523(a). Such nondischargeable debts include debts "to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for
alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a
separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record ....

"

Id.

§ 523(a)(5). In In re Keste, the Bankruptcy Court
determined that the portion of the Divorce Judgement consisting of a $111,475
monetary award was not in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support and
therefore was dischargeable, and that the state court award of $20,000.00 for attorneys' fees was nondischargeable, under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). Neither party
filed an appeal from this portion of the Bankruptcy Court's decision.
Brief of Appellee at 11 n.1, In re Kestell, 99 F.3d 146 (4th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-2925) (citation
omitted).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1994). Section 707(a) provides:
(a) The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and a
hearing and only for cause, including(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(2) nonpayment of any fees or charges required under chapter 123 of title
28 [28 U.S.C. § 1911-31 (1994)]; and
(3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen days or
such additional time as the court may allow after the filing of the petition commencing such case, the information required by paragraph (1) of section 521, but
only on a motion by the United States trustee.
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to discharge listed in 727(a) .25 Section 707(b) also provided an additional impediment to Chapter 7 relief by affording bankruptcy courts
a weapon against debtors who sought to utilize the processes of the
court in order to take advantage of creditors.2 6
The quest for the true meaning of "substantial abuse" in 707(b)
has been likened to the search for the Holy Grail.2 7 This is largely the
result of the scarcity of legislative history that accompanied the enactment of section 707(b). Not only did Congress fail to define "substantial abuse" in the text of the amendment, but there are also no
committee reports on the ultimate version of the Act. 28 Furthermore,

the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of "substantial abuse" was
Id. § 707(a).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a). Section 727(a) provides grounds for denying the debtor a discharge in bankruptcy. Among such reasons for dismissing a debtor's Chapter 7 petition
are situations in which the debtor has done the following:
(2) ... transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or has permitted to be transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed(A) property of the debtor ... or
(B) property of the estate ...
(4) ... knowingly and fraudulently ...
(A) made a false oath or account;
(B) presented or used a false claim;
(C) gave, offered, received, or attempted to obtain money, property, or
advantage, or a promise of money, property, or advantage, for acting or forbearing to act; or
(D) withheld from an officer of the estate entitled to possession under
this title, any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and
papers, relating to the debtor's property or financial affairs ....
§ 727(a) (2)-(4).
26. See Green, 934 F.2d at 570 ("Section 707(b) introduced an additional restraint upon
a debtor's ability to gain Chapter 7 relief, by allowing a bankruptcy court to deal equitably
with the situation in which an unscrupulous debtor seeks to gain the court's assistance in a
scheme to take unfair advantage of his creditors.").
27. See In re Butts, 148 B.R. 878 (N.D. Ind. 1992). The court said:
One of the most enduring sagas from the middle ages involves the search for the
Holy Grail, the mystical cup of Christ from the last supper. Whether in the form
of Chrtien's unfinished poem, Wolfram's completed tale, Wagner's opera,
Monte [sic] Python, Indiana Jones or any of its other incarnations, the story of
this quest continues to delight and enthrall. The matter now before the court
involves the quest for a grail of another kind. The United States Trustee does not
seek the cup of Christ but, instead, searches for the magical point at which a
debtor's ability to repay its creditors, without more, becomes a substantial abuse
of the provisions of Chapter 7, justifying dismissal of the case.
Id at 878.
28. See Green, 934 F.2d at 570-71. Courts have concluded that the ambiguity in the
statutory language reflects the inability of Congress to agree on a definition of "substantial
abuse" that would achieve a proper balance between the fundamental policy goal of the
Bankruptcy Code-affording the debtor a fresh start-and the interests of the consumer
credit industry in curbing abuse of the bankruptcy system. See id. at 571.
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augmented when Congress contemplated including, but ultimately
declined to include, a threshold test of future income or ability to
repay one's debts as a prerequisite for consumer debtors wishing to
obtain Chapter 7 relief.2 9
In attempting to construe "substantial abuse," courts have looked
to the Report on Senate Bill 445, an earlier draft of the 1984 amendments. ° Senate Bill 445 specifically states that "if a debtor can meet
his debts without difficulty as they come due, use of Chapter 7 would
represent a substantial abuse." 1 However, this report is inconclusive
on the issue because it fails to explain the meaning of "meet[ ] [his]
debts without difficulty."3 2 Moreover, it makes no reference to the
directly contradictory legislative history of section 707(a), in which the
drafters asserted that the "section does not contemplate ...

that the

ability of the debtor to repay his debts in whole or in part constitutes
adequate cause for dismissal."3 3
b. Disagreement Among the Circuits on the Meaning of "Substantial Abuse. "--Largely as a result of the ambiguity surrounding the enactment of section 707(b), there has been a significant divergence
among the circuits over the proper meaning of "substantial abuse."
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have held that the mere ability of a
Chapter 7 debtor to repay his debts constitutes per se substantial
abuse of the bankruptcy process. 4 In contrast, the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits have adopted a "totality of the circumstances" test in which
the debtor's ability to repay his debts is but one of many factors for the
courts to consider.3 5 Despite the Sixth Circuit's adoption of the totality of the circumstances test, the court agrees with the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits that a finding of a debtor's ability to pay is sufficient to
warrant dismissal; 36 yet, the Fourth Circuit departs from this reason-

29. See id. This language was proposed in S. 2000, 97th Cong. (1982). Green, 934 F.2d
at 571 n.5.
30. See Green, 934 F.2d at 571 & n.3 (referring to S. REP. No. 98-65, at 54 (1983)).
Senate Bill 445 was not passed by the Senate or the House of Representatives. Id.
31. Id. at 571 (quoting S. REP. No. 98-65, at 54 (1983)).
32. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 95-989, at 94 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5880).
33. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 95-989, at 94 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5880).
34. In reWalton, 866 F.2d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 915 (9th
Cir. 1988).
35. Green, 934 F.2d at 572; In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 126 (6th Cir. 1989).
36. Krohn, 886 F.2d at 126.
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ing altogether and concludes that this factor alone is an insufficient
basis for a finding of substantial abuse."
In In re Kelly,3 8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that the ability of a debtor to repay his debts, as evidenced by the debtor's capacity to fund a Chapter 13 plan, 39 is the

primary factor courts should consider in determining whether the
granting of Chapter 7 relief constitutes a "substantial abuse" of the
process. 40 The court stated: "This is not to say that inability to pay will
shield a debtor from section 707(b) dismissal where bad faith is otherwise shown. But a finding that a debtor is able to pay his debts, standing alone, supports a conclusion of substantial abuse."4 1 In so ruling,
the court examined the legislative history of section 707(b) and determined that, while the Senate Judiciary Committee abandoned a precise formula that would determine when a debtor's ability to repay his
debts warranted dismissal, the broader language of "substantial abuse"
should be construed to use the debtor's ability to repay his debts as
the primary factor in determining whether to dismiss a Chapter 7
petition.4 2
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit, adopting the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit's decision in In re Kelly, has held that a finding that a debtor
has the ability to repay his debts, standing alone, is sufficient to warrant a dismissal for substantial abuse.43 In In re Walton,4 4 the court
concluded that when Congress deleted the requirement of the inability to repay debts out of future income as a prerequisite to Chapter 7
relief, "Congress simply replaced a rigid test with a flexible 'substantial
abuse' standard that does not foreclose the courts from considering,
inter alia, the debtor's ability to pay his debts out of his future income."45 The court further acknowledged that, while a court may
37. Green, 934 F.2d at 572.
38. 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988).
39. Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code allows for the debtor's rehabilitation through a
court-approved plan by which creditors are repaid from income received by the debtor
subsequent to the filing of the petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 1321, 1322, 1325, 1326 (1994); see
also GEORGE M. TREISTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRurcy LAw 385 (4th ed. 1996)
(summarizing Chapter 13).
40. Kelly, 841 F.2d at 914.
41. Id. at 915. Later, this interpretation came to be known as the "per se" test. See infra
notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
42. Kelly, 841 F.2d at 914.
43. See In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 1989).
44. 866 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1989).
45. Id at 983 (citing Kelly, 841 F.2d at 914). In Walton, the debtor filed for Chapter 7
relief in July 1985. Id at 982. After a hearing to determine whether the debtor's petition
constituted substantial abuse under section 707(b), the Bankruptcy Court found inaccuracies in the debtor's schedules of income and expenditures. Moreover, the court deter-
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take the petitioner's good faith and unique hardships into consideration in determining "substantial abuse," an interpretation of section
707(b) that would essentially render "substantial abuse" nothing more
than the equivalent of "bad faith" would unnecessarily duplicate other
provisions of the Code that already required good faith on the part of
debtors.4 6 Moreover, the court noted that this narrow interpretation
would also greatly decrease the power of bankruptcy courts to dismiss
cases filed by debtors who are honest, but not truly needy.4 7 Thus, in
dismissing the debtor's petition, the court adopted the reasoning of
the Ninth Circuit, stating that "'it is obvious that the primary, if not
exclusive, focus of the court would be on the debtor's projected income and expenses as indicated on the schedules and the availability
of that future income to pay off prepetition debts."'4 8
The Sixth Circuit, in In re Krohn,4" also considered the question of
what behavior constitutes substantial abuse-5 ° In Krohn, the court held
mined that the debtor's income exceeded his expenses by $218 per month, which under a
Chapter 13 plan could repay a substantial portion of his debts. Id.
46. Id. at 983. Here, the court referred to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2), which provides:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this
title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-.
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of
credit, to the extent obtained by(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a
statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(B) use of a statement in writing(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for such
money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to
deceive; or
(C) for purposes of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, consumer
debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating more than $500 for "luxury goods
or services" incurred by an individual debtor on or within forty days before the
order for relief under this title, or cash advances aggregating more than $1,000
that are extensions of consumer credit under an open end credit plan obtained
by an individual debtor on or within twenty days before the order for relief under
this tide, are presumed to be nondischargeable ....
11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
47. Walton, 866 F.2d at 983.
48. Id. at 984 (quoting Irving A. Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies:
Chapter 7 Dismissal on the Basis of "SubstantialAbuse, " 59 AM. BANK,R. L.J. 327, 347 (1985)
(footnote omitted)). The Walton court determined that the debtor possessed the requisite
means to pay over two-thirds of his debts through a three-year plan, and that he could
repay all of his outstanding unsecured debts in five years. Id. at 985.
49. 886 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1989).
50. In Krohn, the debtor, who filed for Chapter 7 in December 1986, worked as a financial business manager with a large industrial firm, earning between $75,000 and $80,000 in
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that, in determining whether a Chapter 7 petition should be granted
under section 707(b), the totality of the circumstances should be examined when considering whether the individual debtor was taking
unfair advantage of his creditors, and whether the debtor's financial
situation warranted Chapter 7 relief.5 Specifically, the court ruled
that in making such an assessment, bankruptcy courts should consider
whether the debtor exhibited good faith and honesty in filing schedules, whether the bankruptcy petition resulted from an unforeseen or
catastrophic event, and whether the debtor possessed the ability to
repay his debts out of future earnings.5 2
Like the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the Sixth Circuit held that
the debtor's ability to repay his debts alone may be sufficient to allow
a dismissal under 707(b). 53 In Krohn, the court dismissed the debtor's
bankruptcy petition as a result of a combination of factors. 4 In particular, the court noted the debtor's ample source of future income,
his bad faith (evidenced by his lack of a serious effort to repay his
debts or reduce his expenses), his callous attitude toward his debtors,
and his intentional indulgence in a lifestyle that exceeded a reasonable standard of living.5 5
In 1991, in In re Green,5 6 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit eschewed the per se rule first enunciated by the
Kelly court5 7 in favor of a more flexible standard for determining substantial abuse.5 8 In so doing, the court acknowledged that, in the ma1987. Id. at 125. In July 1987, Krohn and his wife, who did not work and did not seek
bankruptcy relief, received $19,701.86 from the sale of a condominium in which they possessed a one-half interest Id. The Krohns purchased a new home valued at $156,000,
which Society National Bank agreed to finance on the condition that the debtor reaffirm
his unsecured credit debt of $19,626.49. Id Krohn owed $143,074 to unsecured creditors,
and on many occasions he obtained cash advances from one creditor in order to satisfy
part of his debt to other creditors. I& Krohn attributed his large food and clothing bills to
his wife's aversion to cooking and affinity for custom-made clothing. Id
51. Id at 126.
52. Id,
53. Id. The court stated that, in determining whether such a debtor may repay his
debts through future earnings, the bankruptcy courts may consider five factors: (1)
whether the debtor possesses a reliable source of future income, (2) whether the debtor
can fund a Chapter 13 plan, (3) whether state remedies exist to assist the debtor, (4)
whether the debtor could obtain relief through private negotiations, and (5) whether the
debtor could reduce his expenses without depriving him of necessities. Id. at 126-27.
54. Id. at 126-27.
55. Id. at 127-28.
56. 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991).
57. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
58. Green, 934 F.2d at 571-72. In Green, the debtor, Walter Green, filed a voluntary
petition for Chapter 7 relief in March 1989. Id- at 569. The Bankruptcy Court determined
that Green, who worked as a bus driver, had income in 1988 of $46,000, but because of a
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jority of cases in which the question had been considered, courts
viewed the debtor's ability to repay his debts as the primary factor.5 9
Yet, the court noted that the consensus among these courts was that
they must determine "substantial abuse" on a case-by-case basis, in
light of the totality of the circumstances.6" Moreover, the court stated
that by examining these factors, as well as the debtor's ability to repay
his future debts, courts could accurately determine whether dismissal
of the particular case would accomplish the real purpose behind section 707(b), i.e., preventing the abuse of the bankruptcy process by
debtors who desire to avoid their creditors.6 1 In light of the statutory
presumption that the debtor's request for relief should be granted,
the court held that the sole factor of a debtor's solvency does not suffice to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition for substantial abuse.62
c. Substantial Abuse in Cases Arising from Divorce.-In two
cases that addressed substantial abuse in bankruptcy filings arising out
of divorce, the courts based dismissal of the Chapter 7 petitions on a
6 5 the
combination of factors.63 In In re Shands64 and In re Palmer,
courts stressed both the debtors' ability to repay their debts and also
the debtors' illicit motivation in filing for Chapter 7 relief.6 6 In
Shands, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
leg injury preventing him from working overtime, he estimated that his income in 1989
would be $26,000. Id. The court found that Green possessed $40,000 in unsecured debt,
and his monthly income exceeded his necessary expenses by $638 per month. Id The
court found that Green had no dependents, that he had filed for bankruptcy in 1973, and
that many of his unsecured debtors were expensive department stores, jewelers, and consumer loan companies. Id. at 569-70. Moreover, Green's largest debt of $21,900 had been
accumulating for ten years. Id.
59. Id. at 572.
60. Id. The court stated that the totality of the circumstances approach involves an
examination of the following factors, among others:
(1) Whether the bankruptcy petition was filed because of sudden illness, calamity, disability, or unemployment;
(2) Whether the debtor incurred cash advances and made consumer
purchases far in excess of his ability to repay;
(3) Whether the debtor's proposed family budget is excessive or
unreasonable;
(4) Whether the debtor's schedules and statement of current income and
expenses reasonably and accurately reflect the true financial condition; and
(5) Whether the petition was filed in good faith.
Id.
61. Id
62. Id.
63. See infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
64. 63 B.R. 121 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985).
65. 117 B.R. 443 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990).
66. Id. at 446-48; Shands, 63 B.R. at 124.
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Michigan dismissed a voluntary petition for relief in Chapter 7, filed
by Nancy A. Shands, after a finding of "substantial abuse. 6 y In dismissing her petition, the court refused to adopt a rule by which a
Chapter 7 debtor's ability to repay one-hundred percent of her debts
68
within a three-year period would constitute substantial abuse per se.
Rather, the court held that a debtor's ability to repay her debts
through a Chapter 13 plan, coupled with certain egregious circumstances (such as the spiteful intent to "file bankruptcy 'against her exhusband"'), sufficiently warranted a dismissal under section 707(b). 69
In Palmer, a case involving an attempt by a Chapter 7 debtor to
avoid paying a former spouse amounts arising from a marriage dissolution decree, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Iowa dismissed the debtor's bankruptcy petition for Chapter 7 relief for substantial abuse.7 0 The court, looking to the factors
set forth by the Eighth Circuit in In re Walton, examined the facts surrounding the debtor's petition for bankruptcy. First, the court considered the fact that the debtor's schedule of income and expenses did
not present an accurate statement of the debtor's income. 7 1 From the
additional income that the debtor failed to report on the schedule,
the debtor would have possessed the necessary amount of money to
fund a Chapter 13 plan.7 2 As such, the court concluded that enabling
the debtor to discharge $35,000 of unsecured debt and leave bankruptcy with $86,000 of exempt property would result in abuse of the
system by a debtor who, contrary to the aims of the Bankruptcy Code,
did not need a fresh start, but desired to use the process to achieve his
own illicit objectives.73 Second, the court found that the debtor's sole
67. Shands, 63 B.R. at 124. Specifically, the court found that the following two factors
constituted "substantial abuse": (1) that Mrs. Shands's admitted purpose for filing bankruptcy was to discharge her debt to her former husband, and (2) she had the ability to
fund a Chapter 13 plan. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Palmer,117 B.R. at 447-48. In Palmer,as a result of a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage, Beverly Palmer, the wife of debtor William Palmer, was awarded a cash lump sum of
$24,000. Id. at 445. The debtor filed for Chapter 7 relief in February 1990, and the schedules of assets and liabilities indicated that the debtor possessed $86,565 in property and
$35,018.36 in unsecured debts. Id. The cash lump sum settlement owed to Beverly Palmer
and a debt owed to William Palmer's father constituted 90 percent of the debt, and the
debtor's assets exceeded his debts by more than $50,000. Id.
71. Id. at 445. The court determined that while the debtor included $525 per month
in expenses related to farming, he did not include any amount for the income related to
farming in the computation of his total income. Id The court stated that if the debtor
included the expenses in the schedule of expenses, he should also have included the gross
income from the farming on the income side of the ledger. Id
72. Id. at 446-47.
73. Id. at 44748.
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motivation in filing for bankruptcy was to "avoid paying his former
spouse the amounts the Iowa District Court had previously determined are legitimately owed. ' 74 Ultimately, the court ruled that these
two factors were sufficient to constitute substantial abuse, and therefore, a dismissal of the debtor's petition was warranted.7 5
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In In re Kestell, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland properly denied Robert Kestell's
petition for a Chapter 7 discharge. 76 The court began its analysis by
asserting, as Kestell urged, that the main thrust of the Bankruptcy
Code is to afford debtors a fresh start. 77 The court clarified, however,
that this right is predicated on the "honest and forthright invocation
of the Code's protections. 7 8 Moreover, the court added that the
structure of the Bankruptcy Code itself, both in general form and specific provisions, affords bankruptcy courts the authority to forestall the
use of the bankruptcy process to achieve improper objectives.7 9 In
particular, the court referred to sections 707(b) and 727(a) (which
provide grounds for dismissal of a Chapter 7 petition),8 section
1112(b) (which allows dismissal or conversion to Chapter 7 of a Chapter 11 petition), 1 and sections 1325(a) 8 2 and 130783 (which impose a
good faith requirement and provide for dismissal or conversion of a
74. Id. at 448.
75. Id.
76. Kestel4 99 F.3d at 146-47.
77. Id at 147.
78. Id. at 149.
79. Id (explaining that bankruptcy courts are authorized, in both general and specific
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, to prevent debtors from taking advantage of the
process).
80. See supra notes 3, 25.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1994). Section 1112(b) provides 10 specified grounds for the
dismissal or conversion to Chapter 7 of a Chapter 11 petition "for cause," including "inability to effectuate a plan," "unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors,"
and "material default by the debtor with respect to a confirmed plan." § 1112(b) (2), (3),

(8).
82. This section provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law;
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1994).
83. 11 U.S.C. § 1307 (1994). Section 1307 provides that courts may dismiss or convert
a Chapter 13 case to liquidation "for cause." § 1307(c). Among the 10 reasons cited as
examples of adequate cause are "unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to
creditors" and "failure to commence making timely payments under section 1326 of this
title." § 1307(c)(1), (4).
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Chapter 13 petition).8 4 Lastly, the court referred to section 105(a), 8 5
which it described as
"an omnibus provision phrased in such general terms as to
be the basis for a broad exercise of power in the administration of a bankruptcy case. The basic purpose of section 105
is to assure the bankruptcy courts power to take whatever action is appropriate or necessary in aid of the exercise of its
jurisdiction."86

Such provisions illustrate the power that the Bankruptcy Code
grants courts to combat possible abuse by debtors.8 7 With such general principles in mind, the court examined whether the bankruptcy
court's findings were sufficient to warrant the denial of the petitioner's discharge under any of the listed provisions.8 8 The court determined that the case should be dismissed under sections 707(b) and
105(a), rather than dismissed because of fraudulent concealment
under section 727(a) (2).89 The court reasoned that Kestell was an
individual debtor under 707(b), and his debts qualified as consumer
debts for the purposes of the statute.9" In determining whether Kestell's actions amounted to "substantial abuse," the court reiterated its
previous adoption of the "totality of the circumstances" approach in
Green 9 1 and concluded that the record supported the conclusion that
the debtor's behavior established "substantial abuse" under section
707(b) and "abuse of process" under section 105(a) .92 In determining that Kestell's behavior constituted "substantial abuse," the court
concentrated first on Kestell's obvious lack of intent to distribute his
assets equally among his creditors, as evidenced by his plan to avoid
payment of his financial obligation to his former wife while satisfying
84. Kestell 99 F.3d at 148.
85. Id. Section 105(a) provides:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination
necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to
prevent an abuse of process.
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994).
86. Kestell, 99 F.3d at 148 (quoting 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcy § 105.01, at 105-3 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1996)).
87. Id. at 149.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.; see also supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text (discussing the "totality of the
circumstances" test enunciated by the Fourth Circuit in Green).
92. Kestel 99 F.3d at 149.
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his other debts.9 3 The court found, after considering Kestell's expressed desire that Atkinson receive no money and his failure to accurately disclose his assets, that Kestell's sole purpose in filing for
Chapter 7 relief was to avoid paying the debt he owed to Atkinson.9 4
The Fourth Circuit declined, however, to address whether the disputed assets were property of the bankruptcy estate, a determination
that would have been necessary to warrant dismissal Under section
727(a) (2)." The court concluded that, given the findings of the trial
court that demonstrated Kestell's bad faith use of the bankruptcy process, dismissal under sections 105(a) and 707(b) was more
appropriate. 96
4. Analysis.--In In re Kestell, the Fourth Circuit held that the dismissal of Robert Kestell's petition for Chapter 7 relief was proper
under sections 707(b) and 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.9 7 In so
doing, the Fourth Circuit rendered 707(b) the equivalent of a good
faith requirement for debtors filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7.
By omitting any consideration of the debtor's ability to repay his debts
from future income, a primary factor to be considered under the "totality of the circumstances" test enunciated in 1991 by the Fourth Circuit,9 8 the court enlarged the power of the lower courts to dismiss the

petitions of unscrupulous debtors under section 707(b). Moreover,
the court further distanced itself from the per se rule promulgated by
the Ninth Circuit in Kelly.
a. "SubstantialAbuse" Rendered the Equivalent of "BadFaith."The Fourth Circuit's decision in Kestell to abandon altogether any con93. Id. at 149-50.
94. Id. at 150.
95. Id.
96. Id. Kestell argued that his petition should not be dismissed because he relied in
good faith on the advice of his attorneys, who advised him that it was not necessary for him
to include the sick leave benefits and tax reimbursement in his list of assets. Id. The bankruptcy judge concluded first that the manifest evidence of fraudulent intent in Kestell's
testimony sufficed to defeat any claim of good faith trust in the advice of legal counsel. Id.
Moreover, the court added that if Kestell harbored doubts concerning whether to include
the amounts in his schedule of assets, he could have resolved such doubts simply by informing the trustee that he had received such payments subsequent to the filing of his
Chapter 7 petition. Id. By disclosing such information to the trustee, Kestell could have
demonstrated his intent to comply with the bankruptcy process and allowed a just resolution of whether the funds should have been listed as part of the estate. Id Thus, the court
reasoned that Kestell's lack of honesty and his failure to disclose information, two factors
essential to the main goal of the bankruptcy process-the equitable distribution of assets
among creditors-clearly evidenced Kestell's abuse of the process. Id.
97. Id. at 149.
98. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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sideration of the debtor's ability to repay his debts in determining substantial abuse represents a significant departure from precedent. In
Kestell, the court expanded the power of lower courts to dismiss cases
for substantial abuse by allowing them to focus solely on good faith.
The necessity of such an expansion is particularly evident in cases
such as Kestell, which arise from the improper motives of debtors who
choose to file for bankruptcy to avoid paying obligations that emanated from divorce. In Kestell, the Fourth Circuit chose to dismiss the
debtor's bankruptcy petition under sections 707(b) and 105(a) rather
than address the question decided by the district court-whether Kestell's actions amounted to fraudulent concealment, thus justifying dismissal under section 727(a) (2). 9 This voluntary choice by the court
indicates the court's willingness to rely on 707(b) in combating abuse
of the bankruptcy process. Rather than affirm the reasoning of the
district court below, the Fourth Circuit invoked section 105(a), which
the court admitted serves as a rather broad provision giving bankruptcy courts the general authority to promote the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code,1 00 and section 707(b), a provision of the Code
whose meaning and application have become the source of significant
dispute.10 1
The court prefaced its departure from its prior ruling in In re
Green by affirming the "totality of the circumstances" test 10 2 and quot-

ing specific language in Green in which the court recognized "a strong
indication that Section 707(b) was intended to explicitly recognize
the court's ability to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition for lack of good
faith." 103 Thus, the court concluded that, in making its determination
whether Kestell's actions constituted substantial abuse, it "need only
consider whether Kestell's handling of the two benefits, both of which
were earned prior to the bankruptcy petition, evidenced a good faith
invocation of the bankruptcy process."10' 4 Clearly lacking in the
court's discussion of substantial abuse, however, was any discussion of
Kestell's ability to pay his debts out of future income. For example,
while the court did refer in its factual discussion to Kestell's reported

99. Kestell, 99 F.3d at 149.
100. Id. at 148-49.
101. See Michael D. Bruckman, Note, The Thickening Fog of "SubstantialAbuse": Can
707(a) Help Clear the Air?, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. Rv.193, 194-95 (1994) (stating that the
reason for this dispute was Congress's failure to define "specific abuse" when it added
section 707(b) to the Bankruptcy Code).
102. Kestell, 99 F.3d at 149.
103. Id. (quoting In re Green, 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991)).
104. Id. (emphasis added).
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earnings in 1993 as $193,000,105 it is clear from.the text of the opinion
that the court did not consider whether Kestell would possess the financial capacity to repay his debts in the future as a factor in making
its substantial abuse determination.
The Kestell court departed from Fourth Circuit precedent when it
declined to consider the financial condition of the debtor. In Green,
the court stressed that although solvency may raise an inference of
substantial abuse, in light of the statutory presumption in favor of the
debtor, solvency alone does not establish substantial abuse.10 6 Moreover, the Green court stated that in making a substantial abuse determination, the court must explore a totality of the circumstances, "as
well as the relation of the debtor's future income to his future necessary expenses. ' 1°7 Thus, while the Green court clearly declined to
adopt the Ninth Circuit's per se rule in favor of a more flexible standard by which additional factors other than ability to pay must be considered in order to dismiss a petition under section 707(b), the court
nonetheless agreed in Green that future income is the primary factor
for the courts to consider in rendering a "substantial abuse" decision. 10 8 With the exception of Kestell, courts following the totality of
the circumstances approach articulated in Green have considered future income as a significant factor in making their determinations.' 0 9
By failing to consider ability to pay one's debts, the court in Kestell
provided lower courts with greater freedom to combat the rampant
105. Id. at 147.
106. Green, 934 F.2d at 572.
107. Id.
108. Id. Another court has interpreted the Green holding as follows:
Under all three tests [the per se rule, the totality of the circumstances test, and a
hybrid approach], the primary factor to be considered is the debtor's ability to
pay off his debts with his disposable earnings. The only difference is that the
Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits believe that this factor alone may be dispositive
of the "substantial abuse" issue, while the Fourth Circuit in Green requires something more. That something more appears to be bad faith.
In re Ontiveros, 198 B.R. 284, 288 (C.D. Ill. 1996) (emphasis added).
109. One court held:
[I]n ruling on motions under this section, there should be consideration of all
relevant factors bearing on the debtor's relationship with its creditors. If, from
this consideration it appears that the debtor is seeking to obtain an unfair advantage over his or her creditors, in that the debtor could have paid his or her debts
as they become due, without difficulty, then the motion to dismiss should be
granted.
In re Balaja, 190 B.R. 335, 341 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); accord In re Higuera, 199 B.R. 196,
199 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996) ("In the totality of the circumstances test, the ability to pay is
but one of the factors to be taken into consideration."); In re Traub, 140 B.R. 286, 290
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1992) ("The court in Green stated that in addition to the ability to pay, it
would consider the 'totality of the circumstances' . . ...).
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abuse that so often arises out of cases involving divorce.1 10 The court
properly stressed that "[b] ecause favoritism of one creditor over another is antithetical to the goal of equitable distribution, the Bankruptcy Code cannot be used as a vehicle for advancing personal
antagonisms against an ex-spouse."1 1 1 As such, the court evidenced
an unwillingness to tolerate the abuse of the process that occurs when
debtors use the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, not because they
need a fresh start, but rather because they wish to avoid paying a former spouse amounts arising from a divorce judgement. In a case such
as Kestell, there should be no obligation to examine the financial condition of the debtor. Rather, the debtor's unconscionable intent
alone should suffice to justify dismissal of his bankruptcy petition.
Thus, in both Shands and Palmer,the court should have based its dismissal of the debtors' petitions for relief solely on the debtors' admitted intent to discharge debts owed to former spouses.1 2 In light of
this professed intent, any discussion of the debtors' financial situations, including whether the debtors possessed the requisite means to
fund Chapter 13 plans, was not necessary in determining whether "the
granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of
[Chapter 7]. " 11"

By opting to base its determination solely on the grounds of bad
faith, the Fourth Circuit in Kestell adopted an approach that the
Eighth Circuit in In re Walton warned "would drastically reduce the
bankruptcy courts' ability to dismiss cases filed by debtors who are not
dishonest, but who also are not needy." 1 4 Rather than reducing the
power of the courts, however, the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Kestell appropriately expanded the power of the courts to combat "the real concern behind Section 707(b): abuse of the bankruptcy process by a
debtor seeking to take unfair advantage of his creditors."" 5 Indeed,
the Bankruptcy Code does not require that a debtor be insolvent to
file for bankruptcy. 1 6 Section 109 of the Code, unchanged by the
1984 amendments, allows debtors to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 unless they fall within one of the listed exceptions, none of which
apply to consumer debtors or predicate relief upon the ability to repay
110.
divorce
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (giving examples of rampant abuse in
cases).
Kestel4 99 F.3d at 150.
See generally supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994).
In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1989).
In re Green, 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991).
Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1994)).
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debts in the future. 1 7 Rather, section 109, when considered with the
legislative history of section 707(b), indicates that section 707(b) "was
intended to explicitly recognize the court's ability to dismiss a Chapter
7 petition for lack of good faith-when the total picture is abusive."'
Perhaps the clearest example of lack of good faith is a case in which
the debtor attempts to shirk responsibility to a former spouse by invoking the bankruptcy process.
b. The Fourth CircuitMoves FurtherAway from the Ninth Circuit's
Per Se Test.-In contrast with the per se test adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Kelly, the Fourth Circuit determined in Green that a debtor's
ability to pay his debts is not a satisfactory basis for a finding of substantial abuse, absent a consideration of other factors.1 1 9 By moving
beyond Green in Kestell, the Fourth Circuit further widened the gap
between its position on substantial abuse and that of the Sixth, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits. In so doing, the Fourth Circuit properly shifted
the focus of section 707(b) from the debtor's ability to pay to the
debtor's good faith utilization of the bankruptcy process.
In In re Kelly, the Ninth Circuit held that "inability to pay will
[not] shield a debtor from section 707(b) dismissal where bad faith is
otherwise shown. But a finding that a debtor is able to pay his debts,
standing alone, supports a conclusion of substantial abuse."12 ° In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on the committee
reports of Senate Bill 445, an earlier draft of the amendments, which
included a threshold formula for determining the point at which a
debtor's ability to pay his debts would preclude the debtor from obtaining Chapter 7 relief.1 2 1 The report stated that "if a debtor can
meet his debts without difficulty as they come due, use of Chapter 7
would represent a substantial abuse."' 22 The Ninth Circuit determined that because no committee reports on the final amendment
existed, the report of Senate Bill 445 best evidenced congressional intent.1 23 In contrast, the Green court focused on the rejection by Congress of the threshold test and the failure of Congress to explain the
meaning of the language "meet his debts without difficulty as they
117. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) ("[A] person that resides or has a domicile, a place of
business, or property in the United States, or a municipality, may be a debtor under this
title.").
118. Green, 934 F.2d at 572.(internal quotation marks omitted).
119. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
120. In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 915 (9th Cir. 1988).
121. Id. at 914.
122. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 98-65, at 54 (1983)).
123. Id. at 915 & n.7.
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come due." '2 4 In addition, the court in Green emphasized the legislative history of section 707(a), left intact by the 1984 amendments,
which explicitly stated that section 707 did not intend that the ability
of a debtor to repay his debts constituted sufficient grounds for dismissal. 2 5 The court concluded that, as a result of these factors, "solvency alone is not a sufficient basis for a finding that the debtor has in
fact substantially abused the provisions of Chapter 7.7" 126
By moving beyond Green in Kestell, the Fourth Circuit further distanced itself from the approach adopted by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, respectively, in Walton and Kelly, and partially adopted by the
Sixth Circuit in Krohn.1 27 The approach of the Fourth Circuit in Kestell, which compels investigation of the debtor's intentions on a caseby-case basis, better serves to "effectuate the policies of debtor rehabilitation and creditor protection, which are fundamental to the bankruptcy process."1 2 The bankruptcy courts should protect creditors
from debtors who seek to exploit the Chapter 7 process;
"[n]onetheless, an honest debtor, who traditionally [has] been protected by the bankruptcy system, should not be compelled to forfeit
his or her entitlement to a chapter 7 discharge." 129 By concentrating
primarily on the debtor's good faith as opposed to focusing mainly on
the debtor's ability to repay his debts, the court in Kestell properly interpreted the language and congressional intent behind section
707(b) by enlarging the court's power to dismiss cases filed by debtors
who, regardless of their ability to repay their debts, seek to exploit the
bankruptcy process to achieve unethical objectives.
124. In re Green, 934 F.2d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1991).
125. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 95-989, at 94 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5880).
126. Id. at 572.
127. See supra notes 39-55 and accompanying text.
128. Carlos J. Cuevas, Amending Section 707(b), 4 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 507, 508
(1996). Cuevas argues that as a result of the poor drafting of section 707(b), "the courts
have struggled with the issue of what constitutes 'substantial abuse' and some courts have
faltered." Id. at 507. Cuevas asserts that the Ninth Circuit misinterpreted the language of
section 707(b):
[T]he Ninth Circuit did not cite any specific provision of the statute or any definitive legislative history to reach its conclusion. To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit
relied primarily on decisions rendered by bankruptcy courts. As a matter of bankruptcy policy Kelly is contrary to the fundamental policy of the debtor's fresh start.
Indeed, under Kelly it is unnecessary for a debtor to engage in any fraudulent or
any other type of dishonest behavior to be denied a chapter 7 discharge. The
Ninth Circuit's ruling would deny an honest debtor a chapter 7 discharge, which
is inimical to bankruptcy policy.

Id.
129. Id. at 508.
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5. Conclusion.-By failing to consider the debtor's ability to repay his debts in determining substantial abuse under section 707(b),
the Fourth Circuit in Kestell altered the focus of courts that apply the
"totality of the circumstances" test. In so ruling, the Fourth Circuit
provided bankruptcy courts with an additional weapon in combating
the rising number of cases filed by unscrupulous debtors, and it ensured that relief will be awarded only to debtors who attempt "a good
faith invocation of the bankruptcy process."13 ° The court's ruling appropriately affords lower courts a license to dismiss such cases arising
from divorce solely on the basis of the unscrupulous intent of the
debtors. Such a ruling represents an essential step in terminating an
egregious example of abuse of the bankruptcy process.
NicoLE L.

130. Kestel4 99 F.3d at 150.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The Fourth Circuit Properly Overturns a Ban on Lawyer Advertising,
but Troubling Issues Remain

In Ficker v. Curran,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that a Maryland statute2 requiring lawyers to wait
thirty days before sending direct mail solicitations to criminal defendants or incarcerable traffic defendants violated the First Amendment's
protection of commercial speech because it failed to advance directly
a substantial state interest.' On the basis of a correct interpretation of
the case law, the court reached an appropriately narrow holding, limited to the facts of the case. 4 While the court properly avoided addressing the deeper, more troubling issues posed by lawyer
advertising, it did acknowledge that the legal profession's reputation
is a substantial state interest.5 Thus, the court left room for the Maryland legislature to protect the integrity of the legal profession, when
other forms of advertising threaten it, by enacting reasonably fitting
restrictions that directly advance this interest.
1. The Case.-During its 1996 session, the Maryland General Assembly enacted a law restricting lawyer advertising in two circumstances. 6 Section 10-605.1 (a) (1) of the Business Occupations and
Professions Article (section 1) required lawyers to wait thirty days
before sending written solicitations7 to victims of an accident or disaster, or to their relatives.8 This section was modeled on a Florida Bar
rule' that the United States Supreme Court upheld as a constitutional
restriction on commercial speech in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.1 °
The Maryland General Assembly, however, added the following restriction in 10-605.1(a) (2) (section 2):
(a) A lawyer may not send a written communication, directly or through an agent, to a prospective client for the
1. 119 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1997).
2. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF., § 10-605.1(a)(2) (Supp. 1996).
3. Ficker, 119 F.3d at 1156.
4. See id.; see also infra note 200 and accompanying text.
5. Ficker, 119 F.3d at 1153. The United States Supreme Court first unambiguously
accepted the legal profession's reputation as a substantial state interest in Florida Bar v.
Went ForIt, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625 (1995).
6. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF., § 10-605.1.
7. Written solicitations addressed to a potential client known to have a specific legal
problem are known as "targeted mailings." See infra text accompanying note 115.
8. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. OCC. & PROF. § 10-605.1(a) (1).
9. See Went For It, 515 U.S. at 620 (setting forth Florida Bar Rule 4-7.4(b) (1)).
10. 515 U.S. 618 (1995); see infra notes 127-144 and accompanying text.
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purpose of obtaining professional employment if the communication concerns:
(2) a criminal prosecution, or a prosecution of a traffic
offense that carries a period of incarceration, involving the
person to whom the communication is addressed or the person's relative, unless the charging document was filed more
than 30 days before the date the communication is mailed.11
The Maryland Senate intended section 2 of the statute to protect the
same interests as those safeguarded by section 1, namely, the privacy
of the recipient, and the legal profession's reputation or integrity.' 2
After hearing testimony, the Senate found that targeted solicitation
harmed these interests, 1 3 the legitimacy of which had been recognized
by the United States Supreme Court in Went For It. 4
Robin Ficker, a Maryland attorney alleging that he obtained virtually all of his clients through direct mail solicitations of those charged
with incarcerable traffic offenses, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against Maryland Attorney
General Joseph Curran. 5 Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief,
Ficker filed a motion for summary judgment challenging the constitutionality of section 2 under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution.' 6 The district court held that section
17
2 was an unconstitutional restriction of speech.

11. MD. CODE ANN., Bus. Occ. & PROF., § 10-605.1(a)(2). Section (b) of the statute
excepts communications requested by the client. Id. § 10-605.1 (b). A lawyer who violates
section 10-605.1 (a) (2) may be found guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to
one thousand dollars, incarceration for up to one year, or both. See id. § 10-606(c).
12. See SENATE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMMrTEE, FLOOR REPORT, S. 14, Reg. Legis.
Sess. (Md. 1996) (discussing the intent of section 2).
13. Id.
14. 515 U.S. at 625.
15. Ficker v. Curran, 950 F. Supp. 123, 124 (D. Md. 1996), affd, 119 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir.
1997). Ficker was joined by Natalie Boehm, the owner and operator of a company that
produces and mails direct mail solicitations from attorneys to those who have been
charged with jailable traffic offenses. Id.
16. Id. at 123-24. The First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Schneider v. NewJersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939). In lawyer advertising cases generally, restrictions constitute an abridgment of speech by the government in
one of two ways. The restriction may be a state statute, as in Ficker itself. See Ficker, 950 F.
Supp. at 124. Alternatively, the restriction may be a state bar rule that is imposed and
enforced by the state's supreme court. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 353, 355,
361 (1977).
17. Ficker, 950 F. Supp. at 129.
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The district court applied the rule that has become standard in
commercial speech"8 cases, namely, the test developed by the
Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission.19 According to this test, the government may restrict
commercial speech only by a narrowly drawn restriction that directly
and materially advances a substantial state interest.2 ° While acknowledging the state's interests in protecting both privacy and the integrity
of the legal profession, 1 the district court found that section 2 failed
to advance these interests "in a direct and material way." 22 First, the
court determined that the privacy interests of the accident victim and
the arrestee were not analogous: While the former is outraged when
confrontedwith the solicitation in a time of grief or trauma, the latter is
not outraged by the receipt of the solicitation, but is embarrassed simply by the fact that the attorney has learned of his arrest through consulting the public police records.2 3 Relying on Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n,24 the district court found that this kind of intrusion upon privacy is insufficient to support a restriction on commercial speech.2 5
Second, because one arrested for an incarcerable traffic offense has
much less time in which to assert his legal rights than the victim of an
accident, the district court found that the thirty-day restriction
amounted to a total ban of direct mailings, which the United States
Supreme Court had held unconstitutional in Shapero.2 6 Finally, the
district court reasoned that while the state could rehabilitate the image of lawyers, this interest was subordinate to the fair administration
ofjustice, which was served by the free flow of information to arrestees
27
in critical need of it.
Because section 2 did not properly advance the state's interests,
the district court found it to be an unconstitutional restriction of commercial speech.2 8 Maryland appealed to the United States Court of

18. Commercial speech is speech that proposes a commercial transaction. See infta
note 35 and accompanying text.
19. 447 U.S. 557 (1980); see aso infta notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
20. See Ficker, 950 F. Supp. at 125-26.
21. Id. at 126. The district court noted that it was constrained to recognize these interests under Went For It. Id.
22. Id. at 129.
23. Id. at 127-28.
24. 486 U.S. 466 (1988); see infra notes 114-126 and accompanying text.
25. Ficker, 950 F. Supp. at 128-29.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 129.
28. Id.
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Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in order to review the district court's
29
ruling that the law violated the First Amendment.
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Application of the First Amendment to 'Commercial Speech.The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states in relevant part, "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech."3 As the text indicates, the First Amendment does not protect all speech, but freedom of speech.3 1 An early scholar of the First
Amendment, Alexander Meiklejohn, argued that because this protection derived from "the necessities of the program of self-government,"3 2 it was limited to freedom of ideas, specifically, "ideas about
the common good." 3 Because courts did not consider advertising to
be essential to the function of self-government, 34 they were reluctant
to extend First Amendment protection to -commercial speech, that is,
speech proposing a commercial transaction.3 5
The United States Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of restrictions by states on commercial speech in Valentine v.
Chrestensen.36 The defendant, after police had informed him that the
New York City Sanitary Code prohibited the distribution of handbills
in the street, reprinted his previously distributed advertisement with a

29. Ticker, 119 F.3d at 1151.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
31. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 19 (1960). "Congress is not debarred from all action upon freedom of speech.
Legislation which abridges that freedom is forbidden, but not legislation to enlarge and
enrich it." Id.
32. Id. at 27.
33. Id. at 28. Even now, the court distinguishes "core political speech" from other
kinds of speech receiving less protection under the First Amendment. Board of Trustees
of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).
34. See THOMAS L. TEDFORD, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 234 (1985)

(discussing how distrust of exaggerated commercial messages and the idea that commercial speech is of little social value influenced the reluctance of courts to expand First
Amendment protection to commercial expression); see also MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 31, at

37 (distinguishing "a merchant advertising his wares" as a private right of speech, incident
to the Fifth Amendment protection of life and liberty, from "[the utterance] of a citizen

who is planning for the general welfare" as a public right of speech protected by the First
Amendment's unlimited guarantee of public discussion).

35. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 473-74 (defining commercial speech as the sort that proposes a
commercial transaction).

36. 316 U.S. 52 (1942), overruled by Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). For a discussion of Virginia Pharmacy, see
infra notes 50-60, 203-207 and accompanying text.
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protest on the reverse side of it.17 The Court identified the reprinted

version of the handbill as commercial speech, not by its content, but
instead by Chrestensen's purpose in distributing it, which was to evade
the Sanitary Code for his private profit.3" Reasoning that advertising
is an incident of business, the regulation of which is a matter of legislative judgment, 9 the Court held that "the Constitution imposes no
such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising."4 ° The view that commercial speech receives no constitutional
protection prevailed for over twenty years, with some modifications in
the test for identifying commercial speech.4 1
The Court reconsidered its position with respect to commercial
speech in 1975, in Bigelow v. Virginia.4 2 The defendant had published
an advertisement in Virginia for abortion services performed in New
York, where the procedure was legal at the time.4 3 The Court held
that a Virginia law prohibiting advertisements that encouraged abortion was, as applied to the defendant, a violation of the First Amendment.4 4 The Court pointed out that the advertisement, besides
proposing a commercial transaction, contained material of public interest on the issue of abortion.4 5 Unwilling simply to dismiss the advertisement as unprotected commercial speech,4 6 the Court balanced
the defendant's First Amendment interest at stake with the public interest asserted by Virginia.4 7 Thus, instead of a categorical approach
to commercial speech based on the primary purpose of the speaker
(or writer), the Court substituted a balancing test based on the con-

37. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 53. Chrestensen's handbill solicited visitors, for an admission fee, to a former Navy submarine, which he owned and had moored at a state pier. Id.
38. Id at 55; see also LOuSE L. HILL, LAwym ADVERTISING 24 (1993) (stating that the

"primary purpose" definition of unprotected commercial speech "focused on the motives
or objectives of the speaker").
39. See Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 54 ("Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or
pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to what extent such activity shall be adjudged a
derogation of the public right of user, are matters for legislative judgment.").
40. Id.
41. See HILL, supra note 38, at 25-30 (discussing the shift in focus from the motive of the
speech to its content).
42. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
43. Id at 811-12.
44. Id. at 829.
45. Id at 822.
46. Id at 826.
47. Id. The State argued that abortion referral agencies engaged in practices, such as
fee splitting, that tended to affect adversely the quality of medical services. Id at 827. The
Court rejected this argument, however, because the medical services at issue were performed out of state. Id.
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tent of the speech.4" As a result, speech no longer lost its First
Amendment protection simply because it was an advertisement or because it proposed a commercial transaction.4 9
Within a year, the Court strengthened its protection for commercial speech in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.5" The Court considered the constitutionality of a
state law providing that a licensed pharmacist was guilty of unprofessional conduct for publishing the price of prescription drugs.5 ' The
Court observed that, in contrast to the advertisement in Bigelow, which
provided information about a constitutionally protected activity,52 an
advertisement for prescription drug prices was purely commercial.5 3
The Court held, nonetheless, that a state may not "completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about en54
tirely lawful activity."

The Court reasoned that, although Virginia had an interest in
maintaining the professionalism of its licensed pharmacists,5 5 the state
could not properly advance this interest by keeping its citizens in ignorance. 56 Moreover, this state interest was outweighed by the combination of the advertiser's economic interest, 57 the consumer's interest in
48. See id at 826 (noting that "a court may not escape the task of assessing the First
Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the public interest allegedly served by
the regulation"). In this light, the Court reinterpreted Chrestensenas a narrow case permitting a regulation of the manner of advertising rather than a "sweeping proposition that
advertising is unprotected per se." Id. at 820; see also HILL, supra note 38, at 30-31 (explaining that Bigelow "essentially reduced Chrestensen to a general balancing process").
49. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818.
50. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
51. Id. at 749-50. The State justified the law as a way to maintain two related interests:
the professionalism of pharmacists and consumer health. Id. at 767-68. The Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy argued that the latter interest would be jeopardized by the aggressive
price competition resulting from advertising. Id.
52. See supra text accompanying note 45.
53. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761. "The 'idea' [the pharmacist] wishes to communicate is simply this: 'I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price.' Our question,
then, is whether this communication is wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment." Id.
54. Id. at 773. But see id. at 781-83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the First
Amendment protects public decisionmaking rather than private economic choices, the
regulation of which is presumptively the concern of the state legislature, and that the
Court's decision would diminish the states' capacity to regulate all professions within their
borders).
55. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 766.
56. Id. at 769. Also, the Court reasoned that advertising did not really jeopardize this
interest because modem pharmacists usually dispense standardized products rather than
specialized services, which can be of such a diverse nature and variety as to make advertisements about them confusing and deceptive. Id. at 773 n.25.
57. Id. at 762.
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knowing prices," and society's free-enterprise interest in efficiently allocating resources, which requires the free flow of commercial information. 9 Thus, for the first time, the Court established constitutional
protection for purely commercial speech.6'
While Virginia Pharmacy gave some constitutional protection to
commercial speech, the Court, in subsequent decisions, reaffirmed
that commercial speech was not entitled to the same level of First
Amendment protection as "core political speech."6 1 In CentralHudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,6 2 the Court articulated
a test for determining the constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech.6" First, the court must determine whether the commercial speech at issue is protected by the First Amendment, that is,
whether it concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.64 If so, the
court must apply a three-part test.65 First, the state must assert a substantial interest in regulating the speech.6 6 Second, the regulation
must directly advance the asserted state interest.6 7 Third, the regulation must not be more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.6 8 This third prong, which on its face seems to require the least
restrictive means, was later interpreted in Board of Trustees of the State

58. Id. at 763. The Court justified its concern for the listener, rather than the speaker,
on the ground that First Amendment protection is afforded to "the communication, to its
source and to its recipients both." Id. at 756. More specifically, the Court took notice of
the fact that prescription prices could vary by as much as 650% within one city. Id. at 754.
Thus, the consumer's "interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the
day's most urgent political debate." Id,at 763.
59. Id. at 765.
60. SeeJodi Vanderwater, Note, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.: RestrictingAttorney Advertising to Preserve the Image of the Legal Profession, 27 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 765, 771-72 (1996)
(asserting that, in contrast to Bigelow, which involved advertisements on the public issue of
abortion, VirginiaPharmacy marked the first time the Court acknowledged meaningful constitutional protection for commercial speech).
61. See supra note 33.
62. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
63. Id. at 566. The standard of judicial review for evaluating restrictions on commercial speech later came to be called "intermediate scrutiny." See Florida Bar v. Went For It,
Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995). This standard is implemented simply by applying the Central Hudson test. Id. at 623-24.
64. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. In contrast to political speech, whose truth or
falsity the Court does not consider, misleading commercial speech does not receive any
protection because the rationale for protecting commercial speech is the accuracy of information in society's effort to allocate resources efficiently. Id. at 561-63.
65. Id. at 566.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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University of New York v. Fox6 9 to require a "reasonable fit" between the
state's interest and the regulation chosen to implement it.70
b. FirstAmendment Protection of Attorney Advertising as Commercial Speech Prior to the Central Hudson Test.-In 1977, three years
before Central Hudson, the Court first extended constitutional protection to lawyer advertising as a form of commercial speech in Bates v.
State Bar.71 Two Arizona lawyers, who advertised prices for routine
legal services such as uncontested divorces, challenged a State Bar
rule 72 prohibiting this practice. 73 In a five-to-four decision with respect to the First Amendment issue, the Court applied Virginia Pharmacy and held that the State Bar could not prevent the publication in
a newspaper of truthful advertisements concerning routine legal
services.7 4
The Court relied on Virginia Pharmacy's articulation of the interests of the consumer and society in the free flow of commercial information 75 and rejected the State Bar's six proffered justifications for
restricting attorney price advertising. 76 In particular, the Court rejected two arguments significant for subsequent decisions. First, the
Court rejected the argument that advertising of routine legal prices is
inherently misleading.7 7 Second, the Court rejected the claim that
69. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
70. 1d. at 480 ("What our decisions require is a 'fit' between the legislature's ends and
the means chosen to accomplish those ends-a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is

in proportion to the interest served." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Court modified the third prong on the grounds that (1) the application of the
CentralHudson test was analogous to restrictions on time, place, and manner, which do not
require the least restrictive means, and (2) such a test would place an undue burden on
the state's ample regulatory authority in commercial matters. Id. at 477.

71. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
72. For a brief history of Arizona's adoption of the disciplinary rule at issue in this case,

see Vanderwater, supra note 60, at 774.
73. Bates, 433 U.S. at 353-55. The rule was issued by the state supreme court pursuant
to its constitutional authority to do so. Id. at 360.
74. Id. at 384.
75. Id. at 363-65.
76. Id. at 368-79. These justifications were: (1) "The Adverse Effect on Professionalism"; (2) "The Inherently Misleading Nature of Attorney Advertising"; (3) "The Adverse
Effect on the Administration ofJustice"; (4) "The Undesirable Economic Effects of Advertising"; (5) "The Adverse Effect of Advertising on the Quality of Service"; and (6) "The
Difficulties of Enforcement." Id (emphasis omitted).
77. Id. at 372-73. The State Bar argued that attorney advertising is inherently misleading because (1) legal services are unique and cannot be compared based on advertisements, (2) consumers do not know which legal services they need, and (3) price
advertisements omit the important factor of attorney skill. Id. at 372. The Court rejected
this argument by looking to the record, which included the fact that the State Bar spon-
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advertising would adversely affect professionalism, characterizing the
argument as an elitist or hypocritical presumption "that attorneys
must conceal from themselves and from their clients the real-life fact
78
that lawyers earn their livelihood at the bar."
Thus, Bates extended constitutional protection to lawyer advertis79
ing. At the same time, however, Bates held open the possibility of
8°
restricting deceptive advertising, or the mode of truthful advertising,

so that the issue became what kind of restriction could pass constitutional muster.
In In re Primus,8 the Court held that South Carolina's rule
prohibiting in-person solicitation was unconstitutional as applied to an
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) lawyer.82 The lawyer had
sent the client a letter offering free legal representation after a meeting, attended by both the lawyer and the client, about the rights of
mothers who were allegedly -being sterilized as a condition of receiv-

ing public medical assistance."

In a manner reminiscent of Chresten-

sen's "primary purpose" test," the Court distinguished this case from
impermissible in-person solicitation by virtue of the lawyer's motive,
namely, "engag[ing] in litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression. " " This case, then, did not concern commercial speech at
all, but instead "core First Amendment rights," 8 6 the exercise of
which, even in the form of solicitation, was protected to a greater degree than commercial speech.8 7

sored a program in which attorneys provided legal services for a standardized fee. Id. at
373.
78. Id. at 368. But see id at 401 n.ll (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (arguing that opposition to lawyer advertising rests on a valid concern for professionalism rather than on elitism).
79. But see id. at 391-92, 403 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that the Court's decision struck both at professionalism and federalism, by depriving the states of opportunities to experiment with making legal services more widely known
and available without advertising, the putative justification for which presumes a false analogy between professional services and tangible goods).
80. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 384 (noting that "there may be reasonable restrictions on the
time, place, and manner of [lawyer] advertising"). After Bates, the ABA rewrote its model
disciplinary rules on advertising, which were adopted by most states. See HiLL, supra note
38, at 59-60.
81. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
82. Id at 439.
83. Id at 414-17.
84. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
85. Primus, 436 U.S. at 431.
86. Id. at 432 (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. See id. at 434 ("Where political expression or association is at issue, this Court has
not tolerated the degree of imprecision that often characterizes government regulation of
the conduct of commercial affairs.").

1142

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 57:1114

8
In its next lawyer advertising case, Ohralik v. Ohio State BarAss'n,
the Court held that the State, or the Bar acting with state authorization, "may discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person, for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State
has a right to prevent." 9 The Court distinguished Ohralik from In re
Primus in terms of Ohralik's commercial motives,9" which placed his
conduct in the distinct and subordinate category of commercial
speech. 9 ' Also, the Court distinguished Ohralik from Bates by the
mode of communication and the advancement of state interests.9 2
First, in contrast to a newspaper advertisement, "in-person solicitation
may exert pressure and often demands an immediate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or reflection."" Second, unlike the prohibition in Bates, the prohibition against in-person
solicitation actually advanced two state interests: (1) maintaining the
professionalism of lawyers, 4 an interest whose legitimacy the Court
had recognized in Bates,9 5 and (2) protecting consumers from the
dangers posed by in-person solicitation, namely, intrusion and over97
reaching.9 6 Hence the Court upheld the ban as applied in Ohralik.

c. Application of the Central Hudson Test to Attorney Advertising.-The Court first applied the Central Hudson test9" to attorney advertising in In re RM.J.9 9 A lawyer challenged a Missouri Supreme
Court rule that both prohibited mass mailings and limited to precise
88. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
89. Id. at 449. The lawyer visited two young women, one of whom was in the hospital,
after a car accident. Id. at 449-50. After one woman discharged the lawyer, he sued her for
breach of contract. Id. at 452.
90. Id. at 458-59 (noting that Ohralik's conduct did not involve any exercise of political
expression, because it was motivated solely by the hope of remunerative employment).
91. Id. at 455-56.
92. Id. at 457-58, 460-62.
93. Id. at 457. The Court noted that, in light of the lack of opportunity for comparison, in-person solicitation could undermine the very rationale for protecting commercial
speech, namely, facilitating informed decisionmaking. Id. at 457-58.
94. See id. at 460 ("The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great
since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice,
and have historically been 'officers of the courts."' (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975))).
95. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977) (recognizing "true professionalism" as a
state interest).
96. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464-65.
97. Id. at 468. The Court did not require a finding of actual harm in order to justify
the State's prophylactic ban on in-person solicitation, but was satisfied by the State's presumption of harm because such conduct, not being open to public scrutiny, is hard to
regulate. Id at 465-66.
98. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
99. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
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terms the words that an attorney could use to describe her practice in
newspapers, yellow pages, and other publications.10 0 The Court held
that the absolute prohibition of these forms of advertising, in the ab-1
10
sence of a finding that they were misleading, was unconstitutional.
The Court first determined that the lawyer's failure to use the
precise terms required by the rule (for example, "tort law" instead of
"personal injury"), and his mass mailing, were not inherently or actually misleading, so that the advertisements were entitled to some First
Amendment protection 0°2 The Court then found that the State had
failed to assert any substantial interest in the prohibitions, 0 3 and that
it could have used less restrictive regulations, such as requiring registration of general mailings with the state advisory committee. 10 4 Failing even the first prong of the Central Hudson test, the outright ban on
15
these forms of advertising was unconstitutional.
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,'0 6 the Court overturned
Ohio's reprimand of a lawyer for publishing a newspaper advertisement offering to represent women in litigation concerning the
Dalkon Shield.10 7 Unlike the advertisement in Bates, which simply offered routine legal services, Zauderer's advertisement contained information about a specific legal problem, contrary to the rule against selfrecommendation as interpreted by the Ohio Supreme Court.' 8
The Court, finding that the advertisement was not false or deceptive, required the State to assert a substantial interest.1 0 9 The State's
assertion of the same interests as those in Ohralik," ° namely, preventing undue influence and invasion of privacy, did not apply to a newspaper advertisement, which the Court found to be more conducive to
reflection than in-person solicitation. 1 The Court also rejected an
interest in preventing the generation of litigation, on the ground that
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at
Id at
Id at
Id. at
Id at

194-98.
206-07.
205-07.
205.
206.

105. Id. at 207.
106. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
107. Id. at 655-56; see also id at 631 (quoting the advertisement, which publicized the
fact that the Dalkon Shield was an intrauterine birth control device that had caused complications for some of its users).
108. Id. at 639. The advertisement, which included a drawing of the Dalkon Shield, also
violated state rules requiring advertisements to be dignified and prohibiting the use of
illustrations. Id. at 631-32.
109. Id. at 641.
110. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
111. Zauderer,471 U.S. at 641-42.
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access to courts is a commendable attribute of our system ofjustice. 112
Because the State failed to assert a substantial interest, the Court overturned the reprimand without reaching the issue of whether a prophylactic ban on such advertising was a suitable means."'
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n,' 14 the Court invalidated a Kentucky Supreme Court ban against all targeted mail advertising, that is,
communications with potential clients known to have specific legal
problems. 1 5 By analogy to the ban on in-person solicitation upheld
in Ohralik, 6 the Kentucky Bar Association asserted a state interest in
preventing overreaching and undue influence. 1 7 While admitting
that a targeted letter could pose an increased risk of deception, 118 the
Court rejected the ban for being overbroad and for failing to advance
the asserted state interest. x9
The Court reasoned, first, that a targeted letter was simply a more
efficient form of the general mailing permitted in In re R.M.J 2 ° Second, the Court rejected the analogy between in-person solicitation
and targeted mail on two grounds. 12 First, the Court found that direct mail can be dealt with reflectively, or simply ignored. 122 Second,
such mail stands open to public scrutiny, so that the Bar could regulate it in a less restrictive fashion, for example, by requiring targeted
letters to be filed with a state agency.1 23 Finally, the Court rejected
the notion that a targeted letter invades the recipient's privacy, be112. Id. at 642-43.
113. Id. at 644. But see id. at 673-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Dalkon Shield advertisement
was unsolicited legal advice, and that the State had two persuasive reasons for restricting
lawyers from accepting employment resulting from such advice: (1) unsolicited legal advice is not analogous to a free sample used to promote the sale of standardized consumer
products, and it creates an enhanced risk of confusion; and (2) the lawyer's interest in
obtaining business may color his advice, so that it is not complete or disinterested).
114. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
115. Id. at 469-70, 480. The attorney applied to the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising
Commission for approval of a letter he wished to send to potential clients who had foreclosure suits filed against them. Id. at 469. Although the Commission did not find the letter
false or misleading, the Commission denied him permission to send 'it, citing a rule prohibiting advertisements sent to people known to have specific legal problems. Id. at 469-70.
116. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
117. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474.
118. Id. at 476.
119. Id. at 479.
120. Id. at 473. "But the First Amendment does not permit a ban on certain speech
merely because it is more efficient." Id. But see id. at 481-82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(discussing the dangers of targeted mail as a unique mode of communication, e.g., its
suggestion that a lawyer may have personal knowledge of and concern for the recipient).
121. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475.
122. Id. at 475-76.
123. Id. at 476.
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cause the intrusion, if any, occurs when the attorney learns of the recipient's legal affairs, not when he confronts the recipient with this
knowledge."2 4 Hence the Court found the ban on all direct mail advertising unconstitutional 2 5 So far, then, the Supreme Court had established that a complete ban on truthful lawyer advertising violated
the First Amendment, while maintaining that, under the Central Hudson test, narrowly drawn regulations would be permissible if the state
could show that they served a substantial state interest.12 6
The Court next confronted a case involving narrowly drawn regulations that did serve a substantial state interest. In FloridaBar v. Went
ForIt, Inc.,' 27 in a five-to-four decision, the Court upheld a Florida Bar
rule that prohibited lawyers from sending targeted, direct mail solicitations to victims and their relatives for thirty days following an accident or disaster.

128

Applying the Central Hudson test,129 the Court accepted as substantial the Bar's interests in protecting both the privacy of personal
injury victims and the legal profession's integrity. 130 To demonstrate
that this regulation advanced its interests directly, the Florida Bar offered a 106-page summary of a two-year study it conducted.1 3 1 The
study contained statistical and anecdotal data showing that the public,
and especially particular individuals who had been solicited in the
wake of an accident, had poor regard for the legal profession as a
result of this practice. 13 2 Lastly, the Court determined that, as a
124. Idt
125. Id. at 480. But see id, at 485-86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Central
Hudson test should be applied with more deference to the state's legislative judgment, so
that a legal advertisement need only be potentially misleading to support the state's interest
in regulating the advertisement).
126. See Vanderwater, supra note 60, at 780 (noting that while the Court was willing to
allow regulation of attorney advertising, state bar associations repeatedly failed to enact a
regulation that satisfied the requirements of Central Hudson).
127. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
128. Id. at 620.
129. Id. at 635. Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor, despite prior dissents in
such cases, see supra notes 113, 120, and 125, noted that intermediate-level scrutiny, First
Amendment protection for attorney advertising was "well established." Went ForIt, 515 U.S.
at 623.
130. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 624-25. These interests are related: When lawyers invade
the privacy of accident victims, the profession's reputation suffers. Id The Court did not
determine the legitimacy of these interests directly, but instead relied on precedent that
had done so. Id. at 625 (citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)
(noting the broad power of states to establish standards for professions in light of the
states' compelling interests in them)).
131. Id. at 626-27.
132. Id. at 626-28. The Court emphasized, however, that such studies are not always
necessary to demonstrate the factual basis for regulations on speech. Id at 628. The state
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means, the thirty-day restriction was a reasonable fit with the asserted
ends. l" 3 The Court rejected two claims of overbreadth. First, the
Court did not think that the restriction could be narrowed so as to
permit targeted mailings to those with more minor injuries or grief,
because this line would be too difficult to draw.13 4 Second, the Court
rejected the claim that the restriction prevented citizens from learning about their legal options, because the restriction was limited to a
brief time, 3 5 and because there were many other ways, including ad13 6
vertisements in the media, for citizens to learn about these options.
Thus, the Florida Bar's thirty-day ban on sending targeted mail to accident or disaster victims and their relatives passed the Central Hudson
7
test.

13

The Court distinguished this case from Shapero's prohibition of
direct mail 131 in three respects. First, unlike Kentucky in Shapero, the
Florida Bar presented evidence of actual harm caused by the direct
mail. 13 1 Second, unlike the total ban in Shapero, the Florida Bar's restriction was limited by time and audience.' 4 ° Most importantly, the
Court found inapplicable Shapero's argument that, because the intrusion occurs when the lawyer first learns of the recipient's plight,
targeted mail does not violate privacy.'
Instead, the Court reasoned
that, in the case of accident victims, the harm occurs upon receipt and
cannot be undone simply by throwing the letter away, because receipt
triggers the recipient's outrage with the legal profession for soliciting
him at all in such a condition.' 4 2 In view of these distinctions, Florneed only show that the harm is non-speculative, which it may do through history, consensus, and common sense. Id. For a criticism of the Florida Bar study, see Ronald D. Rotunda, Professionalism, Legal Advertising, and Free Speech in the Wake ofFlorida Bar v. Went For
It, Inc., 49 ARK.L. REV.703, 729-32 (1997). For evidence contrary to the Florida Bar study,
see A.B.A. COMM. ON ADVERTISING, LAWYER ADVERTISING AT THE CROSSROADS:

PROFESSIONAL

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 76 (1995), which reported research showing that "consumers are
significantly more positive about lawyer advertising than lawyers."
133. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 634.
134. Id. at 633.
135. For criticism of the Court on this ground, see id. at 643-44 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), in which Justice Kennedy asserted that the restriction deprives victims of information
needed to make their claims at a time when insurance adjustors may be pressing victims to
settle their claims.
136. Went for It, 515 U.S. at 633-34.
137. Id. at 635.
138. See supra notes 114-126 and accompanying text.
139. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 629-30.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 630. The Court considered Shapero's treatment of privacy "casual" because
the State in that case had not asserted privacy as a substantial interest. Id at 629.
142. Id at 630.
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ida's thirty-day restriction passed constitutional muster.1 43 While four
Justices dissented, the basis of the disagreement was not the principle
that, under the Central Hudson test, regulation of attorney advertising
is subject to narrowly drawn restrictions that serve substantial state interests, but instead the application of the Central Hudson test to the
4
facts of this case."1
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Ficker v. Curran, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that section
1 5
10-605.1 (a) (2) of the Business Occupations and Professions Article, 4
requiring that lawyers wait thirty days before sending direct mail solicitations to those arrested for a criminal offense or a jailable traffic offense, unconstitutionally restricted commercial speech."' 6 After
briefly reviewing legal precedent, 147 the court examined the First
Amendment interests at stake, applied the Central Hudson test, 14' and
then distinguished the instant case from Florida Bar v. Went For It,
14 9

Inc.

First, the court reasoned that both the recipients and the senders
of the direct mailing have First Amendment interests.' ° Criminal
and traffic defendants have a right to receive the mailings, even when
the information that they provide could be acquired by other means,
because the dissemination of advertising "'facilitates the consumer's
access to legal services and thus better serves the administration of
justice. '""s" Similarly, attorneys have the right to "speak[ ] in the com143. Id. at 635. But see id. at 637 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that, with respect to
the privacy interest, the relevant inquiry is not the condition of the recipient, but the mode
of communication, namely, the direct mail that Shapero had held could not be banned).
144. Compare Went For It, 515 U.S. at 623 (noting that it is "well established" that lawyer
advertising is commercial speech subject to First Amendment protection under the Central
Hudson test) with id at 637-45 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that Florida's restriction
fails each prong of the Central Hudson test).
145. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
146. Ficker, 119 F.3d at 1156.
147. Id.at 1151-53. The court emphasized two points in this review. First, regulation of
attorney advertising is permitted "only in the limited class of circumstances where state
interests are strong and the potential harm of nonregulation severe." Id.at 1152. Second,
the holding in ForidaBar v. Went ForIt, Inc. is confined to its facts, and not intended "to
abridge previously-recognized First Amendment advertising rights outside the accident victim context." Id. at 1152-53.
148. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
149. Ficker, 119 F.3d at 1153-56.
150. Id. at 1153.
151. Id (quoting Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 110
(1990)).
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mercial marketplace of attorney services."' 52 A ban on direct mailing,
by favoring those who are already known or who can afford television
advertising, operates as an indirect barrier to entering the profession.1 53 In view of these First Amendment interests, the court next
15 4
applied the three-part CentralHudson test.
First, the court recognized the state's substantial interests:
"shielding recipients from undue influence or confusion, guarding
[the] recipients' privacy, and protecting the reputation of the legal
profession." 5 ' The court reasoned, however, that the restriction
failed to advance directly these interests on account of the following
facts: (1) a direct mailing, as distinct from in-person solicitation, can
be dealt with reflectively or ignored, and therefore does not pose the
danger of undue influence;' 5 6 (2) the criminal or traffic defendant's
privacy is already compromised because his arrest is known through
the public record and in other ways;' 5 7 (3) even if mailings to criminal
and traffic defendants cause disrespect for the legal profession,15 this
disrespect is not rooted in the solicitation's timing (as with accident
victims), but in a general distaste for direct mailing itself, which the
United States Supreme Court had already permitted.15 9 Finally, the
Ficker court found that there was not a reasonable fit between the
means and ends of the restriction, because less burdensome alternatives were available, such as requiring the text of any advertisement to
160
be filed with a state agency.
After applying the Central Hudson test, the court distinguished
Ficker from Went For It, which upheld the same restriction in the case
of accident victims, in four ways: (1) the waiting period in Went For It
was justified by the victim's need to grieve, whereas the arrestee has
152. Id. The court reiterated that, 'under Virginia Pharmacy, the fact that the speech is
motivated by pecuniary gain, or contains merely the proposal of a commercial transaction,
does not disqualify the speech from First Amendment protection. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id
155. Id,
156. Id,(citing Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 475 (1988)).
157. Id. at 1154. The court noted that in some jurisdictions a list of arrestees is published in the local newspaper, and that Maryland permits direct mail solicitation for representation in administrative hearings in DWI cases. Id
158. Id. Attorney General Curran pointed to a study of the North Carolina Bar claiming
to show that such direct mailings do diminish the reputation of the legal profession. Id.
However, three members of the North Carolina Bar, as amici, submitted a different North
Carolina survey purporting to show the opposite. Id. The court refused to "resolve this
battle of the studies" on the ground that, even if the reputational harm were real, the
restriction did not directly advance the state's interest in alleviating it. Id.
159. Id (citing Shapero).
160. Id. at 1155.
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no such need; 161 (2) accident victims have three years in which to
assert their rights, whereas criminal defendants can lose theirs within
thirty days; 1 6 2 (3) an accident victim can choose to avoid public scrutiny, whereas the criminal defendant has already had his privacy compromised; 6 3 and (4) unlike a civil litigant, a criminal defendant has a
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the State cannot lightly deprive the defendant of information that might assist in the exercise of
this right.' 6 4 Because section 10-605.1 (a) (2) was distinguishable from
the regulation in Went ForIt, and unable to pass the CentralHudson test
in its own right, the court held it to be a violation of the First
Amendment.

1 65

4. Analysis.-In Ficker v. Curran, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that a thirty-day ban on attorney direct mailings to
criminal defendants or jailable traffic defendants was unconstitutional.1 66 The court reached this predictable1 6 7 and properly narrow

holding in a manner consistent with United States Supreme Court
precedent.
a. The Court Correctly Interpreted Supreme CourtPrecedent.-The
Ficker district court observed that the plaintiffs and the defendant relied heavily on different cases; Ficker and Boehm on Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 168 Maryland Attorney General Curran on FloridaBar v.
Went For It, Inc.'6 9 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit correctly construed these cases by refusing to draw a dichotomy between
them.
In all its recent lawyer advertising cases, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that, under the Central Hudson test, a
161. Id.
162. Id
163. Id at 1156.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. The court found "little difficulty in concluding that the Maryland law implicates
First Amendment interests." Id. at 1153. There is another factor indicating the decision's
predictability. Attorney General Curran himself wrote a letter on May 16, 1996 to the
governor, expressing the view that section 10-605.1(a)(2) was unconstitutional, but that
the bill as a whole should be signed because section 2 was severable from section 1, which
regulated solicitation of personal injury plaintiffs. See Ficker, 950 F. Supp. at 124-25 (quoting portions of the letter). The attorney general originally submitted this letter to show
that section 2 would not be enforced but, after the court did not deny Ficker's motion for
preliminary injunction, the attorney general argued for the constitutionality of section 2.
Id at 124-25, 125 n.3.
168. See supra notes 114-126 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 127-144 and accompanying text.
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state may impose narrowly drawn restrictions on commercial speech if
the restrictions directly serve a substantial state interest. 170 The Court
in Went For It reaffirmed this proposition: "Nearly two decades of
cases have built upon the foundation laid by Bates. It is now well established that lawyer advertising is commercial speech and, as such, is
accorded a measure of First Amendment protection." 171 Thus, Went
For It did not unsettle the case law, 17 2 or allow tighter restrictions on
lawyer advertising in general. 173 It simply held that, in the case of
accident victims, a temporary ban on direct mail solicitation satisfied
the CentralHudson test. 174 Because this test determined the inquiry in
both Shapero1 75 and Went For It,1 76 and still controls today, the Ficker
court rightly refused to decide the constitutionality of Maryland's statute by exclusive reference to one case or the other. Instead, the court
applied the Central Hudson test, and in so doing, distinguished the
case before it from Went For It in three important ways.
First, the privacy interest is distinct. The Court in Went For It
found it permissible for the State to protect intrusions upon the grief
of accident victims or their relatives. 17 7 The mere receipt of a direct mail
solicitation in this context is a harmful invasion. 17' By contrast, the
individual arrested for driving while intoxicated 179 is primarily embarrassed, and wishes to keep his arrest secret.1 8 0 Direct mail may
deepen this embarrassment in two ways.
On the one hand, direct mail may embarrass the recipient by
making family members aware of the arrest, either inadvertently, or as
a result of a family member's searching the mail. In this case, how170. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
171. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995).
172. Id. at 631 n.2.
173. See Ficker, 950 F. Supp. at 125 n.4 (refusing to read "sweeping implications" into
Went For It).
174. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 635.
175. See supra notes 114-126 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 127-144 and accompanying text.
177. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 631-32.
178. Id. at 631.
179. This offense is the most appropriate example in light of the fact that the vast majority of Ficker's direct mail business concerns those arrested for jailable traffic offenses, such
as driving while intoxicated. See Ficker, 950 F. Supp. at 124.
180. Attorney General Curran cited in his brief a May 3, 1994 editorial by Bob Greene in
the Cincinnati Enquirer. This report concerned a 41-year-old man who lived with his
mother, and who had been arrested for driving under the influence. He found it "very
upsetting" that direct mail solicitations had made his mother aware of his arrest. Addenda
to Brief of Appellant at A-O to A-12, Ficker v. Curran, 119 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1997) (No.
96-2724) (citing Bob Greene, Lawyers Court Clients by Mail, CIN. ENQUIRER, May 3, 1994, at
A6, available in 1994 WL 6263987).
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ever, the First Amendment interest of lawyers outweighs whatever interest the state may have in protecting the recipient against intrafamily conflicts that arise upon disclosure of the truth.
On the other hand, direct mail may make the recipient aware
that lawyers combing through the public records know of the arrest.
In this event, the intrusion has already occurred, if at all, when the
lawyer discovered the recipient's name in the public records, in a way
analogous to Shapero.18 ' Because these records are public, however,
and because this same intrusion would occur on the thirty-first day,18 2
Maryland's restriction fails to advance directly the interest it was intended to protect. 18 3 For precisely this reason, the Maryland restriction is distinguishable from the one upheld in Went For It.
Second, the timing is distinct. Because Went ForIt concerned civil
litigants who had three years in which to pursue their rights, a thirtyday ban on direct mail did not prejudice these rights. 84 A person
charged with driving while intoxicated,1 85 however, must act quickly to
preserve certain rights. If he refuses to take an alcohol concentration
test, or scores greater than .10 on this test, the police must confiscate
his license and issue him a forty-five-day temporary license. 8 6 The
Motor Vehicle Administration must suspend his license.' 8 7 The defendant, however, may, within thirty days from the time of the stop,
request a hearing to show cause why his license should not be suspended.' 88 But if he does not do so within the first ten days, the defendant waives the right to have this hearing scheduled within fortyfive days, 189 and the temporary license may expire. In this situation,
the failure to assert legal rights within thirty days results in the automatic suspension of the license for a period of time, and the failure to
do so within ten days could result in the temporary loss of the privilege to drive.
181. See supra notes 114-128 and accompanying text.
182. Ficker, 119 F.3d at 1154.
183. Id. at 1153-54.
184. Horida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632-34 (1995). But see id. at 643
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting that the 30-day ban does prejudice these rights).
185. See supra note 179. DWI is prohibited under MD. CODE. ANN., TRANsp. II,
§ 21-902(a) (Supp. 1997). The penalties for a first DVI offense may include a fine of not
more than one thousand dollars, imprisonment for not more than a year, or both. See MD.
CODE ANN., TRAsp. II, § 27-101(k)(1)(i) (Supp. 1997).
186. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. II § 16-205.1(b) (3) (i)-(iv) (Supp. 1997).
187. Id. § 16-205.1 (b) (1). The duration of the suspension varies with the circumstances.
Id.
188. Id. § 16-205.1 (b) (3) (v) (2).
189. Id.
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In light of these administrative deadlines, it is true that, even if
the criminal prosecution of drunk driving offenses usually takes
longer than thirty days,"' 0 a person charged with this offense can
waive rights and privileges within the thirty days covered by Maryland's ban on direct mail.1 9 For this reason, a thirty-day ban is, in
effect, less like the limited restriction upheld in Went ForIt,' 19 2 and more
analogous to the total ban on direct mailing invalidated as overbroad
93

in Shapero.1

Third, there is a difference between the civil litigant and the
criminal defendant, because the latter has a Sixth Amendment right
to counsel. 19 4 The exercise of this right is essential to the fair administration of justice, the fundamental interest from which the state's interest in the reputation of the legal profession derives.' 95 By making
the Sixth Amendment right more difficult to exercise, the Maryland
restriction attempts-unintelligibly-to advance a derivative interest
at the expense of a more fundamental one. Thus, this restriction is
distinguishable from the one upheld in Went For It, which did not im96
plicate a more fundamental state interest.'
Put differently, the Maryland restriction is reminiscent of In re
Primus,'9 7 in which the Supreme Court determined that an ACLU lawyer's solicitation was protected as a type of "political expression.' 9 8
While the lawyer who sends direct mail presumably has a commercial
190. See Brief of Appellant at 13, 21, Ficker (No. 96-2724) (noting that most DWI criminal
cases take substantially longer than 30 days) (citing NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
DWI/DUI SENTENCING EVALUATION-MARYLAND DISTRICT COURT-FINAL REPORT 14
(1990)).
191. Ficker, 119 F.3d at 1154. The Ficker court observed that "Maryland already permits
immediate direct-mail solicitation for representation in administrative license proceedings,
so any interest in privacy from attorney intrusion is already compromised during the initial
month." Id. While direct mail for this purpose does compromise the privacy interest, it
does not mean that the timing of these proceedings is irrelevant to the issue of prohibiting
direct mall solicitations for criminal representation, because defendants have an interest in
being represented by the same attorney in both contexts.
192. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632-34 (1995) (asserting that the
30-day period following accidents poses no significant harm to those in need of an
attorney).
193. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988) (noting that the state
can regulate the dangers of direct mail solicitation through less restrictive means than a
total ban).
194. Ficker, 119 F.3d at 1156 (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)).
195. Id. at 1154.
196. Went ForIt, 515 U.S. at 634-35 (noting that the Florida Bar regulation did not concern "speech by attorneys on public issues" but instead "pure commercial advertising, for
which we have always reserved a lesser degree of protection under the First Amendment").
197. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
198. 436 U.S. 412, 428 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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motive, rather than a political one, the First Amendment protects the
recipient of the communication as well.19 9 The recipient in this case,
the criminal defendant, has a non-commercial, political interest in the
exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. This political interest distinguishes the criminal defendant from the accident victim with
respect to whom the thirty-day ban on direct mail was upheld in Went
For It.
In light of these fundamental distinctions, the Ficker court was
correct not to expand the scope of Went ForIt beyond its facts merely
because section 10-605.1 (a) (2) was a formally similar thirty-day ban on
direct mailing. Instead, the court properly scrutinized the underlying
issue, namely, the relation between the mode of communication and
the interest served by restricting it with respect to criminal and incarcerable traffic defendants. Reached through a fact-specific application of
the CentralHudson test, the holding was correctly confined to the facts
of the case.2 °°
b. Unaddressed Problems of Lawyer Advertising and the Future of
Such Decisions.-In light of its properly narrow holding and the conformity of this holding with Supreme Court precedent, the circuit
court in Ficker cannot be faulted for not addressing the "general distaste for such solicitation [s]" felt by some members of the bar and the
public.2 0 1 Instead, this fault lies with the precedent itself. As Justice
Rehnquist recognized in Virginia Pharmacy, once the United States
Supreme Court determined that advertising was "speech," rather than
an incident of business subject to state regulation, it was almost inevitable that the Court would strongly limit the capacity of the states to
regulate the professions within their borders in this respect. 20

2

Be-

cause Virginia Pharmacy served as the foundation for the lawyer advertising cases, this decision, and the consequences that follow from it,
should be briefly considered in order to grasp the deeper issues at
stake in such cases.
Virginia Pharmacy invalidated a state regulation on the basis of economic interests: the advertiser's commercial interest, the customer's
interest in knowing prices, and society's free-market interest in effi199. See supra note 58.
200. Ficker, 119 F.3d at 1156 ("Our holding is a narrow one .... We do not bar the state
from regulating lawyer advertising which is inaccurate or misleading. We merely find that
Maryland's thirty day ban on direct-mail solicitation to traffic and criminal defendants cannot withstand review.").
201. Id. at 1154.
202. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 783 (1976) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
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ciently allocating resources.2 °3 But because the First Amendment had
been traditionally limited to protecting political decisionmaking in a
representative democracy, and individual fulfillment through free expression, 20 4 freedom of speech was not a sound basis for overturning
economic regulations-even if, as the Court noted, the consumer's
"interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the
day's most urgent political debate.

' 20 5

Although the Court's remark

implies that the United States is more an aggregate of consumers than
a nation of citizens, "in a democracy, the economic is subordinate to
the political." 2 6 Viewed in this light, Virginia Pharmacy amounts to a
resurrection of Lochner-era
economic due process under the guise of
20 7
Amendment.
the First
This sort of intrusion into state economic regulation is contrary
to the spirit of federalism. 20 8 For example, in Bates v. State Bar,20 9 the

first case to extend constitutional protection to lawyer advertising,
ChiefJustice Burger noted that the organized bar was at that very time
making reforms with respect to increasing the availability of legal services.21 0 The capacity for states to experiment in this regard is, of
course, "one of the great virtues of federalism. ' 211 When, contrary to
federalism, states are deprived of sufficient leeway to regulate economic matters, they also lose the ability to maintain the standards of
212
the professions within their borders.
With respect to the legal profession's standards, opposition to advertising need not be motivated by the hypocritical pretense that law203. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
204. See Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1, 25 (1979) (arguing that Virginia Pharmacy
was wrongly decided because, in light of these traditional bases for First Amendment protection, freedom of speech could not be used to justify the Court's intrusion into state
economic matters).
205. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763.
206. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 599
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
207. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 204, at 30-31; see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 589
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing the Court's striking down of prohibitions against
advertising by state-created electrical utilities as a return to "the bygone era of Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which it was common practice for this Court to strike
down economic regulations adopted by a State based on the Court's own notions of the
most appropriate means for the State to implement its considered policies").
208. See supra notes 54 and 79.
209. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
210. Id. at 388 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
211. Id. at 403 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
212. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 485-86 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that deference to state interests is necessary to preserve the ethical dimension of the legal profession); see also supra note 79.
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yers do not make money,"' or by elitism.214 Instead, such opposition
may be motivated by the recognition that advertising can place lawyers' pecuniary self-interest at odds with their obligation to serve their
clients' best interests. 2 15 For example, an advertisement containing
specific information about a legal problem may be colored by the lawyer's interest in obtaining business, so that the advice is not complete
or disinterested. 216 Or targeted mail-the mode of communication at
issue in Ficker-may misleadingly suggest that a lawyer has some personal knowledge of and concern for the recipient. 2 17 By potentially
opposing a lawyer's pecuniary motives and his ethical obligation, advertising can undermine not only the reputation of the legal profession, but the profession itself, which as such "entails an ethical
obligation to temper one's selfish pursuit of economic success by adhering to standards of conduct that could not be enforced . .
through the discipline of the market. '2 1 ' These ethical, professional,
and federalist issues are the source of the "general distaste for such
solicitation '2 19 that the Ficker court properly did not address.
Even in light of these unaddressed issues, however, one can view
Ficker as a correct decision, because the case implicated a political
right-the Sixth Amendment right to counsel-the exercise of which
the First Amendment is suited to protect from undue state regulation.2 2 0 While Ficker did not address these issues, it showed that, for
better or worse, they are indeed settled. 221 For this very reason, Ficker
is a good indicator of the likely result in future lawyer advertising
cases. Cases involving restrictions of purely commercial speech, such
as FloridaBar v. Went For It, Inc., will be decided by narrow margins on
the issue of how much, if any, regulation is permitted under the Cen213. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 368 (arguing that opposition to attorney advertising "presumes
that attorneys must conceal from themselves and from their clients the real-life fact that
lawyers earn their livelihood at the bar"); see also supra note 78.
214. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 371-72 (asserting that "the belief that lawyers are somehow
'above' trade has become an anachronism"); see also supra note 78.
215. See A.B.A., CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A
NEW CENTURY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT

9 (1992) ("Lawyers should never forget that they are members of a profession, not a business. Lawyers' primary responsibility is to serve the client, the justice system, and the
public.").
216. See supra note 113.
217. See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 481-82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the dangers of
targeted mail as a unique mode of communication); see also supra note 120 and infra note
223 and accompanying text.
218. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 488-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
219. Ficker, 119 F.3d at 1154.
220. See supra notes 197-199 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 172-174 and accompanying text.
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tral Hudson test. Cases involving any restrictions impinging on political rights will be more easily decided in the manner of Ficker itself.
5. Conclusion.-The Ficker court's holding-that requiring lawyers to wait thirty days before sending direct mail solicitation to criminal or incarcerable traffic defendants violated the First Amendmentis consistent with twenty years of "well established"22' 2 Supreme Court
precedent and properly confined to the facts of the case.
On account of this narrow holding, the court's ruling should not
discourage the legislature from regulating lawyer advertising in other
ways by means of reasonably fitting restrictions that directly advance
substantial state interests. For example, direct mail solicitations to
criminal or incarcerable traffic defendants may confuse such a recipient, by leading him to believe that he has been assigned a public defender or a low-fee panel attorney. 223 Because the court
acknowledged the state's substantial interest in preventing confusion, 2 2 4 and because the court mentioned more reasonably fitting
means for doing so-for example, requiring direct mail to be labeled
as an advertisement225-such a label would be likely to pass constitutional muster.
Finally, because the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed that the legal profession's integrity is a substantial state interest, 22 6 the Maryland General Assembly may, and should, remain alert
to practices that endanger the profession's integrity, and take measures to protect the profession when it can do so in a constitutionally
appropriate manner.
KENNETH TURNBULL

222. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995).
223. In hearings before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee on January 18,
1996, a member of the Maryland Criminal Defense Attorneys Association testified, in support of the 30-day ban, that at least one defendant had made this assumption. Brief of
Appellant at 6, Ficker (No. 96-2724).
224. Ficker, 119 F.3d at 1153.
225. Id. at 1155.
226. Id. at 1153.
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COPYRIGHTS AND TRADEMARKS

Expanding the DistributionRight in Copyright Infringement

In Hotalingv. Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a
copyright owner presented sufficient evidence to show that the defendant's library committed an infringing act within the three-year
statute of limitations of the Copyright Act.2 In that case, the library
had placed an unauthorized copy of the copyrighted microfiche in its
collection, included the copy in its catalog or index system, and made
the copy available to the public.' A divided panel for the court determined that, in doing so, the library "distributed" the published work
in violation of the Copyright Act of 1976, 4 thereby infringing the copyright owner's exclusive distribution right.5
In so ruling, the court appropriately interpreted a copyright
owner's distribution right by reasoning that making the unauthorized
copy available to the public for use within the library was sufficient to
violate the Copyright Act. 6 Further, the court ruled that there was
sufficient evidence that the infringement occurred within the threeyear statute of limitations, 7 thereby achieving the correct result by protecting the rights of copyright owners to recover for infringing acts
occurring within three years of filing suit.
1. The Case.-The plaintiffs, Donna Hotaling, William Hotaling,
Jr., James Maher, and Dorothy Sherwood (collectively the Hotalings),
compiled and copyrighted a number of genealogical research materials.8 An independent publisher, All-Ireland Heritage, Inc., marketed
and published the copyrighted works in microfiche form with a black
1. 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 1997).
2. Id. at 202; 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1994).
3. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 203.
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
5. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 201.
6. Id. at 203.
7. Id. at 204.
8. Id. at 201. The research materials at issue are eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
indexes of surnames and land valuations of Ireland. Brief of Appellants at 4 n.2, Hotaling
v. Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1399).
The works were registered with the copyright office and were published in microfiche form
with the appropriate notices of copyright. Id. at 4. Although the validity of the copyright
was not at issue, the Church's brief alluded to the fact that the published microfiches
lacked originality. Brief of Appellee at 4, Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1399). The Church stated that the works
lacked originality in that they consisted primarily of alphabetical listings of deceased individuals followed by a geographical description. Id. The Church compared the works to
telephone books without the telephone numbers. Id.
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background.9 Between 1985 and 1989, the defendant, the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the Church), purchased a legitimate
microfiche copy and added the copy to its main library collection in
Salt Lake City, Utah. i° Sometime before 1992, without the Hotalings'
permission, the Church made microfiche copies of the materials and
distributed them to several of its branch libraries throughout the
country.1 1 The microfiche copies made by the Church contained a
from the legitimate copy that
purple background, as distinguished
12
background.
black
a
contained
In July 1991, Donna Hotaling learned that the Church copied
and distributed the works to its branch libraries.1 3 She contacted the
Church and demanded that the Church stop this unauthorized activity. 14 After receiving her complaint, the Church recalled and destroyed many of the copies distributed to the branch libraries.1 5
In 1992, All-Ireland Heritage, Inc. filed suit in federal court
against the Church for copyright infringement based on the Church's
copying and distribution of the Hotalings' works.16 Because All-Ireto the Hotalings' works,
land Heritage, Inc. did not own the copyright
17
action.
the
dismissed
court
the district
In 1993, the Church sent a memorandum to its branch libraries
asking them to search their microfiche inventories for any other unauthorized copies of the Hotalings' works.1 8 In response to the memo9. Hotaling,118 F.3d at 201.
10. Id. The main library referred to is a not-for-profit genealogical research library
maintained by the Church's Family History Department. Brief of Appellee at 4, Hotaling
(No. 96-1399). There are several other smaller genealogical family history center "branch"
libraries located in Church buildings in the United States and overseas. Id. The libraries
contain millions of rolls of microfilm and microfiche, which mostly contain public birth
and death records and other public records. Id. The libraries are open to the public free
of charge. Id.
11. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 201.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. In addition to recalling and destroying the copies, the Church listed the
microfiche as restricted, meaning that any requests for paper or other copies were not
approved. Brief of Appellee at 5, Hotaling (No. 96-1399). The Family History Department
monitored the availability and handling of the microfiche to ensure that no unauthorized
copies were made after July 1991. Id. The court accepted that the Church did not make
any copies of the material after July 1991. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 202.
16. Hotaling,118 F.3d at 202.
17. Id. Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr., district judge in the Eastern District of Virginia,
granted the Church's motion for summary judgment on May 7, 1993, on the ground that
the copyrights were incorrectly registered and All-Ireland Heritage, Inc. was not the copyright owner. Brief of Appellants at 5, Hotaling (No. 96-1399).
18. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 202. During the course of the prior litigation, the Church
determined that some of its branch libraries may have obtained copies of the microfiches.
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randum, six of the branch libraries found and returned one copy each
of the microfiche. 19 The main library promptly destroyed the copies
returned by the branch libraries.2"
Subsequent to the Church's monitoring and preventative actions,
Donna Hotaling visited a Rhode Island branch library in 1994 and
found a paper copy of one of the Hotalings' works in an infrequently
used section of the library. 2 ' According to the branch library director,
a library patron made the paper copy unbeknownst to the library staff,
and the director destroyed the paper copy immediately after it was
discovered.2 2 Following her discovery of the paper copy in the Rhode
Island branch library, Donna Hotaling visited the Church's main library in Utah in 1995, where she viewed a microfiche copy of the
works.2 3 The copy she viewed was not the authorized copy purchased
by the Church, because the copy's background was purple.2 4 The
one
Church acknowledged that the copy it kept in its main library was
25
that it-made because the original was destroyed inadvertently.
As a result of these discoveries, the Hotalings filed suit against the
Church in August 1995, alleging copyright infringement.2 6 Shortly after the Hotalings filed suit but before the parties conducted discovery,
the Church moved for summary judgment. 27 Judge Claude M. Hilton
denied the motion without prejudice on the ground that the Hotalings stated a valid claim with genuine issues of material fact in
dispute.28
Following discovery, the Church again moved for summary judgment. 29 This time, the district court granted the motion because the
Id. Due to incomplete records, the Church sent the memorandum to all of its branch
libraries that operated prior to January 1990. Brief of Appellee at 6, Hotaling (No.
96-1399).
19. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 202.
20. Id. The six copies returned by the branch libraries for destruction were made prior
to 1990. Brief of Appellee at 6, Hotaling (No. 96-1399).
21. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 202.
22. Id. Prior to April 1992, the branch library had returned the microfiche copy from
which the patron made the paper copy. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 12.
25. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 202.
26. Id. In their complaint, the Hotalings alleged that since sometime after 1986, the
Church "continuously" copied the microfiche in violation of their registered copyright.
Brief of Appellee at 6, Hotaling (No. 96-1399). In a sworn affidavit, Donna Hotaling stated
that the Church "continuously" copied the microfiche without permission from 1986
through the time suit was filed in 1995. Id.
27. Brief of Appellants at 3, Hotaing (No. 96-1399).
28. Id.
29. Brief of Appellee at 2, Hotaling (No. 96-1399). During discovery, Donna Hotaling
admitted in her deposition testimony that she knew of no instance in which the Church
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record contained no evidence of an infringing act within the threeyear limitations period.3 ° The district court denied the Hotalings' request for reconsideration, and the Hotalings appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, challenging the district
court's decision that the claim was barred due to insufficient evidence
within the limitations period.3 1
2. Legal Background.a. Distributionas an InfringingAct.-The United States Constitution provides that: "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries. "32 The Constitution assigns to Congress the
task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that is granted to
authors, balancing the author's interest in controlling her work product with the public's interest in gaining access to it. 33 Congress met

this constitutional task by enacting the Copyright Act of 1976 (the
34
Act).

had copied the microfiche since August 1992. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiffs James Maher, Dorothy
Sherwood, and William Hotaling, Jr. likewise testified in their respective depositions to
their lack of knowledge of any instances of copying by the Church since August 1992. Id. at
7-9. Other discovery materials, such as interrogatories, document requests, and requests
for admissions supported the Church's contention that none of the plaintiffs had specific
knowledge or evidence of any acts of infringement by the Church since that time. Id. at 912.
30. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 202.
31. Id.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
33. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
34. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1 9 94 & Supp. 11995). The exclusive
rights in copyrighted works include the rights:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
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The Act establishes specific enumerated exclusive rights for the
copyright owner.35 The "bundle of rights" granted in section 106 sets
forth the owner's rights in broad terms.3 6 One of the copyright
owner's exclusive rights in the "bundle" is the right "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending."" Elaborating on the impact of this right, legislative reports accompanying the
Copyright Act explained that, under the distribution right, the copyright owner "ha[s] the right to control the first public distribution of
an authorized copy or phonorecord of his work, whether by sale, gift,
loan, or some rental or lease arrangement. Likewise, any unauthorized public distribution of copies or phonorecords that were unlawfully made would be an infringement." 3' After establishing a
copyright owner's exclusive rights, the Act addresses copyright infringement: "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 118 ..

. is an

infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be."39
Despite the statutory language and the congressional explanation
of the distribution right, the Act fails to define "distribute" in the context of an action for infringement.4' One commentator suggests that
"distribute" is not defined in the Act because the statute lists the types
of distribution covered.4 1 Even listing the types of distribution cov35. 17 U.S.C. § 106. When the Act refers to the copyright owner, this reference does
not necessarily mean the author of the copyrighted material. John M. Kernochan, The
DistributionRight in the United States of America: Review and Reflections, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1407,
1409-10 (1989) (considering three approaches that would change the distribution right to
make the author's right more substantial). The copyright owner may be the author or an
heir or anyone to whom the title to the copyright is transferred, whether by sale, will, gift,
operation of law, or otherwise. Id. at 1409. The first suit brought by All-Ireland Heritage,
Inc. against the Church was dismissed on the ground that All-Ireland Heritage, Inc. was not
the copyright owner. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
36. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
38. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675-76;
see also 1 NEIL BooRsTYN, BooRsTYN ON Co'vRiorr § 6.17, at 6-48 (Dvora Parker ed., 2d ed.
1997) ("Once the copyright owner has authorized the initial public distribution of copies
of the work, he or she cannot control their further distribution."); 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY,
COPYRIGHT LAw AND PRACICE 838-41 (1994) (discussing the distribution right and its history through congressional amendments).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (a). Therefore, by operation of section 501 (a), anyone who violates
a copyright owner's section 106(3) distribution right is liable for infringement. Id.
§ 106(3).
40. See id. § 101 (defining terms used throughout the Act). Notwithstanding the lack
of a definition for the "distribution" right, section 101 does contain definitions for some of
the copyright owner's other exclusive rights, including the right to perform or display a
work "publicly" and to perform a work. Id.
41. See 2 PATRY, supra note 38, at 840.
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ered in the Act still presents difficulties in the infringement context
because the types of distributions themselves are not defined by the
Act. For instance, what constitutes "lending" is not defined in the Act.
Because of the Act's failure to elaborate on the meaning of "distribute," Congress has implicitly left the task of interpreting its meaning to the courts. Several jurisdictions have considered the question
of what constitutes infringement of the distribution right.42 In Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Labus,4" a federal district court in Wisconsin
ruled that renting nine unauthorized copies of videocassettes constituted nine infringements of the copyright owner's distribution right."
The copyright owner argued that an infringement occurred each time
the defendant offered the unauthorized copies for rental.4 5 The
court disagreed, holding that a copyright infringement occurs upon
actual rental only; an offer to distribute the tapes to members of the
public does not constitute infringement.4 6
Similarly, in Obolensky v. G.P. Putnam's Sons,4 7 the District Court
for the Southern District of New York stated that a copyright violation
does not occur when "the defendant offers to sell copyrighted materials but does not consummate a sale; equally, there is no infringement
of the [distribution] right where there is copying, but no sale of the
material copied."4 In Obolensky, the defendant publisher entered into
negotiations with the plaintiff copyright owner for publication of a
book.4 9 Due to failed negotiations, the defendant canceled over three
thousand outstanding public orders for the book and never published
nor distributed any copies of the book.5 ° During the negotiation time
period, several independent publication indexes listed the defendant

42. See, e.g., National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426
(8th Cir. 1993) (construing the pleadings to state a breach of contract claim where actual
distribution of the copyright owner's program did not occur); Paramount Pictures Corp. v.
Labus, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1142 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (considering whether the rental of
unlawful copies of videocassettes to resort guests constituted an infringement of the distribution right); Obolensky v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 628 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D.N.Y.) (determining whether offering a book for sale and listing the book in a publications index was within
the Act's meaning of distribution), affd, 795 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1986); F.E.L. Publications,
Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 85 (N.D. Ill.
1978) (finding that the handing
out of unlawful copies of hymnals at church services infringed the distribution right).
43. 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1142 (W.D. Wis. 1990).
44. Id. at 1147.
45. Id. at 1143.
46. Id. at 1144.
47. 628 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D.N.Y.), afj'd, 795 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1986).
48. Id. at 1555 (footnote omitted).
49. Id. at 1554.
50. Id.
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incorrectly as the publisher of the book.5 ' The plaintiff filed suit alleging, inter alia, that listing the book in publication indexes, subsequently notifying the index publishers that the book was canceled,
and offering the book for sale to the public infringed his distribution
right.5 2 Although the plaintiff complained that the defendant's actions made it impossible to disseminate the book, the court found that
those actions did not fall within the Copyright Act's meaning of
53
"distribution."
At least one federal appellate court has attempted to define the
"distribution" right in the infringement context. In National Car
Rental System, Inc. v. Computer Associates International,Inc.,5 4 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that an
"[i] nfringement of [the distribution right] requires an actual dissemination of either copies or phonorecords." 55 In National CarRental, the
court ruled that dissemination did not occur when National Car
Rental, without authorization, allowed third parties to use Computer
Associates International's program.5 6 The third parties were not given
unauthorized copies of the program, but, instead, were allowed to use
the program while National Car Rental retained possession of the program.5 7 The court ruled that the use of the program without actual
distribution may have breached a licensing agreement, but did not
amount to a copyright violation.5 8
A federal district court in Illinois ruled that a distribution requires a public dissemination. In F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic
Bishop,5 9 the court considered whether the act of using unauthorized
copies of hymnals during church services constituted a "distribution"
under the Act.6" Even though the copies never left the church, the
court concluded that this type of distribution was an infringing act.6 '
The court reasoned that the definition of "distribution" was tied to the
nature of the work in question and the use for which it was intended.6 2 The court disagreed with the defendant's argument that no
51. Id. at 1555.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1555-56.
54. 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993).
55. Id. at 434 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id. at 430.
57. Id. at 428.
58. Id. at 434.
59. 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 85 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
60. Id. at 85.
61. Id. at 86. The copying of the hymnals occurred more than three years before the
suit was brought. Id.
62. Id.
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infringing act occurred because the unauthorized copying occurred
outside the statute of limitations period.6" Rather, the court noted
that "under [the] defendants' theory a church could make illegal copies of a copyrighted work, put them in storage for three years, and
thereafter use them during religious services without incurring
64

liability. ,

At least one federal district court has found an infringing distribution without the proof of an actual dissemination of the copyrighted material to the public. In Brode v. Tax Management, Inc.,6 5 a
federal district court in Illinois held that leaving the plaintiffs copyrighted tax portfolio available on LEXIS and making the portfolio
available to subscribers may constitute an infringing distribution, even
though the plaintiff did not introduce any evidence that any subscriber had actually "called up" the portfolio.6 6
Because the Act fails to define "distribute" in the context of an
action for infringement, several federal courts have considered the
question of what constitutes infringement of the distribution right.
Uniformly, the courts considering the question have stated that an
offer to sell unauthorized copies of copyrighted material does not
constitute infringement. For a court to find a distribution within the
Act, it generally looks to several factors including whether an actual,
public dissemination of the unauthorized material occurred and the
nature and intended use of the unauthorized material.
b. The Limitations Period.-The Copyright Act states that:
"No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title
unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued."67
Congress added a statute of limitations provision to the Copyright Act
to establish uniformity among the courts and to discourage forum
shopping among litigating parties.6 8 In addition, the long-established
principle governing the limitations period is that the statute "bars
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1195 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
66. Id. at 1199.
67. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1994). The first Copyright Act, enacted by Congress in 1909,
did not contain a statute of limitations for civil copyright infringement actions; however,
the 1909 Act established a three-year statute of limitations for criminal copyright infringement. David E. Harrell, Comment, Difficulty CountingBackwards from Three: Conflicting Interpretations of the Statute of Limitations on Civil Copyright Infringement, 48 SMU L. REv. 669,
671 (1995) (reviewing court decisions that applied the Act's statute of limitations). Therefore, before the 1957 amendment of the Act, courts applied the statute of limitations of the
state in which the civil suit was filed. Id.
68. Harrell, supra note 67, at 671-72.
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remedies, not the assertion of rights. '69 Even bearing in mind Congress's reasons for adding the limitations provision and the principle
behind such a provision, courts continue to struggle with its
application." °
Although the Fourth Circuit had not addressed the statute of limitations in the civil copyright infringement context prior to Hotaling,
the district court for the Eastern District of Virginia had addressed the
issue. The plaintiff in Hoey v. Dexel Systems Corp.,v James Hoey,
granted Dexel Systems an exclusive marketing license in September
1981 to distribute his copyrighted computer software.7 2 Hoey alleged
that, subsequent to this date, Dexel infringed his copyright when it
began to advertise, offer for sale, and distribute computer software
and manuals that were substantially similar to Hoey's copyrighted
software and manuals.7 3
Dexel countered that the statute of limitations barred the copyright infringement claim because the limitations period expired
before Hoey filed suit on May 5, 1989, and Hoey allegedly knew of at
least one of the alleged infringing acts more than three years prior to
filing suit.74 Hoey urged the court to apply a "rolling statute of limitations" theory.75 "Under such a theory, so long as any allegedly infringing conduct occurs within the three years preceding the filing of the
action, the plaintiff may reach back and sue for damages or other relief for all allegedly infringing acts." 76 The court disagreed with both
arguments, stating that the limitations period was "clear on its face." 7
The court elaborated on this point:
[Section 507(b) of the Copyright Act] does not provide for a
waiver of infringing acts within the limitations period if earlier infringements were discovered and not sued upon, nor
69. Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that "[t]his principle
applies to the Copyright Act").
70. See ROBERT A. GoRmAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 680 (4th
ed. 1993 & Supp. 1997).
71. 716 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Va. 1989) (mem.).
72. Id. at 223.
73. Id. The court's opinion does not give the specific date on which the alleged infringing actions began. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. See generally Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1119 (7th Cir. 1983) ("When the
final act of an unlawful course of conduct occurs within the statutory period, these purposes are adequately served, in balance with the plaintiffs interest in not having to bring
successive suits by ... letting him reach back and get damages for the entire duration of the
alleged violation." (emphasis added)).
77. Hoey, 716 F. Supp. at 223.
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does it provide for any reach back if an act of infringement
occurs within the statutory period. In a case of continuing
copyright infringements an action may be brought for all
acts which accrued within the three years preceding the fil78
ing of the suit.

Consequently, the court allowed Hoey to proceed with his cause of
action for any infringing acts that occurred within the three-year period preceding the filing date, and it dismissed the claims accruing
outside the three-year period.7 9
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed Hoey's reasoning in Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd."° In Roley, the court held
that the plaintiffs action was time barred because the plaintiff knew
the infringement occurred in August 1987, but waited until February
1991 to file suit." In 1985, the plaintiff, Roley, wrote a screenplay and
gave a copy of the original work to a producer friend. 2 Roley's friend
declined to produce the screenplay at that time. 3 Two years later,
however, in August 1987, the friend invited Roley to the screening of
his new movie financed by New World. 4 After viewing the film, Roley
claimed the movie was a production of his screenplay.8 5 Roley waited
until February 1991 to file suit for copyright infringement, over three
6
8

years later.

Like the plaintiff in Hoey, Roley urged the court to accept a "rolling statute of limitations" theory.8 7 The court declined to accept this
theory, and instead followed the reasoning of the Hoey court.8 8 The
Roley court stated that "[t] his interpretation is consistent with the prevailing view that the statute bars recovery on any claim for damages
that accrued more than three years before commencement of [the]
89

suit."

78. Id.
79. Id. at 224.
80. 19 F.3d 479 (9th Cir. 1994).
81. Id. at 481-82.
82. Id. at 480.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 481.
88. Id.
89. Id.; accord Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1049-50 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Recovery is
allowed only for those acts occurring within three years of suit, and is disallowed for earlier
infringing acts."); Hoste v. Radio Corp. of Am., 654 F.2d 11, 11 (6th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) (barring a claim that accrued in 1965 when the suit was filed thirteen years later in
1978); Mount v. Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 555 F.2d 1108, 1110-11 (2d Cir. 1977) (allowing recovery for only the claim that occurred within the three years prior to filing the
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When applying the statute of limitations, courts have differed on
when a cause of action arises and when a claim accrues. For example,
the court in Roley defined when a copyright infringement action accrues. "A cause of action for copyright infringement accrues when
one has knowledge of a violation or is chargeable with such knowledge."9 Other courts have stated that the statute of limitations begins
to run when the last act of infringement occurs.9 2 Still others measure
the limitations period "from the time 'the claim accrued,' which is the
time that the infringement upon which the suit is based occurred."9 3
A party may sustain a cause of action so long as the underlying infringing act occurred within three years prior to filing the suit.9 4 The
cause of action is valid even if other infringing acts are barred because
those acts occurred outside the three year period, by the same defend95
ant, regarding the same work.
In addition, the courts are "sharply divided" over the issue of determining how to treat cases in which multiple infringing acts occur
over a period of time.9 6 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
addressed this issue in Stone v. Williams, ruling that "[e] ach act of infringement is a distinct harm giving rise to an independent claim for
relief."9 7 The court further clarified this notion by stating "[t]his does
not mean that when infringements occur during the limitations period recovery may be had for past infringements. Recovery is allowed
only for those acts occurring within three years of suit, and is disallowed for earlier infringing acts."98
suit); Kregos v. Associated Press, 795 F. Supp. 1325, 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding the
copyright owner of a baseball pitching statistics form "struck out" due to the statute of
limitations), affd, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993); Gaste v. Kaiserman, 669 F. Supp. 583, 584
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (limiting recovery to "those monetary damages which accrued within the
three-year period immediately preceding the filing of the lawsuit"); see also 3 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON CoPYRIGRT § 12.05[A], at 12-112 to 12-114 (1997)

(discussing section 507 of the Copyright Act).
90. Roley, 19 F.3d at 481.
91. Id.; see also Stone, 970 F.2d at 1048 ("A cause of action accrues when a plaintiff
knows or has reason to know of the injury upon which the claim is premised."); Wood v.
Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1128, 1135 (D. Nev. 1980) (discussing tolling the statute of limitations for fraudulent concealment).
92. See, e.g., Baxter v. Curtis Indus., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 100, 101 (N.D. Ohio 1962) (reviewing the legislative history of the Copyright Act, and concluding that the three-year
limitation period begins to run from the date of the last infringing act).
93. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 89, § 12.05[A], at 12-112 (footnotes omitted).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. GoRmaN & GINSBURG, supra note 70, at 680.
97. Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2d Cir. 1992).
98. Id. at 1049-50 (citing Mount v. Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 555 F.2d 1108, 111011 (2d Cir. 1977)).
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The District Court for the Eastern District of New York expanded
this concept in Singh v. Famous Overseas, Inc.9" The court discussed the
issue at length:
Each separate act of infringement is, of course, an "infringement" within the meaning of the statute, and in a literal sense perhaps such an act might be said to have
"commenced" (and ended) on the day of its
perpetration....
The word "infringement" can be used in two senses. As
noted, it can mean both a single act of infringement, and it
can also mean several or continuous or repeated acts of infringement. However, it would be peculiar if not inaccurate
to use the word "commenced" to describe a single act. That
verb generally presupposes as a subject some kind of activity
that begins at one time and continues or reoccurs
thereafter.1 00
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has determined that the three-year statute of limitations will not bar either
the action or the recovery if the infringement constitutes a "continuing wrong." In Taylor v. Meirick, 10 1 the copyright owner of fishermen's
maps filed an infringement action on May 8, 1980, alleging that the
defendant copied the maps without authorization in 1976 and
1977.102 The plaintiff copyright owner did not learn of the unauthorized maps until 1979, when the maps were still being sold by the defendant or his dealers.10 3 The Seventh Circuit concluded that
because all such acts constitute a continuing wrong, only the last infringing act need be within the three-year statutory period.10 4 Because one infringing act occurred within the three-year period, the
court allowed the copyright owner to reach back and recover for all of
the infringing acts. 1 5 The majority of circuits, including the Fourth
Circuit, 10 6 reject the "continuing wrong" theory and do not10 7allow
plaintiffs to recover for acts outside of the limitations period.
99. 680 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (mem.).
100. Id. at 535.
101. 712 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1983).
102. Id. at 1117.
103. Id. at 1119.
104. Id. at 1118-19.
105. Id. at 1119.
106. See Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 202.
107. See, e.g., Hoste v. Radio Corp. of Am., 654 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)
(disregarding allegations that a potentially infringing song continued to be performed);
Mount v. Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc., 555 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Any infringe-
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Hotaling, the Fourth Circuit held
that when a library places an unauthorized copy of a copyrighted work
in its collection, lists the work in its index, and makes the work available to the public, all within the three-year statute of limitations period, that a distribution occurs within the meaning of the Copyright
Act, thereby infringing the copyright owner's distribution right.1 °8 In
so ruling, the court interpreted a copyright owner's distribution right
to include lending an unauthorized work without proof of actual use
by a member of the public."0 9 Upon characterizing the defendant's
actions as a distribution within the meaning of the Copyright Act, the
court next found that the statute of limitations barred suit on all but
one of the Church's actions." l
After reviewing the facts in a light most favorable to the Hotalings, the court initially considered whether the suit was barred by the
Act's three-year statute of limitations.1 1 ' The court stated that a plaintiff does not lose her right to bring a cause of action for infringements
accruing within the three-year limitations period, even if related
claims accruing beyond the three-year period were not asserted.11 2
The court declined, however, to accept a "reach back" theory, which
would allow a party, based on claims that accrued within the limitations period, to "reach back" and recover for infringing acts accruing
outside of the limitations period. 11 The court, quoting a Ninth Circuit case, next determined that "'[a] cause of action for copyright infringement accrues when one has knowledge of a violation or is
chargeable with such knowledge."'1 4
Applying these concepts to the Hotalings' claim, the court ruled
that the statute of limitations barred recovery for any claims that accrued before August 1992, three years from the date the Hotalings
filed suit." 5 Any claim based on the Church's original copying and
distributing of the works accrued in 1991, when Donna Hotaling
learned about those activities, and was therefore barred by the statute
of limitations." 6
ment more than three years before the commencement of the action . . . is barred by
limitations . . . ." (ellipses in original)).
108. 118 F.3d at 201.
109. Id. at 203.
110. Id. at 204.
111 Id. at 202.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994)).
The court did not further examine the implications of the Roey holding. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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Next, the court turned to the issue of what constitutes a copyright
infringement. 1 17 Defining a copyright infringement as "a violation of
'any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner,"'1 18 the court observed that one of the exclusive rights is the right "'to distribute copies..., of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer
of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending[.],"" 9 The court concluded that the distribution right is infringed when a party distributes
an unlawful copy of a copyrighted work.12 °
The court proceeded to an analysis of what constitutes "distribution" within the meaning of the Act.' 2 1 Relying on National CarRental
System, Inc. v. Computer Associates International,Inc., 12 2 the court stated
that "[i]n order to establish 'distribution' of a copyrighted work, a
party must show that an unlawful copy was disseminated 'to the pub1 23
lic.'

The Hotalings conceded that the record did not contain any

evidence demonstrating specific instances in which the Church
loaned the unlawful copies to members of the public. 124 Notwithstanding this concession, the Hotalings urged the court to rule that
evidence that the library held the unlawful work in its collection,
where the work was available to the public, was sufficient to constitute
a "distribution.' ' 25 Conversely, the Church argued that, at most, its
actions constituted only an offer to distribute the work.1 26 Specifically, the Church argued that proof that the public accepted the offer
1 27
was required for distribution.
The majority dismissed the Church's argument, stating that a library could avoid distributing an unauthorized work merely by failing
to keep records of public use.' 28 In this case, the libraries did not
record public use of the microfiche. 29 The court reasoned that the
library's failure to keep these records would allow it to unjustly profit
by their omission.'3 0 The court ruled that a library completes all the
117. Id. at 203.
118. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994)).
119. Id. (ellipsis and alteration in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
123. Hotaling,118 F.3d at 203 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)). Remarkably, the court did
not examine NationalCar Rental or any other case discussing the requirements of "distribution" within the meaning of the Act.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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steps necessary for public distribution when the copyrighted work is
added to the collection, listed in the index or catalog, and made available to the borrowing or browsing public."'
Relying on a narrow interpretation of the statute, Judge Hall dissented from the majority's interpretation of "distribution."' 3 2 Judge
Hall emphasized that, according to the Act, the distribution right includes only the right to distribute the work "by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease or lending."'3 3 Hall reasoned that because
the microfiche was non-circulating, the Church did not "lend" the
works to the public by simply allowing the public to consult the works
at the library."' Thus, he concluded that because it did not sell, give,
rent, lease, or lend an unauthorized copy to the public, the Church
did not infringe the distribution right.'3 5
After determining what constituted "distribution" within the
meaning of the Act, the majority examined three different infringing
acts to determine whether there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the Church infringed the Hotalings'
rights.1 36 The court observed that the evidence of only one of those
acts was sufficient to show that an unauthorized copy was distributed
to the public.' 3 7 Specifically, the court noted Donna Hotaling's observation that the copy was part of the library's collection, was listed in
the card file, and was available to the public.13
131. Id.
132. Id. at 205 (Hall, J., dissenting).
133. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994)).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 203-04. The three acts the majority examined were the
microfiche copy Donna Hotaling examined in Salt Lake City in 1995, the paper copy she
found in Rhode Island in 1994, and the six copies that were returned and destroyed by the
Church in 1993. Id. at 203.
137. Id. at 203. Donna Hotaling personally observed an infringing act at the Church's
main library in 1995. Id.
138. Id. The Church acknowledged that the sole copy of the work maintained in the
main library was not the copy it originally obtained from All-Ireland Heritage, Inc. Id. at
204. The Church maintained that this copy was a replacement copy authorized by 17
U.S.C. § 108, which provides in part that
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of [17 U.S.C.] section 106, it is not an
infringement of copyright for a library or archives ...to reproduce no more than
one copy or phonorecord of a work, or to distribute such copy or phonorecord
(c) The right of reproduction under this section applies to a copy or phonorecord of a published work duplicated in facsimile form solely for the purpose
of replacement of a copy or phonorecord that is damaged, deteriorating, lost, or
stolen, if the library or archives has, after a reasonable effort, determined that an
unused replacement cannot be obtained at a fair price.
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After concluding that there was sufficient evidence for the 1995
claim, the court concluded that the Hotalings' other claims did not
present sufficient evidence showing that unauthorized copies were
available to the public at any of the branch libraries."l 9 According to
the unrebutted affidavit in the record, the paper copy found by
Donna Hotaling in the Rhode Island branch library was made and left
behind by a library patron.1 4 ° The court stated that there was no evidence to show that the library made the paper copy a part of its collection or listed the copy in its catalog file. 14 1 Moreover, the court ruled
that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the six copies
returned to the main library and destroyed in 1993 were distributed to
the public.

1 42

Finally, the court addressed the Church's assertion that even if an
unlawful copy of the work was held during the limitations period, the
143
claim was barred because it accrued outside the limitations period.
Finding the Church's argument unpersuasive, the court reasoned that
because each infringing act gives rise to an independent claim for relief, the limitations period did not bar relief.'" Here, the court concluded that the Church distributed the work in 1995, within the threeyear limitations period, regardless of whether past infringements occurred outside the period. 4 '
4.

Analysis.-

a. Infringing Act.-In Hotaling, the majority appropriately
expanded the definition of "distribution" as an infringing act by holding that an unlawful work is distributed when a library places the work
in its collection, lists the work in its index, and makes the work available to the borrowing or browsing public.' 46 Specifically, the court
17 U.S.C. § 108(a), (c) (1994). Because the district court did not address this issue, the
Fourth Circuit declined to address it on appeal. Hotaling,118 F.3d at 204. On remand, the
Fourth Circuit instructed the district court to dismiss the action if the court found that the
Church complied with section 108, and to conduct further proceedings on outstanding
claims if the Church did not comply with section 108. Id. at 205.
139. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 204.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. The Church pointed to Donna Hotaling's deposition testimony for its assertion
that the claim accrued outside the limitations period. Id. Her deposition testimony indicated that she knew the libraries were adding unlawful copies to their collections in 1991.
Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 203.

1998]

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

1173

determined that the library did not have to engage actively in distributing unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work to be liable for copyright infringement. Rather, the court ruled that the mere act of
making the unauthorized copy 1available
for distribution constituted a
47
violation of the Copyright Act.
The Copyright Act seems to require proof of a more "active" dissemination.14 8 Nonetheless, the library's passive dissemination still
qualifies because of the unique context of a library. The Act states
that the distribution right is the right to distribute copies of the copyrighted work "to the public." '49 The plain meaning of "to the public"
implies that the distribution right is tied to a physical transfer of possession. 50 In Hotaling, the Church's public disclosure consisted of
placing the copyrighted material in a place where the general public
had access.'
The act of placing the material in the library's collection was more passive than what the language of the Act implies. The
library context is unique because of the varying nature of the materials found in a library and the use limits placed on the materials. For
example, some materials, such as microfiches, are by their nature
designed for use only within the library. Although the library does
not physically transfer the materials, it makes sense to qualify the passive grant of access to materials "to the public" as a dissemination
within the meaning of the Act.
Focusing on a specific type of distribution, the dissent in Hotaling
correctly pointed out that "lending" was not occurring in the sense of
a library patron borrowing the material for use outside of the library." 2 The term "lending," however, is not limited to the dissent's
use of the word. "Lend" can mean " [t] o part with a thing of value to
another for a time fixed or indefinite, yet to have some time in ending, to be used or enjoyed by that other."' 5 3 The essence of "lending"
is a time restriction without referring to a place or location. Hence, a

147. Id.
148. See

LIBRARIES AND COPYRIGHTr: A GUIDE TO
1990s, at 20 (1994) ("The most common manifestation of the reproduction and distribution rights occurs when an author transfers to a publisher the right
to reproduce a novel in book copies and to distribute the copies through sale to bookstores
and libraries.").
149. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994).
150. See GoRMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 70, Supp. at 49 (pointing out the differences
between a distribution by physical means and a distribution through electronic
transmission).
151. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 203.
152. Id. at 205 (HallJ, dissenting).
153. BLACK'S LAw DIcIoNARY 901 (6th ed. 1990).
LAURA

N.

GASAWAy & SARAH K. WiAr,

COPYRIGHT LAw IN THE
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library can lend a patron research material that can only be used
within the confines of the library.
Understanding "lending" in a more expansive context makes intuitive sense when discussing copyrighted material that is not intended to leave the library."' Following the dissent's reasoning, one
could imagine a library escaping copyright infringement liability because its collection consists entirely of non-circulating unauthorized
works.
Case law discussing the distribution right requires more of a public dissemination than what the Hotaling majority required. For instance, in National Car Rental, the Eighth Circuit required an actual
dissemination in order for an act to constitute distribution. 5 5 Similarly, in Labus, the court awarded damages to the copyright owner
only where there was proof of actual video rental to resort guests.' 56
Likewise, the court in Obolensky required more than the Hotaling
court, ruling that listing the copyrighted work in an index and offering the work for sale was not a violation of the distribution right.'5 7
Similarly, the court in F.E.L. Publicationsruled that a distribution right
infringement occurred when the unauthorized hymnals were actively
handed out to members of the congregation.'
These cases, however, are distinguishable from Hotaling because
they do not reflect the unique nature of non-circulating research material in the library context. In the library context, where the copyrighted materials are designated for use only in the library, proof of
public dissemination is difficult if not impossible. This is especially
true where the library does not maintain records of public use of these
materials. As correctly pointed out by the Hotalingmajority, a library's
lack of public use record keeping should not prejudice the copyright
owner.

15 9

Although the issue of whether non-circulating research material
constitutes "lending" under the Act had never been addressed by a
154. See Ernest A. Seemann, A Look at the Public Lending Right, 30 COPYRIGHT L. SyvMP.
(ASCAP) 71, 71 (1980) (discussing a Public Lending Right that compensates an author for
the use of his work by libraries to include the use of the author's books in reading and
reference rooms).
155. National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 434 (8th
Cir. 1993).
156. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Labus, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1142, 1144 (W.D. Wis.
1990).
157. Obolensky v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 628 F. Supp. 1552, 1555-56 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 795
F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1986).
158. F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 85, 86 (N.D. Ill.

1978).
159. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 203.
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court, Hotaling comports with rulings in similar contexts. For example, in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena,16 ° the court considered whether
placing copyrighted materials on the Internet or a similar on-line service constituted "lending" in violation of the Copyright Act."' The
Playboy Enterprises court held that a computer bulletin board operator
engaged in unauthorized distributions of copies by making images
available to subscribers. 6 2 Significantly, the court found the bulletin
board operator liable even though it was the subscribers who
downloaded the unauthorized images. 63 Similarly, in Brode v. Tax
Management, Inc.,1 6 4 the court ruled that making unauthorized tax
portfolios available to subscribers on LEXIS may constitute an infringing distribution.16 Non-circulating library materials resemble on-line
materials for several reasons. First, the non-circulating library materials are placed in a public location to allow greater access to the public.
Similarly, placing materials on-line allows greater access to the public.
Second, access to materials in the library or on-line is unrestricted.
b. Statute of Limitations.-The Hotalingmajority properly applied the Act's three-year statute of limitations to allow recovery only
for those infringing acts that occurred within three years of the filing
date. 16 6 In the course of applying the limitations period, the court
had to decide when the action accrued. 167 The court stated that an
action accrues when one has knowledge of a copyright violation or is
chargeable with such knowledge. 168 This is appropriate when the infringing act is a one-time occurrence, but it becomes problematic
160. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (order).
161. Id. at 1554.
162. Id. at 1556 ("There is no dispute that Defendant Frena supplied a product containing unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work. It does not matter that Defendant Frena
claims he did not make the copies itself [sic].").
163. Id. But see Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907
F. Supp. 1361, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("Only the subscriber should be liable for causing the
distribution of [a] plaintiffs' work, as the contributing actions of the BBS provider are
automatic and indiscriminate ....
Netcom does not create or control the content of the
information available to its subscribers; it merely provides access to the Internet . . ").
One commentator suggests that the inconsistency between Playboy Enterprises and Netcom
On-Line is attributable to the level of control the operator has over the content of the
bulletin board or website. GoRMaN & GINSBURG, supra note 70, Supp. at 50. A library more
closely resembles the factual scenario presented in Playboy Enterprisesbecause, like the bulletin board operator, the library has complete control over the materials that are accessible
to the public.
164. 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
165. Id. at 1200.
166. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 202.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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when the infringing act is more continuous in nature. 169 Instead of
ruling that a "continuing wrong" occurred, the court determined that
each act of infringement was a separate and distinct harm. 170 The
court's application of the limitations period is consistent with "the
long established rule that statutes of limitations bar remedies, not the
17 1
assertion of rights. This principle applies to the Copyright Act."
Because an infringing act occurred as recently as 1995, the court correctly allowed the Hotalings to assert their distribution rights and stop
the infringing act. A party should always be allowed to assert its rights
barring an application of an equitable doctrine such as laches.
In order to determine what claims are recoverable, the Hotaling
court followed the above maxim when interpreting and applying the
Act's statute of limitations.. The court correctly concluded that because the Hotalings filed suit in August 1995, any claims accruing
before August 1992 were barred by the statute of limitations. 17 2 This
1 73
application follows the rule set forth in Hoey
and Roley.' 74 The
plaintiff in Hoey filed suit on May 5, 1989.17' The court allowed recovery for only those claims that accrued within three years of the May 5
filing date.' 7 6 Similarly, in Roley, the court allowed recovery for infringing acts that occurred within three years of the February 7, 1991,
17 7
filing date.

There are two schools of thought on when a copyright infringement claim accrues. The Hotalingcourt, following the first school of
thought articulated by the Roley court, stated that a cause of action
accrues when a person knows or has reason to know of a copyright
violation.17 8 The second school of thought states that a cause of action for copyright infringement accrues when the last infringing act
occurs. 17

Applying either of these theories to the Church's original

copying and distribution in 1991 would achieve the same result. Applying the Ro/ey reasoning, a cause of action based on the 1991 infringing acts is barred because Donna Hotaling knew the Church was
copying and distributing the copyrighted works. Therefore, a suit
169. See supra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
170. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 204.
171. Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
172. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 202.
173. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
175. Hoey v. Dexel Sys. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 222, 223 (E.D. Va. 1989) (mem.).
176. Id. at 224.
177. Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994).
178. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 202.
179. Baxter v. Curtis Indus., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 100, 101 (N.D. Ohio 1962) (concluding
the three-year limitations period begins to run from the date of the last infringing act).
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brought in 1995 was not timely for an action that accrued with her
knowledge in 1991. Applying the last infringing act theory also yields
the same result. The last act of the original copying and distributing
occurred in 1991; thus, the suit brought in 1995 was not timely.
The theories yield differing results when applied to the Hotalings' claim that the Church infringed their distribution right by offering an unauthorized copy to the public in August, 1995. Applying the
Roley reasoning, the cause of action should be time barred because
there is evidence that Donna Hotaling knew about the unauthorized
copy prior to 1992. The cause of action would accrue when she knew
about the unauthorized copy, thereby barring a suit brought in 1995.
Applying the last infringing act theory, however, the Hotalings have a
timely cause of action because the Church distributed the unauthorized copy as late as 1995; therefore, a suit filed in 1995 is timely.
In order for the Roley court and the Hotalingmajority to yield the
same result as the last infringing act theory, an extra theoretical step
was added. The court stated that each act of infringement was a distinct harm giving rise to an independent claim for relief.1 8 0 Therefore, the fact that Donna Hotaling knew the Church was distributing
the works before 1992 does not bar a cause of action based on the
Church's distributing the works in 1995. In effect, each day the
Church offered works to the public, it was committing a separate act
of infringement.
5. Conclusion.-In Hotaling, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that a library distributes an unlawful copy
to the public in violation of the Copyright Act when the library maintains the copy in its collection, lists the copy in its index or card catalog, and makes the copy available to the public."l
This holding
legitimately expands the definition of "lending" to include non-circulating works held by a library. To hold otherwise would allow libraries
to place unauthorized copies of copyrighted material on their shelves,
treat the copies as non-circulating, and thus never violate the Copyright Act. In addition, the court aptly applied the statute of limitations to allow recovery for only those infringing acts that occurred
within the three-year limitations period. 8 2 In the course of its discussion on limitations, the court adopted the Ninth Circuit's definition of

180. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 204.
181. Id. at 201.
182. Id. at 202.
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when an infringing act accrues. 1 83 Regardless of the accrual theory
adopted, the guiding principle to follow is that a statute of limitations
bars remedies, but not the assertion of rights.'8 4 Adhering to this underlying principle will yield the correct result regardless of which theory of accrual is applied.
JOSEPH

B.

F.

KEY

Confusion in the Fourth Circuit About FederalJurisdiction Under the
Lanham Act

In Gibraltar, P.R, Inc. v. Otoki Group, Inc.,' the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a petition to compel arbitration of a trademark dispute on the grounds that the district court
did not have jurisdiction to compel arbitration because it would not
have had jurisdiction over the dispute if it had been litigated rather
than arbitrated. 2 Despite language in the opinion which suggests that
the court dismissed the action because, "in essence," it involved a contract dispute,3 the court's analysis regarding its jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's request for injunctive relief indicates that the Fourth Circuit
continues to follow the "face of the complaint" approach for determining federal jurisdiction in suits arising out of contracts licensing or
assigning intellectual property. The court's lack of analysis on the
question whether the district court would have had jurisdiction over
the declaratory judgment action may indicate that the Fourth Circuit
will not apply the Edelmann doctrine4 to establish jurisdiction over a
declaratory judgment action when a party threatened with a suit for
trademark infringement seeks an adjudication of its rights. Because
the court failed to address the possible applicability of Edelmann, however, it is not clear whether the court intended to preclude the application of Edelmann in all trademark cases or only those cases arising
out of a contract involving a trademark, or whether the court intended to restrict its application at all.
1. The Case.-Gibraltar and Otoki are Puerto Rico based clothing companies.5 Gibraltar manufactures commercial and military ap183. Id.; see Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994); see also
supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
184. Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir. 1992).
1. 104 F.3d 616 (4th Cir. 1997).
2. Id. at 619.
3. Id.
4. See infra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
5. Gibraltar,104 F.3d at 617.
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parel, and Otoki is "a small sportswear design company."6 In January
1994, they formed a joint venture named Acorn Partners (Acorn) for
7
the purpose of designing, manufacturing, and selling apparel.
Under the original Joint Venture Agreement, Otoki agreed to assign
to Acorn the "right to use" all of Otoki's trademarks.8 The agreement
was amended ten months later to assign Acorn all of Otoki's "right,
title and interest in and to all trademarks and trade names" utilized or
possessed by Otoki.9 Pursuant to this amendment, Otoki's president
executed an assignment of three of Otoki's trademarks to Acorn.1 °
Otoki later claimed that the amendment and assignment were invalid, while Gibraltar contended that they were properly approved."'
The relationship between the parties soured soon after the dispute
over the amendment arose. 2 In accordance with its position that the
amendment and assignment were invalid, Otoki wrote to Acorn's attorney and demanded that he not comply with instructions he might
receive from Acorn with respect to the assignment and registration of
the Otoki trademarks."3 Otoki also wrote to Gibraltar and threatened
that if Gibraltar attempted or proceeded to transfer any of the subject
trademarks, Otoki would sue Gibraltar "in the Federal Court of Puerto
Rico for violation of trademark registration rights."' 4 By that time,
however, the transfer of the trademarks had already taken place.' 5 In
addition, Otoki contacted Acorn's business associates and told them

6. Gibraltar, P.R, Inc. v. Otoki Group, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1203, 1204 (D. Md. 1995)
(mem.), affd, 104 F.3d 616 (4th Cir. 1997).
7. Brief of Appellant at 8, Gibraltar, P.R., Inc. v. Otoki Group, Inc., 104 F.3d 616 (4th
Cir. 1997) (No. 95-2877).
8. Gibraltar,104 F.3d at 618.
9. Id.
10. Plaintiffs Amended Petition to Compel Arbitration at 3, Gibraltar, P.R., Inc. v.
Otoki Group, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1203 (D. Md. 1995) (mem.) (No. 95-1303), afjfd, 104 F.3d
616 (4th Cir. 1997). The three trademarks assigned were "Otoki," "Etniko & Design," and
"Etniko." Id.
11. Gibraltar,104 F.3d at 618. Otoki alleged that its president signed the assignment
documents without written authorization from Otoki's board of directors. Brief of Appellee at 5, Gibraltar, P.R., Inc. v. Otoki Group, Inc., 104 F.3d 616 (4th Cir. 1997) (No. 952877).
12. Gibraltar,104 F.3d at 618.
13. Plaintiff's Amended Petition to Compel Arbitration at 5, Gibraltar (No. 95-1303).
14. Brief of Appellant at 11, Gibraltar(No. 95-2877) (quoting letter from principals of
Otoki to principals of Gibraltar (Dec. 10, 1994) (footnote omitted)); accord Plaintiffs
Amended Petition to Compel Arbitration at 6, Gibraltar(No. 95-1303); see also Gibraltar,914
F. Supp. at 1204 (noting that Otoki threatened legal action if the trademarks were used or
transferred).
15. Brief of Appellant at 11, Gibraltar(No. 95-2877). The assignment was recorded in
the United States Patent and Trademark Office on November 2, 1994. Id.
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that Acorn did not own Otoki's trademarks.' 6 Gibraltar also alleged
that during the first week of January 1995, members of Otoki's board
of directors "seized and took into their possession records and other
items of property belonging to the joint venture"1 7 that were necessary
to Acorn's use of the trademarks, "includ[ing] patterns and prototypes of products developed by Acorn . . . for sale under the [as-

signed] trademarks." 8
On January 4, 1995, pursuant to an arbitration clause in the Joint
Venture Agreement, Gibraltar filed a Demand for Arbitration with the
American Arbitration Association.1 9 When Otoki refused to participate in arbitration, Gibraltar filed a petition to compel arbitration in
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.2" Several
weeks after filing its petition, in response to a letter from Otoki's
counsel that Gibraltar alleged was a renewed threat of suit for trademark infringement, Gibraltar amended its Demand for Arbitration to
include a request for a declaration of Acorn's rights in the trademarks.2 1 The Amended Demand for Arbitration contained allega16. Gibraltar,914 F. Supp. at 1204.
17. Plaintiffs Amended Petition to Compel Arbitration at 6, Gibraltar(No. 95-1303).
18. Id; see also Gibraltar,914 F. Supp. at 1204 (noting that Otoki did not contradict
these allegations).
19. Brief of Appellant at 13, Gibraltar (No. 95-2877). The Joint Venture Agreement
provided:
Any dispute arising out of or concerning this Joint Venture Agreement will be
resolved by arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of
the American Arbitration Association, any such arbitration to be administered by
the American Arbitration Association office in Washington, D.C., with all arbitration hearings to be held in Baltimore, Maryland. Judgment on any award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered by any court having jurisdiction thereof.
Id. at 12 (quotingJoint Venture Agreement). Gibraltar claimed that it filed its Demand for
Arbitration because "[b]y the time Otoki began to proclaim its right to use the trademarks,
and threatened to sue Gibraltar for 'violation of [federal] trademark registration rights,'
Gibraltar had already expended, pursuant to the Joint Venture Agreement, substantial
monies and effort marketing the trademarks which Otoki had assigned to Acorn Partners."
Id. (quoting letter from principals of Otoki to principals of Gibraltar (Dec. 10, 1994)).
"With so much at risk," Gibraltar claimed it "wanted to resolve the disputes between the
parties as soon as possible." Id Gibraltar filed two subsequent amendments to its Demand
for Arbitration. Plaintiffs Amended Petition to Compel Arbitration at 8, Gibraltar(No.
95-1303).
20. Gibraltar,914 F. Supp. at 1204.
21. Brief of Appellant at 14-15, Gibraltar(No. 95-2877). The letter from Otoki accused
Gibraltar of unlawfully stealing Otoki brandnames "by trying to 'assign' or transfer them to
third parties or entities" and stated that "if Acorn Partners were to continue to use Otoki
trademarks, this would in effect constitute a violation of the laws of Puerto Rico and the
United States." Id at 14 (quoting letter from Otoki's counsel to Gibraltar's principals
(Mar. 3, 1994)). Gibraltar had amended its Demand for Arbitration twice prior to filing its
Petition to Compel Arbitration. Plaintiffs Amended Petition to Compel Arbitration at 8,
Gibraltar (No. 95-1303).
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tions that Otoki had "threaten[ed] Gibraltar with a suit for
infringement of Otoki's alleged federal trademark rights," had "interfer[ed] with the use of the said trademarks by the unauthorized
and unlawful taking of certain records and other written materials
necessary to the use of the said trademarks," and had "wrongfully assert[ed] that Otoki [was] the owner of the said trademarks., 22 The
final amendment to the Demand for Arbitration specifically requested
a declaration as to Acorn's rights in the trademarks. Because Otoki
was continuing to claim that it owned and had the right to use the
trademarks, and was in possession of the materials necessary to use the
trademarks, Gibraltar also requested an injunction against Otoki's use
of the trademarks. 23 After amending its Demand for Arbitration, Gibraltar filed an Amended Petition to Compel Arbitration in the dis2 4

trict court.

The district court dismissed Gibraltar's Amended Petition on the
grounds that it failed to allege a violation of federal law, and that the
25
court, therefore, lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action.
In an unpublished memorandum opinion, the district court denied
Gibraltar's motion for reconsideration. 26 Gibraltar appealed the district court's ruling to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.2 7
2.

Legal Background.-

a. The FederalArbitrationAct.--Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 28 provides:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of
another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save
for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28,
in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit
arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an or-

22. Plaintiffs Amended Petition to Compel Arbitration at 9, Gibraltar (No. 95-1303)
(quoting amendment to Demand for Arbitration filed with the American Arbitration Association (Mar. 29, 1995)).
23. Brief of Appellant at 15, Gibraltar(No. 95-2877).
24. Id. at 17-18.
25. Gibraltar,914 F. Supp. at 1206. Neither Gibraltar's Demand for Arbitration nor its
Amended Petition contained allegations that Otoki was actually using or infringing the
trademarks in dispute. Id, at 1205.
26. Gibraltar, P.R., Inc. v. Otoki Group, Inc., Civil No. 95-606, slip op. at 11 (D. Md.
Aug. 29, 1995) (mem.), affd, 104 F.3d 616 (4th Cir. 1997).
27. Gibraltar,104 F.3d at 618.
28. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
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der directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner
29
provided for in such agreement.
The Supreme Court has stated that despite the FAA's status as a
body of federal substantive law "establishing and regulating the duty
to honor an agreement to arbitrate," the FAA does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction.3" Rather, section 4 of the
FAA provides for an order compelling arbitration "only when the federal district court would have jurisdiction over a suit on the underlying dispute."3 1 Thus, there must be diversity of citizenship or some
other independent basis for federal jurisdiction before an order compelling arbitration can issue.32
b. Federal-QuestionJurisdiction Under 28 US.C. § 1338.-In
cases involving contractual arrangements for the exploitation of intellectual property, there is often a question whether an action arising
out of the contract should be considered a state law contract claim or
a federal claim within the jurisdiction of a federal court.33 Two lines
of authority have developed for determining whether an action involving a dispute over a trademark or copyright license or assignment

29. Id.
30. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983).
In Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he Arbitration Act is something of an
anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive
law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not
create any independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or otherwise."
Id. (citation omitted).
31. Id. The court must analyze the underlying issues in the dispute and determine if it
would have had jurisdiction had the issues been litigated rather than arbitrated. See TM
Marketing, Inc. v. Art & Antiques Assocs., L.P., 803 F. Supp. 994, 1000 (D.N.J. 1992) (determining that the federal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration
award pursuant to section 9 of the FAA because, had the dispute been litigated rather than
arbitrated, it would have been grounded upon contract rights protected by state law). In
addition to establishing federal subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff must state a claim
to compel arbitration under the FAA. To state a claim to compel arbitration under the
FAA, the plaintiff must allege:
(1) the existence of a dispute between the parties, (2) a written agreement that
includes an arbitration provision which purports to cover the dispute, (3) the
relationship of the transaction, which is evidenced by the agreement, to interstate
or foreign commerce, and (4) the failure, neglect or refusal of the defendant to
arbitrate the dispute.
Whiteside v. Teltech Corp., 940 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir. 1991).
32. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25 n.32.
33. See Foxrun Workshop, Ltd. v. Klone Mfg., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 86, 87-88 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
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"arises under" 28 U.S.C. § 133834 and is thus properly brought before
a federal court. 5 In making the jurisdictional determination, some
courts look at the "face" of the complaint and determine jurisdiction
on the basis of the well-pleaded complaint rule, 6 while others look
behind the complaint in an attempt to discern the "essence" of the
plaintiff's claim.37
T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu3 8 is the leading case on when a claim
arises under the Copyright Act. 39 Harms involved a dispute over the

rights to certain renewal copyrights.4" The controversy in Harms concerned whether the defendant had executed an assignment granting
the plaintiff rights in the defendant's renewal copyrights to four

34. This section provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action arisingunder any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trade-marks." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
35. See Amy B. Cohen, "Arising Under"Jurisdictionand the Copyright Laws, 44 HAsI-NGS
LJ.337, 362 (1993). The cases have primarily dealt with jurisdiction under the Copyright
Act, but the analysis has been found to be equally applicable in determining jurisdiction
under the Lanham Act. SeeJay S. Fleischman, Comment, Swimming the Murky Waters: The
Second Circuit and Subject-MatterJurisdiction in Copyright Infringement Cases, 42 Burr. L. REv.
119, 120 n.5 (1994) ("It has been widely recognized that actions in copyright, patent and
trademark law closely resemble one another and are guided largely by the same principles." (citing Foxrun Workshop, 686 F. Supp. at 86; Tollinger v. Ithaca Gun Co., No. 86-1351,
1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3230, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1988); Bear Creek Prods. v. Saleh, 643
F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1986))); see also Gibraltar,914 F. Supp. at 1205 (noting that the
analytical similarity between actions involving copyrights and those involving trademarks
makes cases concerning federal jurisdiction over copyright claims "particularly apposite" in
analyzing a court's jurisdiction over a trademark dispute).
36. Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal jurisdiction exists "only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S.
109, 112-13 (1936)). Thus, the court determines whether a case arises under federal law by
what necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim." Arthur Young &
Co. v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 967, 969 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74,
75-76 (1914))).
37. See James M. McCarthy, Comment, Federal Subject MatterJurisdiction: When Does a
Case Involving the Breach of a Copyright License Contract "Arise Under" the Copyright Act, 19 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 165, 166-67 (1993) (noting the dispute among courts in making the jurisdictional determination for "cases involving the breach of a licensing contract and an infringement claim"). Under the essence of the complaint approach, courts look behind the
complaint to "evaluate the true nature of the dispute before them" and make a jurisdictional determination on that basis. Cohen, supra note 35, at 368-69.
38. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964).
39. See McCarthy, supra note 37, at 169; see also Arthur Young & Co., 895 F.2d at 969-70
(noting that Harms "set out what has remained the definitive jurisdictional test for copyright cases"). See generally supra note 35 (noting that the jurisdictional analysis in copyright
suits can apply to cases brought under the Lanham Act).
40. Harms. 339 F.2d at 824.
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songs. 4 1 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, after filing renewal
applications, assigned his rights in the renewal copyrights to a third
party instead of to the plaintiff as required by the alleged assignment.4 2 The plaintiff filed a complaint in federal court setting forth a
single claim and containing allegations that the action was one arising
under the Copyright Act. 43 The district court dismissed the action for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction after determining that the complaint did not contain any allegations of copyright infringement4 4
and, therefore, was nothing more than a suit to establish4 title
to the
5
renewal copyrights that should be resolved in state court.
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal, holding
that the case did not "arise under" the copyright laws.4 6 In reaching
this decision, Judge Friendly formulated and applied a test for determining when a case arises under the Copyright Act:
[A] n action "arises under" the Copyright Act if and only if
the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act,
e.g., a suit for infringement or for the statutory royalties for
record reproduction, or asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act . . .or, at the very least and perhaps more

doubtfully, presents a case where a distinctive policy of the
Act requires that federal principles control the disposition of
the claim. The general interest that copyrights, like all other
forms of property, should be enjoyed by their true owner is
not enough to meet this last test.47
The court found that the complaint did not meet any of the criteria
outlined, and therefore, did not arise under the Act.4 8
41. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 226 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 339 F.2d 823 (2d
Cir. 1964).
42. Harms, 339 F.2d at 824-25. The assignment to the third party was made subject to a
'judicial determination" of the defendant's ownership. Id. at 825.
43. Harms, 226 F. Supp. at 338.
44. Id. at 339-40 (noting that although "plaintiff contends.., that [federal] jurisdiction
is preserved by allegations of infringement ... contained in the complaint," none of the
acts alleged by the plaintiff "constitutes any act which uses, violates or threatens the copyrights," and therefore no federal jurisdiction existed).
45. Id. at 341.
46. Harms, 339 F.2d at 828-29.
47. Id. at 828 (citations omitted).
48. Id. The court determined that no remedy had been sought under the Copyright
Act because the defendants did not use or threaten to use the copyrighted material, but
rather only sought to establish their ownership of the copyrights through judicial action.
Id. at 825. The court also found that the complaint did not "reveal" a need for interpretation of the Act. Id. at 827. Lastly, the court found that the complaint did not "fall[ ] in the
shadow of a federal interest suggested by the Copyright Act." Id, at 828.
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The Harms court did not intend to preclude the exercise of federal jurisdiction over actions arising out of contracts licensing or assigning copyrights. In fact, Judge Friendly made a point of noting
that when one who is licensed to use intellectual property is alleged to
have forfeited the right of such use, the plaintiff controls the question
of federal jurisdiction by either directing his pleadings against the offending use, 49 i.e., a suit for infringement, or by bringing a state law
contract action to set the license aside.5 °
Since Harms, federal courts, particularly the district courts of New
York, have been unable to agree on the proper application of Judge
Friendly's test.5 1 The confusion centers around whether courts are
constrained to determine jurisdiction based on the face of the plaintiff s well-pleaded complaint or whether a court can look behind the
allegations of the complaint to determine its "essence" and dismiss the
cause of action where it finds that the dispute between the parties is
really nothing more than a contract dispute.5 2
Some courts seized upon the following language from the district
court opinion in Harms as a basis for adopting the "essence" test: "In
considering the plea of lack ofjurisdiction, the formal allegations [of
the complaint] must yield to the substance of the claim. ''5 ' This one

49. This is assuming that there is use by the defendant. The plaintiff in Harms claimed
that its complaint contained allegations of infringement, but the district court held that
the allegations, which the plaintiff contended constituted pleading against the offending
use, did not. In other words, the court found that the defendant was not "us[ing], violat[ing] or threaten[ing]" the copyrights, and thus, the plaintiff failed to state a claim for
copyright infringement. Harms, 226 F. Supp. at 339-40. Had the district court found that
the plaintiff stated a claim for copyright infringement, it would not have denied jurisdiction. See id. at 340 (indicating that had the plaintiffs complaint contained allegations of
activity that constituted infringement under the Copyright Act, it would have arisen under
federal law and properly been before the federal court).
50. Harms, 339 F.2d at 825 (citing Luckett v. Delpark, 270 U.S. 496 (1926)).
51. As one writer has noted, since the Harms decision "many federal courts have relied
on Judge Friendly's test for copyright jurisdiction... however, applications of his test have
often produced inconsistent results." Cohen, supra note 35, at 362. Another commentator
has stated that "Judge Friendly has, with a single paragraph, left a legacy of confusion that
has led to a series of apparently irreconcilable judicial opinions and rules." Fleischman,
supra note 35, at 125.
52. See McCarthy, supra note 37, at 166-67.
53. Harms, 226 F. Supp. at 338. Although this statement seems rather straightforward,
it is unclear that, taken in the context of the opinion, this statement is properly relied
upon as a basis for asserting that the "essence" of the plaintiff's claim should control the
jurisdictional question. The plaintiff in Harms argued that its complaint arose under the
Copyright Act and contained allegations of copyright infringement. Id. at 338-39. However, the court found that the allegations in the complaint did not state a claim for copyright infringement. Id. at 339-40. The plaintiffs only remaining claim was for a
declaratory judgment that it was the owner of the defendant's interest in the copyrights,
and the court held that a claim based on "assertions of tide, unaccompanied by acts that
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statement appears
to be responsible for the promulgation of the "es54
sence" test.
The "essence of the complaint" test finds its origins in Elan Associates, Ltd. v. Quackenbush Music, Ltd.5 5 Elan involved an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant that gave the plaintiff the exclusive
right to publish and obtain copyrights to songs written by Carly Simon.5 6 During the three years following the initial agreement, the
defendant, a corporation partly owned by Simon that had been
formed to publish and hold copyrights in the songs Simon composed,
obtained copyrights in seven songs written by Simon on the belief that
the agreement with the plaintiff pertained only to one particular
song.5 7 After realizing that the agreement did in fact give rights to the
violate the copyright itself, is not one arising under the laws of the United States." Id. at
340. Thus, Judge Weinfeld's statement that "the formal allegations [of the complaint]
must yield to the substance of the claim," id. at 338, may only mean that if the alleged acts
of infringing use do not in fact constitute infringing use under the Act, and therefore do
not state a claim under the Copyright Act, then the "formal allegation" that the suit arises
under the Copyright Act will not confer jurisdiction.
54. See Berger v. Simon & Schuster, 631 F. Supp. 915, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (denying
jurisdiction because the plaintiffs complaint was "in substance, albeit not in form" seeking
to settle the contractual rights and duties of the parties, although the complaint was
"framed entirely in terms of infringement"); Fleischman, supra note 35, at 125 (stating that
the "essence of the claim" approach "makes use of only one part of the district court ruling" in Harms); McCarthy, supra note 37, at 180 (noting that the "line of cases [adopting
the 'essence' test] follows the proposition from the Harms district court opinion that the
complaint's formal allegations must yield to the substance of the claim"); see also Felix
Cinematografica, S.R.L. v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 671 F. Supp. 313, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(citing Berger in support of its dismissal of an action "framed entirely in terms of infringement" on the grounds that the defendant's claim was "in essence" a contract dispute).
There may be an argument that one case, decided by Judge Weinfeld after Harms, and
often cited as supporting the "essence" rule, refutes the interpretation this Note ascribes to
Judge Weinfeld's statement in Harms that "the formal allegations [of the complaint] must
yield to the substance of the claim." See supra note 53. In Stepdesign, Inc. v. Research Media,
Inc., 442 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),Judge Weinfeld dismissed a complaint that purported
to contain a claim for copyright infringement on the grounds that the "primary and controlling purpose of the complaint" was to reestablish the plaintiff as the rightful owner of
the subject copyrights. Id. at 34. However, Judge Weinfeld dismissed the claim on this
basis only after finding that the plaintiff had not stated a claim for copyright infringement,
and therefore, had not directed his pleadings "against the offending use," as required by
the Second Circuit opinion in Harmsfor federal jurisdiction to exist in a case where a party
licensed to use a copyright is alleged to have forfeited the grant. Id.; see Fleischman, supra
note 35, at 127 (supporting this interpretation of the Stepdesign opinion). Stepdesign, therefore, is similar to the Harms district court opinion, in which judge Weinfeld strongly indicated that had the plaintiffs complaint stated a claim for infringement, he would have
found that the court had jurisdiction to hear the dispute. Compare Harms, 226 F. Supp. at
341 with Stepdesign, 442 F. Supp. at 34.
55. 339 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see Cohen, supra note 35, at 363 (noting that the
essence test originated with Elan).
56. Elan, 339 F. Supp. at 461.
57. Id.
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plaintiff in those seven songs, the defendant instituted an action in
New York state court to void the agreement on the grounds of fraud.5"
The plaintiff subsequently secured copyrights in the same seven songs
previously copyrighted by the defendant and instituted a federal suit
alleging that the defendant was infringing its copyrights. 9
The court found that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear
a case "which essentially involve[d] a dispute as to the ownership
rights to copyrights."6 ° The court stated that the "principal and controlling issue" in the federal action involved the question of who had
title to the songs in dispute, and although the action had been cast in
terms of infringement, the court did not have jurisdiction under the
Harms test.6"

Another line of authority developing after Harms holds that federal jurisdiction to hear a claim arising out of the breach of a contract
licensing or assigning intellectual property is determined from the
face of the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint.6 2 These cases rely primarily on judge Friendly's statement in Harms that "[f] ederal jurisdiction is held to exist if the plaintiff has directed his pleadings against
the offending use, referring to the license only by way of anticipatory
replication,"6 and on that portion of the Harms three-part "arising
under" analysis that states that an action arises under the Copyright
64
Act if "the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act."
Commentators consider the decision in Foxrun Workshop, Ltd. v.
Klone Manufacturing,Inc.,6 5 to be the "primary authority" on the "face

of the complaint" test.6 6 The plaintiff in Foxrun alleged that the defendants had forfeited their right to use the plaintiff's federally registered trademark because they failed to perform their obligations
58. Id.
59. Id at 461-62.
60. Id. at 462.
61. Id. The Elan opinion, while purportedly based upon application of the test announced by Judge Friendly in Harms, does not appear to have considered the portion of
Harms that stated that pleadings directed at the "offending use" of a party who has allegedly lost its right to use copyrighted material under the terms of a contract provide a basis
for federal jurisdiction, even if the claim is essentially a contract dispute. See T.B. Harms
Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1964).
62. See Fleischman, supra note 35, at 130; McCarthy, supra note 37, at 175.
63. Fleischman, supra note 35, at 130 (quoting Harms, 339 F.2d at 825); McCarthy,
supra note 37, at 175.
64. McCarthy, supra note 37, at 175 (quoting Harms, 339 F.2d at 828).
65. 686 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
66. McCarthy, supra note 37, at 175; see also Daniel Wilson Prods., Inc. v. Time-Life
Films, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 40, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (rejecting the "essence of the claim" test
and holding that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction because the complaint alleged
copyright infringement and requested remedies provided by the Copyright Act).
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under a licensing agreement giving them the right to use the trademark.6 7 The plaintiff asserted that the defendants were infringing
upon its federal trademark rights by continuing to use the trademark
even after their right of use under the license had terminated.6 8 Because the plaintiff "pleaded that the defendants ha[d] infringed his
trademarks and ha[d] not asserted a claim for breach of contract," the
plaintiff had "'directed his pleading against the offending use,"' and
thus, federal jurisdiction was present.6 9 The court explicitly rejected
the defendants' argument that the court should "look behind the
complaint to assess whether the action turns primarily on claims of
breach of contract ' 70 and cited several reasons that the "face of the
complaint" test is the better rule. 7 '
The Fourth Circuit adopted the "face of the complaint" approach
in Arthur Young & Co. v. City of Richmond.7 2 In Arthur Young, the City
of Richmond had contracted with Arthur Young & Co. (Arthur
Young) for the design of a computer information system. 73 When disputes arose concerning payments and performance, the City locked
Arthur Young out of the workplace, but continued using the system
that Arthur Young had installed." Arthur Young subsequently registered a copyright of the system and brought suit in federal court alleging copyright infringement as well as several state law contract
claims. 75 The district court dismissed the action for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction after finding that copyright infringement was not
the "principal and controlling issue" in the case, but rather, that the
action was in essence a contract dispute governed by state law.76
The Fourth Circuit, after noting that Judge Friendly set out the
"definitive jurisdictional test for copyright cases" in Harms,7 7 ex67. Foxrun Workshop, 686 F. Supp. at 87.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 90 (quoting Harms, 339 F.2d at 825). The court announced that its decision
rested upon a consideration of the "factors enunciated in" Harms. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. (stating that the "face of the complaint" test is the better approach because
"[i]t is important to the parties to know from the outset whether the court has subject
matter jurisdiction over the case" and noting that the "essence" approach "admits a possibility of dismissal at the time of, or even after trial, upon the court's conclusion that the
action primarily sought enforcement of contract rights"); see also Mother Waddles Perpetual Mission, Inc. v. Frazier, 904 F. Supp. 603, 608-09 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (discussing competing policy considerations behind the two rules).
72. 895 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1990).
73. Id. at 968.
74. Id.
75. Id
76. Id. at 969.
77. Id. at 969-70.
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amined the Harms decision and concluded that Judge Friendly had
dismissed the plaintiffs claims in that case "not because they raised
state law issues of ownership, but because there was no allegation of
copyright infringement."7 8 The court held, therefore, that under
Harms, when a complaint contains proper allegations of copyright infringement on its face, a federal court has jurisdiction over the action
regardless of the difficulty or centrality of state law contract issues regarding ownership.7 9 The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court
after finding that the complaint contained proper allegations of copyright infringement ° under the Harms test, as interpreted by the
Fourth Circuit, and therefore, the action arose under the Copyright
Act.

81

Recognizing that the question whether a breach of a contract licensing or assigning intellectual property gives rise to a federal cause
of action "isa complex issue in a 'murky' area,"82 the Second Circuit,
in Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc.,8" recently adopted a threepart "hybrid" analysis for determining whether a claim arises under
the Copyright Act. 84 The analysis adopted by Schoenberg resolved the

78. Id. at 970.
79. Id. at 970-71 ("The fact that a complaint containing proper allegations of copyright
infringement might not present difficult issues of federal law has no bearing on the fundamental question of whether the suit arises under the Copyright Act. As Judge Friendly
noted, 'many infringement suits .. .depend only on some point of fact and require no
construction of federal law. .. .'" (quoting T.B. Harms v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 826 (2d Cir.
1964) (ellipses in original))).
80. Id.at 971.
81. Id.; see also Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 839 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir.
1988) (applying the "face of the complaint" approach in making the jurisdictional determination); Daniel Wilson Prods., Inc. v. Time-Life Films, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 40, 41-42
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same); Powell v. Green Hill Publishers, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 743, 745 (N.D.
Ill. 1989) (same). In coming to its conclusion regarding the proper jurisdictional analysis,
the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that "[t]he line between cases that 'arise under' patent
and copyright laws, as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), and those that present only
state law contract issues, is 'a very subtle one,' and .. . leads down 'one of the darkest
corridors of the law of federal courts and federal jurisdiction.'" Arthur Young, 895 F.2d at
969 n.2 (quoting 13B CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3582, at 307 & n.11 (2d ed. 1983) (quoting Donald Shelby Chisum, The Allocation of
Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REv. 633
(1971))).
82. Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 971 F.2d 926, 931 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing
Berger v. Simon & Schuster, 631 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
83. 971 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1992).
84. The Schoenberg court adopted the following analysis for determining when a case
involving the alleged breach of a copyright license or assignment arises under the Copyright Act:
A district court must first ascertain whether the plaintiff's infringement claim is
only "incidental" to the plaintiff's claim seeking a determination of ownership or
contractual rights under the copyright. If it is determined that the claim is not
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conflict that had developed among the judges of the Southern District
of New York who were divided over the question of federal jurisdiction in cases arising out of contracts licensing or assigning intellectual
85
property.
c. DeclaratoryRelief Under the Lanham Act.-The Declaratory
Judgment Act (DJA) provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except
with respect to Federal taxes .... any court of the United
States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief
is or could be sought.8 6
The DJA "gives a means by which rights and obligations may be
adjudicated in cases involving an actual controversy that has not
reached the stage at which either party may seek a coercive remedy
and in cases in which a party who could sue for coercive relief has not
yet done so. ''87 One purpose behind providing this type of relief is to
permit those threatened with liability to obtain an early adjudication
of their rights without having to wait and accrue damages until their
adversary sees fit to bring suit.88 This procedural device has proven
particularly useful in patent litigation where declaratory judgment liti-

merely incidental, then a district court must next determine whether the complaint alleges a breach of a condition to, or a covenant of, the contract licensing
or assigning the copyright .... [I]f a breach of a condition is alleged, then the
district court has subject matterjurisdiction. But if the complaint merely alleges a
breach of a contractual covenant in the agreement that licenses or assigns the
copyright, then the court must undertake a third step and analyze whether the
breach is so material as to create a right of rescission in the grantor. If the breach
would create a right of rescission, then the asserted claim arises under the Copyright Act.
Id. at 932-33 (citations omitted). For a detailed analysis of the Schoenberg test, see Fleischman, supra note 35, at 133-39.
85. See Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 931 (comparing cases from the Southern District of New
York that were split on the use of the "essence" test and the "face of the complaint" test).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1994). With respect to the question of how this section operates in the context of a trademark dispute, one commentator has stated that "[w ] here a
trademark user is threatened with a trademark infringement action, he may bring an action in the federal court under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act for an adjudication
of noninfringement, provided that an 'actual controversy' exists and federal jurisdiction is
established." 3 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 8.03(2], at 8-31
(1997) (emphasis added).
87. 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 81, § 2751, at 569.
88. Id. (citing E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852, 854 (7th Cir.
1937)).
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gation is common, s 9 and it has been equally useful in trademark
disputes.9 0
The operation of the DJA is procedural only." It does not alter
the jurisdiction of the federal courts.9 2 Thus, requests for declaratory
judgments may be heard only in cases that are otherwise within the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the court.9 3 The DJA also requires that
there be an "actual controversy" between the parties before the court
will grant declaratory relief. 4
(1) Actual Controversy.-In trademark cases, the existence of
an "actual controversy" is determined by the application of a twoprong test.9 5 First, the declaratory plaintiff must have "a real and reasonable apprehension of litigation."9 6 Second, the declaratory plaintiff must have "engaged in a course of conduct which brought it into
adversarial conflict with the declaratory defendant." 7 More fundamentally, the courts use this test to determine "whether the plaintiff
seeks merely advice or whether a real question of conflicting legal interests is presented for judicial determination."9 8 Congress designed
the DJA to prevent alleged infringers from having to choose between
89. See 4 J. THOMAS McCARTI, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 32:50, at 32-65 (4th ed. 1997) (discussing how the availability of declaratory relief destroyed the "racket" of patentees who gained unfair advantage over competitors by threatening infringement lawsuits that might never be brought and left the alleged infringer
without a chance to contest the validity of the patentee's claims).
90. See Starter Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 84 F.3d 592, 596 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Declaratory
judgment actions are particularly useful in resolving trademark disputes, in order to
promptly resolve controversies where the alleged owner of a trademark right threatens to
sue for infringement."); see also Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF Inc., 828 F.2d 755, 757
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (noting that declaratory judgment actions involving trademarks are analogous to those involving patents); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 89, § 32:50, at 32-65 (noting that
"[t]he purpose of federal declaratory judgment in trademark cases is almost identical to
that in patent cases").
91. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950).
92. Id. at 671-72.
93. See 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 81, § 2751, at 569; infra notes 112-127 and accompanying text (discussing federal-question jurisdiction and the DJA).
94. See 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 81, § 2751, at 569.
95. See Starter, 84 F.3d at 595; Windsurfing, 828 F.2d at 757; Baltimore Luggage Co. v.
Samsonite Corp., 727 F. Supp. 202, 210 (D. Md. 1989).
96. Windsurfing, 828 F.2d at 757 (citing Topp-Cola Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 314 F.2d 124,
125-26 (2d Cir. 1963)).
97. Id (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 605, 608 (D. Del.
1976)).
98. Simmonds Aerocessories v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 257 F.2d 485, 489 (3d Cir.
1958); see also Windsurfing, 828 F.2d at 758 (holding that the declaratory plaintiff did not
satisfy second prong of the test because it had demonstrated only a "desire" to use the
trademark and sought nothing more than an advisory opinion from the court-"something a federal court may not give").
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(1) risking the accrual of damages while the party threatening litigation waited to bring suit, and (2) ceasing the allegedly infringing activity without being able to secure an adjudication of their rights. To
further that congressional intent, courts liberally construe the DJA
when determining the existence of an actual controversy in trademark
disputes. 99
In determining whether there is a real and reasonable apprehension of an infringement action, courts attempt to discern the "real and
reasonable perceptions of the [declaratory] plaintiff."' 10 0 It is not necessary that there be a direct threat of litigation in order to invoke the
DJA.' 0 "It is sufficient if such a threat is implicit in the attitude of the
defendant as expressed in circumspect language contained in a letter."10 2 For example, in Jeffrey Banks, Ltd. v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers,
Inc.,' °3 the court found that there was a real and reasonable apprehension of litigation where the plaintiff received a letter claiming that
its use of a trademark constituted a "false representation of affiliation
or association" and was a violation of the defendant's rights under the
Lanham Act.'0 4
In order to satisfy the second prong of the test for determining
the existence of an actual controversy, a plaintiff must engage in a
course of conduct that brings it into adversarial conflict with the defendant. 10 5 Thus, the plaintiffs mere desire to engage in conduct
that a declaratory defendant claims will infringe its trademark is not

99. See Starter, 84 F.3d at 596; Simmonds, 257 F.2d at 489; Manufacturers Hanover Corp.
v. Maine Sav. Bank, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 525, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
100. Manufacturers Hanover, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 526 (citing Chesebrough-Pond's,
Inc. v. Faberge, Inc., 666 F.2d 393, 396-97 (9th Cir. 1982)).
101. Simmonds, 257 F.2d at 489-90; see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 89, § 32:51, at 32-68
(noting that an "actual controversy" can be found even in the absence of direct charges of
infringement against the plaintiff by the defendant).
102. Simmonds, 257 F.2d at 490.
103. 619 F. Supp. 998 (D. Md. 1985).
104. Id. at 1002. The letter made no direct threat of litigation. Id. The defendant in
Jeffrey Banks had also filed an opposition to the plaintiff's trademark registration application. Id. at 1000; see also Chesebrough-Pond's,666 F.2d at 396-97 (holding that it was reasonable for the plaintiff to infer a threat of an infringement action from the defendant's letter
stating that the plaintiffs trademark was "likely to cause confusion" with the defendant's
and notifying the plaintiff of an intent to file an opposition to the plaintiff's trademark
registration application); ManufacturersHanover,225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 527 (holding that a
letter to the plaintiff stating that the plaintiffs use of a trademark might create a "likelihood of confusion," coupled with the defendant's filing of opposition to the plaintiffs
trademark registration application, created a reasonable apprehension of an infringement
action).
105. See supra notes 95 & 97 and accompanying text.
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sufficient. 10 6 Recognizing, however, that requiring a declaratory
plaintiff to incur substantial expense in manufacturing and marketing
and to expose itself to liability under the Lanham Act before it can
have its rights adjudicated would run counter to the policies of the
DJA,1 °7 the Second Circuit has stated that the second prong is satisfied
upon demonstrating an "actual intent and ability to imminently engage in the allegedly infringing conduct" and a showing of "more
than a vague or general desire" to use the trademarks.1 0 8
In Starter Corp. v. Converse, Inc.,1 0 9 the Second Circuit found that
the second prong was satisfied when the declaratory plaintiff was prepared to begin the manufacture and sale of the allegedly infringing
product, but had not begun selling goods under the allegedly infringing trademark because of the threat of a trademark infringement
suit.110 The declaratory plaintiff in Starter alleged that it had invested
significant time and money into the project, designed styles and prepared prototypes of the product, made marketing decisions, and attempted to find a manufacturing partner."' 1
(2) FederalJurisdiction.-"The federal Declaratory Judgment
Act is not a grant of jurisdiction."1" 2 It merely adds to the remedies
available when federal subject-matter jurisdiction otherwise exists. 1 3
Therefore, in order for a court to have jurisdiction over a declaratory
judgment action, there must be an independent basis of federal jurisdiction. When an action for declaratory relief in essence seeks to assert a defense to threatened litigation, one can ascertain whether a
declaratory judgment action arises under federal law by "looking to
106. See Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF Inc., 828 F.2d 755, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding
that the second prong was not met where the declaratory plaintiff had alleged it was merely
"interested in using the mark . . . in connection with its products"); see also Baltimore
Luggage Co. v. Samsonite Corp., 727 F. Supp. 202, 210 (D. Md. 1989) (holding that the
second prong was not satisfied where the declaratory plaintiff had at one point "engaged in
conduct which brought it into conflict" with the declaratory defendant, but had since
"ceased that course of conduct" and simply feared that the declaratory defendant would
'again assert its trademark rights" if the declaratory plaintiff resumed that conduct in the
future); Polaroid Corp. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 605, 608-09 (D. Del. 1976)
(holding that averments by the declaratory plaintiff that it contemplates using and needs
to use the defendant's allegedly invalid trademark "fall far short of allegations of a substantial dispute between the parties").
107. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (noting the purpose behind providing
declaratory relief to a party threatened with an infringement suit).
108. Starter Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 84 F.3d 592, 596 (2d Cir. 1996).
109. 84 F.3d 592 (2d Cir. 1996).
110. Id. at 596.
111. Id.
112. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 89, § 32:56, at 32-76.
113. Id.
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the nature of the action threatened by the declaratory defendant." 114
Thus, if the threatened suit would arise under federal law, then a declaratory judgment action seeking to assert a defense to such a suit
115
also arises under federal law.

It has long been settled that an action arises under the patent
laws, and is thus properly brought in federal court, when a declaratory
plaintiff, who is threatened with a suit for infringement of a declaratory defendant's patent, institutes a declaratory judgment action for a
declaration of noninfringement and the invalidity of the defendant's
patent." 6 In E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co.," 7 the plaintiff,
in response to the threat of suit for patent infringement, sought a
declaratory judgment respecting the validity of the defendant's patent, and if the patent was found valid, whether the plaintiff had infringed it." 8 The Seventh Circuit, citing the DJA's policy of
preventing the accrual of avoidable damages to one not certain of his
rights, found that it had jurisdiction to hear the case.1 19 The court
reasoned that the plaintiffs filing of the action for a declaration of its
rights prior to the defendant's instituting infringement litigation did
not change the nature of the suit and held that such a suit, whether
brought by the patentee or alleged infringer, was "in either instance
one arising under the patent laws of the United States."' 120 The court
continued: "It is of no moment, in the determination of the character
of the relief sought, that the suit is brought by the alleged infringer
instead of by the owner."' 2 ' The Fourth Circuit cited with approval

114. Id (citing Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952)).
115. See id.; see also Colonial Penn Group, Inc. v. Colonial Deposit Co., 654 F. Supp.
1247, 1251 (D.R.I. 1987) ("[W]here the defendant in the coercive suit brings the declaratory judgment action ... one examines the nature of the plaintiffs claim in the coercive
suit in order to determine if federal question jurisdiction is present in the declaratory
judgment action." (citing Public Ser'. Comm'n, 344 U.S. at 242)).
116. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 19 n.19
(1983) (citing E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1937));
see also EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORYJUDGMENTS 808-10 (2d ed. 1941) ("Where the issue
is the validity of the patent or its infringement, whether patentee or alleged infringer initiate the action . . . it seems clear that the case arises 'under the patent . . . laws,' thus

conferringjurisdiction on the federal courts." (second ellipsis in original) (citing Edelmann
as the "most exhaustive refutation of the contrary view")).

117. 88 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1937).
118. Id. at 853.
119. Id. at 854.
120. Id.
121. Id. Such a suit is merely an infringement suit with reversed parties. See BORCHARD,
supra note 116, at 810.
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the jurisdictional analysis of Edelmann in United States Galvanizing &
PlatingEquipment Corp. v. Hanson-Van Winkle-Munning Co.'2 2
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Velveray Corp.,'2 the Southern District of
New York found that the reasoning of Edelmann applied equally to
trademark cases, and the court held that it had jurisdiction over a
declaratory judgment action brought by a party seeking a declaration
124
that it had not infringed the declaratory defendant's trademark.
Similarly, in Apex Beauty Products Manufacturing Corp. v. Brown Shoe
Co.,125 the Southern District of New York again applied the reasoning

of Edelmann and held that where a party was threatened with a suit for
trademark infringement, the federal court had jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action brought by the accused party.1 26 In so
holding, the court stated: "Certainly if [the declaratory] defendant
wished to take the initiative in bringing suit alleging infringement of
its trademark there would be no question as to the federal court's
jurisdiction. Now the converse of that situation is before the court in
an action for declaratory judgment and the same basis for jurisdiction
is applicable.

1

27

122. 104 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1939). The court quoted extensively from the Edelmann
opinion:
"It was the congressional intent to avoid accrual of avoidable damages to one not
certain of his rights and to afford him an early adjudication without waiting until
his adversary should see fit to begin suit, after damage has accrued. But the controversy is the same as previously. Heretofore the owner of the patent might sue
to enjoin infringement; now the alleged infringer may sue. But the controversy
between the parties as to whether a patent is valid, and whether infringement
exists is in either instance essentially one arising under the patent laws of the
United States. It is of no moment, in the determination of the character of the
relief sought, that the suit is brought by the alleged infringer instead of by the
owner."
Id, at 861 (quoting Edelmann, 88 F.2d at 854). Importandy, the parties in Hanson were of
diverse citizenship. Hanson-Van Winkle-Munning Co. v. United States Galvanizing & Plating Equip. Corp., 24 F. Supp. 249, 250 (N.D. W. Va. 1938), modfied, 104 F.2d 856 (4th Cir.
1939). The court's citation to Edelmann was in the context of analyzing the justiciability of
the controversy. Hanson, 104 F.2d at 861. Thus, while the quoted language from Edelmann
states that a declaratory judgment action by the alleged infringer of a patent challenging
the validity of the patent, and seeking a declaration of noninfringement, arises under the
patent laws, the court's subject matter-jurisdiction was not based on application of
Edelmann. Therefore, at most, Hanson stands for the proposition that the Fourth Circuit
has cited with approval the jurisdictional analysis of Edelmann.
123. 175 F. Supp. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
124. Id at 647; see also King Kup Candies, Inc. v. H.B. Reese Candy Co., 140 F. Supp.
115, 117 (M.D. Pa. 1956) (holding that federal jurisdiction exists where a declaratory plaintiff is seeking to adjudicate a claim of infringement made by the declaratory defendant).
125. 209 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
126. Id. at 74.
127. Id. (citing Velveray, 175 F. Supp. at 648; King Kup Candies, Inc. v. H.B. Reese Candy
Co., 134 F. Supp. 463, 466 (M.D. Pa. 1955)); see also Jeffrey Banks, Ltd. v. Jos. A. Bank
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Gibraltar,P.R., Inc. v. Otoki Group,
Inc., the Fourth Circuit upheld the dismissal of a petition to compel
arbitration on the grounds that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
compel arbitration because it would not have had subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying suit if it were litigated rather than arbitrated. 128 Specifically, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court
did not have jurisdiction to grant an injunction against future use of a
trademark when no infringing activity had been alleged. 1 29 The court
further held that it did not have jurisdiction to issue a declaratory
judgment when a party seeking a declaration of its rights in a trademark in response to the threat of an infringement suit did not allege a
130
violation of the Lanham Act by the party threatening suit.

In response to the plaintiff's request for an injunction, the court
stated that "[a] dispute does not invoke federal jurisdiction simply because the plaintiff seeks a remedy [i.e., an injunction] that happens to
be available in a federal statute."13 ' Rather, the court said, "[a] violation of federal law is a necessary predicate for claiming the remedies
of the Lanham Act." 13 2 The Lanham Act protects a trademark owner
only against use of its trademark "in commerce" in a manner that "is
likely to cause confusion."'1 3 Because Gibraltar's petition to compel
arbitration did not allege that Otoki was "using" the trademarks in
dispute, the petition did not contain proper allegations of infringement and, therefore, did not seek a "remedy granted by" the Lanham
Act."3 Thus, the petition failed to meet the "arising under" test
adopted by the Fourth Circuit from Harms 35 for establishing federal
jurisdiction over a trademark dispute, which requires the face of the
Clothiers, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 998, 1002 (D. Md. 1985) (recognizing that federal-question
jurisdiction under the Lanham Act is present when a party threatened with an infringement suit by the holder of a federally registered trademark sought a declaration of rights
under the DJA).
128. Gibraltar,104 F.3d at 619.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 618.
132. Id.
133. Id at 619 (citing Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922,
930 (4th Cir. 1995)).
134. In other words, the court cannot enjoin future use under the Lanham Act where
there has been no use in commerce that is likely to cause confusion. See infra note 146 and
accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Arthur Young, which adopted the "face of the complaint" test for making the jurisdictional determination in suits arising out of contract disputes involving intellectual
property).
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plaintiff's complaint to contain proper allegations of trademark
infringement.

136

The Fourth Circuit addressed the declaratory judgment issue by
first noting that the DJA, like the FAA, does not provide an independent basis of federal jurisdiction.1 37 Therefore, the court stated, Gibraltar's declaratory judgment claim must "fall back on the Lanham Act
for subject matter jurisdiction.

' 13 8

The court then summarily con-

cluded that there was no subject-matter jurisdiction over the action
1 39
because Gibraltar alleged no violation of the Lanham Act by Otoki
The court made a point of noting that the Lanham Act does not
confer jurisdiction simply because the subject of the dispute is a trademark.14 ° After finding that there was no basis of jurisdiction under
the Lanham Act, the court held that the case was "in essence" a dispute over the ownership of the trademarks.'
Consequently, the
court did not have jurisdiction because "[a] dispute over property
ownership does not properly fall under federal law just because the
property is a federally-created interest like a trademark."1 4' 2 The court
concluded its opinion by stating that "[v] iewed from any perspective,
this is not a Lanham Act case; it is a simple contract dispute. It poses
not a question of infringement, but a question of ownership. "143
4.

Analysis.a.

Request for Injunction.-The Fourth Circuit determined

that the dispute between Gibraltar and Otoki was "in essence" a dispute about the ownership of trademarks.14 4 The court, however, did
not deny jurisdiction on that basis.14 5 The dismissal for lack of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction following the court's characterization of Gi136. See Gibraltar,104 F.3d at 619 ("None of Gibraltar's allegations address the type of
infringing use covered by the Lanham Act."); Gibraltar,914 F. Supp. at 1205 ("Neither
Gibraltar's original petition to arbitrate nor its amended petition ... alleges that Otoki has
infringed upon Acorn Partners's trademarks."); Gibraltar,Civil No. L-95-606, slip op. at 8
("TB. Harms' holding that a federal court has jurisdiction if the complaint asks for a federally-created remedy does not mean that a plaintiff may bring a suit in federal court merely
by asking for an injunction.... Rather... the requested federal remedy must follow from
the deprivation of a federal right, as in a suit for infringement.").
137. Gibraltar,104 F.3d at 619.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. (citing Speedco, Inc. v. Estes, 853 F.2d 909, 912-13 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
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braltar's claim as essentially a contract dispute should not be read as a
departure from the Fourth Circuit's "face of the complaint" approach
to the jurisdictional determination under 28 U.S.C. § 1338. To the
contrary, Gibraltarshould be seen as an extension of the "face of the
complaint" approach to determining jurisdiction over disputes arising
out of contracts licensing or assigning trademarks.
The court's jurisdictional determination with respect to the request for an injunction rested upon the conclusion that the Lanham
Act does not provide for the remedy of an injunction to prevent the
future infringement of a trademark by the defendant.1

46

It was only

after the court determined that the plaintiff had not stated a claim for
the remedy of an injunction under the Lanham Act, i.e., had not
made proper allegations of trademark infringement, that it dismissed
the claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 4 7 Despite the seeming clarity of the basis upon which the court declined to exercise jurisdiction, the court's holding that the plaintiffs case did not "arise
under" the Lanham Act even though the plaintiff had requested a
remedy available under the Lanham Act, coupled with the court's remarks that Gibraltar's claim was "in essence" a contractual dispute
about the ownership of property, makes Gibraltarsimilar to the Harms
case. Gibraltaris thus subject to the same risk of misapplication1 4 that
spawned the divergent lines of authority for determining jurisdiction
under the Copyright Act.' 4 9
Gibraltarand Harms are similar in that the plaintiffs purported to
be seeking remedies granted by the Lanham Act and Copyright Act
respectively. In Harms, although the plaintiff alleged that its suit arose
under the Copyright Act and contained allegations of infringement,
which under the test set out by Judge Friendly in Harms would be
146. This holding seemingly runs contrary to the "well established [principle] that injunctive relief quia timet may be granted where trademark infringement... is threatened or
imminent." 3 GILSON, supra note 86, § 8.07[2], at 8-155. However, Professor McCarthy has
noted that if the threatened infringement is "merely a possibility," no injunction will be
granted and that "[s]ome courts require that the plaintiff allege that defendant has 'already taken steps to begin marketing its infringing product"' before an injunction can
issue. 4 McCARTHY, supra note 89, § 30:10, at 30-19 (quoting NTN Communications, Inc. v.
Interactive Network, Inc., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
147. See Gibraltar,104 F.3d at 618-19 (discussing when a case arises under the Lanham
Act, and concluding that Gibraltar's claim did not because it did not allege a violation of
the Lanham Act).
148. See supra note 53 (arguing that, carefully read, the district court opinion in Harms
does not provide a basis for the "essence of the claim" test of federal jurisdiction over
actions arising out of contracts licensing or assigning intellectual property).
149. See supra notes 51-85 and accompanying text (discussing the split of authority that
developed from the two Harms opinions).
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sufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction,1 5 ° the court denied jurisdiction on the grounds that the plaintiff had not alleged any acts of
copyright infringement and, therefore, was not entitled to relief
under the Copyright Act.'
The rationale for the denial of jurisdiction was that the complaint did not really seek a remedy "expressly
granted by the Act," although it purported to do so, because the Copyright Act did not provide relief for the acts that had been alleged by
the plaintiff."5 2 Similarly, in Gibraltar, the relief requested by the
plaintiff, while available under the Lanham Act when a trademark has
been infringed, is not available upon allegations of a mere threat of
53
1

infringement.

It would be easy to read Gibraltarand assert that the Fourth Circuit has adopted the "essence of the complaint" test for determining
jurisdiction under the Lanham Act in cases arising out of contracts
licensing or assigning trademarks, just as many courts did with the
Harms opinion.1 54 The basis for such an argument would be that
although the plaintiff in Gibraltarsought a remedy granted by the Lanham Act, just as the Harms test dictates, the court denied jurisdiction
and cited the nature of the plaintiffs complaint as essentially being
one in contract. 155 However, Gibraltar's claim was in "essence" only a
contract dispute because it did not state a claim under the Lanham
Act. Had Gibraltar alleged that Otoki was using and, therefore, infringing the trademarks, the court would have assumed
jurisdiction. 5 6
150. Under the Harms test, a case arises under the Copyright Act if "the complaint is for
a remedy expressly granted by the Act, e.g., a suit for infringement...." T.B. Harms Co. v.
Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964).
151. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 226 F. Supp. 337, 339-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), affd, 339 F.2d
823 (2d Cir. 1964).
152. Id.
153. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing availability of an injunction
under the Lanham Act for threatened infringement).
154. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of the essence
of the complaint approach and suggesting that the adoption of that approach was based
on an incorrect interpretation of the Harms opinions).
155. See Gibraltar,104 F.3d at 619 ("In essence, this is a contract dispute between the two
companies over the ownership of property.").
156. The court in Gibraltardid conduct an inquiry, however brief, into whether the
plaintiff had stated a claim under the Lanham Act before concluding that the district court
did not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction. Id. at 618-19. After the district court dismissed Gibraltar's petition to compel arbitration, Gibraltar refiled its petition. Brief of
Appellee at 6, Gibraltar(No. 95-2877). In its new petition, Gibraltar alleged that Otoki was
using and, therefore, infringing the disputed trademarks. Id Otoki moved to dismiss this
subsequent petition, but the district court denied its motion. Id. Ajury trial was held on
the question whether there was an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, and the district
court compelled Otoki to submit to arbitration. Id. at 6-7.
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Parties may be tempted to seize upon the language in Gibraltar
stating that "[i]n essence, this case is a contract dispute between the
two companies over the ownership of property," 157 to cite the court's
denial ofjurisdiction, and then claim that the Fourth Circuit now follows the "essence of the complaint" test. It was that type of cut and
paste analysis that led to the split of authority among courts following
the Harms decision. It should not happen in the Fourth Circuit.
b. Request for DeclaratoryRelief.-In the Gibraltaropinion, the
Fourth Circuit determined that there was no jurisdiction under the
DJA because "Gibraltar... failed to allege a violation of the Lanham
Act.' 158 While this may have been the proper inquiry for a determination of the court's jurisdiction to issue an injunction, the court did not
5
explore the possibility that application of the Edelmann doctrine,1 1
which has been applied in the trademark context by several courts,
may have provided a basis of jurisdiction. 6 '
In accordance with its position that the assignment of its rights in
the disputed trademarks was invalid, Otoki threatened legal action
against Acorn Partners/Gibraltar if it used or attempted to transfer
the trademarks. 161 Specifically, Otoki threatened to "sue Gibraltar in
the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico for
violation of Otoki's 'trademark registration rights,"" 6 2 and warned Gibraltar that "if Acorn Partners were to continue to use Otoki trademarks, this would in effect constitute a violation of the laws of Puerto
Rico and the United States." '6 3 It was in response to these letters that

157. Gibraltar,104 F.3d at 619.
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 123-127 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have applied
the Edelmann doctrine in trademark disputes).
161. Gibraltar,914 F. Supp. at 1204.
162. Plaintiff's Amended Petition to Compel Arbitration at 8, Gibraltar(No. 95-1303); see
also Gibraltar, 914 F. Supp. at 1204 (noting that, at the time of its opinion, Otoki had
commenced suits against Gibraltar in federal court in Puerto Rico for trademark infringement); Brief of Appellant at 11, Gibraltar(No. 95-2877) (quoting the letter from Otoki to
Gibraltar which stated that Otoki would bring an action against Gibraltar "in the Federal
Court of Puerto Rico for violation of trademark registration rights" (Dec. 10, 1994)).
163. Brief of Appellant at 14, Gibraltar(No. 95-2877) (quoting letter from Otoki to Gibraltar (Mar. 3, 1995)). The letter, in addition to stating that Gibraltar's continued use of
the trademarks would violate federal law, stated that the transfer and use of the trademarks
by Gibraltar had caused Otoki "losses... estimated to be a sum not less than two million
dollars." Id.
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Gibraltar amended its Demand for Arbitration to request a declaration of its rights in the disputed trademarks. 6
As discussed above, to obtain relief under the DJA a declaratory
plaintiff must establish that there is an "actual controversy" between
the parties and also an independent basis of federal jurisdiction.'6 5
With respect to the "actual controversy" determination, Gibraltar alleged that it received a letter from Otoki that threatened a suit for
violation of Otoki's federal trademark registration rights.' 6 6 The first
letter did not contain any "circumspect language" that would leave
doubt as to whether Gibraltar's apprehension of a suit was reasonable;
rather, the letter plainly stated that if Gibraltar attempted to transfer
the trademarks, it would be sued in federal court for a violation of
Otoki's federal trademark rights.'6 7 Even the second letter, which,
without directly threatening suit, stated that Gibraltar's use of the
trademarks was causing Otoki to suffer damages and that Acorn Partners' continued use of the trademarks would be a "violation of the
laws of ... the United States," would itself be sufficient to create a
168
reasonable apprehension of litigation.
Gibraltar had also engaged in a course of conduct that brought it
into adversarial conflict with Otoki, and thus it satisfied the second
prong of the "actual controversy" requirement. 1 69 At the time that
Gibraltar had received the letters from Otoki threatening the federal
suit, Gibraltar had already recorded the assignment of trademarks in
the United States Patent and Trademark Office.17 ° Gibraltar also alleged that it had "expended... substantial monies and effort marketing the trademarks which Otoki had assigned." 7 Thus, Gibraltar was
164. Id. at 15 ("Following its receipt of the March 3, 1995 letter, Gibraltar amended its
Demand for Arbitration pending before the AAA once again, this time to specifically request a declaration from the arbitrator as to Acorn Partners' rights in the trademarks.").
165. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the "reasonable apprehension of litigation" prong of the "actual controversy" requirement was satisfied even though no direct threat of litigation existed).
168. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text (discussing cases where this type of
"circumspect language" was held sufficient for the creation of a reasonable apprehension
of litigation).
169. See supra notes 95, 97 and accompanying text.
170. Brief of Appellant at 11, Gibraltar(No. 95-2877) ("[Bly December 10, 1994, when
Otoki sent this letter to Gibraltar, the 'transfer' of the trademarks from Otoki to Acorn
Partners had already taken place pursuant to the Joint Venture Agreement; the assignment
was recorded in the U.S. Office of Patents and Trademarks on November 2, 1994.").
171. Id, at 12; accord Plaintiffs Amended Petition to Compel Arbitration at 4, Gibraltar
(No. 95-1303) ("Gibraltar has expended substantial monies and effort marketing the ...
trademarks.").
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not merely seeking an advisory opinion from the court on the basis
that it "desired" to engage in conduct that might subject it to suit;
rather, it had engaged in the precise conduct for which Otoki had
172
threatened to sue it.
The court did not address the issue of justiciability, i.e., the "actual controversy" requirement, in Gibraltarbecause it was unnecessary
to answer that question once the court determined there was no independent basis ofjurisdiction to hear the controversy. 17 The court,
noting that the DJA does not provide an independent basis ofjurisdiction, and therefore, that Gibraltar's claim for declaratory relief must
fall back on the Lanham Act for subject-matter jurisdiction, concluded there was no jurisdiction because Gibraltar had not alleged
that Otoki was violating the Lanham Act. 1 74 The court erred, however, in looking only to the nature of the declaratory plaintiffs claim
in making the jurisdictional determination.
In essence, Gibraltar's declaratory judgment action sought to assert a defense to Otoki's threatened claims. 175 Thus, the determination of whether there is federal subject-matter jurisdiction over the
suit should be decided by looking at the nature of the suit threatened
by the declaratory defendant. 176 The coercive suit in this case was the
one threatened by Otoki against Gibraltar for the transfer of the
trademarks in violation of Otoki's "trademark registration rights" and

172. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts found
that the "actual controversy" requirement was not met when the declaratory plaintiff
merely expressed a "desire" to engage in conduct for which the declaratory defendant was
threatening suit). It should be noted that the Fourth Circuit has not addressed the question of the justiciability of declaratoryjudgment actions involving trademarks. The District
Court of Maryland, however, has applied the Windsurfing approach to the justiciability determination in the trademark context. Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Samsonite Corp., 727 F.
Supp. 202, 210 (D. Md. 1989); see supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (discussing the
two-prong test adopted by the Federal Circuit in WindsurfingInt'lv. AMFInc., 828 F.2d 755,
757 (Fed. Cir. 1987), for determining justiciability of a declaratory judgment action involving a trademark dispute).
173. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (noting that actions under DJA must have
an independent basis ofjurisdiction).
174. Gibraltar,104 F.3d at 619.
175. Gibraltar's request for a declaration of its rights in the trademarks was added to its
Demand for Arbitration in response to Otoki's letters stating that Gibraltar would be sued
in federal court for violation of Otoki's federal trademark registration rights and that Gibraltar's use of the trademarks was causing monetary damage to Otoki and violated federal
law. That is, the declaratory judgment action sought to assert a defense to Otoki's claims
that Gibraltar was violating federal trademark laws by transferring and using the trademarks. See supra notes 21, 163 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text (discussing the basis for the jurisdictional determination where the action brought by the declaratory plaintiff is essentially
asserting a defense to a suit threatened by the declaratory defendant).

1998]

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

1203

for use of the trademarks in "violation of the laws of ... the United
States."1 77 Therefore, the court must make the jurisdictional determination on the basis of whether Otoki's threatened claims would arise
under federal law if it were to bring suit against Gibraltar.
In its letters to Gibraltar, Otoki asserted that it would sue Gibraltar in federal court for violation of Otoki's federal trademark registration rights if Gibraltar attempted to transfer the trademarks to Acorn
Partners. 178 Otoki also asserted in its letters that it had suffered over
two million dollars in damages as a result of Gibraltar's use of the
trademarks and warned that continued use of the trademarks would
constitute a violation of the laws of the United States.' 7 9 There can be
no doubt that a claim brought by Otoki alleging that Gibraltar was
using Otoki's trademarks in violation of the laws of the United States
would arise under the Lanham Act because this would essentially be a
suit for trademark infringement.18 0 The Fourth Circuit, therefore,
had it applied Edelmann, would have found that it had jurisdiction to
issue a declaratory judgment and compel arbitration. t 8 '
The court's failure to apply Edelmann, despite Gibraltar's urging
of its application,1 8 2 seems to indicate that the Fourth Circuit will not
apply Edelmann to establish subject-matter jurisdiction when a party
brings a declaratory judgment action in response to the threat of a
suit for trademark infringement. It may have been the court's intention, however, to limit its refusal to apply Edelmann to the facts of this
case, i.e., where the action involves a trademark assignment or li-

177. See supra notes 161-163 and accompanying text (discussing the letters sent by Otoki
to Gibraltar respecting Gibraltar's transfer and use of the disputed trademarks).
178. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
180. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1994) (stating that defendants are liable to the trademark registrant for the remedies provided in the Lanham Act if they "use in commerce" a
trademark in a manner "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive" (emphasis added)). In this case, because Otoki's claim of infringement would have arisen out
of a contract assigning the trademark, the assertion that a federal court would have had
jurisdiction over Otoki's coercive suit is based on the Fourth Circuit's having adopted the
"face of the complaint" test for determining when a case "arises under" the Lanham Act.
See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text (discussing the Arthur Young case). If the
Fourth Circuit followed the "essence" rule, it would not have had jurisdiction over a suit
brought by Otoki alleging infringement of Otoki's trademark rights. See supra notes 51-85
and accompanying text (discussing the split among courts for determination of federal
jurisdiction in cases arising out of contracts licensing or assigning intellectual property).
181. See supranote 122 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Circuit's approval
of Edelmann, which would permit a party threatened with an infringement suit by a patentee to bring a declaratory judgment action in federal court seeking a declaration as to the
validity of the patent and as to noninfringement).
182. See Brief of Appellant at 26-34, Gibraltar(No. 95-2877) (arguing that Edelmann provided a basis for establishing federal jurisdiction in this case).
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cense. 8 3 The fact that Otoki's threats of an infringement suit arose
out of disputes concerning a contract of assignment, which could
serve as the basis for a state court action to establish title in the trademarks, may provide an argument against the applicability of Edelmann.
When a declaratory plaintiff is threatened with a suit for infringe-

ment, the availability of a declaratory judgment action prevents the
threatened party from having its "commercial hands" tied.1 8 4 The declaratory judgment action permits the threatened party to test the validity of the patentee's claims,1 85 thus obtaining an adjudication of its
rights with respect to the allegedly infringing activity and avoiding the
unnecessary accrual of damages or cessation of activity that was not
infringing. Perhaps the Fourth Circuit did not apply Edelmann because Gibraltar did not have its hands tied by Otoki's threats. A federal declaratory judgment action was not the only way that Gibraltar
could have obtained an adjudication of its rights, and therefore, application of Edelmann as a basis for jurisdiction may have been unnecessary to prevent Gibraltar from having to choose between accruing
damages in a suit that Otoki 6might bring in the future or ceasing its
18
allegedly infringing activity.
183. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of providing
declaratory relief to a party threatened with infringement litigation).
184. Professor McCarthy has described the "racket" of patentees who sought to gain
unfair advantage in the marketplace by threatening alleged infringers with lawsuits that
might never be filed. 4 McCARTHY,supra note 89, § 32:50, at 32-65. If the threatened party
were to continue the allegedly infringing activity, it was potentially accruing damages for a
suit that might one day be filed by the patentee. The other option for the party threatened
with suit was to cease the allegedly infringing activity. This "racket" described by Professor
McCarthy would often have the effect of permitting an invalid patent to remain as a "scarecrow" in the marketplace with only the patentee having the power to obtain an adjudication of its rights in the patent. Id. Before the availability of a declaratoryjudgment action:
[u]nless the patentee so grossly abused his privileges as to enable the alleged
infringer to demonstrate a malicious or bad faith attempt to destroy his business
or property, so that an injunction against unfair competition might be granted,
the infringer was unable to obtain relief. He was forced by the law to await the
pleasure of the patentee in bringing the validity of his patent and the charge of
infringement to judicial test.
BORCHARD, supra note 116, at 803. Even if the alleged infringer were to bring a suit for
unfair competition, such a suit "might enjoin the continuance of the charges of infringement and threats of suit, but [it] could not determine the issue of infringement." Id. at
803 n.10 (citations omitted).
185. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 89, § 32:50, at 32-65.
186. Because this dispute arose out of a contract of assignment, Gibraltar could have
brought a state law action to establish its rights in the trademarks. See, e.g., Northern Assurance Co. of Am. v. EDP Floors, Inc., 311 Md. 217, 223, 533 A.2d 682, 685 (1987) (noting
that a state court of general jurisdiction has the power "to construe a written contract and
declare the rights of the parties under it" (citing MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
." 3-402, 3-406 (1984)).
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At least one court has declared, however, that this would not be
an adequate basis for denying federal jurisdiction over a declaratory
judgment action that otherwise fits under the Edelmann pattern. In
Grip Nut Co. v. Sharp,18 7 the Seventh Circuit, which also decided
Edelmann, held that the existence of a license between the patentee
and alleged infringer, and the availability of state court proceedings to
determine title to the patents, were not sufficient bases for denying
federal jurisdiction over the alleged infringer's declaratory judgment
action.18 8 The plaintiff in Grip Nut sought a declaration of rights in
response to charges by the defendant that the plaintiffs sale and manufacture of certain goods was an infringement of certain patents of
the defendant.1 8 9 Aside from denying infringement of defendant's
patents, the plaintiffs complaint affirmatively stated that the defendant had no cause of action because the plaintiff had a license to manufacture and sell the goods and had an "equitable title to the
"The sole question" for the court was whether the compatents. '
plaint presented a controversy "arising under" the patent laws. 91
In holding that the case did arise under the patent laws, the Seventh Circuit stated:
In this case, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant has
charged plaintiff with infringement of patents and that plaintiff denies it. The plaintiff is entitled to have a declaration as
to whether that charge is true.
The right to have the question of infringement settled
once and for all is not lost to the plaintiff by its further plea
that it was a licensee and the equitable owner of the patents.
In the ordinary suit for infringement such a plea must be set
up in the answer, and we believe that the new right of the
alleged infringer to bring a suit for a Declaratory Judgment
has not removed this onus since the Declaratory Judgment

187. 124 F.2d 814 (7th Cir. 1941).
188. Id. at 815. The district court in Grip Nut held that an action for a declaratory judgment in response to threats by the declaratory defendant to sue for patent infringement
could not be maintained by the declaratory plaintiff where a license governs the relations
of the parties with respect to the patent because "the state courts are open to [the] plaintiff
... [to] have the title to the patent adjudicated." Grip Nut Co. v. Sharp, 40 F. Supp. 80, 82
(N.D. I11.), rev'd, 124 F.2d 814 (7th Cir. 1941). The district court explicitly rejected the
plaintiff's argument that "where one of the parties to a controversy may maintain an action
against the other in a federal court, the other must have the right to go into the same court
and maintain there a suit for a declaratory judgment." Id.
189. Grip Nut, 124 F.2d at 815.
190. Id.
191. Id-
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suit, once brought, is really no different than the suit by the
patentee for infringement.
* * * The defendant has seen fit to charge plaintiff with
infringement and those charges give the plaintiff a right to a
declaration as to its merits. It would be most unreasonable
to hold that plaintiff must try the issue of license and title in
the state court. To require that would be to deny the plaintiff a defense in its suit for declaration of no infringement
which it would have had if this were an infringement suit by
the patentee. Such a result would violate the purpose of the
Declaratory Judgments Act and impair unwisely the efficient
t9 2
administration of justice.
Of course, because the Fourth Circuit did not even discuss the possibility of Edelmann's applicability to this case, there is no way to know
whether the court was attempting to craft some exception to the applicability of Edelmann in cases where the charge of infringement arises
out of a contract licensing or assigning the intellectual property, 9 3 or
whether the court will simply not apply Edelmann in the trademark
94

con text. 1

5. Conclusion.-A careful reading of Gibraltarreveals that the basis upon which the Fourth Circuit determined that the district court
did not have jurisdiction to compel arbitration of the action for injunction supports the view that the Fourth Circuit follows the "face of
the complaint approach" for determining jurisdiction in cases arising
out of contracts licensing or assigning intellectual property. Unfortunately, the court used language at several points in its opinion that
could be seized upon and used as a basis for arguing that the Fourth
Circuit now follows the "essence of the complaint" approach. The
courts of the Fourth Circuit, however, should not fall victim to the
type of "cut and paste" analysis that the New York district courts exercised following Harms and should continue to follow the "face of the
complaint" approach.
The Fourth Circuit's failure to consider whether application of
the Edelmann doctrine would have supplied a basis of jurisdiction to
issue a declaratory judgment when a declaratory plaintiff is threatened
with a suit for trademark infringement raises questions about the
192. Id. (citations omitted).
193. This exception was rejected by the Seventh Circuit in Grip Nut, which also decided
Edelmann. See supra notes 187-192 and accompanying text.
194. The court must have been aware that the application of Edelmann would have provided a basis of jurisdiction in this case, because that point was argued extensively by the
Appellant in its brief. Brief of Appellant at 26-34, Gibraltar(No. 95-2877).
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Fourth Circuit's willingness to apply Edelmann in the trademark context. The court's failure to apply the doctrine in this case, however,
may be a result of the fact that the threat of the infringement suit
arose out of a contract of assignment, which perhaps negates some of
the policy considerations that ordinarily favor application of
Edelmann. Nevertheless, in light of the Seventh Circuit's rejection of
that reasoning, the Fourth Circuit's failure to provide a reason for not
applying Edelmann leaves the law in the Fourth Circuit in a state of
uncertainty.
RYAN

M.

WALSH
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CRIMINAL LAW

Creating an Unnecessary Bright-Line Rule Allowing Searches of Cars
with Tinted Windows

The United States Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in
the case of United States v. Stanfield,' in which the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit created a bright-line rule allowing
police officers, during lawful traffic stops, to open the doors of cars
with heavily tinted windows whenever "it appears in their experienced
judgment prudent to do so" in order to visually inspect the interior of
the car to determine whether the driver is armed, whether he has access to weapons, or whether there are other occupants of the vehicle
who may pose a threat to the officers.2 The Fourth Circuit justified its
holding, in part, by using three prior Supreme Court cases-Terry v.
Ohio,3 Michigan v. Long,4 and Maryland v. Buie5- collectively allowing
police officers in stop and frisk situations6 to conduct a limited search
of a suspect's person, and the area around him, for weapons and possible third parties when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion of danger. This Note will argue that the facts available to the
arresting officer in Stanfield were insufficient to create a reasonable
articulable suspicion of danger, 7 and therefore, the officer's actions
were not justified under existing search and seizure principles. Moreover, the bright-line rule announced in Stanfield eliminated the objective standard of the reasonable articulable suspicion rule by
suggesting that an officer's actions be judged subjectively, according
to what the officer felt was prudent at the time. This new rule is an
1. 109 F.3d 976 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 156 (1997).
2. Id. at 981.
3. 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that a police officer has the authority to conduct a
patdown of a suspect's outer clothing for weapons when the officer has reason to believe
that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual).
4. 463 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983) (holding that, during a lawful stop, the police may
conduct an area search of the passenger compartment of a car to uncover weapons "as
long as they possess an articulable and objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is
potentially dangerous").
5. 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (holding that a police officer can, incident to an arrest,
look in the areas immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be
immediately launched, when the officer has "articulable facts which, taken together with
the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in
believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the
arrest scene").
6. The "stop and frisk" rule refers to the Court's rule in Terry that the police may
"stop" a person and detain him briefly for questioning if they reasonably suspect him of
criminal activity, and may "frisk" the individual for weapons upon further reasonable suspicion that he is armed. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 27.
7. See infra notes 90-173 and accompanying text.
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illustration of the trend' toward expanding police power at the expense of individual privacy rights in automobile search and seizure
cases. The decision in Stanfield creates a greater potential for police
abuse of discretion and discrimination.
1. The Case.-At approximately 9:00 a.m. on April 29, 1994, Officers Mackel, Buie, and Hamel of the Baltimore City Police Department were patrolling a high-crime area in West Baltimore when they
saw a black Nissan Pathfinder with heavily tinted windows illegally
parked in the street, blocking traffic. 9 After circling the block once,
the officers, who were armed and wearing bullet-proof vests over their
uniforms, parked in front of the Pathfinder and exited their unmarked vehicle.10 At that time, the driver of the Pathfinder, Billy
Howard Stanfield, was talking to a man whom the officers recognized
as a "known drug dealer."11 The officers approached Stanfield's Pathfinder and noticed that the front driver's side window was down, but
that the front passenger's side window was raised.12 The tinting on
the Pathfinder's windows was so dark that Officer Mackel, who approached the passenger's side, could not see into the vehicle, so, without notice to Stanfield, he opened the passenger's side door to
determine "whether Stanfield was armed or had access to weapons
and whether he was alone in the Pathfinder."1 3 When Officer Mackel
opened the passenger's side door, he saw in plain view, from outside
the vehicle, a plastic bag of cocaine protruding from the mouth of a
brown paper bag on the back seat of the Pathfinder.14 The officers
8. See infra notes 27-60 and accompanying text.
9. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 978. Maryland's Vehicle Laws provide that "[a] person may
not stand or park a vehicle on the roadway side of any other vehicle that is stopped or
parked at the edge or curb of a highway." MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. II § 21-10 0 3(r) (1992).
10. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 978.
11. Id.
12. Id. This is one of many facts vigorously disputed at the suppression hearing before
the district court. Id. at 979 n.1. The officers testified that both the driver's and passenger's side windows were down; Stanfield testified that only the driver's side window was
down. Id. The district court found that the driver's side window was down, but the passenger's side window was up, apparently because it was cloudy and 59 degrees that day, making it unlikely that Stanfield would have both windows down. United States v. Stanfield,
906 F. Supp. 300, 303 n.5 (D. Md. 1995), affd, 109 F.3d 976 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 156 (1997).
13. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 978-79.
14. Id. at 979. This was another fact heavily disputed at the suppression hearing. Stanfield testified that Officer Mackel opened the passenger's side door, climbed inside the
vehicle, and searched under the back seat to find the cocaine. Stanfield, 906 F. Supp. at
302. However, the district court rejected this testimony, finding that the cocaine was in
plain view once Officer Mackel opened the passenger's side door and that he neither entered the vehicle nor searched under the vehicle's seat. Id. at 303 n.6.
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then placed Stanfield under arrest for possession with intent to dis5
tribute cocaine and cocaine base.'
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied Stanfield's motion to suppress the evidence discovered by Officer
Mackel. t6 The court found the search constitutional under two
Supreme Court cases. First, under Texas v. Brown,17 officers may illuminate the interior of a car with the aid of a flashlight without violating Fourth Amendment search and seizure protections.' 8 In Stanfield,
however, the heavy tinting of the windows precluded Officer Mackel
from seeing in; therefore, the district court concluded, Officer Mackel
was constitutionally permitted to open the door.' 9 Second, the district court, citing Michigan v. Long,2" found that Officer Mackel had an
objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion of danger when he
21
opened the car door.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit stated the issue to be resolved in terms of a balance between
the individual's right to privacy and the officer's safety.22 It addressed
whether the government's substantial interest in officer
safety during a lawful traffic stop outweighs the intrusion on
the privacy interests of the vehicle's occupants which results
when, because of heavily tinted windows that prevent the interior compartment from being viewed, an officer opens a
door of the vehicle in order to ensure that the vehicle's
driver is unarmed and that there are no other occupants who
23
might threaten his safety during the investigatory stop.

2. Legal Background.-The Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides individuals with the right to be free from
15. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 979.
16. Stanfield, 906 F. Supp. at 301.
17. 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (plurality opinion).
18. Stanfield, 906 F. Supp. at 303-04. The court further reasoned that in looking
through the car window, an officer would not be violating any legitimate expectation of
privacy. Id. at 303 n.9 (citing Brown, 460 U.S. at 740).
19. Id. at 304.
20. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). In Long, the Supreme Court concluded that after a valid
stop, police officers may conduct a Terry search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle
"as long as [the officers] possess an articulable and objectively reasonable belief that the
suspect is potentially dangerous." Id. at 1051.
21. Stanfield, 906 F. Supp. at 304 n.l. "[B]ecause Officer Mackel was unable to see
through the heavily tinted windows of the Pathfinder, he had an objectively reasonable
belief that Stanfield (or a hidden passenger) was potentially dangerous." Id.
22. See Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 978.
23. Id.
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"unreasonable searches and seizures. "24 In interpreting the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has repeatedly struggled to strike
the proper balance between an individual's right to privacy and the
government's interest in conducting searches.2 5 Initially, the Court
concluded that any search without a warrant is "per se unreasonable," 6 but it soon began to carve out exceptions to this rule. 27 These
exceptions embodied a trend toward reading the protections of the
Fourth Amendment narrowly, while expanding the powers of police
officers to search. This trend is especially apparent in two areas of
search and seizure cases: automobile searches and protective searches
for weapons. The two areas often overlap.
a. The Car Exception to the Warrant Requirement.-The
Supreme Court introduced the car exception to the warrant requirement in Carroll v. United States.2" In that case, the Court recognized
the inherent unreasonableness of searching someone's home without
a warrant, but determined that there is a greater government interest
in searching cars without first having to obtain a warrant. 29 It reasoned that vehicles, unlike homes, may be moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which a warrant would be sought;30 therefore, police
officers have an interest in conducting the search before the owner
can move the vehicle and possibly destroy the evidence contained
therein. Accordingly, the Court held that a warrantless search of an
automobile does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officer has
probable cause to believe that the car contains contraband of some
31
sort.

24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
25. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) (explaining that "in determining
reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests").
26. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
27. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (authorizing the warrantless search of property that a person knowingly exposes to the public); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (permitting police officers to conduct a limited warrantless
search of the premises around an individual incident to a lawful arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (allowing police officers to search premises without a
warrant when there are exigent circumstances).

28. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
29. Id. at 153.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 149. The concept of probable cause may be traced to the Fourth Amendment itself, which provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." U.S.
CONsT. amend. IV. Probable cause is generally defined as: "'A reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man in the belief that the party is guilty of the offence with which he is charged.'" Stacey v.
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Since Carroll, the Supreme Court has continued to interpret the
Fourth Amendment as requiring fewer protections in car searches,
claiming that there is a lesser expectation of privacy. For instance, it
has determined that automobiles are the subject of pervasive regulation by the states, so drivers of motor vehicles must expect that the
state will intrude to some extent upon their privacy. 2 It has also
noted that "[o] ne has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's
residence or as the repository of personal effects." 3
Additionally, the Court has stated that, because the passenger
compartment of a car is generally open to public view, car owners
should not expect the same degree of privacy as they would in their
homes.3 4 However, the Court cautioned in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States 5 that "the Carrolldoctrine does not declare a field day for the
police in searching automobiles. Automobile or no automobile, there
must be probable cause for the search."36
b. The Protective Searchfor Weapons Exception to the Warrant Requirement.-The Court introduced the second relevant exception to
the warrant requirement in Teny v. Ohio,3 7 setting forth the "stop and
frisk" rule. According to this rule, where an officer observes unusual
conduct by an individual that leads him to conclude reasonably that
criminal activity may be afoot, the officer may stop the individual and
Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878) (quoting Munn v. De Nemours, 17 F. Cas. 993, 995 (C.C.D.
Pa. 1811) (No. 9926).
32. See NewYork v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 113 (1986) ("[A]utomobiles are justifiably the
subject of pervasive regulation by the State."); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441
(1973) ("Because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic .... the extent of
police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater than police-citizen
contact in a home or office.").
33. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion).
34. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (plurality opinion) (reasoning that
because the general public could peer into the defendant's car through the windows, the
officer should not be prohibited from doing so); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13
(1977) (distinguishing the privacy interests in luggage, which is not open to public view,
from automobiles, which are open to public view), abrogated, California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 565 (1991); Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590 (explaining that cars deserve a lesser protection
of privacy because they travel through "public thoroughfares" where their occupants and
contents "are in plain view"); cf California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 388, 393 (1985) (concluding that the defendant had a lesser expectation of privacy in his motor home, even
though it had shades covering the windows, because it was still a mobile vehicle subject to
pervasive regulation by the State).
35. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
36. Id. at 269.
37. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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briefly detain him in order to investigate.3 8 If the officer then has a
reasonable articulable suspicion that the individual is armed and presently dangerous, he is entitled, for the protection of himself and
others in the area, to frisk the suspect for weapons, carefully limiting
the search to the suspect's outer garments.3 " The officer "must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the officer's] intrusion."4 °
The Court's primary goal in applying the "reasonable articulable
suspicion" standard has been to strike the appropriate balance between an individual's privacy interests and the government's interest
in protecting police officers in stop and frisk situations. 4 1 In applying
the rule, the Court has emphasized that "the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture-must be taken into account,"4 2 instead of
merely identifying particular circumstances that establish a reasonable
articulable suspicion of danger.4 3
Since Terry, the Court has applied the "reasonable articulable suspicion" standard to various other situations. In Maryland v. Buie,4 4 the
Court extended the rule to in-home arrests, holding that a protective
sweep of a home did not require probable cause of danger. 45 It determined that once a police officer frisks and arrests a suspect, the officer
might still have reason to conduct a protective search of the area in
order to make sure there are no additional individuals who pose a
danger.4 6 The Court held that, as long as the officer "possesse [d] a
reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the officer in believing that the area swept harbored an individ38. Id. at 30.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 21. The Court found that such facts existed in Terry. Id. at 28. The officer in
that case observed two individuals on a city street who appeared to be "casing" a store. Id.
at 5-6. The men would walk past the store, peer in the window, and then confer with each
other. Id. at 6. They engaged in this process approximately a dozen times, twice conferring with a third man. Id. Suspecting that the three men were contemplating an armed
robbery, the officer approached them and asked for their names. Id. at 6-7. At that point,
the men mumbled something in response, and the officer spun one of the men around,
frisked him, and found a .38 caliber revolver. Id. at 7.
41. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990).
42. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
43. See infta text accompanying notes 90-180 for cases analyzing the sufficiency of various circumstances for a "reasonable articulable suspicion" of danger.
44. 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
45. Id. at 336-37.
46. Id. at 327.
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ual posing a danger to the officer or others," 47 the search was
reasonable. 4' The Court remanded the case to the Maryland Court of
Appeals, 49 which determined that the officer did, in fact, have a reasonable articulable suspicion of danger when he conducted the protective sweep of the house.5 °
The Supreme Court has also applied the "reasonable articulable
suspicion" rule to automobile cases. In Michigan v. Long,5 1 the Court
concluded that police officers are justified in conducting a Terrtype
search of the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle during a lawful traffic stop when they reasonably believe it is necessary to protect
themselves. 52 Again, officers were required to have an "articulable
suspicion that the suspect is potentially dangerous."5 3
The Supreme Court developed an exception to the "reasonable
54
articulable suspicion" standard, however, in Pennsylvania v. Mimms

and Maryland v. Wilson.5 5 In those cases, the Court eliminated the
47. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. In Buie, the police went to Buie's house to execute an arrest warrant for robbery.
Id. at 328. One of the officers called down to the basement for all occupants to come
upstairs. Although there had been two suspects, only Buie emerged, whereupon the officers handcuffed him. Believing that the second suspect might be in the house, one officer went into the basement to make sure no other individuals were there and found
evidence of the crime for which Buie was being arrested. Id.
49. Id. at 337.
50. Buie v. State, 320 Md. 696, 706, 580 A.2d 167, 172 (1990). The Court of Appeals
explained that on the day of the offense, the officers secured arrest warrants for both Buie
and his accomplice and immediately placed Buie's house under surveillance. Id. at 703,
580 A.2d at 170. The officers did not observe either suspect for two days. Id. at 703-04, 580
A.2d at 170-71. When they entered Buie's home and only Buie emerged from the basement, the officer who conducted the protective sweep was justified in believing that the
other suspect might still be hiding in the basement. Id. at 705, 580 A.2d at 171. Moreover,
the officer knew that Buie had used a gun in the robbery and it had not yet been recovered. Id. Thus, if the accomplice were still in the basement, he might have been armed.
Id.
51. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
52. Id. at 1051.
53. Id. at 1052 n.16. The court in Longheld that such suspicion existed. Id. at 1035. In
that case, two police officers stopped a car after observing it speeding and swerving into a
shallow ditch. Id. The driver, David Long, exited the car, meeting the officers at the rear
of his vehicle. Id. After Long failed to respond to the officers' repeated requests for his
driver's license and vehicle registration, the officers determined that Long was "under the
influence of something." Id. at 1036. Long began to walk back toward the car, when the
officers saw a hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's side of the car. Id. Upon
seeing the knife, the officers subjected Long to a pat-down search and found no weapons.
Id. One officer then shined his flashlight into the car and saw something protruding from
under the front-seat armrest. Id. After lifting the armrest, he found a bag of marijuana.
Id.
54. 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam).
55. 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
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need for a reasonable articulable suspicion of danger as a prerequisite
for ordering drivers5 6 and passengers5 7 out of vehicles during lawful
traffic stops by the police.5 8 In both cases, the Court reasoned that
the State's concern for officer safety greatly outweighed the minimal
inconvenience occasioned by the driver or passenger in exiting the
vehicle. 59 Although ordering occupants out of a vehicle does not rise
to the level of a search,6" these cases demonstrate the Supreme
Court's trend toward expanding police power at the expense of individual privacy, especially in automobile cases.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Stanfield, the Fourth Circuit conducted a reasonableness inquiry to determine whether Officer Mackel
was justified in opening the passenger's side door of a vehicle with
tinted windows.6 1 Using two different rationales, the court affirmed
the district court's denial of Stanfield's motion to suppress the recovered cocaine.

56. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111.
57. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886.
58. In Mimms, two officers observed the defendant driving a car with an expired license
plate. 434 U.S. at 107. While approaching the vehicle, one of the officers asked the driver
to step out of the car. Id. The State of Pennsylvania, although conceding that the officer
had no reason to suspect foul play from the driver at the time of the stop because there was
nothing suspicious about his behavior, stated that it was the officer's practice to order all
drivers out of their vehicles whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation. Id. at
109-10. The Court concluded that this practice was constitutional because the safety of the
officer outweighs the individual's privacy concerns. Id. at 111. It explained that being
required to exit a vehicle is "at most a mere inconvenience," while the officer has a substantial interest in protecting himself from the dangers of ongoing traffic and potential violence by the driver by asking him to "step out of the car and off onto the shoulder of the
road where the inquiry may be pursued with greater safety to both." Id.
In Wilson, an officer attempted to pull a car over for speeding. 117 S. Ct. at 884.
During his pursuit, he noticed the two passengers repeatedly ducking out of his sight and
then reappearing. Id. When the car finally pulled over, the officer approached it and
noticed that the front-seat passenger "was sweating and ... appeared extremely nervous."
Id. The officer instructed the passenger to exit the vehicle. Id. When he got out of the
car, a quantity of crack cocaine fell to the ground. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court
reiterated the view, announced in Mimms, that the danger to an officer from a traffic stop
is substantial and is likely to be greater when there are passengers in the vehicle. Id. at 886.
The Court then held that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers out of the
car as a matter of course. Id.
59. See Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886; Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111.
60. See Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886 ("The only change in [a passenger's] circumstances
which will result from ordering them out of the car is that they will be outside of, rather
than inside of, the stopped car."); Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111 ("The driver is being asked to
expose to view very little more of his person than is already exposed.").
61. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 979-81.
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a. Bright-Line Rule.-First, the court determined that the
government's interest in protecting police officers often outweighs an
individual's expectation of privacy in a vehicle, particularly in cases
involving tinted windows.6 2 This fact, according to the court, justifies
a bright-line rule allowing police officers to open at least one door of
a vehicle with heavily tinted windows whenever "it appears in their
experienced judgment prudent to do so."63 It based this determina-

tion on an analysis of prior cases involving protective searches by police officers. 6'
The court noted that Fourth Amendment cases have often focused on protecting police officers.65 It cited Terry and Long as cases
allowing officers to conduct pat-down type searches of individuals and
their cars "'as long as they possess [a] reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous."' 6 6 It then noted that, in Mimms and
Wilson, the Supreme Court adopted bright-line rules allowing officers
to order drivers and passengers from vehicles during routine traffic
stops, even without a reasonable fear of danger, in order to ensure the
officers' safety.67
The court concluded that, given the Supreme Court's precedent
regarding protective searches, a bright-line rule allowing the searches
of cars with tinted windows was in order.6" It asserted that tinted windows pose a unique danger to police officers: "[W] e can conceive of
almost nothing more dangerous to a law enforcement officer in the context of a
traffic stop than approachingan automobile whose passenger compartment is
entirely hidden from the officer's view by darkly tinted windows."6 9
62. Id. at 980-81.
63. Id. at 981.
64. See id. at 979-80 (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997); Maryland v. Buie,
494 U.S. 325 (1990); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 980 (alteration in original) (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1051).
67. Id. The court noted that the justification behind the rule announced in Mimms was
that "the additional intrusion on personal liberty occasioned by requiring drivers to exit
their vehicles and to move off onto the shoulder of the road [is] 'de minimis,' 'at most a
mere inconvenience,"' because "'[t]he driver is being asked to expose to view very little
more.., than is already exposed' when the driver is seated in his automobile." Id. (second
alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111; Teny, 392 U.S.
at 17). It further noted that "the Court in Wilson recently expanded the Mimms per se rule
to allow officers to order not only drivers, but all occupants," out of the car in order to

ensure officer safety. Id. at 980-81 (citing Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885).
68. See id. at 981 ("Notwithstanding that the Court 'generally eschew[s] bright-line
rules in the Fourth Amendment context,' we believe that the Court's decisions in Mimms
and Wilson in particular would support [a new rule for cars with tinted windows]." (first

alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885 n.1)).
69. Id.
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The court then reasoned that the privacy interest at stake when
an officer opens a vehicle's door is minor in comparison to the potential danger to police officers. 70 Because a driver must expose some of
the inside of his car when he lowers the window to interact with the
officer, the officer's opening of one of the vehicle's doors "would
seem minimal when measured against the enormous danger law enforcement officers face when they approach a vehicle with heavily
tinted windows." 7' The court also noted that this invasion of privacy is
no greater than when an occupant must open his door to exit the
vehicle under the authority of Mimms or Wilson. 72
The court's final justification for its bright-line rule was that no
alternative would infringe less upon the privacy interests of occupants
of vehicles with tinted windows while still protecting police officers to
the same degree. 73 Simply ordering the occupants out of the vehicle
would subject police officers to the danger of attack, and ordering the
occupants to open the vehicle's doors themselves would allow them to
move about the vehicle, thus giving them an opportunity to access
weapons.7 ' Therefore, the court adopted a bright-line rule that
"would at least reduce.., the enormous danger to which law enforcement authorities are exposed as a consequence of the advent of tinted
75
windows."
b. Existing Law: Reasonable Articulable Suspicion.-In the second half of its analysis, the court stated that, even absent a bright-line
rule, its holding was justified under the principles of Tery, Long, and
Buie.76 The court found that Officer Mackel had a reasonable articulable suspicion of danger when he opened Stanfield's door.7 7 The
court pointed to the following facts as creating this reasonable articulable suspicion: 78 First, Stanfield committed a traffic violation, justifying the officers' stop of the vehicle.7 9 Second, the stop occurred in
70. Id. at 982.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
73. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 983 ("There simply do not appear to be any alternatives to the
bright-line rule we suggest, which would infringe less on the residual privacy interests that

drivers and passengers retain....").
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 984.
77. Id.
78. See infra text accompanying
considerations.
79. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 984.

notes 90-118 for the sufficiency of these
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the "early morning in a relatively deserted area of town."8 " Third, the
area was known to be a high crime area."1 Fourth, Stanfield's vehicle
8s2
"is of the class of four wheel drive vehicles favored by drug dealers.
Fifth, the tinting on the windows precluded the officers from determining whether Stanfield was alone or had access to weapons."s Finally, Stanfield was talking to "a known drug dealer" at the time of the
stop.8 4
The court deemed these considerations sufficient to give Officer
Mackel a reasonable articulable suspicion that Stanfield could have
been armed and dangerous; 5 therefore, the court reasoned, his act of
opening the passenger's side door of Stanfield's vehicle was a justifiable protective search of the interior of Stanfield's vehicle.8 6 It concluded that even absent a new bright-line rule, the search was
constitutional.87

4. Analysis.-The Fourth Circuit's new bright-line rule declares
that:
whenever, during a lawful traffic stop, officers are required
to approach a vehicle with windows so heavily tinted that
they are unable to view the interior of the stopped vehicle,
they may, when it appears in their experienced judgment
prudent to do so, open at least one of the vehicle's doors
and, without crossing the plane of the vehicle, visually inspect its interior in order to ascertain whether the driver is
armed, whether he has access to weapons, or whether there
are other occupants of the vehicle who might pose a danger
to the officers.88
Although the court claimed that this rule is consistent with the
principles of Terry, Long, and Buie, 9 a careful analysis of the facts
reveals that the circumstances of this case were not sufficient to give
Officer Mackel a reasonable suspicion of danger. As a result, the
court's new rule becomes an extension of police power and discretion
resulting in the further limitation of an individual's right against un80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 984-85.
Id. at 984.
Id.
Id. at 981.
See supra notes 37-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
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reasonable searches. Also, because of the subjectivity of the new rule,
it is likely to facilitate police abuse of discretion and discrimination
because there are no longer any sufficient objective limitations on
when officers may search cars with tinted windows.
a. The Court's Holding Is Not Justified Under Existing Principles.-Contrary to the court's assertion, its holding is not in accord
with the principles of existing Fourth Amendment law.9" After considering the facts of this case and comparing them to the facts of other
reasonable articulable suspicion cases, it becomes apparent that at the
time Officer Mackel opened Stanfield's door, he did not have articulable facts that would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing
that the Pathfinder harbored an individual posing a danger to the
officers or that Stanfield was armed and presently dangerous. A balancing between Stanfield's privacy interests and the government's interest in protecting police officers reveals further that the court's
holding is not justified under existing law.
(1) FactualAnalysis.--Indetermining whether the officers in
Stanfield had a reasonable articulable suspicion of danger sufficient to
justify opening Stanfield's car door, the totality of the circumstances
facing the officers must be considered.9 1 The court articulated six
facts that it claimed were sufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion of
danger: Stanfield was double-parked, the stop occurred early in the
morning, the area had a high crime rate, Stanfield was in a vehicle
"favored by drug dealers," the vehicle had tinted windows, and Stanfield was talking to "a known drug dealer. ' 92 However, a careful analysis shows that these facts, when considered with the other
circumstances of the event, could not have created a reasonable articulable suspicion of danger.
Two of these facts, the type of vehicle Stanfield was driving and
his acquaintance's status as a known drug dealer, are not appropriate

90. The court stated:
Even absent a...
per se rule that officers may, in the circumstances we have
described, open a vehicle's door to [determine] the number of occupants within
and whether any of those occupants are armed or have access to weapons ...
Officer Mackel's opening of Stanfield's passenger door was fully authorized
under the principles, if not by the direct holdings, of Terry, Longand Buie. Officer
Mackel's belief that he was potentially in danger as he approached Stanfield's
Pathfinder was imminently reasonable; it would be folly to suggest otherwise.
Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 984.
91. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
92. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation mariks omitted); see also supra text
accompanying notes 79-84.
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considerations for the purpose of determining whether reasonable articulable suspicion existed. The court explained that Pathfinders are
a type of vehicle "favored by drug dealers. 93 However, the court gave
no authority for this generalization. Unless the court could show that
Pathfinders are associated with dangerous individuals and that the officers here based their suspicion of danger on this association, the
type of car Stanfield was driving should not be considered. Moreover,
in deterat least one circuit has explicitly eschewed this consideration
94
mining the existence of reasonable articulable suspicion.
" [W] e must not accept what has come to appear to be a prefabricated or recycled profile of suspicious behavior very likely to sweep
many ordinary citizens into a generality of suspicious appearance
merely on hunch."9 The court is in danger of doing this when it
accepts the stereotype of Pathfinders as indicative of criminal activity
and danger. Thus, the type of car Stanfield was driving was an inappropriate consideration in determining the officers' reasonable articulable suspicion of danger.
It was also inappropriate to consider Stanfield's talking to a
"known drug dealer"9 6 as an articulable fact under the reasonable articulable suspicion test. In Sibron v. New York, 97 a police officer saw a
suspect speaking with a group of known drug users and argued later
that this gave him reason to fear for his safety.9" The Supreme Court
concluded that "[t] he suspect's mere act of talking with a number of
known narcotics addicts over an eight-hour period no more gives rise
to reasonable fear of life or limb on the part of the police officer than
it justifies an arrest for committing a crime."99 Thus, the fact that
Stanfield's acquaintance was identified by the officers as being a drug
dealer could not legally give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion
of danger.
The remaining circumstances of the Stanfield case did not warrant
Officer Mackel's opening of Stanfield's door. It is true that Stanfield
was engaged in a traffic offense at the time the search occurred, but it
93. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 984.
94. SeeUnited States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 716-17 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting
the officers' contention that their reasonable articulable suspicion was bolstered by the
suspect's two-door General Motors vehicle, a "favorite" of drug traffickers), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996).
95. United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1992), amended by 997
F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1993).
96. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 984.
97. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
98. Id. at 62.
99. Id. at 64.
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was a concededly minor, non-violent offense. 0 0 In some cases, activity
appearing innocuous to an average person might appear suspicious
when observed by a trained officer.1" 1 However, the State produced
no evidence indicating that the officers in this case had any reason to
believe that double-parking was an indication of dangerousness. 102
Similarly, the time of day in this case does not lend any support to
a finding of reasonable articulable suspicion. The officers saw Stanfield at 9:00 a.m.,

0

in broad daylight. The courts on occasion have

considered the time of day relevant to the formation of a reasonable
suspicion of danger, but generally only when it was in the middle of
the night or some time when it would be unusual for people to be out
on the streets. 10 4 It seems reasonable for people to be on the streets
at 9:00 a.m. Thus, this consideration fails to support the officer's
claim that he believed he was in danger.
The characteristics of the area in which the officers stopped Stanfield was an appropriate consideration-it is settled that an area's disposition toward criminal activity is an articulable fact that officers may
consider."5 However, as the Fourth Circuit recognized in United
States v. Moore,' °6 an individual's mere presence in a high crime area is
100. Stanfield's vehicle was double-parked, blocking the flow of two-way traffic. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 978; see MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. II § 21-1003(r) (1992 & Supp. 1996)
(prohibiting double-parking); id. § 27-101(b) (making double-parking a misdemeanor
punishable with a fine of not more than $500).
101. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419 (1981) (explaining that "when used
by trained law enforcement officers, objective facts, meaningless to the untrained, can be
combined with permissible deductions from such facts to form a legitimate basis for suspicion of a particular person and for action on that suspicion").
102. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1968). In Terry, the officer observed seemingly
innocent behavior-two men repeatedly walking past a store window, looking in, and then
conferring with each other-but in his trained experience, the officer recognized this behavior as indicative of the planning of an armed robbery. Id. Given the possible crime
involved, it was reasonable for the officer to suspect that the individuals might be armed.
Id. at 28.
103. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 978.
104. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983) (considering relevant the fact
that "the hour was late"); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (considering relevant the fact that the stop occurred at 2:15 a.m.); United States v. Bull, 565 F.2d 869, 870
(4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (declaring that whether it was "late at night or not" should be
considered in determining whether an officer reasonably feared that an individual might
be armed); Brian J. O'Connell, Casenote, Search and Seizure: The Erosion of the FourthAmendment Under the Terry-Standard, Creating Suspicion in High Crime Areas, 16 U. DAYrON L. REv.
717, 730 (1991) (noting that courts sometimes consider the time of day at which a suspect
is observed in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists).
105. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) ("Officers may consider the characteristics of the area in which they encounter a vehicle.").
106. 817 F.2d 1105 (4th Cir. 1987).
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not, by itself, enough to raise reasonable suspicion. 10 7 Thus, the officers in Stanfield must have had other reasons for fearing danger.
The officers did have another reason. The most important consideration in the totality of the circumstances of Stanfield was the fact
that Stanfield's car windows were heavily tinted.10 8 Because the officers could not see inside the Pathfinder, they could not tell whether
10 9
Stanfield had a weapon or whether other individuals were inside.
However, an officer's lack of knowledge regarding whether a dangerous person or weapon is in the vehicle could not rise to the level of an
individualized suspicion. 1 0 An officer must have some particularreason to believe that the tinted windows are hiding a dangerous person
or weapon; mere lack of knowledge occasioned by tinted windows is
insufficient.11 '
Thus, the court's six articulable facts boil down to three officers
approaching a car with tinted windows in a high crime area. There
are other facts that the court did not consider that should also be
weighed in a totality of the circumstances analysis. The officers were
armed and wearing bullet-proof vests and were patrolling their normal beat at the time they encountered Stanfield." 2 They circled the
block once before stopping him. 13 They did not see Stanfield engaging in any dangerous crimes. They did not see a weapon. Stanfield
was calm and cooperated with the officers.1 1 4 Therefore, the court
107. Id. at 1107; see also United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 154 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that an area's propensity toward criminal activity, while a valid consideration, is not by
itself enough to raise reasonable suspicion); People v. Aldridge, 674 P.2d 240, 242 (Cal.
1984) ("A history of past criminal activity in a locality does not justify suspension of the
constitutional rights of everyone, or anyone, who may subsequently be in that locality.").
108. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 984.
109. Id.
110. See United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773, 778 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Lack of information
cannot provide an articulable basis upon which to justify a protective sweep."); see also
United States v. Akrawi, 920 F.2d 418, 420 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that it was improper for
the officers to conduct a protective sweep of an arrestee's home, because they articulated
no specific basis for believing that the residence harbored any individual posing a threat to
them); United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1298-99 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the officers failed to point to specific and articulable facts supporting their
belief that dangerous persons were on the premises when they had no information that
any other persons were in the suspect's apartment or that weapons were left in the
apartment).
111. Cf.Buie v. State, 320 Md. 696, 580 A.2d 167 (1990) (holding that an officer had
reason to believe that a second suspect might be dangerous and hiding in Buie's basement
when the officer knew that two men committed an armed robbery, neither man had been
seen, the gun had not been found, and Buie emerged from his basement alone).
112. Stanfield, 906 F. Supp. at 301.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 302.
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should have concluded that the officers were in control of the
situation.
Finally, other factors that the courts have considered relevant in
establishing reasonable articulable suspicion were not present in this
case. Other than violating a minor traffic law, Stanfield was not engaged in particularly suspicious activity, as the suspects in Terry
were."1 5 Stanfield did not appear to be intoxicated, and he did not
act nervous or attempt to avoid the officers when they approached
him." t 6 On the contrary, the officers testified that he was "calm and
cooperative."11
Nor did the officers see any bulges in Stanfield's
clothing or any weapons through his open driver's side window that
would cause them to fear danger.1 18 It becomes even more apparent
that the totality of the circumstances did not produce a reasonable
articulable suspicion when the facts in Stanfield are compared to the
facts of other cases establishing the standard.
(2) Comparison to Other Cases.-Despite the court's insistence
to the contrary, 9 the facts in Stanfield simply do not rise to a comparable level of urgency as in the other cases interpreting the "reasonable articulable suspicion" standard, especially the principal cases of
Terry, Long, and Buie. As the comparison demonstrates, the Fourth
Circuit's holding in Stanfield expanded police power.
First, the court noted that, in Terry, the officer observed conduct
that was "entirely innocent in itself," but he was still justified in believing that one of the men could be armed. 2 ' Stanfield, the court explained, was not engaged in innocent behavior-he was actually
committing an offense by double-parking. 21 This comparison ignores the Supreme Court's express rationale that the officer in Terry

115. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
116. Cf Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983) (considering the suspect's apparent intoxication an appropriate factor); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885
(1975) (noting that, in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed, the driver's obvious attempts to evade officers can be relevant); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148
(1972) (concluding that the suspect's failure to comply with the officer's order to get out
of the car helped to establish the officer's reasonable fear of danger).
117. Stanfield, 906 F. Supp. at 302.
118. Cf Long, 463 U.S. at 1050 (1983) (considering the officers' observation of a hunting knife in the car important in establishing a reasonable suspicion); United States v.
Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 113-14 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that the bulge in the suspect's pocket
created a particularized suspicion).
119. In the second half of its analysis, the court compared the facts of Stanfield and the
facts of Tery, Long, and Buie, ultimately concluding that the officers in Stanfield faced an
equal or greater danger. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 985-87.
120. Id. at 986 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968)).
121. Id.
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properly interpreted the suspects' actions as preparation for an armed
robbery, a crime that generally involves a weapon. 122 Double-parking
ordinarily does not involve a weapon, so the same conclusion of reasonableness does not follow.
The court also observed that the stop in Terry did not occur in a
high crime area or involve a suspect in a car associated with criminal
activity talking with a known drug dealer, as the district court found to
be the case in Stanfield.12 ' As discussed above, though, the type of car
and the criminal status of Stanfield's acquaintance are improper considerations. 1 24 Further, the characteristics of the area cannot give rise
to the requisite individualized suspicion of danger. 125 The officer in
Terry had that individualized suspicion because of the suspects' conduct before the stop. The officers in Stanfield did not observe any
unusual or dangerous conduct on the part of Stanfield.
Second, the court claimed that "[t]here was more reason for Officer Mackel to believe that his safety might be in danger than there
was in Long for Deputies Howell and Lewis to believe that their safety
might be in danger."' 26 The court reasoned that the officers in Long
conducted the search of Long's vehicle after they had already detained and frisked him; thus they knew he was alone and unarmed at
the time they searched his vehicle. 127 In Stanfield, however, the officers had just initiated their encounter with Stanfield when Officer
Mackel opened his car door, so they did not know whether he was
alone or armed. 128 The court's analysis is oversimplified. The Court
in Long held the officers' search permissible because it was late at
night, Long was speeding and driving recklessly, he got out of his car
without a request from the officers, he failed to comply with the officers' orders, and he appeared to be intoxicated. 129 Further, the officers had seen a hunting knife in the car as Long was about to reenter
it.'3 ° These facts show a greater potential for danger than in Stanfield,
122. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28.
123. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 986.
124. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
126. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 985.
127. Id. (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983)).
128. Id.
129. Long, 463 U.S. at 1050.
130. Id. In Stanfield, the Fourth Circuit claimed that the Supreme Court did not rely on
the observation of the hunting knife in Long's car tojustify the officers' reasonable suspicion of danger. 109 F.3d at 985 n.6. However, the Supreme Court did mention the knife
as one of the relevant factors in finding the officers' search permissible. See Long, 463 U.S.
at 1050.
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where it was 9:00 a.m.,1 3 Stanfield was merely sitting in his car,13 2 he
was cooperative with the officers and did not appear to be intoxicated,13 3 and the officers had not observed any behavior on his part
that might indicate that he had weapons in the car. Although the
officers could not see the entire interior of his car, 13 4 the officers did
see Stanfield himself through the open driver's side window, 13 5 and
he did not appear to lunge or reach for anything as the officers
136
approached.
Finally, the court compared Stanfield to Buie.1 7 It first pointed
out that, through his use of tinted windows, Stanfield was able to secure for himself a confined setting into which the officers could not
see.13 8 Thus, the officers had to confront Stanfield on his own "turf,"
just as the officers in Buie had to do when confronting a suspect in his
home. 139 In Buie, however, the Court emphasized that a person's
home is his "turf" because it has a configuration with which an officer
is unfamiliar. 4 ' Although tinted windows on a car make the inside
difficult or impossible to see, the interior of a car is not an "unknown
configuration" in the same sense as a home. A home has several
rooms in which people or things may be hidden. This is not the case
with vehicles, which have only limited space. Further, the interiors of
various automobiles are relatively uniform, while the insides of homes
vary drastically. Although the officers' inability to see into the car is a
valid concern,"' it isnot the same type of concern confronting the
officers in Buie.
It further explained that in Buie, there were six or seven officers,
while in Stanfield there were only three. 1 4 2 However, in Buie, the officers had to search an entire house, while in Stanfield, the encounter
was a simple traffic stop involving only one vehicle.
The court then asserted that in Buie the officers went to the
house specifically to arrest Buie and were thus prepared for "anything
that might develop," but in Stanfield the officers came upon Stanfield

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 978.
Id.
Stanfield, 906 F. Supp. at 302.
Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 987.
Id.
The officers made no mention of any such movement.
Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 987.
Id.
Id.
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333 (1990).
See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 987.
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unexpectedly. 1 43 The court apparently failed to consider that when
the officers saw Stanfield double-parked, they circled the block once
before stopping in front of his car.' 44 Additionally, they were patrolling their normal beat, were armed, and were wearing bullet-proof
vests.' 4 5 These facts show that the officers were prepared for possible
danger.
The Stanfield court further commented that in Buie, there appeared to be no specific facts to support an inference that someone
might be hiding in the house with Buie. 146 The court then admitted
that the officers in Stanfield "likewise had no specific reason to believe
that there were other passengers in the Pathfinder."' 47 It claimed that
the officers' lack of information regarding the number of people in
the car justified their fear of danger. 4 ' But that contradicts the very
concept of a reasonable articulable suspicion, which requires that the
officers have some specific and articulable facts that reasonably warrant their fear. 1 49 Lack of information cannot suffice.15 ° The officers
in Stanfield knew only that Stanfield was in the car. They had insufficient facts to support any belief that he might be dangerous.1 5
Further, the majority in Buie concluded on remand that the officer did, in fact, have specific facts to justify a reasonable suspicion of
danger.'5 2 The officers there secured arrest warrants for two suspects
and immediately placed Buie's house under surveillance. 5 They saw
neither suspect for two days.'
When they entered Buie's house, one
officer called down to the basement for any occupant to come out. 5 5
Only Buie emerged.1 5 6 The court held that the officer was entitled to
suspect that Buie had been hiding out in his basement since the robbery and that the second suspect could have been with him.' 5 7 Further, the officer knew that Buie had used a gun in the burglary, and it
143. Id.
144. Id. at 978.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 987 (citing Buie v. State, 320 Md. 696, 709-10, 580 A.2d 167, 173-74 (1990)
(Adkins, J., dissenting)).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
150. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 93-111.
152. Buie v. State, 320 Md. 696, 705, 580 A.2d 167, 171 (1990).
153. Id. at 703, 580 A.2d at 170.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 704, 580 A.2d at 171.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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-had not yet been recovered. 5 8 The court concluded that the officer
therefore had sufficient facts to determine that the second suspect
could be hiding, armed, in the basement.15 9
Prior cases from the Fourth Circuit and from other circuits lend
further support to the conclusion that the totality of the circumstances in Stanfield did not give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion of danger. For instance, in United States v. Bull, 6 ' the Fourth
Circuit emphasized that, apart from the characteristics of the area, the
suspicious conduct of the suspect, such as nervous conduct or an obvious attempt to avoid the officers, is a paramount factor in establishing
a reasonable articulable suspicion of danger.16 1 Similarly, in United
States v. Lender,'62 the court based its decision that the officers had a
reasonable articulable suspicion of danger on the suspect's refusal to
comply with the officer's commands to stop and the fact that he
brought his hands to the front of his waist as though reaching for
something in that area. 6 3 Again, the officers in Stanfield conceded
16 4
that Stanfield exhibited no such suspicious conduct.
In United States v. Moore,16 5 the Fourth Circuit found that because
"It] he hour was late, the street was dark, the officer was alone, and the
suspected crime was a burglary, a felony that often involves the use of
weapons," the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion of danger. 166 In Stanfield, by contrast, the hour was not late, the street was
not dark, Officer Mackel was not alone, and the offense that Stanfield
committed was not a felony that often involves the use of weapons.16 7
The factors considered by the other circuits also indicate that
more is needed to warrant a reasonable articulable suspicion of danger than was present in Stanfield. In United States v. Rideau,1 68 the Fifth
Circuit found a reasonable articulable suspicion of danger where the
suspect was standing in the middle of the street in a high crime area at
10:30 p.m., failed to respond to the officer's request for his name,
158. Id.
159. Id. at 706, 580 A.2d at 172. Specifically, the court said, "[A] prudent police officer
in [this officer's] position could reasonably suspect that the basement harbored an individual who posed a danger to those on the arrest scene, and thus he was justified in conducting a cursory sweep of that area to neutralize the danger." Id.
160. 565 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
161. Id. at 870-71.
162. 985 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1993).
163. Id. at 153.
164. See Stanfield, 906 F. Supp. at 302.
165. 817 F.2d 1105 (4th Cir. 1987).
166. Id. at 1108.
167. See Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 978.
168. 969 F.2d 1572 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
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seemed nervous, and tried to back away. 169 Similar factors were not
present in Stanfield.

The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Richards,'T° concluded that
the officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion of danger when the
suspect they were arresting opened the door of his house with a gun
and failed to answer the officers' question about whether anyone else
was in the house. 17 ' The same court found a protective sweep of a car
constitutional in United States v. Evans,'72 concluding that the officers
had a reasonable articulable suspicion of danger when they observed a
suspect speeding and weaving in and out of traffic and then leaning
forward as if to reach under the seat for something upon seeing the
1 73
officers behind him.

These cases from the Supreme Court and the Fourth, Fifth, and
Seventh Circuits provide guidance as to what constitutes a reasonable
articulable suspicion. The circumstances facing the officers in Stanfield simply do not compare. Thus, Officer Mackel did not have the
proper individualized suspicion necessary to open Stanfield's car door
and look inside.
(3) Balancing Test.-Under the circumstances of this case,
the government's interest in protecting the three officers did not outweigh Stanfield's privacy interest. Stanfield had a substantial interest
in the privacy of his vehicle. Many of the rationales for holding that
individuals have a lesser expectation of privacy in cars become obsolete when tinted windows are involved. Although drivers should expect some police contact given the extensive codes regulating the
condition and manner in which vehicles may be operated,' 7 4 this regulation generally does not involve the passenger compartment of the
vehicle, and any police contact should be with the driver, not the inside of his car. In cars without tinted windows, the privacy interest of
the driver is diminished by this regulatory contact because officers,
when dealing with the driver, can see through the windows into the
inside of the car. However, in cars with tinted windows, the officer's
view is confined to the outside of the car and whatever part of the
inside as can be viewed through the open driver's side window (which,
incidentally, are all that an officer needs to see in order to conduct a
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 1574-75.
937 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1291-92.
994 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 321.
See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
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routine traffic stop to be sure that all vehicle regulations are met).
The regulations still exist, but they do not lessen the driver's interest
in the privacy of his car's interior when the car has tinted windows.
Similarly, the justification that the occupants and contents of cars
'
are "open to public view"175
does not apply when a vehicle has tinted
windows, because tinting precludes direct observation of the inside of
the car. Indeed, the very purpose of tinting is to preserve the privacy
of the passenger compartment of the car.
The Supreme Court's decision in Californiav. Carney,1 7 6 however,
seems to indicate that tinted-windowed cars should be accorded no
greater expectation of privacy than cars without tinted windows. The
defendant in Carney had a motor home with shades covering all the
windows. 177 The Court concluded that he was not entitled to any
greater expectation of privacy than owners of regular cars because
"[t] hese reduced expectations of privacy derive not from the fact that
the area to be searched is in plain view, but from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways."'1 78 However, it did not articulate a reason why pervasive regulation should
diminish one's expectation of privacy when that regulation does not
result in an officer's being able to see into the vehicle. Due to the
growing popularity of tinted windows, it is time for the courts to
reevaluate the reasons for according vehicles a lesser expectation of
privacy. The Carney dicta is simply no longer persuasive.
Finally, tinted windows are legal in Maryland, although the degree of tinting is regulated. 179 Until the legislature outlaws tinted windows, law enforcement should respect the privacy sought by drivers
taking this measure. 8 °
175. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (recognizing that one fact that
diminishes the privacy aspect of an automobile is that its contents are open to public view);
see also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion) (claiming that "[a]
car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny" because its contents are in plain view).
176. 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
177. Id. at 390.
178. Id.
179. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 22406(i) (1) (i) (Supp. 1996).
(1) . . . [A] person may not operate a vehicle registered under.., this article on
a highway in this State if
(i) . . . there is affixed to any window of the vehicle any tinting materials
added to the window after manufacture of the vehicle that do not allow a light
transmittance through the window of at least 35% ....
Id. The Fourth Circuit in Stanfield did not mention whether Stanfield's Pathfinder was in
compliance with Maryland's law.
180. Cf Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 454 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (explaining that "[i]ndividuals who seek privacy can take precautions ... to avoid
disclosing private activities to those who pass by").
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Therefore, individuals who have cars with tinted windows are justified in having a somewhat greater expectation of privacy in their cars
than those whose cars do not have tinted windows. The court in Stanfield failed to recognize Stanfield's privacy interest adequately, especially considering the lack of articulable facts by the police officers
indicating Stanfield could be dangerous.
Given this analysis, it is clear that, contrary to the court's opinion,
Officer Mackel's search of Stanfield's Pathfinder was unreasonable
and unjustified under existing Fourth Amendment precedent. The
court's attempt to fashion a bright-line rule regarding cars with tinted
windows may have been predictable in light of the continuing trend
toward limiting individual privacy rights in automobiles, but it is unnecessary because the "reasonable articulable suspicion" standard adequately protects officer safety while preserving the individual right to
privacy. More importantly, the bright-line rule is likely to facilitate
discrimination and abuse of discretion by police officers.
b. PotentialConsequences of the Bright-Line Rule.--The wording
of the new rule indicates the Fourth Circuit's intention to limit the
availability of this rule to those situations in which officers fear for
their safety. The court held that officers can only open a car door
"when it appears in their experienced judgment prudent to do so,"
and further limited the search to a visual inspection from outside the
plane of the vehicle "to ascertain whether the driver is armed, whether
he has access to weapons, or whether there are other occupants of the
vehicle who might pose a danger to the officers." 8 1 However, as explained below, the new rule significantly differs from the "reasonable
articulable suspicion" standard, because it calls for a subjective, rather
than an objective test. This subjectivity is likely to lead to abuse.
The Supreme Court in Terry clearly stated that the "reasonable
articulable suspicion" rule is "an objective standard: would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search
'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action
taken was appropriate?" '8 2 It further indicated that a subjective standard would be unconstitutional: "'If subjective good faith alone were
the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate,
and the people would be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects," only in the discretion of the police.""'18
181. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 981.
182. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96
(1964)).
183. Id. at 22 (quoting Beck, 379 U.S. at 97 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV)).
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The Fourth Circuit's bright-line rule eliminates the objectivity inherent in the "reasonable articulable suspicion" rule in cases involving
the searches of cars with tinted windows. Under the new rule, officers
can open the doors of cars with tinted windows whenever it appears
"in their experienced judgment prudent to do so. '' 1"4 The rule does
not require that a reasonableofficer would feel it prudent to open the
door. It only requires that the officer in question feels it prudent to do
so. This rule is subjective and potentially unconstitutional because it
puts individual rights in the hands of police discretion.
Too much police discretion creates a potential for arbitrary and
discriminatory law enforcement, and this is especially likely when dealing with tinted windows. The courts should avoid creating a stereotype that cars with tinted windows belong to drug dealers or some
other type of criminal. In a recent poll, researchers found that many
African-American men "take measures such as avoiding tinted windows or special detailing on cars ... that might draw police attention. '
With the Stanfield rule, an officer's claim, no matter how
unreasonable, that he felt he was in danger during a traffic stop of a
car with tinted windows because of the tinting on the windows, will
justify a search of that car. Thus the existence of tinted windows provides a smokescreen to disguise the officer's true motives."8 6 "And,
through this smokescreen, it becomes possible for an officer to overrely on stereotyped conceptions of race when deciding which motorists to investigate." ' 7
The courts have tried to avoid the facilitation of stereotypes, because stereotypes are unreliable. For instance, the courts generally
reject the use of "drug courier profiles," relied on by police officers in
traffic cases to establish a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, because they tend to describe too many law-abiding individuals.1 8 8 Permitting the existence of tinted windows to be a justification for
opening people's car doors without notice is analogous, because many
law-abiding non-dangerous individuals have cars with tinted windows.
184. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 981 (emphasis added).
185. Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for Civilian Review
Boards, 28 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REv. 551, 552 (1997).
186. Cf id. at 570-71.
187. Id.
188. See, e.g.,
United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367, 1371 (lth Cir. 1990) (rejecting a
profile because it included "a combination of factors that could plausibly describe the behavior of a large portion of motorists engaged in travel upon our interstate highways");
United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1418-19 (9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting a
profile because it describes "too many individuals" including "many law-abiding
motorists").
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Nonetheless, they are all now subject to searches by police officers, at
the officers' discretion. The court's rule indicates that in almost any
stop of a car with tinted windows, police officers may open the car's
door and look inside.
The subjective standard set forth in the court's bright-line rule
cannot be justified under the Constitution. As the court in United
States v. Colbert"s9 aptly stated:
It would perhaps reduce the danger inherent in the job if we
allowed the police to do whatever they felt necessary, whenever they needed to do it, in whatever manner required, in
every situation in which they must act. However, there is a
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution which necessarily
forecloses this possibility. As long as it is in existence, police
must carry out their often dangerous duties according to certain prescribed procedures ....

"0

5. Conclusion.-The general trend toward limiting the privacy
rights of individuals in automobiles reached a new level with the
Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Stanfield. The court's holding that Officer Mackel acted properly when he searched Stanfield's
car with tinted windows was not justified under the standard of "reasonable articulable suspicion," because the officer did not have sufficient articulable facts to support a reasonable suspicion of danger.
Further, Stanfield's interest in maintaining privacy in his vehicle outweighed the officer's interest in protecting his safety because there
was no objective threat of danger. Finally, the court's bright-line rule
that police officers may search cars with tinted windows whenever they
feel it "prudent" to do so introduces a subjective element that may
result in police abuse of discretion and discrimination.
KRISTEN

189. 76 F.3d 773 (6th Cir. 1996).
190. Id. at 778.
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V. HEALTH CARE
A.

Limiting Psychiatrists'Full Recovery for Services Rendered to Qualified
Medicare Beneficiaries

In Maryland Psychiatric Society, Inc. v. Wasserman,1 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that states participating in the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary (QMB) program2 are not required to pay
the 37.5% Medicare exclusion of costs incurred for outpatient psychiatric services provided to Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries (QMBs). 3
Based on its interpretation of the Medicare and Medicaid statutes,4
the court made three findings: (1) the 37.5% exclusion does not fit
under the definition of "coinsurance" as that term is defined in the
Medicare/Medicaid statutes;5 (2) psychiatrists do not possess a statutory right to recover 100% of the costs for services they provide; 6 and
(3) by designating less funding for mental health services than for
physical health services, Congress could not have intended to require
states to fund a larger share of these mental health expenses.7 In
reaching these conclusions, the court failed to give adequate attention
to established case law, and it neglected to address Congress's overall
intent in creating the QMB program. While the court's decision succeeds in sparing the states the burden of paying the 37.5% exclusion,
it does so by undermining the purpose of the QMB program.
1. The Case.-The Maryland Psychiatric Society, Inc. (the Society), a professional association of psychiatrists, brought suit, demand1. 102 F.3d 717 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 51 (1997).
2. See infta note 8 for a description of the QMB program.
3. Maryland Psychiatric Soc'y, 102 F.3d at 722.
4. Medicare, Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, is a federally funded program that
Congress enacted to finance medical treatment for certain disabled individuals and people
65 years of age and older. 42 U.S.C. §§ 426, 1395c (1994). The Medicare program consists
of two parts: Part A and Part B. Part A, funded through federal tax dollars, provides reimbursement for inpatient hospital care and related benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c to 1395i-4
(1994). Part B is a voluntary insurance program that allows persons entitled to Part A
benefits to purchase supplementary insurance for hospital outpatient services, physician
services, and other medical services not covered under Part A. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j to
1395w-4 (1994).
Medicaid, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, is a federal-state cooperative cost-sharing welfare program that Congress enacted to provide medical assistance to persons who
are poor and destitute. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (1994). Although states are not required
to participate in Medicaid, once a state decides to participate, it enters into an agreement
with the federal government so that it can receive federal funds for its Medicaid program.
Rehabilitation Ass'n v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1447 (4th Cir. 1994).
5. Maryland Psychiatric Soc'y, 102 F.3d at 719.
6. Id. at 721.
7. Id. at 721-22.
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ing injunction and declaratory relief, against the United States
Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Maryland Secretary
of Health and Mental Hygiene, challenging their interpretation of the
federal laws concerning payments for outpatient psychiatric services
under the QMB program.'
The QMB program is a joint Medicare/Medicaid program that
allows impoverished elderly or disabled persons to be eligible for both
Medicare Part A enrollment and Part B insurance coverage.'
Although QMBs are eligible for Medicare Part A enrollment and Part
B insurance coverage, they may not be able to afford the Part B supplementary coverage premiums or Part A's or Part B's deductibles or
coinsurance amounts.1 ° Therefore, the QMB program requires that
states use state Medicaid funds to pay for QMBs' Medicare Part B premiums and the deductibles and coinsurance payments that beneficiaries incur under both Medicare Part A and Part B.11
Under Medicare Part B, enrollees are required to pay a monthly
premium and an annual deductible.1 2 Once the deductible is depleted, the federal government will pay for 80% of any "reasonable
charge" for services provided.'" The provider can then charge the
beneficiary the remaining 20% of the fee schedule amount.14 As part
of the QMB program, states are required to pay the remaining 20%
on behalf of their QMBs. 15
8. Id. at 718-19. A QMB is defined as an individual who (a) is entitled to benefits
under Medicare Part A, (b) has an income that does not exceed the federal poverty line,
and (c) has resources not exceeding twice the maximum amount of resources that an
individual may retain in order to receive benefits under the Supplemental Security Income
program. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(p)(1). There are two types of QMBs: dual eligibles and pure
QMBs. RehabilitationAss'n, 42 F.3d at 1447. Dual eligibles are persons who are eligible for
both Medicare and Medicaid benefits under the strict Medicare and Medicaid requirements. Id. Pure QMBs are individuals who are eligible for Medicare, but are ineligible for
Medicaid despite their satisfaction of certain criteria for poverty. Id.
9. RehabilitationAss'n, 42 F.3d at 1447-48.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 13951(b) (1994) (explaining the annual deductible charge under
Medicare Part B); 42 U.S.C. § 1395r (1994) (explaining the monthly premium charge
under Medicare Part B).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 13951(a) (explaining payment of Medicare benefits for services not
including mental disorders). The reasonable charges are determined annually by the Secretary of Health and Human Services and are contained in the Model Fee Schedule. See 42
U.S.C. § 1395w-4 (1994).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 13951(a). This remaining 20% is usually referred to as a copayment or
coinsurance. RehabilitationAss'n, 42 F.3d atc1446.
15. In order to receive federal funding for their Medicaid programs, states must participate in the QMB program and agree to pay the "Medicare cost-sharing" expenses for
QMBs. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (E) (1994). "Medicare cost-sharing" includes four categories that the state must pay for through its Medicaid program: premiums, coinsurance,
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Although Medicare pays for 80% of the entire fee schedule
amount for most services, outpatient psychiatric services are only partially reimbursed.1 6 Under 42 U.S.C. § 13951(c), the federal government is responsible for only 80% of 62.5% of the total fee schedule
amount for any outpatient mental health services.1 7 For QMBs, the
states are required to pay the remaining 20% of the 62.5%.18 After
both Medicare and Medicaid have reimbursed the provider for the
requisite amount, there is still 37.5% of the fee schedule amount that
has not been paid. Although the provider may charge most beneficiaries for the remaining 37.5% of costs, federal law exempts QMBs
19
from such charges.
Under the Secretaries' interpretation of the QMB program, the
states are not required to pay for the 37.5% exclusion that remains
after the federal and state governments have paid their required
amounts.20 In opposition, the Society contended that the states are
required to pay the 37.5% exclusion when outpatient psychiatric serv21
ices are provided to QMBs.

Judge Smalkin of the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland agreed with the Society's interpretation of the relevant
statutes and granted summaryjudgment in its favor. 22 The court specifically addressed whether the 37.5% exclusion for mental health
services fell within any of the four categories of "Medicare cost-sharing,"2 3 which, under the QMB program, states are obligated to pay.2 4
Relying on principles of statutory interpretation, relevant legislative
history, case law, and the broader policies behind the QMB program,
the court focused its inquiry on subsections (B) and (D) of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d(p) (3).25

deductibles, and the 20% that remains after Medicare pays 80% of specified services. 42
U.S.C. § 1396d(p) (3) (1994).
16. See42 U.S.C. § 13951(c) (describing Medicare coverage of outpatient mental health
services).
17. Id.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(p) (3).
19. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(a)(2) (A), 1395w-4(g) (3) (B).
20. Maryland Psychiatric Socy, 102 F.3d at 719.
21. Id
22. Maryland Psychiatric Soc'y, Inc. v. Shalala, No. S 95-894, slip op. at 20 (D. Md. Aug.
21, 1995) (mem.), rev'd sub nom. Maryland Psychiatric Soc'y, Inc. v. Wasserman, 102 F.3d
717 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 51 (1997).
23. Id. at 11-17.
24. See supra note 15 (stating that participation in the QMB program and payment of
"Medicare cost-sharing" expenses is required of all states in order to receive federal Medicaid funding).
25. Maryland Psychiatric Socy, No. S 95-894, slip op. at 9-20. Section 1396d(p) (3) (B)
describes "coinsurance" as a cost that is incurred by the states on behalf of their QMBs.
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The Secretaries argued that the court should grant deference to
the statutory interpretation of the government agency in charge of
administering the Medicare and Medicaid programs, the Department
of Health and Human Services. 26 The court recognized that, in general, deference should be granted to the expertise of an administrative agency when the statutory language is not clear. 27 Judge Smalkin,
however, refused to do so in this case because the Secretary had taken
inconsistent positions regarding the states' obligation to pay the
37.5% exclusion. 28 The court stated that "far less deference is warranted when the administrative agency's interpretation of the statute
at issue has been inconsistent. '29 In light of this inconsistency and the
legislative history of the QMB program, the court determined that it
would grant no deference to Secretary Shalala's current interpretation
of the statute.3 0
In its analysis of subsection (B), the court examined the term "coinsurance" to determine its meaning within the statute.3 1 Judge
Smalkin noted that because Congress did not define "coinsurance,"
the court must use the common meaning of the word when interpreting the statute. 32 To determine the common meaning of "coinsurance," the court relied on Webster's CollegiateDictionary and found that
Section 1 396(p) (3) (D) explains that the states are responsible for the remaining 20% of
costs that are left after the federal government has paid its required 80% of the fee schedule amount. The court found that the 37.5% exclusion "does not fit comfortably within
the language of subsection (D)." Id. at 12. The court came to this conclusion by noting
that section 1396d(p) (3) (D) contains no provision that allows QMBs' "cost-sharing responsibilities," in the case of mental health services, to be greater than 20% of the fee schedule
amount. Id. at 12-13.
26. Id. at 9-10. Secretary Shalala, the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services, opined that the QMB statutes do not require the states to pay the 37.5%
exclusion. Id. at 7.
27. Id. at 10 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
28. Id.; see infra notes 158-160 and accompanying text (discussing the specific inconsistencies in the Secretary's interpretation).
29. Maryland Psychiatric Soc'y, No. S 95-894, slip op. at 10 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987)); see infra notes 156-162 and accompanying text.
30. MarylandPsychiatricSoc y, No. S 95-894, slip op. at 10-11 ("Because the Court determines that Congress has expressed its intent on the issues in this case, and because the
Department of Health and Human Services has espoused varying interpretations of the
statutory provisions governing reimbursement for mental health services, no deference to
the Department's current interpretation of the statute is warranted.").
31. Id. at 13-17.
32. Id. at 13. The court stated that " [i]t is a well-known principle of statutory construction that 'words should be given their common and approved usage,' unless 'it is obvious
from the act itself that the legislature intended that [the word] be used in a sense different
from its common meaning.'" Id

(quoting 2A NORMANJ. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY

CONSTRUCrION § 46.01, at 82-83 (5th ed. 1992) (alteration in original)).
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"the statute's treatment of the 37.5% amount places it squarely within
the ordinary concept of coinsurance as a shared obligation or 'joint
33
assumption of risk.'
Continuing its analysis, the court turned to legislative history and
noted that Congress had repeatedly referred to the disputed 37.5% as
"coinsurance." 34 The court cited four specific examples where, in the
case of mental health services, Congress referred to the costs remaining after Medicare reimbursement as "coinsurance. ' 3' Referring to
the legislative history, the court recognized that it does not provide
conclusive evidence as to how the 37.5% should be characterized. 6
Nevertheless, Judge Smalkin emphasized the importance of using the
legislative history to determine whether the disputed amount should
be classified as "coinsurance" under 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(p) (3) (B). 37
The court acknowledged that the legislative history regarding "coinsurance" pertained to the mental health limitation contained in 42
U.S.C. § 13951(c), rather than to the provision defining cost-sharing
under the QMB program contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(p)(3).38
However, it stated that because the QMB program is a combination of
the Medicare and Medicaid programs, "[i]f the disputed amount is
coinsurance under section 13951(c), then it is coinsurance under section 1396d(p) (3) (B)."3 9
Addressing the case law, the court looked to four recent circuit
court decisions discussing the QMB program.4" In each case, the
court addressed whether, under the QMB program, states were obligated to pay providers the entire 20% Medicare coinsurance for their
QMBs, or whether the coinsurance payment could be limited if the
amount charged by the provider exceeded the Medicaid fee schedule

33. Id. (quoting WEBSTER's NINrH NEw COLLEGIATE DIcnONARY 257 (1986)).
34. Id. at 14.
35. Id. The court made three references to committee reports that addressed the
mental health services provisions in the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988. Id.
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-105, pt. 1, at 24 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 803, 826;
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-661, at 208 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 923, 986). The
court also referred to legislative history pertaining to mental health services as mentioned
in the Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 361
(1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2087).
36. Id. at 14-15.
37. Id. at 15.
38. Id.
39. Id at 15-16.
40. Id. at 17 (citing Rehabilitation Ass'n v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444 (4th Cir. 1994);
Haynes Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Alabama, 36 F.3d 1074 (11th Cir. 1994); Pennsylvania
Med. Soc'y v. Snider, 29 F.3d 886 (3d Cir. 1994); New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v.
Perales, 954 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1992)).
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amount.4" "All four courts held that QMB patients were primarily
Medicare patients, that providers were entitled to receive the Medicare fee schedule amount, and that the states must pay the entire 20%
copayment on behalf of their QMBs. ' 4 2 Judge Smalkin quoted language from three of the cases that supported the providers' right to
collect the complete amount of their reasonable costs and charges for
services rendered.4" The court added specific emphasis to the Fourth
Circuit's view of the states' obligation: "'Our reading of the statute,
and the contemporaneous legislative history, discloses to us clear Congressional intent that state copayments under the buy-in program for
[QMBs] be, except for optional nominal charges ...

,

complete."' 44

Lastly, the district court noted that the QMB program's overall
purpose is to provide medical care to indigent people.45 The court
supported the position that providers should not have to bear the financial burden of treating poor Medicare recipients, but rather that
the states should assume complete responsibility for the Medicare obligations of QMBs. 4 6 In addition, Judge Smalkin recognized that the
purpose of the QMB program would be undermined if providers of
mental health services began avoiding treatment of QMBs because
47
they received incomplete payment.
In light of these findings, the court concluded that the 37.5% of
the Medicare fee schedule amount that is excluded by Medicare
under 42 U.S.C. § 13951(c), is "Medicare cost-sharing" within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(p) (3).48 Consequently, the court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Society and concluded that
the states are required to pay the 37.5% exclusion when outpatient
psychiatric services are provided to QMBs.4 Secretaries Wasserman
and Shalala both appealed the trial court's ruling to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.5 °
41. Id. at 17-18.
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id. at 18-19. "'Providers who furnish medical care to Medicare eligible patients
have the right to collect 100 percent of their reasonable costs or charges."' Id. at 18 (quoting New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 954 F.2d at 858). "' [T]he Medicare Act contains
no exception to the reimbursement of 100 percent of the reasonable costs and charges for
QMBs.'" Id. (quoting PennsylvaniaMed. Socy, 29 F.3d at 891).
44. Id. at 18-19 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting RehabilitationAss'n, 42
F.3d at 1458).
45. Id. at 19-20.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 19.
48. Id. at 20.
49. Id.
50. Maryland Psychiatric Soc'y, 102 F.3d at 719.
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2. Legal Background.a. Legislative Histoy.-The Social Security Amendments of
1965 established the Medicare and Medicaid statutes."' These statutes
included a combined Medicare/Medicaid program, usually referred
to as the "buy-in" or "QMB" program.5 2 The buy-in provisions required that state plans for medical assistance meet certain requirements for "eligible individuals 65 years of age or older who [were]
covered by either or both of the insurance programs established by
[Medicare] .''5 These requirements included mandatory and total
state coverage of Medicare Part A deductibles and mandatory, but not
necessarily total, state coverage for any cost-sharing under Medicare
Part B.

54

Since the creation of the QMB program, Congress has frequently
revisited and modified this area of legislation to create the current
version of the QMB program.5 5 Most recently, in 1988, Congress
made three changes with regard to QMBs and cost-sharing. First, it
51. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 102(a), 121 (a), 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. (79 Stat. 286, 291, 343) 305, 311, 370 (amended 1967) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c to 1395w-4, 1396 to 1396v).
52. See id. § 121(a). The QMB program is referred to as a "buy-in" program because
the states, by paying the enrollment premiums and annual deductibles for QMBs, are buying individuals into Medicare Part B insurance. See Rehabilitation Ass'n v. Kozlowski, 42
F.3d 1444, 1448 (1994).
53. Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121(a).
54. RehabilitationAss'n, 42 F.3d at 1451. See supra note 4 for an explanation of Medicare Parts A and B.
55. Congress first modified the buy-in statutes in 1967. Social Security Amendments of
1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821 (1968). After these amendments, all dual eligibles
qualified to participate in the buy-in program. RehabilitationAss'n, 42 F.3d at 1452. Additionally, the states would not receive matching Medicaid funds if they did not "buy-in" their
dual eligibles, and the states' required contribution under the buy-in provision included
premiums, deductibles, and cost-sharing on either a total or a less-than-total basis. Id.
Next, Congress amended the buy-in statutes through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-509, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 1874. These amendments introduced QMBs into the Medicaid buy-in provision of Medicare. Id. § 9403, 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) at 2053-56. The Act defined QMBs as individuals who were eligible for insurance benefits under Medicare Part A but not eligible for Medicaid, had incomes no greater than a state-determined limit, and had resources no greater than the
benefit maximum under the Supplemental Security Income program. Id. § 9403(b), 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) at 2053-54. The amendments granted the states the option to use
their Medicaid funds for "Medicare cost-sharing" for QMBs. Id. § 9403(a), 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) at 2053. The Act defined "Medicare cost-sharing" to include premiums under Part B, deductibles and coinsurance under Part A, the annual deductible
under Part B, and the difference between the federal payment of 80% and 100% of the
reasonable charges under Part B. Id. § 9403(d), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) at 2054;
Rehabilitation Ass'n, 42 F.3d at 1453 (interpreting part (D) of the Medicare cost-sharing
definition in 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(p) (3)).
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made the QMB buy-in provision mandatory for all states by eliminating the states' option to participate.56 Second, it expanded the definition of QMBs by increasing the required maximum income level and
resource amount.17 Third, through the Technical and Miscellaneous
Revenue Act of 1988,5" Congress redefined what constitutes a QMB.59
After the revisions, QMBs could be covered under the state Medicaid
program and consequently receive benefits.6" The revised definition
of QMB required the individual to be eligible for Medicare and meet
the stipulated income and resource limitations.6 1 Thus, by the end of
1988, the QMB provisions had been greatly expanded.6" As a result,
all Medicare-eligible individuals whose incomes fell below the federal
poverty line, regardless of whether those individuals were eligible for
Medicaid, were covered by the QMB provisions.6 3 This definition of
QMBs has remained unchanged since the 1988 amendments.
b. Case Law.-From 1992 through 1994, many courts addressed the issues of provider reimbursement and states' obligations
under the QMB program.6 4 In this time, the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits all held that health care providers who render services to
QMBs are entitled to 100% reimbursement for their reasonable costs
and charges. 6 5 The courts established that states may not limit payment to QMB care providers by capping reimbursement at the Medicaid fee schedule amount.6 6 Rather, the courts found that QMBs are
56. See Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 301 (a) (1),
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 683, 748 (striking "at the option of the State" from the beginning of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (E)). This made it mandatory for all states to assume
QMBs' Part B cost-sharing liability. RehabilitationAss'n, 42 F.3d at 1455.
57. Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 301(b), (c), 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) at 748-49. The
Act increased the maximum income level to 100% of the federal poverty line with no state
option to set the eligibility line lower. RehabilitationAss'n, 42 F.3d at 1455. The expanded
resource amount allowed assets at or below twice the Supplemental Security Income guidelines. Id. at 1455-56.
58. Pub. L. No. 100-647, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 3342.
59. See id. § 8434(a), 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) at 3805 (removing the requirement
that a QMB not be covered under the state Medicaid program).
60. Id.
61. RehabilitationAss'n, 42 F.3d at 1457. This definition left essentially all dual eligibles
and pure QMBs covered under the buy-in provisions. Id
62. See id. (summarizing the impact of Congress's changes to the QMB provisions
through 1988).
63. Id.
64. See id. at 1450-62; Haynes Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Alabama, 36 F.3d 1074 (lth Cir.
1994) (per curiam); Pennsylvania Med. Soc'y v. Snider, 29 F.3d 886 (3d Cir. 1994); New
York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Perales, 954 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1992).
65. See infra notes 139-149 and accompanying text.
66. See Haynes Ambulance Serv., 36 F.3d at 1076; Pennsylvania Med. Socy, 29 F.3d at 892;
New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 954 F.2d at 858-59. In these cases, the states have
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primarily Medicare patients, and therefore, providers who render
services to QMBs are entitled to complete reimbursement under the
Medicare fee schedule.6 7
In 1994, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of state obligations under the QMB program in RehabilitationAss'n v. Kozlowski.68 In
that case, the court reaffirmed the states' obligation "to pay any and
all premiums, deductibles and copayments for the elderly poor, with
the exception of the nominal charges allowed under [42 U.S.C.]
§1396o. "169 The court recognized that Congress, when it created the
QMB program, intended to relieve impoverished elderly persons from
the burden of paying for the cost-sharing provisions of the Medicare
program.7 0 In Kozlowski, the Fourth Circuit recognized Congress's intention to assure that indigence not affect an individual's opportunity
71
to receive quality health care.
c. Statutory Interpretation.-When analyzing statutory language, courts use methods of statutory interpretation to determine
the meaning of specific words or phrases within the statute. 72 In Chevargued that the QMB program is primarily a Medicaid program and therefore, for each
service, the amount of reimbursement that the states are required to pay should be capped
at the Medicaid fee schedule rate. Haynes Ambulance Serv., 36 F.3d at 1076; Pennsylvania
Med. Soc', 29 F.3d at 891-92; New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 954 F.2d at 858. The
states base this argument on the fact that state Medicaid funds are used to buy QMBs into
Medicare Part B insurance coverage, and QMBs receive Medicare Part B coverage solely
because of their status as Medicaid patients or impoverished individuals. See id. The court
rejected this argument. Id. If Medicaid were meant to be the controlling program, then it
would make little sense for Medicare Part B to pay 80% and Medicaid to pay only 20% of
the Medicare fee schedule rate for services provided to QMBs. Id. In addition, if Medicaid
were to be the primary program, it would seem that providers would be reimbursed at the
Medicaid rate rather than at 80% of the Medicare rate. Id. "[B]oth the statutory framework and legislative history reflect that Congress intended QMBs to be Medicare patients
rather than Medicaid patients." PennsylvaniaMed. Socy, 29 F.3d at 892.
67. See supra note 66.
68. 42 F.3d 1444 (4th Cir. 1994).
69. Id. at 1459.
70. Id,
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 351 (1994) (discussing "the
scope of 18 U.S.C. § 3501, the statute governing the admissibility of confessions in federal
prosecutions"); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-45 (1984) (explaining the judicial review of an agency's interpretation of a statute
it administers); United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 1994) (determining whether
the defendant assaulted "a person assisting a federal employee" within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1I1(a) (1), (b), 1114); Media Gen. Cable v. Sequoyah Condominium Council,
991 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1993) (deciding whether, under the Cable Communications Policy
Act, a cable television franchise "was entitled to install its cable wires in compatible easements" on a condominium's common areas); United States v. Southern Management
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ron U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc, 73 the Supreme
Court set forth guidelines for judicial review of an administrative
agency's interpretation of a statute.7 ' The Court stated that there is a
two-part inquiry that courts should follow when deciding the meaning
of statutory language. 75 First, the court should determine whether
Congress has directly addressed the question at issue and whether
Congress's intent is clear.76 If the court finds that Congress has not
directly addressed the question at issue, it should then consider the
interpretation of the administrative agency that executes the statute.7 7
When addressing the agency's interpretation, "the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." 7' To do this, courts must apply traditional
principles of statutory interpretation.7 9
Statutory interpretation begins with the plain language of the
statute and then, if necessary to clarify the statutory language, expands
to any relevant legislative history.8" Generally accepted principles of
statutory construction direct that "words should be given their common and approved usage" unless "it is obvious from the act itself that
the legislature intended that [the word] be used in a sense different
from its common meaning."8 ' When a word has both a technical
meaning and a common meaning, absent contrary legislative intent,
the common meaning controls.8 2 The United States Supreme Court
followed these same principles of statutory interpretation in United
States v. Alvarez-Sanchez."3 In that case, the Supreme Court used the
American HeritageDictionary to define the term "delay." 4 In doing so,
the majority stated that because "delay" was not defined in the statCorp., 955 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1992) (discussing the meaning of "addiction" under the Fair
Housing Act to determine whether persons with addiction are considered handicapped).

73. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
agency
text.
79.
80.

See id. at 842-45.
Id.
Id. at 842.
Id. at 843.
Id. Less deference is granted to an agency's interpretation of a statute when the
has made inconsistent interpretations. See infra notes 156-157 and accompanying
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 35 (1990).

81. 2A

NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCrION §

46.01, at 82, 83

(5th ed. 1992).
82. See id. § 47.29, at 260; see also Palestine Info. Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 937-38
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussing "the basic principle of statutory construction that words are
ordinarily to be given their 'plain meaning.'").
83. 511 U.S. 350 (1994).
84. Id. at 357-58.
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ute's plain text, the Court was required to "construe the term 'in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning. '"'85 In United States v.
Southern Management Corp.,8 6 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals used
Webster's Third InternationalDictionary to define "addiction" and "addict" within the meaning of the Fair Housing Act. 87 Similarly, the

Fourth Circuit used Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary to define
the terms "employ" and "assist" in United States v. Murphy.8 8 When the
court decides that a word is a term of art, as in Media General Cable v.
Sequoyah Condominium Council,89 it has used Black's Law Dictionary to
determine the technical or legal meaning of that term." As these
cases illustrate, courts have relied on dictionaries to determine the
statutory meaning of various words.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In MarylandPsychiatricSociety v. Wasserman, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that under the QMB
program, states are not required to pay the 37.5% of costs for outpatient psychiatric services that are excluded from the federal Medicare
fee schedule.9" The court focused on four issues in reaching its
conclusion.9 2
First, the court considered whether the term "coinsurance," as it
is spelled out in 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(p) (3), allows an inference that
Congress intended the 37.5% exclusion to be paid by the states. 93 Us-

ing language from PennhurstState School & Hospital v. Halderman,94 the
court recognized that when the federal government expects the states
to use state funds as part of a federal program, Congress must be explicit and unambiguous about such expectations.9 5 Following this
principle, the court noted that the QMB provisions do not explicitly
and unambiguously require the states to pay the 37.5% exclusion for
outpatient psychiatric services.9 6 Similarly, the court reasoned that if
Congress intended the term "coinsurance" to encompass every Medi85. Id. at 357 (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994)).
86. 955 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1992).
87. Id. at 920-21.
88. 35 F.3d 143, 145 (4th Cir. 1994).
89. 991 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1993).
90. Id. at 1173.
91. Maryland Psychiatric Socy, 102 F.3d at 722.
92. Id. at 719-22.
93. 1& at 719-21.
94. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
95. Maryland Psychiatric Soc'y, 102 F.3d at 719-20 (stating that when Congress sets conditions for states to meet in order to receive federal funds, "[s]uch conditions ... must be
explicit and unambiguous, so that states understand the bargain they have made when they
sign up for federal programs" (citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17)).
96. Id. at 720.
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care payment obligation shared by the federal and state governments,
then coinsurance would necessarily include the 20% copayment that
states are required to pay under the QMB program.9 7 The court
stated that if that were true, then Congress would not have needed to
include section 1396d(p) (3) (D) in the QMB provisions, which specifically requires states to pay the 20% copayment for QMBs. 9
Consequently, the court refused to accept the district court's position that the term "coinsurance" includes the 37.5% exclusion.9 9 Instead, the court interpreted the term "coinsurance" to refer
specifically to those expenses that Congress explicitly labeled as "coinsurance" in the statutes that 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(p) (3) (B)
references. 100

Second, the court considered the current interpretation of the
QMB provisions as propounded by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services.' 1 The court found it significant that both the Federal Secretary of Health and Human Services and the State Secretary
of Health and Mental Hygiene agreed as to the meaning of the terms
in their QMB contract.1" 2 As a result, the court took the position that
it should not "casually change [the contract] terms and require the
states to spend millions of additional dollars on psychiatric
1

services."

0 3

Third, the court rejected the Society's assertion that its members
have a right to be reimbursed 100% of their reasonable charges in
providing services. 10 4 The court recognized that while the statutory
language allows providers to charge for the full amount of their serv97. Id.
98. Id. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that if the QMB provisions were read broadly to
include the 37.5% under the definition of "coinsurance," the provision requiring states to
pay the 20% copayment would be superfluous. Id. The court supported its position by
stating that "[r]ules of statutory construction forbid us to construe one provision in a way
that renders another provision of the same enactment superfluous." Id. (citing Freytag v.
Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 877 (1991)).
99. Id.
100. Id. Section 1396d(p) (3) (B) requires states to pay QMBs' "[cloinsurance under
subchapter XVIII of this chapter (including coinsurance described in section 1395e of this
title.)" 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(p) (3) (B) (1994). Section 1395e only uses the term "coinsurance" for certain identified costs that are not covered by Medicare. 42 U.S.C. § 1395e.
Such costs include charges for inpatient hospital services, outpatient hospital diagnostic
services, blood, and post-hospital extended care services. Id.
101. Maryland Psychiatric Socy, 102 F.3d at 721 (discussing the amount of deference
granted to Secretary Shalala's interpretation of the QMB statutes). Secretary Shalala maintained that the states are not required to pay the 37.5% exclusion. Id.; see infra notes 159160 and accompanying text.
102. Maryland Psychiatric Soc'y, 102 F.3d at 721.
103. Id,
104. Id.
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not establish a right for complete recovery of their
ices, it does
5
10

charges.

Fourth, the court concluded that Congress intended for mental
health services to have a lesser claim than physical health services to
federal resources."0 6 In reaching its holding, the court reasoned that
"[i]t would be ironic to conclude that when Congress designates a
particular service for lesser funding it expects states to spend a greater
percentage of their limited Medicaid funds on that disfavored
service. '"107

4. Analysis.There can be no doubt but that the statutes and provisions in question, involving the financing of Medicare and
Medicaid, are among the most completely impenetrable
texts within human experience. Indeed, one approaches
them at the level of specificity herein demanding with dread,
for not only are they dense reading of the most tortuous
kind, but Congress also revisits the area frequently, generously cutting and pruning in the process and making any
of the matters addressed merely a passing
solid grasp
10 8
phase.

a. Defining the Undefined in a Statutory Context.-Because the
term "coinsurance" is not defined in the Medicare or Medicaid statutes, the court in Maryland Psychiatric Society used rules of statutory
construction to determine whether the 37.5% exclusion fits within
Congress's definition of coinsurance. 10 9 The Fourth Circuit rejected
the district court's dictionary definition of coinsurance and established its own interpretation.1 1 0 In doing so, the court reasoned that
if it accepted the district court's interpretation, the Medicare costsharing provision requiring the states to pay a 20% copayment for
105. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a) (2) (A)).
106. Id. at 721-22 (stating that "the state's interpretation of the statute complies with
Congress' judgment that mental health services have a lesser claim than physical health
services on scarce governmental resources"). By comparing the percentage of costs that
Medicare covers for physical health services (80%) to the percentage of costs that it covers
for mental health services (50%), the court concluded that Congress places a greater importance on physical health services. Id.
107. Id. at 722.
108. Rehabilitation Ass'n v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1450 (4th Cir. 1994).
109. Maryland Psychiatric Soc'y, 102 F.3d at 719-21.
110. Id. at 720. The court "read the word 'coinsurance' to refer specifically to those
expenses which Congress identified as 'coinsurance' in the statutory sections that
1396d(p) (3) (B) references." Id.
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QMBs would be superfluous.I"' However, the court's reasoning in applying these particular statutory construction rules is not strong. The
court should have followed the district court by acknowledging the
principles of statutory interpretation established by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez" 2 and the Fourth Circuit in
113

three recent cases.
Congress's definition of "Medicare cost-sharing" includes four
separate and distinct categories.11 4 The fourth category that the
"Medicare cost-sharing" definition establishes is a standard 20%
copayment or coinsurance that states are obligated to pay for their
QMBs. 115 The language of this fourth section explicitly states that this
20% copayment is applicable only when the Medicare Part B payment
is 80% under 42 U.S.C. § 13951(a). u 6 However, for outpatient psychiatric services the reference to the Medicare Part B payment is contained in 42 U.S.C. § 13951(c)."1 The percentage of services covered
in section 13951(c) does not correspond with the 80% federal and
20% state ratio established in 42 U.S.C. § 13951(a). 1 Although there
is a shared obligation and joint assumption of risk involved in each of
these statutory sections, the percentage of that obligation and risk differs." 9 Each section is necessary to define the obligations and risks
for which the federal and state governments are responsible under
each category of health care service. Consequently, regardless of
whether coinsurance is defined as ajoint assumption of risk, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d(p) (3) (B) is not superfluous. Accepting the district court's
definition of coinsurance simply adheres to Congress's overall intent
in creating the QMB program by placing the financial burden of costs
111. Id. (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(p) (3) (D) (1994)) (citing Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 877 (1991)); see supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. The district court interpreted "coinsurance" as a "shared obligation" or "joint assumption of risk."
Maryland Psychiatric Socy, No. S 95-894, slip op. at 13 (quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW CoLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY 257 (1986)).
112. 511 U.S. 350 (1994).
113. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 15.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(p)(3)(D).
116. Id. Section 1396d(p) (3) (D) defines coverage for "[t]he difference between the
amount that is paid under section 13951(a) of this title and the amount that would be paid
under such section if any reference to '80 percent' therein were deemed a reference to
'100 percent."' Id.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 13951(c) (1994). This section states that for outpatient psychiatric services "there shall be considered as incurred expenses for purposes of subsections (a) and
(b) of this section only 62 1/2 percent of such expenses." Id.
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 13951(a) (explaining payment of Medicare benefits for services not
including mental disorders); supra note 117.
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 13951(a) (explaining payment of Medicare benefits for services not
including mental disorders); supra note 117.
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on the states.' 2 ° Rules of statutory interpretation as well as prior case
law and legislative history support the district court's definition of
coinsurance.

12 1

Following well-established principles of statutory construction,
the district court was correct in using a Webster's Collegiate Dictionaryto
obtain the common meaning of the term "coinsurance." 122 "Coinsurance," in a common, legal, or technical sense, means an allocation or
a sharing of risk between the insurer and the insured. Black's Law
Dictionary defines coinsurance as "[a] relative division of risk between
the insurer and the insured." 123 The same definition of "coinsurance"
is found in a more technical source, Couch on Insurance.1 24 The "common meaning," as stated in the district court opinion, is a shared obligation or 'joint assumption of risk." 125 Therefore, regardless of which
specific definition is used, the district court was correct when it stated
that "the statute's treatment of the 37.5% amount places it squarely
within the ordinary concept of coinsurance. 1 26 The Maryland Psychiatric Society court should have followed the precedent set by the
Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit in deciding the meaning of
27
"coinsurance."

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to use the general
dictionary definition of coinsurance to interpret the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1396d(p) (3) (B).' 2 8 In doing so, the court reasoned that
"[i] n all events, the general dictionary definition of coinsurance is too
loose to support the imposition of substantial financial burdens on
state governments." 129 By using this reasoning, the court has ignored
methods of statutory interpretation that have been accepted and exercised by the United States Supreme Court as well as the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals.13 What the court fails to recognize is that there is
no statutory authority that supports eliminating the 37.5% of fee
schedule charges for outpatient psychiatric services from the coinsurance that states must pay under 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(p) (3) (B). More120. See Rehabilitation Ass'n v.
Congress's intent in creating the
121. See supra notes 72-90 and
122. See supra notes 80-90 and

Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1459 (4th Cir. 1994) (discussing
QMB program).
accompanying text.
accompanying text.

123. BLACK'S LAw DIcriONARv 260 (6th ed. 1990).
124. 16 RONALD A. ANDERSON, COUCH: CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 62:124, at 598

(2d ed. 1983).
125. See supra text accompanying note 33.
126. Maryland Psychiatric Socy, No. S 95-894, slip op. at 13.
127. See supra notes 83-90.
128. See Maryland Psychiatric Socy, 102 F.3d at 720.
129. Id.
130. See supra notes 83-90.
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over, there is no statutory language that forces providers of outpatient
1
psychiatric services to absorb a 37.5% loss for treating QMBs.

31

If

Congress intended providers of outpatient psychiatric services to absorb the 37.5% exclusion for QMBs, it certainly did not indicate its
1
intention in the statute.

32

The legislative history contains additional support for finding
133
that the 37.5% exclusion fits under the definition of coinsurance.
A committee report from the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of
1988 explains that Medicare pays only 80% of 62.5% for mental
health services, and therefore, "the effective coinsurancerate is 50 percent. ' 134 The report also states that the proposed amendment would

not affect the relevant percentages, stating that "[t] he coinsurancerequirement would remain the same."1 3 5 Similarly, in the committee
report of the Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, the legislative history
notes that for mental health services, "the patient is responsible for 50
percent coinsurance,instead of the standard 20 percent."13' 6 As the district court in Maryland Psychiatric Society indicated, although these remarks do not definitively confirm Congress's intent regarding the
appropriate characterization of the 37.5%
exclusion, they provide val13 7
uable guidance and helpful insight.
To determine the meaning of "coinsurance" in the QMB provisions, the Fourth Circuit should have looked to the principles of statutory interpretation established by both the Supreme Court and the
Fourth Circuit. In addition, the court should have considered the legislative history of the QMB provisions as it related to the meaning of
coinsurance. Had the court done so, it could have found that the
37.5% exclusion appropriately falls under the definition of "coinsurance," and therefore, the states are responsible for paying this excluded amount.
131. See Maryland PsychiatricSoc'y, 102 F.3d at 720 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13951(c) and stating
that "nothing in the statute mentions who, if anyone, is required to pay the excluded
amount for QMB patients").
132. Cf id. ("If Congress intended states to pay the 37.5% exclusion for outpatient psychiatric services for QMBs, it certainly did not say so explicitly, clearly, and unambiguously.
The QMB provisions do not mention the exclusion at all.").
133. See Maryland Psychiatric Socy, No. S 95-894, slip op. at 14 (recounting references in
the legislative history to the 37.5% amount as "coinsurance").
134. H.R. REP. No. 100-105, pt. 1, at 24 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 803, 826
(emphasis added).
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 361 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2087
(emphasis added).
137. Maryland Psychiatric Socy, No. S 95-894, slip op. at 14-15.
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b. Recognizing the Providers' Right to 100% Reimbursement.The Fourth Circuit in Maryland Psychiatric Society refused to recognize
that providers of outpatient mental health services have a right to be
reimbursed 100% for the reasonable cost of services that they provide. 3 8 In doing so, the court declined to accept the opinions of
other courts regarding this matter, and it failed to recognize Congress's overall intent in creating the QMB program.
In New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. v. Perales,139 the Second
Circuit followed the opinion of other circuits by recognizing that
"providers who furnish medical care to Medicare-eligible patients have
the right to collect 100% of their reasonable costs or charges."1 4 ° The
New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. court noted that the Medicare
Act, on its face, entitles providers to collect their reasonable costs or
charges and that such entitlement should not be frustrated. 4 ' Furthermore, the court held that "a Medicare provider need not be satisfied with inadequate payment, i.e., less than reasonable costs or
charges, even when that provider is treating a Medicare patient who
happens also to be poor." '4 2 In addition, the court identified that the
purpose of fully compensating providers is to ensure that they con43
tinue to treat the elderly, poor, and disabled.
Two years later, the Third Circuit followed the rationale of New
York City Health & Hospitals Corp. In Pennsylvania Medical Society v.
Snider,"4 the court noted that "the Medicare Act contains no exception to the reimbursement of 100% of the reasonable costs and
charges for QMBs and dual eligibles."14' 5 In addition, the court reaffirmed that Congress's intent in creating the QMB program was to

138. Maryland Psychiatric Soc'y, 102 F.3d at 721.
139. 594 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1992). New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. held that a New
York regulation eliminating the right of health care providers to receive reasonable compensation for services provided to poor Medicare patients violated the Medicare and Medicaid Acts. Id. at 860.
140. Id. at 858 (citing Mercy Community Hosp. v. Heckler, 781 F.2d 1552, 1556-57 (11 th
Cir. 1986); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1182, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 1985);
Menoran Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 292, 296 (8th Cir. 1985); St. James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460, 1472 (7th Cir. 1985)).
141. Id.
142. Id at 860.
143. Id The court summarized this significant notion by stating that "[a] guarantee of
reimbursement, by protecting providers, protects patients." Id at 861.
144. 29 F.3d 886 (3d Cir. 1994). The Pennsylvania Medical Society court held that Pennsylvania must pay the entire amount of Medicare Part B costs on behalf of its QMBs. Id. at
903.
145. Id at 891.
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have the states accept the complete .burden of paying Medicare costsharing for their QMBs.' 4 6
In Haynes Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Alabama,14 7 the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Second and Third Circuits' interpretation of the
QMB program."' In reversing the lower court's opinion, the Haynes
court held that health care providers who render services to QMBs are
entitled to 100% reimbursement for their reasonable costs and
49
charges.

1

These three circuits provide persuasive support for the notion of
providing 100% reimbursement for services that health care providers
deliver to persons who qualify as QMBs. In addition to these cases,
the legislative history confirms that Congress intended to make available to QMBs the best health care possible. 50 The QMB program's
purpose is to guarantee that poverty will not affect participation in the
Medicare Part B program. 1 5 ' As the district court in Maryland Psychiatric Society noted, "[t] his purpose would surely be undermined if providers of mental health services began avoiding treating the QMB
population because of the inadequate payment they receive."' 5 2
The Fourth Circuit refused to follow the opinions of the Second,
Third, and Eleventh Circuits when it failed to recognize a right to
100% reimbursement for all health care providers.'
Although the
court provides reasoning for such a decision, the distinctions that the
court makes are insignificant when viewed in light of Congress's over146. Id. at 892 (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-509, at 106 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3607, 3696).
147. 36 F.3d 1074 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
148. Id. at 1075-1076 (following the Third Circuit's reasoning in Pennsylvania Medical
Society to determine the state's payment responsibilities under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d(p) (3) (D)).
149. Id. at 1076.
150. See S. REP. No. 404, at 27 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1967-68. The
Senate Report that accompanied the original Medicare Act shows Congress's intent to
avoid a wealth-based, two-tiered system of health care for elderly persons and those with
certain disabilities. Id. It states that because the service's reasonable cost would be covered
under Medicare and Medicaid, providers of health care would not be deterred from providing the best of modem care to nonpaying or underpaying patients over 65. Id. The
report notes the incentive that providers would have to make their services available: "The
provision of insurance against the covered costs would encourage participating institutions, agencies, and individuals to make the best of modem medicine more readily available to [those covered by the program]." Id. at 24, 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1965.
151. Rehabilitation Ass'n v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1459 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining
that by enacting the QMB statutes, Congress has extended the Medicare program to include the elderly poor).
152. Maryland Psychiatric Soc'y, No. S 95-894, slip op. at 19.
153. MarylandPsychiatric Soc'y, 102 F.3d at 721 (stating that the Society's assumption that
its members have a right to 100% reimbursement has no statutory basis).
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all intent in creating the QMB program.1 54 Congress's intent in creating the QMB program was to provide the best health care possible for
persons who are elderly, poor, or have certain disabilities.'
There is
no doubt that quality health care providers, individual or institutional,
will shy away from treating those patients who will furnish less that
100% reimbursement for services provided. Consequently, the Fourth
Circuit's decision creates a wealth-based, two-tiered system of health
care in which indigent persons receive lower quality health care than
those persons who are wealthy.
c. Inconsistency in Interpretation Leading to Less Agency Deference.--Generally, deference is granted to an administrative agency's
interpretation of a statute when the language of that statute is unclear
or ambiguous.1 56 However, if an agency's current interpretation of a
relevant statute conflicts with its earlier interpretation, the agency's
1 57
current interpretation is "entitled to considerably less deference."
The Department of Health and Human Services, the government
agency charged with administering the Medicare and Medicaid programs, has taken inconsistent positions regarding the financial responsibility for the 37.5% exclusion.' 5 8 In 1989, in response to an
inquiry from the State of Missouri, the Department declared:
" [W] hile the 37.5 percent of approved charges referred to is
not usually called a coinsurance in Medicare administrative
issuances, that is what it, in fact, is. Therefore, the State is
responsible for 37.5 percent of the approved charges, plus 20
percent of the remainder of those charges, for
outpatient
' 59
psychiatric services, in the situation described.'
Three years later, in response to an inquiry from the State of
Georgia, the Department changed its position:
154. The court stated that although 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a) (2) (A) enables providers to
charge the full amount of services provided, it does not guarantee 100% recovery. Id. In
addition, the court noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a) (2) (A) applies only to "'providers of
services,'" not including psychiatrists or other physicians. Id (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395cc(e) (1994)).
155. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
156. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984) (stating that administrative agencies are granted a substantial amount of deference in interpreting the meaning of statutes that Congress has not explicitly defined).
157. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451
U.S. 259, 273 (1981)).
158. Maryland PsychiatricSoc'y, No. S 95-894, slip op. at 7.
159. Id (quoting Memorandum from Kathleen A. Buto, Acting Director, Bureau of Eligibility, Reimbursement and Coverage, to the State of Missouri (1989)).
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"[T] he remainder following the 62 and 1/2 percent reduction
is not labeled coinsurance under the statute, regulations, or
section 2170 of the Medicare Carriers Manual. Therefore,
Medicaid will not require States to pay toward the 37 and 1/2 peris excluded from incurred cost as a coinsurcentage which 160
ance amount."

Because the Department of Health and Human Services has advocated inconsistent positions regarding the 37.5% exclusion amount,
the district court in Maryland Psychiatric Society correctly granted less
deference to Secretary Shalala's interpretation of the relevant provision.' 6 1 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit should have granted less deference to the Secretary's interpretation of the statute. As the New York
City Health & Hospitals Corp. court noted, " [t]he expertise in statutory
becomes dubious when the
interpretation to which we normally defer
1' 62
expert cannot make up its own mind.'
d. Comparing Coverage for Outpatient Mental and Physical
Health Services.--Finally, the Fourth Circuit asserted that because Congress has allotted a smaller percentage of funds for outpatient mental
health services than for outpatient physical health services, mental
health services are "disfavored." 6 ' Therefore, the court concluded
that Congress does not expect the states to take responsibility for
spending a greater amount of their Medicaid funds on outpatient
mental health services. 1 64 Although this may be a reasonable inference, it does not provide sufficient support for the Fourth Circuit's
conclusion because it conflicts with Congress's overriding intent in
creating the QMB program-to provide high quality health care to
impoverished elderly persons. 165 Once again, the Maryland Psychiatric
Society court has addressed a specific portion of the QMB provisions
without considering Congress's overall intent in creating the QMB
program.
By allowing states to avoid paying the 37.5% exclusion, the Maryland PsychiatricSociety court has placed a financial burden on psychiatrists who treat QMBs. These psychiatrists are forced to absorb the
160. Id. at 8 (quoting Memorandum from Christine Nye, Director, Medicaid Bureau, to
the State of Georgia (1992)).
161. Id. at 11 (granting no deference to the Department's current interpretation of the
statute).

162.
1992).
163.
164.
165.

New York City Health & Hosps. Corps. v. Perales, 954 F.2d 854, 861-62 (2d Cir.
Maryland Psychiatic Soc'y, 102 F.3d at 722.
Id.
See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
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37.5% loss for providing services to QMBs.' 6 6 A logical and obvious
result of this lack of reimbursement is that providers of outpatient
psychiatric services will refuse to accept QMBs as clients. The incentive to deliver high quality care to poor elderly persons would then be
greatly diminished. As a result, low-income persons with mental ill167
Withness are likely to experience continued mental deterioration.

out the opportunity to receive quality mental health care, an
increasing number of elderly poor persons will face social consequences such as homelessness, increased levels of addiction, and suicide. 168 In addition, " [w] hile most mentally ill people are non-violent,
mental patients on the whole have consistently higher arrest rates and
higher rates for certain types of violent crime than the general population. " "' Clearly, these are not the kind of statistics that Congress
was intending to support when it created the QMB program. It would
make much more sense for states to incur the costs of quality services
now to decrease the risk of increasing future societal problems.
It seems that if the states were required to make the investment in
quality outpatient psychiatric care now, the financial burdens of providing inpatient care in the future could be lessened. For the past
three decades, states have worked toward deinstitutionalization of
mental patients. 170 "While the number of institutionalized patients
has decreased dramatically, the funding has not followed the patients
out into the community."'
Without adequate resources in the community, persons with mental illness will continue to end up homeless
or reinstitutionalized in state-funded psychiatric facilities.1 72 The decision in Maryland Psychiatric Society simply adds to the problem of de166. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. The relevant statutes state that providers are usually entitled to charge beneficiaries for the 37.5% of costs, but for QMBs,
providers are prohibited from collecting these charges. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
167. See Leonard S. Rubenstein, Ending DiscriminationAgainst Mental Health Treatment in
Publicly FinancedHealth Care, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 315, 318 (1996) (discussing "the historic
patterns of underfunding of mental health services").
168. Id. at 316; see also Wayne Edward Ramage, The PariahPatient: The Lack of Fundingfor
Mental Health Care, 45 VAND. L. R.Ev. 951, 953-55 (1992). The suicide rate for persons with a
major affective disorder is 15 to 30 times greater than the rate in the general population.
Id. at 953. Studies have shown that between 28 to 56 percent of homeless adults suffer
from mental illness, and 28 percent of mentally ill persons have been homeless at some
point in their adult life. Id. at 954-55.
169. Ramage, supra note 168, at 954.
170. Id. at 956.
171. Id.
172. The cost of inpatient psychiatric care is much more expensive than outpatient care.
Notwithstanding this fact, mental health coverage under most insurance plans, including
Medicare and Medicaid, is biased toward institutional care. See Rubenstein, supra note 167,
at 324.
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creased funding and resources for the mentally ill. There is no doubt
that Congress intended to use the QMB program to increase the
amount and level of health care services to persons who are impoverished and elderly. Through its decision, the court in Maryland Psychiatric Society chose to ignore Congress's intentions and instead, became
a catalyst for decreased quality health care for QMBs.
Beyond these issues,
society has certain moral obligations towards the mentally ill.
The process of deinstitutionalization removed the mentally
ill from situations in which they could be treated. Although
there were undeniable instances of abuse and mistreatment,
the abuse mandated reform and better treatment, not necessarily the cessation of all care. Society has not supported adequately the hoped-for alternative of community-based
treatment, breaking the implied promise of better care. Instead of a bed-be it in a hospital or community centermany of the mentally ill will sleep on a sidewalk grate tonight. Society owes it to these people, and to itself, to provide adequate care. 7 '
It is apparent that through the QMB program, Congress has made
efforts to increase the quality of care provided to persons who are
poor and elderly. However, there is some uncertainty in the statutory
language outlining the states' financial obligations to their QMBs. In
light of these uncertainties in the QMB statutes, Congress should take
the time to readdress this important program so that its true intentions are carried out by all parties involved. By doing this, Congress
would ensure that persons in the QMB program have access to quality
health care services regardless of their financial status.
5. Conclusion.-In Maryland Psychiatric Society v. Wasserman, the
Fourth Circuit ignored relevant case law and used a narrow interpretation of congressional intent in determining that states are not financially responsible for the 37.5% exclusion for outpatient psychiatric
services rendered to QMBs. As a result, the court has created a deficiency in adequate psychiatric care for QMBs, thereby undermining
Congress's intent in creating the QMB program.
As the statutes, legislative history, and case law illustrate, Congress's overall purpose in establishing the QMB program was to "guarantee [ ] that indigency should not affect an individual's participation
in the Medicare Part B program. " 17 ' By declining to secure adequate
173. Ramage, supra note 168, at 975-76.
174. Rehabilitation Ass'n v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1459 (4th Cir. 1994).
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reimbursement to psychiatrists for their services to QMBs, the court
failed to ensure the guarantee that Congress intended to make. The
precedent set by the court opens the door for other courts to ignore
Congress's intent in creating the QMB program, and consequently, to
contribute to diminished health care for the elderly poor.
CHRISTOPHER L. COFFIN
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SECURITIES LAW

Affirming the Unique and Complementary Roles of the NASD and SEC

In Jones v. SEC,' the Fourth Circuit considered for the first time
whether disciplinary action by the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) has a preclusive effect on similar proceedings
brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission). 2 The court held that principles of resjudicata, the Maloney
Act of 1938,' and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment4 did not bar the SEC from initiating its own action subsequent
to an NASD disciplinary action.5 In so ruling, the court legitimized
the SEC's unique ability to review NASD. actions6 and to begin its own
investigation following an NASD sanction. 7 Although the Fourth Circuit's decision rested on well-grounded legal principles, the court left
open the question whether monetary penalties imposed by both the
NASD and the SEC constitute multiple punishments in violation of
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
1. The Case.-In 1989, Ivan D. Jones, Jr., a stockbroker, became
director of a registered broker-dealer, Jones & Ward Securities, Inc.
(Jones & Ward).8 Soon thereafter, Jones notified the NASD that he
had assumed all management responsibilities of the firm as president
and "control person."9 The year before, Jones and two other owners
of Trask, Hunt, Hunt, Jones, Ltd. (THHJ) formed Sidbury Land Company (Sidbury), which issued stock in order to raise money for a recent acquisition of land by THHJ.1 0 , The same three owners then
formed One Virginia Partners (OVP) to raise money for other land
1. 115 F.3d 1173 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1512 (1998).
2. Id. at 1177.
3. Maloney Act of 1938, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3 (1994)) (mandating industry self-regulation through the creation of registered national securities associations).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. Jones, 115 F.3d at 1175.
6. See id. at 1180 (stating that "[e]ven had [the SEC] exercised the right of review,
however, as reviewer, the SEC does not become a party; its review role is an adjudicatory
one").
7. See id. at 1182 (holding that "the Maloney Act's limitations of the SEC's review over

NASD disciplinary action do not constitute limitations on the SEC's other enforcement
rights and obligations").
8. Id. at 1175.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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and office building acquisitions in the vicinity of the land they
purchased under the corporate name THHJ. l"
In April 1989, Jones obtained the assistance of his attorney, L.
Bruce McDaniel, to draft a circular for Jones & Ward's underwriting
of the Sidbury offering.' 2 The offering would provide 38,400 shares of
common stock at $10 per share, sold in units of 1200 shares, to no
more than thirty-two purchasers. 1 3 Moreover, the circular promised
investors a refund with interest if fewer than half of the shares, valued
at $192,000, were sold by August 10, 1989.14 Payments were to be
made to the "Sidbury Land Company Escrow Account," and "the first
$192,000 of sales proceeds [were to] be escrowed with United Carolina Bank of Wilmington, North Carolina.""5
McDaniel then advised Jones that in order to comply with the
terms of the circular and avoid having to refund the investors' money,
he would have to establish a true escrow account by August 10, 1989.16
Instead of following his attorney's advice and opening a true escrow
account, Jones opened a regular checking account under his exclusive
control.1 7 The checking account was labeled "Sidbury Land Co., Inc.
Escrow Account.' 8 Throughout the month of July, Jones withdrew
funds from the escrow account for a variety of reasons, including paying Jones & Ward for underwriting commissions, and compensating
THHJ for expenses incurred in relation to the offering.19 AfterJones
withdrew $32,410 for various expenses from the account, the account
ultimately failed to meet the $192,000 balance requirement. 20 Rather
than restart the entire offering procedure and refund investors as advised by his attorney and as promised in the circular,2 ' Jones extended
the offering period, and in March 1991, Sidbury purchased the unimproved land from THHJ.2 2
In May 1989,Jones offered some investors in the Sidbury offering
the right to have their shares repurchased at the purchase price at any
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

16. Id. McDaniel informed Jones that a "true escrow" account required "that 'the bank
hold[ ] money in trust, and [that] they cannot release it except in accordance with terms
of the escrow agreement.'" Id. (alterations in original).

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1175-76.
Id. at 1175.
Id. at 1176.
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time by THHJ. 2' Although Jones later claimed that THHJ had a sufficient line of credit to repurchase these shares, at the time of the offer,
THHJ did not have sufficient assets to fulfill the repurchase
agreements.2 4
Contemporaneous with the Sidbury offering, OVP was attempting
to raise $490,000 for the purchase of a THHJ-owned building. 25 As he
had previously done with the Sidbury offering, Jones opened a checking account under his own control instead of an escrow account.2 6
Again, Jones withdrew funds from this account to pay various expenses, including payments to THHJ. 2 7 He loaned $20,000 from the
account to Southeastern Car Care Center #1 (SCCC).28 Shortly after

receipt of the loan proceeds, SCCC declared bankruptcy and failed to
repay the borrowed money.2 9 Jones, however, covered the loss with
his own money.3 0 Moreover, Jones withdrew $20,000 from the OVP
account and loaned it to Jones & Ward." Jones & Ward repaid the
3 2
loan about ten months later.
During this time period, from April 1989 to April 1990, the SEC
required broker-dealers who held funds or securities, or owed money
or securities to customers, to maintain $25,000 of net capital, and it
required independent escrow-agents to maintain a minimum of $5000
net capital.3 3 Because Jones & Ward did not have an independent
escrow account, it had to meet the SEC's $25,000 minimum balance
requirement.3 4 However, Jones & Ward did not even have enough
capital to meet the less stringent $5000 requirement for independent
escrow accounts.3 5 Nevertheless, Jones falsely represented the accu-

racy of the firm's financial records to obtain NASD approval to open
Jones & Ward Securities in 1989.36

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.; see Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1 (a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a) (1997) (stating that
every broker or dealer must maintain net capital equal to or greater than the highest minimum requirement).
34. Jones, 115 F.3d at 1176.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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Furthermore, although Jones agreed to the NASD's request that
he qualify as a Financial Operations Principal (FINOP) within ninety
days, it took him over two years to do so. 37 Moreover, Jones & Ward
did not file quarterly financial reports from April 1989 through December 1990, failed to timely file its 1990 annual report, failed to
maintain an accurate broker-dealer registration, and failed to give the
SEC required records regarding net capital and record-keeping
problems.

38

In 1989, the NASD examined Jones & Ward Securities and issued
a ten-count complaint against Jones, another firm officer, and the
firm. 9 As a result of negotiations with Jones, the NASD issued its "Decision and Order of Acceptance of Offers of Settlement" on October
9, 1992.4o Pursuant to the settlement, Jones was required to requalify
by examination to remain a general securities principal, and he received a censure, a $22,500 fine, and a three-day suspension as
sanctions.4
On May 6, 1993, the SEC instituted an administrative proceeding
against Jones for the same actions that resulted in the NASD's sanctions.4 2 The SEC claimed that Jones violated various sections of the
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and it further alleged antifraud violations,
net capital violations, and reporting violations.4 3 Jones argued, inter
alia, that he had already been sanctioned by NASD, and therefore further sanctions by the SEC would be inappropriate. 44 An administrative law judge (ALJ) suspended Jones "from association with any
broker or dealer or investment advisor for 12 months and [barred
Jones] thereafter . .. from association with a broker or dealer or investment advisor in a proprietary, supervisory, or managerial capacity
with a right to reapply to become so associated after 18 months."4 5

37. Id. at 1176-77. A Series 27 Financial and Operations Principal "is for people who
supervise the preparation of broker-dealer financial reports, the maintenance of brokerdealer books and records, and other back office operations, including custody of customer
funds and securities." Melalne Kimmel, How Does It Work? A Look at NASD ContinuingEducation, MANAGERS MAC., June 1995, at 28, 29.

38. Jones, 115 F.3d at 1177.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. In reJones & Ward Sec., Inc., Initial Decision Release No. 45, 56 S.E.C. Docket 256,
268 (Feb. 16, 1994).
45. Jones, 115 F.3d at 1177; see alsoJones & Ward, 56 S.E.C. Docket at 270.
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Pursuant to Rule 17(b) of the Rules of Practice,Jones filed a petition for review with the Commission.4 6 Again, Jones argued that he
had already been punished by the NASD sanctions.4 7 On October 10,
1995, the Commission affirmed the holding of the ALJ.4 8 Jones appealed the Commission's ruling to the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, arguing that principles of res judicata, the Maloney
Act of 1938, and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
precluded the SEC action subsequent to the NASD disciplinary
action.4 9
2. Legal Background.a. ResJudicata.-The doctrine of resjudicata, also referred
to as claim preclusion, serves the dual purpose of reducing the
amount of litigation in the courts and protecting individuals from the
burden of litigating the same claim twice.5 ° Res judicata acts as an
affirmative defense when the following requirements are met: "'(1) a
final judgment on the merits in a prior suit, (2) an identity of the
cause of action in both the earlier and the later suit, and (3) an identity of parties or their privies in the two suits.' ' S

Modem courts rely

on common law rules to formulate and develop the concept of res
2
5

judicata.

The Fourth Circuit case law provides guidance on the specific requirements of each element of resjudicata. The first prong of the res
judicata test requires a final judgment in the first action.53 In federal
cases, because judgments are set forth on a separate document, "identifying whether a judgment has been entered rarely poses great difficulty."5 4 Thus, in attempting to define the requirements of res
judicata, the Fourth Circuit has focused its analysis on the second and
third elements of the test-whether the cause of action is the same as
that in the prior suit, and whether the same parties or persons in privity with those parties are involved in both suits.5 5
46. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.410(b) (1997) (providing Rule 17(b) of the Rules of Practice).
47. In re Ivan D. Jones, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 36355, Advisors Act Release No.
1530, 60 S.E.C. Docket 1377, 1391 (Oct. 10, 1995).
48. Id. at 1392 (order).
49. Jones, 115 F.3d at 1175.
50. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CML PROCEDURE § 14.3, at 617 (2d ed. 1993).
51. Meekins v. United Transp. Union, 946 F.2d 1054, 1057-58 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting
Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 1981)).
52. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 50, § 14.3, at 619.
53. Meekins, 946 F.2d at 1057.
54. FRIEDENrTHAL ET AL., supra note 50, § 13.1, at 582 n.2.
55. See, e.g., Meekins, 946 F.2d at 1057.
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The Fourth Circuit addressed the second requirement-identity
of the causes of action-in Meekins v. United Transportation Union,56
and concluded that res judicata did not apply where the claim advanced in the second suit did not exist at the time of the first suit. 57 In

applying the three-prong test to determine whether res judicata
barred the plaintiffs' claims, the court found that resjudicata did not
apply because the second prong of the test-identity of the cause of
action in both the earlier and the later suit-was not satisfied. 58 The
court concluded that the two causes of action were not identical because the plaintiffs' current claims did not exist at the time of the first
suit.59 The court explained that the standard is "objective, and 'it is
the existence of the present claim, not party awareness of it, that
controls."'6 °
The Fourth Circuit addressed the third prong of the res judicata
test, the privity requirement, in Nash County Board of Education v.
Biltmore Co.6 1 In that case, the Nash County Board of Education sued
dairy companies supplying milk and other products to the school system, alleging violations of federal antitrust laws.6 2 That suit was filed
subsequent to a similar settled suit brought by the Attorney General
under state antitrust laws. 63 In determining that res judicata barred
the Nash County Board of Education from bringing an antitrust suit
against the Biltmore Company, 64 the court found that all three re56. 946 F.2d 1054 (4th Cir. 1991).
57. Id. at 1058 (holding that union members could not have obtained the same relief
in the first suit as they sought in the second suit). The facts of the case indicate that in
1970, the plaintiffs' former employer, Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., merged with their
current employer, Richmond, Fredricksburg & Potomac Railroad Co. Id. at 1055. The
railroads entered into a consolidation agreement that allowed union members formerly
employed by Seaboard to transfer to Richmond; however, it did not allow the new employees to receive the same pay. Id. at 1055-56. As a result, Meekins and Koenig sued their
union, the United Transportation Union, alleging breach of the union's duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act. Id. at 1056. On remand, the district court ruled
that the plaintiffs were entitled to receive the same pay as other employees under the
consolidation agreement, and entered judgment in their favor. Id. When the union failed
to comply with that order for the time period after the court's entry of judgment, the
plaintiffs again filed suit on April 11, 1989, seeking damages and attempting to enjoin the
union from refusing to honor the pay scheme for the period after the court's judgment in
the first suit. Id.
58. Id. at 1057-58.
59. Id.; see supra note 57 for a description of the claims.
60. Meekins, 946 F.2d at 1057 (quoting Harnett v. Billman, 800 F.2d 1308, 1313 (4th
Cir. 1986)).
61. 640 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1981).
62. Id. at 486.
63. Id. at 485-86.
64. Id. at 497.
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quirements of the res judicata test were met.6 5 The court concluded

that Nash County Board of Education was in privity with the Attorney
General who brought the first antitrust suit.6 6 The court asserted:
"'Privity states no reason for including or excluding one from the estoppel of ajudgment. It is merely a word used to say that the relationship between the one who is a party on the record and another is close
enough to include that other within the resjudicata. '' 6 7 Based on the
close relationship and aligned goals of the Board of Education and
the Attorney General, the Court held that the second suit was
barred.68
In Comite de Apoyo a Los Trabajadores Agricolas (CATA) v. United
States Department of Labor,69 the Fourth Circuit held that "[e]ven in its
most abstract conception, privity attaches only to those parties whose
interests in a given lawsuit are deemed to be 'aligned."' 7 ° Comite de
Apoyo involved a challenge by a group of migrant farm workers to the
Department of Labor's ("DOL") approval of a $3.50 per hour wage to
perform orchard work for two western Maryland orchards-Hepburn
Orchards, Inc. and Fairview Orchards Associates. 7 CATA and a
number of other individual plaintiffs filed a complaint against the two
orchards and the DOL, claiming that the $3.50 per hour wage was
"too low."7 2 After considering several motions, the district court
granted Hepburn's motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs had not
worked for Hepburn during the season in question.7 3 The court also
dismissed Fairview by relying on a clause in the plaintiffs' labor con74
tract requiring all disputes to be resolved through arbitration.
Lastly, the court rejected the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction because the wage rate calculations were "complex, and best
75
left to the expertise of the Department of Labor."
Despite the fact that the district court deferred to the expertise of
the DOL to formulate fair wages, the DOL soon professed that it had
erred in approving the $3.50 per hour wage. 76 To rectify the situa65. Id. at 486-97.
66. Id. at 494.
67. Id. (quoting Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 423 (3d Cir. 1950)).
68. Id. at 495 (stating that the Attorney General's interests were identical to those of
the Board of Education).
69. 995 F.2d 510 (4th Cir. 1993).
70. Id. at 514.
71. Id. at 512.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id.
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tion, the DOL increased the wage to $3.84 per hour under a new
wage-correlation methodology.7 7 Plaintiffs responded by amending
their complaint to challenge the DOL's new calculation formula.78
The district court awarded summary judgment to the DOL and the
plaintiffs appealed, arguing that they were entitled to a declaratory
judgment that the DOL improperly computed the wages.7 9
Upon consideration of the matter, the Fourth Circuit held that
the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the newly calculated
wages.8 ° The court explained that to have standing, "[a] plaintiff
must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief."8 In response, the plaintiffs asserted that a declaratory judgment
would preclude Fairview from challenging the back pay claim in arbitration." Thus, the plaintiffs explained, such relief would redress
their injuries, a required element to show standing, because it would
allow them to obtain an arbitration back pay award.8 3 By requesting a
declaratory judgment when a party that would be adversely affected by
the judgment was not present, the plaintiffs essentially urged the
court to deem that Fairview and the DOL were in privity.84
The court refused to find that Fairview and DOL were in privity
because the two did not "have [any] of the special relationships-e.g.,
familial, commercial, fiduciary-to which courts have traditionally assigned the status of privity."8 5 In so concluding, the court stressed
that the interests of the parties were not aligned by contrasting the
DOL's interest in establishing a fair wage rate with Fairview's desire to
86
have a low wage rate.

In United States v. Manning Coal Corp.,8 7 the Fourth Circuit once
again evaluated the meaning of privity and took "into account how
the regulatory scheme" affected the operation of res judicata.8 8 The
source of the controversy in Manning stemmed from several contracts
that Manning Coal Corporation entered into with Red River Coal
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 513.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 514.
Id.
Id.
977 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 121.
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Company to mine coal from property owned by Red River.8 9 In these
contracts, Manning Coal agreed to pay all taxes levied against the coal
it mined, including the thirty-five cents per ton fee required by the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA).90 Manning
Coal did not live up to its end of the contract-although it mined over
450,000 tons of coal between June 1981 and December 1983, Manning Coal paid no SMCRA reclamation fees. 1 Red River attempted to
obtain a declaratory judgment against the government, arguing that it
did not owe any SMCRA reclamation fees. 92 The government
countersued. 3
Red River eventually settled with the government and paid almost
$185,000 in fees on the coal mined by Manning Coal.9 4 In exchange,
the government assigned Red River the right to collect from Manning
Coal itself.9 5 In Red River's action to reclaim those fees from Manning Coal, however, the government intervened and attempted to recover interest and other administrative expenses on those same fees
from Manning Coal.9 6 The district court held that Manning Coal did
not have to pay additional fees to the government because Manning
Coal was in privity with Red River by virtue of their principal-agent
97
relationship.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit disagreed that Red River and Manning were in privity by focusing on how the regulatory scheme under
the SMCRA affected the application of res judicata.9 8 The court first
cautioned future courts to hesitate before "interpos [ing] a view of preclusion that is wholly at odds with the purposes of a statutory
scheme."9 9 To elaborate on this point, the court stressed that the language of the SMCRA provides that "'[a] 11 operators of coal mining
operations' should pay fees to help reclaim mined lands."' 0 0 Moreover, the court stated that "operator[s]," which include both mining
contractors and landowners, should be jointly and severally liable for
SMCRA reclamation fees.' 0 1 The court then concluded that "[i]t

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 119.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting SMCRA).
Id.

1998]

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

1265

would confound the administration of the Act to hold, for purposes of
preclusion, that jointly and severally liable parties like Red River and
Manning are in privity."1 °2 By looking at the SMCRA, the court also
recognized the congressional intent not to limit government action
against either the mineral owner or the mining company.10 3 Thus, in
light of the fact that Congress can amend the common law defense of
resjudicata at any time, the court adhered to the congressional intent
behind the SMCRA.1 °4
When the Fourth Circuit ruled on the above cases, it established
valuable guidelines for evaluating the proper scope and application of
res judicata. These cases provide specific guidance to determine such
essential factors as when parties are in privity and when congressional
intent behind a statutory scheme contradicts the court's threepronged analysis of res judicata. Against this legal background, the
Fourth Circuit ably looked to existing case law on resjudicata when it
decided Jones.
b. The Creation of the Maloney Act.-The Great Depression
spawned many legislative initiatives aimed at strengthening the financial market.1 °5 Of these enactments, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Exchange Act) had a significant impact on the securities industry1" 6 and paved the way for additional statutory regulation of the financial markets.1 °7 Because the origin and purpose of the Maloney
Act l"' are directly rooted in the Exchange Act, a brief examination of
the function and purpose of the Exchange Act is appropriate.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. The court warned that courts should be "hesitant to interpose a view of preclusion that is wholly at odds with the purpose of the statutory scheme." Id. Reasoning that
because Congress can change the application of res judicata, congressional intent behind
an act is relevant even if it defies the basic principles of res judicata. Id.
105. See Steven R. Salbu, The MisappropriationTheory of Insider Trading: A Legal, Economic,
and Ethical Analysis, 15 I-LARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 223, 225 (1992) (crediting the passage of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to pressure from "popular opinion that blamed the
Great Depression on unfairness, manipulation, and abuse in financial markets"); see also
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, NationalLaws, InternationalMoney: Regulation in a
Global CapitalMarket, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1855, 1856 (1997) (stating that "[t]he current
framework for securities regulation in the United States emerged from the Great Depression" and that Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 in response to the perception of fraudulent financial activities in the 1920s).
106. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 105, at 1856 (stating that the Securities Act of 1933
and the Exchange Act "form the core of the modern-day securities regulation regime").
107. See id. (listing subsequent acts relating to the securities industry, including the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment
Company Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1994).
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In addition to establishing the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Exchange Act provided regulations for securities exchanges10 9 and promulgated rules to prevent unfair practices in the
exchanges and markets. 110 The Exchange Act defines a broker as
"any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank.""' The
Act also stipulates that a dealer is
any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise,
but does not include a bank, or any person insofar as he buys
or sells securities for his own account, either individually or
in some fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of a regular
business.

112

Upon enacting the Exchange Act, Congress mandated that all exchanges regulate securities brokers who trade on the exchange." 3 A
considerable portion of other trading, however, did not occur within
exchanges but rather "over the counter," by non-member brokers and
dealers. 1 14 Because Congress mainly vested the SEC with authority to
regulate the securities exchanges, brokers who traded outside of the
exchanges were inadequately regulated."' This lack of direct supervision resulted in a need and a desire for a national securities associa6
tion to govern non-member broker-dealers."
In 1938, Congress responded by passing the Maloney Act, which
amended the Exchange Act to authorize national securities associations to regulate non-member broker-dealers." 7 To carry out this
role, the national securities associations are permitted to enact rules
109. An exchange is defined as "any organization, association, or group of persons,
whether incorporated or unincorporated, which constitutes, maintains, or provides a mar-

ketplace or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a) (1) (1994).
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1994).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (3) (B) (4).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (3) (B) (5).
113. Douglas C. Michael, FederalAgency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 171, 204 (1995).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 205.
116. Id. at 205-06.
117. See Maloney Act § 15A (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3) (stating that
"[a] n association of brokers and dealers may be registered as a national securities association"); 6 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2790 (3d ed. 1990) ("The

new §15A added to the Exchange Act gave legislative sanction to the formation and registration of 'national securities associations' that would supervise the conduct of their
members.").
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subject to the oversight of the SEC." 8 Moreover, the SEC may abrogate or amend the associations' rules as detailed in the Exchange
1

Act. 19

To date, the only entity that has applied for registration as a national securities association pursuant to the Maloney Act is the NASD,
a nonprofit corporation under Delaware law. 120 The NASD is a selfregulatory organization with over half a million registered representatives.' 21 The NASD is responsible for self-regulation of its members, 1 22 and all disciplinary action taken by the organization is subject
to oversight by the SEC. 1 23 The Maloney Act grants the SEC power to
review NASD orders and modify the NASD's sanctions if the Commission finds them to be excessive.' 24 The Commission cannot, however,
25
increase NASD sanctions.
c. DoubleJeopardy.-TheDouble Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution requires that no person
shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb.' 26 The purpose of the clause is to protect "against multiple punishments for the same offense."1 27 Although the language of
the Double Jeopardy Clause is seemingly straightforward, the clause is
often the subject of controversy. Moreover, recent Supreme Court decisions have sparked a heated debate concerning the reach and pro118. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(a).
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1994) (stating that "[t]he Commission, by rule, may abrogate, add to, and delete from . . . the rules of a self-regulatory organization ... as the

Commission deems necessary"); see also Michael, supra note 113, at 205-06 (explaining that
the Maloney Act gave the SEC the power to review disciplinary proceedings and the ability
to propose rule changes).
120. 6 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 117, at 2794-95. In 1939, the Investment Bankers
Conference, Inc., which had been a nonprofit corporation under Delaware law, became
the NASD. On August 7, 1939, the Commission granted the NASD's application for registration as a national securities association. Id.
121. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURTIEs DEALEms, INC., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 2
(1997). "The NASD's membership is comprised of more than 5,500 securities firms which
operate over 60,000 branch offices and employ more than 535,000 registered representatives." Id.
122. The NASD promulgated the Rules of Fair Practice, addressing both illegal and unethical conduct by its members. Vincent L. Briccetti, Note, Governmental Action and the
National Association of Securities Dealers, 47 FoRi-AM L. REV. 585, 587 (1979).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(h) (3).
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e) (2) (stating that the Commission "may cancel, reduce or require the remission" of a NASD sanction); 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)(2) (explaining the procedures by which the SEC can review NASD sanctions).
125. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e) (2) (stating that the Commission "may cancel, reduce, or require the remission of such sanction").
126. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
127. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2149-50 (1996) (Kennedy, J.,concurring).
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tections of this constitutional component. 128 Most recently the
Supreme Court has addressed the issue of double jeopardy in the con12 9
text of civil forfeiture cases.
In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States,' a defendant who
had been acquitted of criminal charges for smuggling jewels claimed
that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a subsequent civil forfeiture
action initiated by the government for the same offense. 3 1 The Court
held that the civil action did not constitute a multiple punishment in
violation of double jeopardy because the case "involve [d] neither two
criminal trials nor two criminal punishments. 1 3 2 In establishing that
the civil action was not punitive, the Court employed the following
two-prong analysis: (1) whether the purpose of the action is "remedial rather than punitive, ' and (2) whether the method of recovery
"is so unreasonable or excessive that it transforms what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty."'3 4 The Court then
concluded that, in this case, the purpose of the civil forfeiture was
remedial and not punitive, and that the method of recovery was not so
excessive as to transform the civil remedy into a criminal penalty.' 3 5
Thus, a person may be subject to both criminal and civil punishment
based on separate, independent causes of action without violating the
36
Double Jeopardy Clause. 1
A decade later, the Court invoked the two-prong test articulated
in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones to dismiss a double jeopardy defense. In
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,3 7 the Bureau of Alcohol,
128. See Peter J. Henning, Precedents in a Vacuum: The Supreme Court Continues to Tinker
with Double Jeopardy, 31 AM. CruM. L. REv. 1, 3 (1993) (stating that the Supreme Court
constantly "tinker[s]" with the Double Jeopardy Clause thereby "generat[ing] greater confusion than clarity").
129. See generally United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996) (holding that a civil
forfeiture was not considered punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause); United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding that imposing a civil forfeiture subsequent
to a criminal conviction violates the Double Jeopardy Clause if the civil sanction is "sufficiently disproportionate" to the amount of harm caused by the defendant); United States
v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984) (applying the test from One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones to determine that the civil forfeiture in question was not punishment
and therefore did not invoke the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause); One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that a civil
forfeiture action by the government is not barred subsequent to a criminal suit).
130. 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam).
131. Id. at 232-33.
132. Id. at 235.
133. Id. at 237.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 236.
137. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
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Tobacco, and Firearms seized firearms from Patrick Mulcahey's home8
13
and charged him with knowingly dealing firearms without a license.
After Mulcahey was acquitted of the criminal charges, the government
pursued an in rem action for the forfeiture of the firearms."3 9 Upon
applying the test set out in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, the Court concluded that because the forfeiture was not intended as punishment,
the Double Jeopardy Clause was not applicable. 4 ' The government,
therefore, was free to pursue its in rem action. 41
In United States v. Halper,4 ' the Court held that where a defendant previously endured a criminal penalty, and the penalty sought in
the subsequent proceeding "bears no rational relationship to the goal
of compensating the Government for its loss," the defendant is entitled to an accounting to determine if the second penalty constitutes a
punishment.'4 3 The Court compared the $130,000 fine sought by the
government to the $16,000 of costs incurred by the government.' 4 4
Because the disparity between the government's costs and the defendant's liability was "sufficiently disproportionate," the Court held that
the civil sanction constituted a second form of punishment for the
same offense.

45

The Court again contemplated the relationship between the
Double Jeopardy Clause and civil forfeitures in United States v. Ursery.14 6 The Ursery Court held that a civil forfeiture subsequent to a
criminal conviction did not constitute two punishments for the same
offense.14 7 Reversing the rulings of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits below, the Court demonstrated that the two circuits had misconstrued
previous Supreme Court holdings.' 4 8 Specifically, the Court reasoned
that it is impossible to quantify the nonpunitive purposes of civil for138. Id. at 355-56.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 362-66.
141. Id. at 366.
142. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
143. Id. at 449.
144. Id. at 452. The defendant in Halper faced a 65-count indictment for violating a
criminal false-claims statute. Shortly after his conviction, the government filed a new suit
under the civil False Claims Act, which allowed a $2000 statutory maximum penalty for
each violation of the Act. Id. at 437-39.
145. Id. at 452.
146. 116 S.Ct. 2135 (1996).
147. Id. at 2149.
148. Id. at 2142-47. According to the Court, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits had interpreted previous Supreme Court decisions, including Halper,to mean that, "as a categorical
matter, forfeitures under § 981 (a)(1)(A) and § 881 (a)(6) always constitute 'punishment.'"
Id. at 2139.
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feitures, as required by Halper.t49 The Court noted that nothing in its
previous cases "purported to replace [the] traditional understanding
that civil forfeiture does not constitute punishment for the purpose of
the Double Jeopardy Clause."' °
As evidenced by the above cases, the Supreme Court established
unclear precedent with regard to whether civil forfeitures constitute
punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The two-prong test
laid down in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones is inadequate in that it requires
a vague inquiry into the excessiveness of the action. 5 1 Thus, when
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits struggled to apply the two-prong test,
these courts were reprimanded for misconstruing previous Supreme
Court holdings.15 2 Fortunately, however, the Supreme Court's decision in Ursery, by explaining that certain sanctions are immeasurable
for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, provided additional
guidance in determining whether an action falls under the civil or
criminal domain."5 3 Thus, when the Fourth Circuit ruled on whether
a debarment was civil or criminal, it strongly relied on the Supreme
15 4
Court's reasoning in Ursery.

In United States v. Hatfield,1 55 the Fourth Circuit held that the debarment 56 of a government contractor for a period of twenty-six
months was not punitive and did not implicate the Double Jeopardy
Clause.' 5 7 In so concluding, the court utilized the two-prong analysis
enunciated in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones to determine whether the
debarment constituted a civil or criminal sanction.15 8 The first part of
the analysis yielded the conclusion that "debarment cannot be imposed to punish but only to serve the remedial goal of protecting the
government." 59 In answering the second prong of the analysis, the
court invoked the Ursery reasoning and refused to measure the govern-

149. Id. at 2145.
150. Id. at 2147.
151. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 146-150 and accompanying text.
154. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
155. 108 F.3d 67 (4th Cir. 1997).
156. Debarment "exclude[s] a contractor from Government contracting and Government-approved subcontracting for a reasonable, specified period." 48 C.F.R. § 9.403
(1995).
157. Hatfield, 108 F.3d at 70. Hatfield argued that after his debarment, the DoubleJeopardy Clause protected him from the government's criminal indictment. Id. at 68.
158. Id. at 68-69; see supra notes 130-136.
159. Hatfield, 108 F.3d at 69.

1998]

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

1271

ment's harm against the value of the debarment because of the impos160
sibility of quantifying the value of a debarment.
Other circuits have addressed whether a non-governmental entity
can be considered an agent of the U.S. government for purposes of
invoking constitutional provisions.16 1 In the Second Circuit's United
States v. Solomon,' 6 2 the defendant argued that the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is an arm of the federal government because it administers portions of the Exchange Act. 163 The court rejected this
argument by reasoning that the Fifth Amendment only restricts the
conduct of "government in the narrowest sense," and that "[no] private body, however close its affiliations with the government, can ...
subject a person 'for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb."'" 6 4
Other circuits have held that the SEC's revocation of a broker's
license does not constitute punishment.'6 5 In BlaiseDAntoni &Associates v. SEC, 6 6 the Second Circuit held that " [t] he Commission's order
[revoking a broker's registration] is not punitive; it is not a penalty
imposed on the broker. Revocation and denial of registration are but
means to protect the public interest."167 The court explained that rev-

160. Id. at 70.
161. See Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 738 F.2d 179, 186 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
that actions initiated by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange are not considered governmental); United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 869-70 (2d Cir. 1975) (declaring that actions
by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) are not governmental in nature and therefore
have no effect on the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).
162. 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975). Solomon, a broker-dealer and member of the NYSE,
was summoned by the NYSE to testify about a matter. Id. at 865. Soon thereafter, the
government relied on the statements made during his appearance before the NYSE to
pursue a criminal action against Solomon. Id. Based on these statements, Solomon was
held criminally responsible for violating SEC regulations. Id. at 865-66. Solomon then
appealed, arguing that his statements during his NYSE testimony were inadmissible in his
criminal trial because of the protections of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against selfincrimination. Id. at 866. Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit pronounced that the SelfIncrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment only restricts government action and not
private actions like that of the NYSE. Id. at 869-70. In holding that the NYSE was a private,
non-governmental entity, Judge Friendly rejected Solomon's Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim. Id.
163. Id. at 868.
164. Id. at 867 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
165. See Blaise D'Antoni & Assocs. v. SEC, 289 F.2d 276, 277 (5th Cir. 1961) (determining that revocation of registration is not punitive, but rather a method used to protect the
public); Pierce v. SEC, 239 F.2d 160, 163 (9th Cir. 1956) (holding that the SEC's revocation of a broker's license protects the public and is not a penalty against a broker).
166. 289 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1961).
167. Id. at 277.
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ocation of a registration was not unreasonable in light of the broker's
violation of the Commission's net capital rule. 68
The Supreme Court has sent mixed signals regarding the Double
Jeopardy Clause.1 69 It is clear, however, that remedial civil sanctions
that are impossible to quantify cannot be deemed punishment under
the Due Process Clause. 170 The Court's pronouncement of this concept in Ursery was followed by the Fourth Circuit's refusal in Hatfield to
71
qualify a debarment as punishment.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Jones v. SEC, the Fourth Circuit
held that an action taken by the NASD did not have a preclusive effect
upon a subsequent action by the SEC. 1 7 2 In reaching this conclusion,
the court carefully considered principles of res judicata, the Maloney
73
Act, and the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause.
The court first addressed Jones's argument that because the SEC
did not choose to review, modify, or cancel the NASD's sanction, it
should be barred from initiating its own investigation by the principles
of res judicata1 74 The court then ruled that Jones failed to establish
the second and third elements required for a successful res judicata
defense.1 75 Specifically, Jones was unable to demonstrate that the
SEC's subsequent enforcement action was the same as the NASD's enforcement action, and he could not show privity between the NASD
17 6
and the SEC.
The court next explored the statutory authority of the Maloney
Act by examining legislative intent.177 Jones did not espouse any statutory interpretation or provide legislative history to support his theory
that the SEC is not authorized to initiate its own action subsequent to
similar NASD sanctions. 178 The court found that Congress provided
the SEC with the authority to modify, reduce, or cancel sanctions imposed by the NASD.' 79 The court also recognized the SEC's need for
168. Id.; see also 17 C.F.R_ § 240.15c3-1 (1997) (stating that "[e]very broker or dealer
shall at all times have and maintain net capital no less than . . . its ratio requirement
[outlined in this section]").
169. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 146-150 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 155-160 and accompanying text.
172. 115 F.3d at 1175.
173. Id. at 1177.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1178-81.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1181-82.
178. Id. at 1182.
179. Id. at 1181.
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authority to execute securities laws in order to protect the public's
interest in maintaining a fair and safe market. 80° While emphasizing
the SEC's unique supervisory role, broad responsibilities, and enforcement rights, the court held that the Maloney Act does not limit the
SEC's enforcement rights and obligations in this situation."8
The court next rejected Jones's argument that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits punishment by both the NASD and the SEC for
the same conduct.' 82 In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that the Double Jeopardy Clause functions to "prohibit[ ] successive governmental criminal prosecutions and successive governmental
punishments for the same conduct."'8 3 Because the NASD is considered a closely regulated corporation, the court deemed it to be a private corporation rather than a governmental agency.' 8 4 Thus, the
court concluded that disciplinary action taken by the NASD cannot
implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause.'88 This conclusion was also
rooted in the Solomon court's observation that the Double Jeopardy
Clause "restricts the conduct of the 'government in the narrowest
sense,' and '[n]o private body, however close its affiliation with the
government, can ...subject a person' to double jeopardy."' 8 6
The court further explained thatJones had not endured two punishments under the Double Jeopardy Clause because he failed to illustrate the "clearest proof . . . that the proceeding is not civil but

criminal in nature."' ' To assess whether Jones carried his burden,
the court invoked the two-prong analysis laid down in One Lot Emerald
Cut Stones and examined whether the sanction (1) was designated to
be remedial and (2) whether the remedy "'is so unreasonable or excessive that it transforms what was clearly intended as a civil remedy
into a criminal penalty."" 8 BecauseJones did not sufficiently demonstrate that the SEC's suspension was disproportionate to the benefits
received by the government in protecting the public, the court concluded that he failed to satisfy the required burden.1'8 In so ruling,
the court emphasized that the detrimental nature of Jones's conduct
180. Id. at 1182.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1182-83.
183. Id. at 1183.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (alteration and ellipsis in original) (quoting United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d
863, 867 (2d Cir. 1975)).
187. Id. (ellipsis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. See supra notes 133-134 and accompanying text.

189. Jones, 115 F.3d at 1183.
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may have resulted in investor losses.1"' The court also invoked the
reasoning in Blaise D'Antoni & Associates v. SEC to assert that the suspension of a broker-dealer is not punitive, but rather a way to protect
the public interest.1"' Thus, the court held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause did not prevent the SEC from initiating its own action.19 2
Finally, the court briefly discussed Jones's challenge to the "sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of scienter and the illegal conduct related to it" and his claim that a thirty-month suspension
was "unduly harsh."1"' Because the SEC was the fact finder in this
case, the Fourth Circuit was not in a position to review the facts. 9 4
The court accepted the findings of the SEC that Jones acted with scienter.19 5 Moreover, the court found that the SEC properly protected
the interests of the investing public by suspending Jones.9 6
4. Analysis.-In Jones v. SEC, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit determined that the SEC was not barred from initiating its
own proceeding subsequent to a NASD disciplinary action. 97 In so
concluding, the court found that concepts of double jeopardy, res
judicata, and the Maloney Act did not prohibit the conduct of the
SEC.'9 8 The court correctly applied precedent and legislative intent
to establish that any action taken by the NASD does not bar future
action by the SEC.'
a. Res Judicata.-The Fourth Circuit analyzed Jones's res
judicata claim by applying the three requirements of res judicata set
forth in Meekins v. United Transportation Union.20 0 The court correctly
rejected the res judicata argument by determining that the situation
did not meet all three required elements.2 0 1
The court correctly assumed "that a prior SEC decision based on
the NASD's disciplinary order would have preclusive effect to the
same extent as any other agency decision where the agency acts in an
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
quired

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1183-84 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1184.
Id.
Id. at 1184-85.
Id. at 1175.
Id.
Id. at 1178-83.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 50-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of the three reelements.
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adequately judicial capacity. 2°2 This first element of resjudicata was
issued
clearly identified by the court, because the NASD unequivocally
20 1
a final judgment on Jones's dealings with Sidbury and OVP.
Second, the court's rejection of the "same cause of action" prong
was a conservative measure to preserve the integrity of the Maloney
Act, 20 4 and to prevent the potential flood of cases that would have
resulted had the court adopted Jones's argument that the identity of
the cause of action in both the earlier and the later suit was the
same. 205 The court correctly discarded this contention in light of conSEC "overlapping discigressional intent to grant the NASD and the
20 6
Act.
Maloney
the
under
plinary authority"
Third, the court properly established that the SEC and the NASD
were not in privity. 2° v The court, in making this conclusion, looked to
many recent Fourth Circuit cases that focused on whether the interests of the parties were aligned for purposes of privity. 208 The court
then examined the objectives that the SEC and the NASD serve in
initiating actions. 2 0 When the SEC reviews an NASD disciplinary proceeding, the court explained, the SEC's purpose is to take a neutral
interest in the outcome of the case, and to promote a fair proceeding. 210 In contrast, when the NASD initiates an action, it takes on a
prosecutorial role. 2 11 By highlighting these unique and complementary attributes, the court established that the two parties were not in
privity. 2 12 The SEC's goal is to protect the public; the NASD's role is
self-regulation.213

When the Jones court rejected the second and third prongs of
Jones's res judicata argument, it greatly deferred to congressional intent.2 14 Absent the existence of the Maloney Act, however, there is a

strong indication that the court would have deemed the NASD and
202. Jones, 115 F.3d at 1178.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1181 (recognizing the relationship between Jones's res judicata claim and
Congress's intent behind passing the Maloney Act).
205. Id at 1178.
206. Id. at 1180.
207. Id. at 1180-81.
208. See supra notes 61-104.
209. Jones, 115 F.3d at 1180.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1180-82.
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the SEC to be in privity. 2 15 The court even acknowledged that the two
suits involved similar causes of action when it noted that the actions
are "undoubtedly similar and arguably duplicative in some respect. "216
By recognizing that the second cause of action would have a preclusive effect absent the existence of a statute, the court essentially eliminated the res judicata defense in future actions involving the NASD
and the SEC. Future defendants who raise the defense of resjudicata
will do so with virtually no chance of success unless Congress aligns
the goals of the SEC and the NASD.
b. The Court Avoided Conflict Between the Maloney Act and Res
Judicata.-TheJones court interpreted the Maloney Act both logically
and thoughtfully. There is a compelling indication that the Maloney
Act was enacted to require the NASD to serve as a self-regulating entity.21 v This is evidenced by the fact that Congress vested the SEC with
considerably more powerful disciplinary tools than the NASD, such as
the right to seek injunctive relief and initiate criminal prosecution. s
The greatest sanction of the NASD, in contrast, is to "expel a member,
revoke his registration, and bar him from association with NASD
members. 21 9 Had the court found the two parties in privity, the SEC
would, in all likelihood, involve itself in all NASD actions because the
SEC would fear the preclusive effect of NASD sanctions. Moreover,
because of the distinct roles and interests of the SEC and the
NASD, 220 defendants would have greater difficulty negotiating a settlement with the two parties. In turn, this could result in a drain on
judicial resources as parties are unnecessarily forced to litigate cases.
To protect the integrity of the market and the securities industry,
therefore, it was important for the Jones court to shield the SEC from
the res judicata effect of an NASD sanction.
c. DoubleJeopardy.-By questioning whether the suspension
of a broker-dealer constitutes punishment under the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the court entered a confusing web of Supreme Court decisions on civil forfeiture actions.

221

The court, however, did not ad-

215. See id. at 1180 (stating that "when enacting the Maloney Act, Congress consciously
divided the securities regulatory effort between industry self-regulation and SEC
regulation").
216. Id.
217. See supra notes 116-123 and accompanying text.
218. Jones, 115 F.3d at 1179-80.
219. Id. at 1179.
220. See supra notes 105-125 and accompanying text.
221. See Henning, supra note 128, at 3 (blaming the Court's double jeopardy decisions
for creating confusion rather than clarity).
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dress the inconsistencies and illogical distinctions found in these past
decisions. Because Jones was unable to show that the harm he would
suffer by virtue of his suspension would outweigh the benefit to the
government, the court relied on the reasoning of One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones, Ursery, and One Assortment of 89 Firearms in concluding that the
sanction did not qualify as punishment under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.22 2 Because these cases could be applied to the facts of Jones,
the Fourth Circuit avoided discussing other Supreme Court cases that
set forth unclear precedent with regard to the Double Jeopardy
Clause.223 Moreover, because the Urseiy Court somewhat clarified the
confusion surrounding the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Jones court
of Supreme Court cases that
confidently cited Ursery and the stream
224
punishment.
of
definition
the
limited
The Jones court properly accepted the government's argument
that the Double Jeopardy Clause is not applicable because (1) the
NASD is a private party and not a governmental entity, 225 and (2) the

SEC's sanctions were remedial and not penal.22 6 By determining that
the NASD was not a governmental entity, the court heeded the Second Circuit's determination that no one "except [the] government 22in7
the narrowest sense" is capable of violating the Fifth Amendment.
Moreover, "[n]o private body, however close its affiliations with the
government, can hold a person.. . 'for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb."'' 2 28 The NASD does possess many

characteristics of a private association because it is a nonprofit corporation chartered in Delaware with jurisdiction solely over its own
members. 229 Therefore, in a sense, the Jones decision was supported
by this line of reasoning. Yet, some courts have left open the question
whether the NASD serves as a governmental entity. 23 0 The Jones court
did not enter this debated area, but instead dismissed this issue with
222. Jones, 115 F.3d at 1183.
223. See United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2142 (1996) (stating that the Ninth
Circuit misread three of the Supreme Court's civil forfeiture decisions).
224. Jones, 115 F.3d at 1183.
225. Id. at 1182-83. But see Briccetti, supra note 122, at 586-605 (arguing that the NASD
acts in a "governmental manner" and should therefore be subject to the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments).
226. Jones, 115 F.3d at 1182-83.
227. United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1975).
228. Id.
229. 6 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 117, at 2794.
230. See, e.g., Ross v. Bolton, 106 F.R.D. 315, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that "the exact
status of the NASD is unsettled: it is granted governmental-type powers for some functions,
while maintaining its private nature for others").
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little exploration of the matter. 23 1 Perhaps the Jones court did not
want to go so far as to classify an SRO as an extension of the government and thereby extend the application of constitutional rights. In
future decisions of this nature, however, the court may be forced to
analyze the question in more detail.
After explaining that the NASD was not a governmental entity for
the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the court further
demonstrated that Jones did not incur two punishments because the
SEC's sanctions were remedial and not penal.2 3 2 While the sanctions
in the SEC's action were nonmonetary and therefore, immeasurable
under the Halper test, a different outcome may have resulted if the
SEC's sanctions had included a monetary fine. This holds true because the Ursery Court constricted the use of Halper to instances where
the nonpunitive purpose of a sanction can be quantified. 2 3" Thus, if
the SEC imposes a monetary fine and a future court determines that
the fine is disproportionately higher than the costs incurred by the
234
NASD and SEC, the fine may constitute a form of punishment.
Under this analysis, a defendant similarly situated to Jones would
likely succeed in obtaining the protections of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
5. Conclusion.-The Fourth Circuit's holding in Jones v. SEC validated the unique role of the SEC as an investigator, reviewer, judge,
and prosecutor. Brokers must realize the harsh repercussions of their
illegal and unethical activities. The holding in this case emphasizes
that brokers who break the law cannot be shielded by weak settlements administered by their own trade association. Rather, they will
continue to be subject to the Commission's own investigation and
prosecution. By allowing subsequent action by the SEC, the court reinforced the structure of the securities industry as mandated by
Congress.
ROBERT F. BAHRAMPOUR

231.
232.
233.
234.

Jones, 115 F.3d at 1183.
Id.
United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2145 (1996).
Id.

